Transferable training and the collective action problem for employers: An analysis of further education and training in four Norwegian industries. by Johansen, Lars-Henrik
Transferable training and the collective action problem for employers: 
An analysis of further education and training in four Norwegian industries
Lars-Henrik Johansen
A dissertation submitted for the degree of Ph.D. (Econ.)
Faculty of Economics 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London
1999
UMI Number: U146740
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U146740
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Ti+£5£S
AOS- 1
*  AN3 £ r
W T
7hD!bb
To m y parents and ThorHallgeir
2
Abstract
The potential significance of employers’ collective action for economic 
performance is widely acknowledged, but has not been complemented 
with corresponding theory-guided research on the probability of 
collective action and the conditions for effective action.
This thesis examines the nature of, the conditions for, and the 
consequences of employers’ collective action on further training, a crucial 
component of a successful high-skill strategy for industries and nations. 
The study addresses three core issues of labour economics: transferability 
of training, skill shortages, and sharing of training costs between employer 
and employees.
The enquiry builds on and adds to previous contributions that 
analyse transferable training as a collective good. It scrutinises the 
theoretical foundation and compares its implications with those of human 
capital theory. Finally, the empirical study of further education and 
training in four Norwegian industries is offered as a strategic test of these 
two alternative theories.
The collective action perspective shares core assumptions of 
human capital theory, but integrates the possibility of collective action as 
a solution to some of the market failures associated with investment in 
transferable human capital. This alternative view also predicts in what 
labour market settings such action is likely to occur, building on Olson’s 
work and theories of employers’ collective action.
The collective action perspective differs crucially from human 
capital theory by predicting that transferability is endogenous i.e. 
significantly shaped by employers’ individual and collective action, and 
not simply by technology. Thus, ‘endogenous transferability’ is a principal
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link between the constitution of labour markets and employers’ choice of 
training and skill supply strategies.
The results confirm the prediction that transferability is 
‘endogenous’. Moreover, they suggest that employers’ collective action is 
more likely to succeed in ensuring transferability and encouraging 
employee investment than is using sanctions against employers to 
promote employer-financed transferable training.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The research question
The purpose of this thesis is the study of the conditions for and the nature 
and consequences of employers’ collective action on further education and 
training. It draws on collective action theory together with the basic 
principles of training as an investment, and the notion of transferable 
training as a collective good, to show how this approach diverges from 
human capital theory. This alternative view predicts that, depending on 
institutional and labour market structures, some market failure problems 
of transferable training might be overcome through collective action by 
employers, and predicts under what conditions such action is likely to 
occur. The empirical study is designed to test three pairs of hypotheses 
derived both from human capital theory and this alternative perspective, 
in order to assess the value of incorporating employers’ collective action 
in economic theory of transferable training.
The structure of the argument is quite simple: the basic assumption 
is that for both employers and employees training is an investment; if 
strict conditions concerning information and competition are fulfilled, 
some optimal amount of training will be provided, but if parties other 
than those investing benefit from the transferable training, too little will 
be provided.1 According to human capital theory this would reflect a 
market failure, and the only guarantee of the right amount of transferable 
training being provided is a ‘perfect’ labour market.
1 Taking into account that training makes an employee more valuable for other firms, 
Hendry, Arthur and Jones (1994: 203) argue that ‘any single firm faces a strategic 
dilemma between contributing to learning and retaining ownership of it.’
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The alternative view states, on the other hand, that the problem of 
externalities might be solved if employers were to act collectively. If 
successful, such action can ensure that the outcomes are the optimal for 
the group of employers as a whole. One problem, however, is that since 
each individual employer has an incentive to free ride while other 
employers contribute, collective action may not occur although it would 
be the rational option for employers as a group. Therefore a powerful 
superordinate body might be needed to induce employers to collaborate. 
Both employers’ organisations or the national government might 
constitute such a ‘powerful body,’ so there need be no dichotomy between 
state and non-state solutions. In addition to this institutional solution, 
collective action might also result from interaction between a small group 
of large employers. However even if there is collective action to address 
the collective action problem of transferable training, the action might be 
counterproductive or it might address only one of several related 
problems of training provision.
The three separate problems of sharing training costs, ensuring 
that training is transferable and providing sufficient training are all 
collective action problems that need to be addressed and adequately 
resolved. If these problems are solved through collective action by 
employers, it means that the ‘market failure’ problem of transferable 
training might also be solved, even if the labour market is not ‘perfect’ and 
that institutions and employer collaboration may be more important 
determinants of training outcomes than labour market competition alone. 
Moreover, since the alternative view predicts that collective action by 
employers is least likely if there is strong labour market competition and 
no superordinate powerful body, fiercer labour market competition does 
not necessarily mean that the market failure problem is less severe.
Hence many of the predictions of the collective action perspective 
contrast with those of human capital theory. Still, a salient feature of the 
alternative perspective is that is does not violate standard assumptions of 
economic theory. Training is seen as an investment that improves
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productivity, agents are assumed to maximise utility or profit and, at the 
point of departure, markets are assumed to be efficient. Thus the 
alternative view is simply developed by integrating the economic theory 
of collective action with human capital theory. Therefore it may be seen 
both as an independent alternative to human capital theory and also as a 
possible development of the theory.2
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into four parts each with a different aim. The 
purpose of this chapter and chapters 2 and 3 is to set out the research 
question, based on an analysis of background and core theory that results 
in the proposal of two sets of hypotheses to be tested in the empirical 
study. This first part also aims to show that while the thesis builds on 
established theories and examines core issues within education and 
training research, it also goes beyond established theories through their 
further development, and designs an empirical study to critically evaluate 
human capital theory versus the alternative perspective. After the 
introduction to the research question followed by a brief overview of the 
arguments introduced above, this chapter goes on to examine the 
significance of the research, and to show how previous research has 
treated the role of employers’ organisations in training provision. The 
next part presents existing research on each of the three main topics: cost 
sharing, transferability and amount of training. The purpose of chapter 2 
is to derive hypotheses from human capital theory on each of these topics. 
In order to do this Becker’s human capital theory is complemented by 
more recent human capital contributions which have modified the 
original model. In chapter 3, a set of alternative hypotheses is developed in 
order to facilitate a test of the two theories. The bulk of the chapter
2 However, chapter 8 will show the importance of collective action as an institutional 
basis for transferability and labour market competition, and discuss the possibility of 
integrating collective action theory and human capital theory.
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explains how the notion of transferable training as a collective action 
problem can be developed to constitute an alternative to the theory 
presented in chapter 2.
The purpose of the second part of the thesis, chapter 4, is to 
provide a link between the hypotheses and the empirical study. The 
chapter explains how the empirical research is designed and how four 
industries are selected in order to test the three pairs of hypotheses. The 
chapter also provides the necessary information on the Norwegian labour 
market and presents the existing types of formal further training offers in 
the four cases.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the empirical study and 
explain where the empirical results support or conflict with the two 
theories. Each chapter treats one pair of hypotheses, ^ ^ p te r^ ^ x a m in e s  
the way employers act or fail to act to ensure that further training is 
transferable; {^ hapteTjfr looks at how employers and employees share the 
costs of training; the topic of the last chapter in this section is the extent 
to which the two theories can or cannot explain the existence of skill 
shortages or deficiencies. The final part, chapter 8, summarises and 
evaluates the results and their implications for the two theories. The final 
section of the chapter provides some suggestions for further research.
1.3 Two important topics
The study of further education and training as a collective action problem 
contributes to two fields where research is needed, and where research 
results potentially are of great relevance to policy.
First, the topic of further training is one where significant political 
concern, at least on the rhetorical level, is coupled with still insufficient 
research on how measures should be designed to accomplish the political 
aims. One of the most important tasks is to find a balance between 
individual needs and company needs, between employers’ need for 
relevant skills and the labour market’s need for mobile employees. Reich’s
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(1992: 3) forecast concerning the near future is that ‘each nation’s primary 
assets will be its citizens’ skills and insights.’ Hence a crucial task for all 
states is to ensure not only that their citizens’ initial training meets 
current needs but also that their skills are updated and upgraded 
throughout their working life. Current policies on further education and 
training are hardly up to this task, according to an OECD report, which 
claims that on the whole the present systems are ‘expensive,’ ‘inefficient,’ 
‘partial,’ narrow’ and ‘locally constrained’ (Clement et al. 1993: 81-82). 
Moreover ‘the consequences of inadequate further education and training 
and skill formation generally are becoming more serious in an economic 
climate that promises to become increasingly competitive, with human 
resources becoming a more decisive determinant of competitive advantage’ 
(Clement et al. 1993: 94).
The second key topic is the potential significance of employers’ 
collective action for economic success. According to Streeck (1992: 17-21), 
diversified quality production requires several production inputs that are 
collective goods. Broad and high-level skills, polyvalent organisational 
structures, decentralised competence and social peace are all factors that 
‘firms on their own find hard to produce or procure since their provision 
depends on some form of co-ordinated collective action’ (Streeck 1992: 
12). This view is echoed by Finegold (1991b: 105), who argues that 
collective action by employers is essential for economic success since ‘a 
high skill strategy requires a number of investments that may be beyond 
the means of any one player to finance but to the mutual benefit of many 
if they share the costs and the risks involved.’ Moreover co-operation 
between firms is also claimed to be an important factor in successful 
‘flexible specialisation’ (Piore and Sabel 1984). Indeed, Bowman (1998: 
304) holds that what Best’s ‘new competition,’ Streeck’s ‘diversified quality 
production’ and Piore and Sabel’s ‘flexible specialisation’ have in common 
is collective action by business firms. The claims about the significance of 
collective action by employers have however not yet been complemented 
with extensive research concerning the conditions for and nature of such
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collaboration. According to Bowman (1998: 304), ‘how this co-ordination 
among employers is achieved is hardly addressed in the literature.’
1.4 Employers’ collective action and training
An analysis of the nature and importance of employers’ collective action 
for training provision requires a distinction between the consequences of, 
the conditions for and the nature of such action, as illustrated in figure 
1.1. This section gives a broad overview of how these three topics have 
been treated in previous research.
Figure 1.1 Conditions for, nature of and consequences of collective action by 
employers____________________________________________________
Conditions —------► Collective action —------^  Consequences
by employers
One of several formulations of the collective action problem involved in 
training provision is that ‘the fundamental uncertainty for employers 
recovering their training expenses in an open, contractual labor market 
turns skills, from the viewpoint of individual employers, into a collective 
good’ (Streeck 1992: 24). The problem is that there is limited available 
research on how collective action can solve the problem, what possible 
other consequences such actions have, and under what conditions 
employers’ collective action occurs. Therefore, this review will also 
highlight some of the limitations of previous research.
1.4.1 The nature of collective action by employers
Collective action by employers has been seen as a key to the success of the 
German dual system of initial vocational training. The research on 
employers’ collective action and training has therefore primarily been 
based on this example (Berg 1994: 294-295; Finegold and Crouch 1994;
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Soskice 1994a; 1994b; Streeck 1987), even if there are other studies of 
employer associations and training (e.g. Rainbird and Grant 1985).
Streeck (1987: 84) distinguishes four ways in which employers’ 
organisations may participate in the regulation, financing, administration 
and implementation of industrial training policy. Firstly, they can 
participate as interest representatives according to the classic model of 
pluralist interest politics. Moreover, they can participate through the 
formulation and aggregation of interests relevant to industrial training 
policy. A third mode of participation is in the exercise of public 
authority, for example through implementing vocational training policies. 
Finally, employers’ associations may be suppliers in the market for 
training services.
But employers’ organisations may also take different types of 
action that are not associated with government training policies. In the 
case of further training, where national government policies have had 
little impact, these actions are more important. They may take many 
different forms.
One type of action attempts to address the problem that individual 
employers or other training providers might lack the knowledge to 
deliver high-quality training, by advising employers on how to set up 
internal training, or human resource practices more generally. Through 
knowledge from a variety of member firms, and sometimes through 
independent research and development, the collective organisations may 
be well positioned as advisers on employers’ training efforts. Moreover, if 
employers rely on external training providers, such as schools or 
universities, employers’ associations may play a significant role through 
complementing employers’ ‘exit’ with ‘voice’ in order to ensure that 
training offers are in line with its members’ demands (Hirschman 1970). 
Thirdly, employers’ organisations may choose to offer training 
themselves. Since the employer organisations seek neither profit nor the 
fulfilment of diverse government pledges (for example training for
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unemployed), they might enjoy more legitimacy than government 
organisations and private companies.
However, training below agreed standards or insufficient amount 
of training requires different forms of action. Employers’ organisations
Acan use monitoring of employers and informal as well as formal sanctions 
to address these problems. An inherent problem of employer-based , 
training is the informational asymmetry between the employer and other ' 
parties, such as the trainee, other employers and government agencies. 
This asymmetry can lead to training below agreed standards since 
individual employers might be tempted to undercut standards, provide 
too specific training or use trainees as cheap labour. The employer 
organisations can therefore act to ensure high quality of training by 
monitoring the employers’ training standards. In Germany’s 
apprenticeship system, this is done through assessing the suitability of 
firms to provide training and through the monitoring of training.
If the problem is too low a supply of training, employer 
organisations may use positive incentives to encourage employers to 
provide training or negative incentives to discourage under-provision. For 
example, the organisations can co-finance employers’ training activities. A 
levy scheme, in which employers are obliged to invest a certain amount in 
training, is an even more formalised system of sanctions (Drake 1991; 
Snower and Booth 1996: 345). Still, informal sanctions may be equally 
important in the organisations’ efforts to increase training quantity. In 
Germany, ‘employer associations, including chambers, have significant 
informal sanctioning ability over companies’ (Soskice 1994a: 34). For 
example, employer organisations can contribute to establishing norms on 
what ‘adequate training efforts’ are and publicise information on how 
much individual employers invest in training in order to facilitate peer 
pressure among employers.
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1.4.2 Conditions for and consequences of employers’ 
collective action
While the nature and purpose of employers’ collective action regarding 
training has been given some attention, as shown above, the research has 
left largely untouched the questions of when and how such collective 
action occurs, and what the consequences of such action is.
If one accepts the conclusions from the German studies mentioned, 
it is clear that in some situations employers’ collective action might 
successfully solve the collective action problem of transferable training. 
The question is, however, when employers’ collective action is 
worthwhile, given the costs and possible unintended negative
consequences. The possible negative side effects of state intervention to 
solve the collective action problem are most frequently cited, for example 
characterised as ‘government failure’ as opposed to ‘market failure’ 
(Finegold 1996; Hansen 1992). However, even in other cases it might be 
that employers as a group would be better off with the collective action 
problem unsolved than with attempts to solve the problem through 
employers’ collective action. For example, collective training
organisations have shown problems in adapting to employers’ needs 
(Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999). Therefore, the overall outcome is not 
necessarily better than it would be without a solution to the problem. 
Thus, a study of employers’ collective action and training should include 
not only what the purpose of the organisation’s actions are, but also an 
analysis of how the targets are met.
The second question that few contributions have attempted to 
answer is under what conditions employers’ collective action on training 
occurs. Chapter 3 describes the existing research in some detail, and shows 
that, with few exceptions, previous research lacks not only a critical 
evaluation of positive and negative consequences of employers’ collective 
action, but also theoretical predictions about the occurrence of such 
action.
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1.5 Three issues in training research
The previous section showed that there is limited available research on the 
link between employers’ collective action and training. There is however 
no lack of research on training more generally. This section first presents 
some of the main alternative theoretical approaches to training, and then 
illuminates the contents of these contributions by discussing each of the 
three main aspects of training studied in the thesis:
• transferability of training;
• cost sharing;
• and the amount of training and skill shortages.
Training and skills are both important policy issues and keys to a 
variety of different theories explaining a multitude of different 
phenomena. Training is ‘at the centre of almost all theories of labour 
markets’ (Rubery and Grimshaw 1999: 4). Education and training are also 
seen as a more or less integrated part of business strategy, an investment 
opportunity for employers and individuals, a device for signalling ability 
or screening individuals, an important source of inequality between 
individuals, a source of self realisation, an important determinant of both 
companies’ and nations’ productivity and a factor that contributes to 
determining the business strategies companies choose. Moreover, a long- 
running theoretical debate has been concerned with whether training is 
determined primarily by technology, by the organisation of work, by 
characteristics of the educational system, by institutions and rules or by 
some combination of these factors. Thus, all attempts to provide an 
overview of theoretical approaches to education and training necessarily 
neglect a range of significant theories.
In an overview of the wide range of theories, Ashton and Green 
(1996) propose five crude categories of labour market theories on training: 
the human capital approach, the internal labour market approach, the 
corporatist approach, the business systems and societal approaches as well
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as the political science approach. Rubery and Grimshaw (1999) add labour 
process theories and segmentation theories.3 Even if categorisation can be 
valuable, the inherent risk in attempts to make clear distinctions is that 
the fine details and the significant similarities between the contributions 
are neglected. Therefore, in order to avoid ‘pigeonholing’, the review 
below is focused on the three main topics, and attempts to draw on 
research in all these categories to give a picture of existing research on 
each issue.
This thesis makes no claim that the three issues were selected 
purely on the basis of empirical significance. On the contrary, they are 
chosen to address three core issues in human capital theory, and thus 
reflect the dominant position of human capital theory. After its ‘birth’ in 
1962 (Blaug 1992a: 3), human capital theory has developed into one of the 
most significant areas of economic research, and it is ‘still the most 
influential strand of theory linking education and training behaviour of 
individuals and firms to economic performance and outcomes’ 
(Buechtemann and Soloff 1994: 237). Thus, the advantage of selecting 
issues in line with human capital theory is that the thesis addresses some 
of the most important questions in economic research on education and 
training. On the other hand, the study must inevitably treat issues that 
might be of equally great empirical importance in less detail, for example 
how training is organised effectively, how skills are transferred from 
formal learning to daily practice, the effect of training and innovation as 
well as the link between training, work organisation and so-called 
organisational learning. However, since these issues are linked to 
assessments of optimal training levels, they cannot be totally ignored.
3 O ne might also argue that Human Resource Management (HRM) research should be 
included, but the question is whether HRM can be seen as a theory or merely a field of 
study consisting of employee influence, human resource flow, reward systems and work 
systems (Beer 1984: 7; Blyton and Turnbull 1992; N oon 1992).
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1.5.1 Transferability and labour market structures
Transferability of training, the topic of chapter 5, is important because it 
is a determinant of labour market structures, and is also partly formed by 
these structures. In addition, transferability is significant for cost sharing, 
as the next section shows. Later in the thesis, it is shown that the assumed 
significance of employers’ actions as a determinant of transferability is a 
crucial difference between the two theories.
There are several benefits of training being transferable instead of 
non-transferable. One important advantage is that employers can draw on 
a pool of skilled labour, which is especially important for small firms.4 
The major advantage for employees is that they can more easily change 
jobs without loss of acquired skills and pay. From the employers’ point of 
view, that may make it is easier to lay off people, because the employees 
can expect to get jobs elsewhere. Society as a whole can benefit through a 
better allocation of skilled resources (Marsden 1986: 235).
This section presents Doeringer and Piore’s account and other 
explanations of how and why internal labour markets develop, with 
emphasis on the role of transferability of training. The five explanations 
are skill specificity, the inherent problems of the employment relation, 
employers’ relatively free choice, ‘societal’ factors and finally that internal 
labour markets are the ‘natural state’ for most skilled jobs.
While internal labour markets and occupational labour markets are 
ideal types, actual labour markets consist of some combinations of each of 
the two types, and the degree of transferability of training is partly a 
result of this structure and partly a determinant of the actual labour 
market structure. Hence, transferability of training is crucial in the 
analysis of internal and occupational labour markets.
4 For example, Streeck (1987: 81) argues that ‘it cannot simply be assumed that in the 
long term only trade unions will have an interest in standardizing the increasingly 
important further training certificates. The associations of employers, if not necessarily 
their individual members, are interested in a functioning external labor market.’
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The structure of internal labour markets can shape not only the 
provision of training; it can also be shaped by the training that is 
provided. Research on the relative importance of these two causal chains, 
and other explanations of labour market structures, have proceeded 
Doeringer and Piore’s (1971: xvi) Internal labor markets and manpower 
analysis. This landmark work marked a departure from the neo-classical 
framework.5 An internal labour market is defined as ‘an administrative 
unit, such as a manufacturing plant, within which the pricing and 
allocation of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and 
procedures’ (Doeringer and Piore 1971: l).6
Skill specificity, and hence transferability, is at the core of 
Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) explanation for why employers develop 
company internal labour markets.7 The two most important reasons why 
employers develop company internal labour markets, Doeringer and 
Piore claim, are skill specificity and on-the-job training.8 These two 
factors are reinforcing, since on-the-job training tends to be firm specific 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971: 32). Internal labour markets facilitate on-the- 
job training, and especially informal training, through skill accumulation 
and incentives. Skill accumulation is enhanced through job ladders. When 
a worker has learnt one job, he has an advantage when he has to learn the 
job on the next level of the ladder. The second reason is that workers have 
an incentive to provide training when they are promised internal
5 Yet, it still maintains the assumption that skill specificity is independent of employers’ 
actions.
Subsequent research has used operational definitions of internal labour markets that are 
narrower than Doeringer and Piore’s definition (Althauser and Kalleberg 1981).
7Doeringer and Piore distinguish between enterprise internal labour markets, craft 
internal labour markets and competitive labour markets. The focus here is on enterprise 
internal markets and not craft internal labour markets.
8 The third reason is that workers must be socialised, using the sociological term, or 
learn how to adhere to ‘an unwritten set of rules based largely upon past practice or 
precedent’ (Doeringer and Piore 1971: 23).
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promotion opportunities. Seniority pay also enhances the incentives for 
experienced workers to teach (Piore 1968).
Employers have strong incentives to avoid turnover of these 
specifically trained employees.9 While Becker (1962; 1993) suggests that 
this can be done with a wage premium, as will be shown in chapter 2, 
Doeringer and Piore put forward the idea that firms can use career ladders 
for the same purpose. Thus, employers solve the problem by placing the 
job in an internal labour market with employment security and 
advancement promises.
Employers might also choose to develop internal labour markets 
because they solve inherent problems in employment relations 
(Williamson 1975). The core of Williamson’s argument with respect to 
internal labour markets is that since promotion is awarded for both high 
productivity and non-opportunistic behaviour, employees get incentives 
for such beneficial behaviour in a way that would be difficult to achieve in 
other ways.
Some contributions emphasise that employers’ have considerable 
room for choice in deciding to rely on the internal or the external labour 
market for supply of skills. Despite many differences, this is a key element 
of both Osterman’s (1984a; 1984b) analysis of internal labour markets for 
white-collar workers and Cappelli and Cocker-Hefter’s (1993) analysis of 
core competencies.
Osterman stresses that several factors other than skill specificity 
can affect internal labour market organisation, and that employers have 
freedom of choice when they have to decide what kind of subsystem to 
implement. Firms are composed of industrial relations subsystems that 
‘vary considerably in their rules, procedures, and employment outcomes’ 
(Osterman 1984b: 170). What differentiates Osterman’s analysis from 
Doeringer and Piore’s is that ‘it does not seem likely that skill specificity
9 Chapter 2 shows that Becker’s distinction between general and specific training is based 
on usefulness in other firms and market conditions. Doeringer and Piore’s definition is 
however based only on usefulness outside the firm.
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can explain differences in subsystem structure’ (Osterman 1984b: 176). 
The results ‘undermine rather severely the human capital explanation,’ 
which says that internal labour markets are designed to protect employers 
against turnover of specifically trained employees. Instead, Osterman 
(1984b) claims that product market, labour market and technology 
changes are the factors that can influence the conditions for change 
between different subsystems. He argues that ‘company culture’ is an 
important variable explaining different managerial choices of industrial 
subsystem. Fear of unionisation and government regulations can also 
affect the choice. Osterman uses a case of computer programmers to 
exemplify managerial choice of subsystem even when work tasks are 
given. In this case there was under-supply, employers chose to provide 
internal training, keep training narrow and select employees with long 
tenure to avoid turnover instead of hiring from the craft market. The craft 
market is based on employee-financed training outside the firm.
The scope for employer choice corresponds with Cappelli and 
Cocker-Hefter’s (1993: 1) claim that ‘the notion of a single set of ‘bes^’ 
practices [in managing people] may be overstated.’ They show that success
1within a single sector or niche can be the result of contrasting j 
employment practices, training strategies and ways of organising work. 
Some combinations of practices are considered successful. There is no  ^
single ‘high skill route,’ but employers can be successful with strong I 
internal labour markets and focus on provision of internal training, or 1
1
new ^
opportunities, and do not develop employee competencies from within j
because it does not pay to do so’ (Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1993: 17). [
i
Thus, numerical flexibility may be a feasible strategy even in a high skill ;
sector, and it is thus ‘an important empirical question as to whether firms j
with highly skilled, broadly trained employees can be more flexible in /
they can ‘compete through flexibility, moving quickly to seize
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their product markets than can firms that hire-and-fire to change their 
competencies’ (Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1993: 17).10
A fourth group of contributions claim that the existence, 
prevalence and characteristics of internal labour markets cannot be 
explained by individual employers’ choices or skill specificity in isolation, 
but must be seen as responses to a particular societal setting or a ‘societal 
effect’ (Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1984; 1986). The Aix-en-Provence 
researchers argue that the educational, organisational (which binds 
individuals to a society through the division of labour)’ and industrial 
relations (which bind individuals to society through systems that establish 
social identity and economic opposition, i.e., management, workers, and 
their organisations) ‘domains’ must be seen as interrelated (Maurice, 
Sellier, and Silvestre 1984: 233). Based on a comparison of carefully 
matched samples of manufacturing plants in France and Germany, the 
conclusion is that one cannot explain phenomena in one ‘domain’ without 
considering the other two.
In Germany, for example, the broad, vocational training for a large 
proportion of the youngsters fits work organisations with broad jobs and 
mobility based on formal skills in an occupational labour market. By 
contrast, Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre argue that in France workers have 
narrower jobs, and the labour market is characterised by internal 
mobility. The important difference is that mobility in France is more 
linked to the specific company, while German workers’ mobility is linked 
to the formal qualifications they achieve. This is partly due to the 
educational domain, because the vocational track is stronger in Germany. 
However, it is also because of the organisational domain, since German
10 This description o f a choice between strategies seems more appropriate in the 
American than in the European labour market. Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter (1993: 18) 
agree that ‘in European countries, the constraints on dismissing employees/using the 
external labour market encourage investments in existing employees and, it is argued, 
shift production towards the higher quality (and higher) cost markets that makes use of 
higher skills.’
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employers to a greater extent take workers’ qualification into account 
when organising jobs, so that they fit their capabilities and skills (Maurice, 
Sellier, and Silvestre 1984: 246).
By adding a dynamic element to the ‘societal analysis’ through 
including more recent developments, such as changes in further education 
and training, Gehin and Mehaut (1995: 75) argue that the two countries 
have become more similar. In Germany, ‘individual employer initiative; 
strong orientation to production needs; and the principle of non­
recognition in terms of job classification and salary’ (Gehin and Mehaut 
1995: 74-75) for further training may contribute to an internalisation of 
the occupational labour market. In France, on the other hand, further 
training is the basis for a development towards a more ‘occupational 
model’ (Gehin and Mehaut 1995: 79; Mehaut 1988).
Gehin and Mehaut’s inclusion of a dynamic element helps to lessen 
the problems of societal analysis, namely that it uses many independent 
variables to explain a limited number of different outcomes, and it does 
not make clear which variables are necessary or sufficient. Consequently, 
it cannot be empirically tested on other cases (Rose 1985).
The fifth account of the existence and characteristics of internal 
labour markets argues that the existence of internal labour markets, at 
least for skilled labour, requires no explanation. According to Rubery 
(1994), there is a wide range of reasons, ranging from skill specificity to 
trust and commitment as production conditions, why employers would 
prefer long-term employment relationships. Marsden (1986: 231) argues 
that ‘one might expect company internal labour markets to be the natural 
state of affairs, and that, if anything, one should have to explain how 
occupational labour markets sometimes emerge when employers have 
developed their own internal labour markets.’ The reason is that there are 
substantial costs associated with the establishment and maintenance of } 
occupational labour markets, which usually cannot be borne by individual ^  
employers, but require employer co-ordination. Thus, Marsden’s view is
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that the provision of transferable skills is a collective action problem, a 
notion that will be studied in detail in chapter 3.
1.5.2 Cost sharing
The second topic, analysed in chapter 6, is how employers, employees and 
others share the costs of transferable training. Education and training are 
very often a shared investment. If cost sharing is inadequate, too little, too 
much or the wrong type of training is provided. Thus, cost sharing is of 
great practical importance since it is a prerequisite for successful training 
initiatives.
Economic theory says that those who benefit from a good should 
contribute to its financing, funding the same fraction of the total costs as 
the share of the benefits they receive. But finding such solutions is 
problematic in the case of training. One problem is that the employers 
and employees have different time frames and markedly different 
capacities to finance training costs. Moreover, as chapter 2 shows, there 
are externalities present in training provision. An additional problem is 
that there is likely to be limited information about the cost of training, 
particularly for on-the-job training. Cost sharing for training is also 
difficult because there are risks involved. Not only is the effect of training 
uncertain but employers cannot know beforehand if and when employees 
quit, and employees cannot know if and when they are laid off. Matters 
are even more complicated by the fact that cost sharing is inevitably 
tightly linked to wage setting, where employers, employees and their 
organisations must accommodate a series of concerns other than how 
training costs are shared.
Broadly speaking, there are two different conclusions from |
research on cost sharing. The first is that employers usually finance the j
training that is needed for employees to do their jobs, while the /
alternative view is that employers are reluctant to invest in training that I
[
increases employees’ value on the external labour market.
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The first type of explanation takes work organisation as its point 
of departure. It says that job design and job tasks are the primary 
determinants of the training employees get, and that employers usually 
finance the training that is required to do the job. If training is le§s 
relevant for the job, the employer and the employee share the costs of 
training or the employee fully finances training costs. Thus, the most | 
important factors for cost sharing are job design and relevance of training.^ 
Scoville (1969; 1972) presents a theoretical justification for this argument.
The basis of the argument is that ‘given the work to be done and 
the basic technology, the recent literature on job design suggests that 
different constellations on tasks and duties incorporated in varying 
bundles of jobs are feasible’ (Scoville 1969: 37). Therefore, the employers 
must choose how broad or narrow are the jobs they want. If jobs are 
narrow, employers will experience higher efficiency and lower training 
costs, but also lower quality control by workers, higher supervision costs 
and decreased work force stability. Employees will avoid narrow jobs 
because they will receive less training, the risk of unemployment is 
higher, and there is a psychological cost associated with narrow jobs. On 
the other hand, the workers will need to pay less for the training, since it 
is shorter than for broad jobs According to Scoville, employers will 
always finance training that is required for a job. In addition, employers 
have preferences for ‘excess training’ that are ‘analogous to those for job 
breadth alone’ (Scoville 1969: 48). Thus, if employers think ‘excess 
training’ will increase quality control, reduce supervision costs or increase 
work force stability, they will finance even more training than is required 
in the job.
The alternative claim is that employers are reluctant to invest in j 
training that increases employees’ value on the external labour market. |
The basis of this lies in human capital theory, which will be discussed in \
\
detail in chapter 2. The core of the argument is that in a competitive 
labour market, employers will not finance general training, which is as
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useful outside as within the firm, because they must award wage increases 
that equal the productivity increase after training.
There is thus a clear contrast between the two views on how 
training costs are shared.11 While both can account successfully for some 
forms of labour market behaviour, there are also intrinsic problems with 
each. It is likely that both types of logic are evident, but to a different 
extent in different settings and for different types of training. The reason 
is that the human capital view tends to over-estimate the impact of the 
external labour market, while the job design approach tends to under­
estimate it.
The most important problem with the view that employers are 
reluctant to finance training that is useful outside the firm, is that it relies 
on the assumption that employees are easily disposable and replaceable, 
and that employees are highly mobile. Therefore, this view is most likely 
to hold for types of training that significantly changes employees’ value on 
the labour market, and external recruitment of skilled employees is a 
viable option.12 For types of training that, in practice, has limited impact 
on employers’ opportunities in the external labour market, for example 
short up-dating training, the human capital view is likely to over-estimate 
the impact of the external labour market on cost sharing.
By contrast, the most important problem with the Scoville model 
is that it does not convincingly address the possibility of external 
recruitment. The model ignores the fact that firms can hire ready-trained 
workers, and also that workers might choose to find jobs somewhere else 
if they are not compensated for their general training. The three reasons 
are that the wage rate is assumed to be fixed and independent of the job 
design (Scoville 1969: 41), that broad training will reduce turnover
11 Both views also embody implicit normative judgements about how costs should be 
shared. As chapter 2 shows, optimal provision of general training requires that 
employees bear the full cost of training.
12 The empirical study is of long further training, which is assumed to potentially have a 
significant impact of employees’ value in the labour market.
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(Scoville 1969: 40), and that abundant availability of fully qualified 
employees is assumed to be no more than hypothetical over the long run. 
Scoville (1969: 39) does acknowledge, however, that if external 
recruitment is available, ‘the training cost aspect of choice and job content 
would vanish.’ Thus, while the model is ‘less fettered by neo-classical 
preconceptions about labour markets’ (Scoville 1969: 53), it under- 
estimates the impact of the external labour market. Thus, the model seems 
relevant only if external recruitment is not a likely alternative and 
training does not significantly increase employees’ value in the external 
labour market.
In practice, affecting cost sharing is one of the most important 
ways in which employer organisations influence training provision. In 
some cases, ij.evy  systemuis used, but usually collective agreements are the 
most important vehicle for affecting the way costs are .shared, through 
determining wages during and after training.
An organisation can have two different goals for its cost sharing 
policies. One purpose is to achieve cost sharing that gives employers and 
employees the incentives that in turn lead to the right quality and 
quantity of training. But the organisation can also simply seek to keep the 
degree of employer financing low so that employees or the government 
bear most of the costs.
In principle employers would prefer to pay as little as possible 
during training, but still sufficient to ensure that enough able individuals 
want to undertake the training. Employees, on the other hand, would 
prefer as high a wage as possible, as long as the quality of training remains 
good and the number of training places remains sufficiently high. Wages 
and employment prospects after training are important because they 
determine the individuals’ incentives to invest in training. Young people 
need assurance that both employment security and higher earnings will 
compensate the low income they receive during training. On the other 
hand, employers might become less willing to invest in training if
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employees are very well rewarded after training.13 So cost sharing is an 
area where different interests must be taken into account to find a 
solution that serves the purpose of ensuring sufficient amounts of high 
quality training. But at the same time both the employee and the 
employer side might want to reduce costs at the expense of the other 
party.
The example of apprentice wages illustrates the problem. 
Employer organisations might argue that these wages should be reduced 
in order to make employers willing to supply more training places, and 
thus increase the supply of skills in the labour market.14 However, at the 
same time, a reduction means reduced costs for employers, and potentially 
an increased chance that trainees replace normal employees. Therefore, it 
may be impossible to distinguish between the two purposes when 
evaluating employer organisation policies to affect cost sharing.
Thus, the way training employers and employees share training 
costs is not only a theme of great theoretical importance, but also a 
significant issue for employers’ and employees’ organisations that seek to 
promote their members’ interests in both adequate skill provision and in 
benefiting from, but not financing, training.
1.5.3 Amount of training and skill shortages
To explain why some employers, industries and nations provide more 
training than others, and how this changes over time, one must 
distinguish between what factors cause skill needs, requirements or 
demand, and what determines whether or not these are met. This section 
shows that while skill needs are usually explained as consequences of 
technology and work organisation, j t  is assumed that ‘market failures’ ^  
explain why skill supply does not necessarily meet demand. While the
13 In some instances, this is described as employees ‘exploiting’ their bargaining power.
14 For example, in Norway, apprentice wages were reduced in connection with Reform 
94 in order to make it easier for pupils in vocational education to get apprenticeships 
(Bosch 1997).
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focus later in the thesis is on skill shortages, or whether or not training 
meets employers’ demand, a brief discussion of the evolution of skill 
requirements is needed to understand the relationship between skill 
shortages and the amount of training provided.
In addition to the acknowledgement that education and training 
are important determinants of individuals’ welfare and of inequality in 
society, the political concern about further education and training in the 
1990s was driven by the two impressions that skill requirements were 
expected to rise rapidly as a result of the accelerating speed of 
technological change and that employees’ skills were becoming 
increasingly important requirements for competitive business.
The research shows, however, that there is not necessarily a direct 
link between technological change and skill requirements. Moreover, 
other factors, such as organisation of work, may be as important 
determinants of skill requirements. The contributions involved in 
studying this question have attempted primarily to explain what 
constitute skill requirements or employers’ skill demand. Most have 
implicitly assumed that these requirements are met, and consequently that 
the amount of training provided is a reflection of employers’ demand.
One core discussion has been whether technological change leads 
to ‘upskilling,’ ‘deskilling’ or ‘polarisation.’ The debate is based on a 
simplified view of Braverman (1974), namely that technological change in 
a capitalist society inevitably leads to ‘deskilling’ of jobs (Armstrong 
1988). The evidence suggests that the effect of technology on the content 
of jobs depends on a variety of other factors (Cappelli and Rogovsky 1994; 
Lewis 1992; Osterman 1995a). Evidence from Britain, the United States 
and Norway suggests that there is at least no trend towards deskilling, but 
rather ‘polarisation’ of skills (Gallie 1991; Gooderham, Kvitastein, and 
Nordhaug 1996; Osterman 1995a).
One reason why the evidence on the link between technology and 
skill requirements is not straightforward is that it depends on employers’ 
choice of organisational structure. Employers have considerable freedom
41
in deciding how to meet technological change, and there are no automatic 
effects of technology on organisational design (Sorge and Streeck 1988; 
Training Agency 1990b: 21).15 One argument has been that in sectors 
where there are rapid changes, either technological or organisational, the 
employees need broader training to tackle the changes. That is the core of 
‘functional flexibility’ (Atkinson and Meager 1986), and also an aspect of 
the ‘lean production’ management strategy (Pfeffer 1994). However, it is 
also possible to achieve flexibility by breaking down complex tasks into 
simple components (Brown 1994; Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1993) or 
by ‘numerical flexibility’ (Atkinson and Meager 1986).
A second reason why the research gives mixed results on the link 
between technology and skill requirements is that there is a clear 
difference between the short-term and long-term effects of new 
technology. The introduction of new technology necessarily requires 
some induction training, but does not necessarily require a higher level of 
skills than previous equipment. For example, the introduction of 
information technology (IT) might necessitate frequent up-dating training 
when new versions of the software arrive but that has little impact on the 
long-term skill requirements of the jobs.
Acknowledging the problem of explaining skill needs directly 
through technology, a second group of contributions emphasise the 
impact of work organisation on skill needs, partly directly and partly as a 
factor that determines the effect of technology on skill needs. One simple 
argument is that the basis of all training provision is the jobs people are in. 
The broader these jobs are, the broader training employees will receive 
(Scoville 1969). More recently it has been shown that some ‘bundles’ of 
human resource practices (i.e. certain combinations of HR practices)
15 Product market changes are not necessarily caused by technological changes, even if 
they often are. A  recent Norwegian study argues that consumer demand for formal 
training as a ‘quality indicator’ is an important trigger of training initiatives in the private 
sector (Larsen et al. 1997), in line with neo-institutional theory(Meyer and Rowan 1991; 
Powell andDiMaggio 1991).
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account for differences in training levels between employers (Kochan and 
Osterman 1994: 170; MacDuffie and Kochnan 1995; Osterman 1994). Still, 
these studies cannot show if this is a long-term effect or only a temporary 
effect, since the implementation of new work practices invariably requires 
new skills. Another version of the argument that work organisation 
determines skill needs is that there is, or will be, a gap between a group of 
highly qualified employees in safe, high-skill jobs and a group of 
employees in jobs where skill requirements remain low (Doeringer and 
Piore 1971).
A third way of explaining skill requirements is that they first and 
foremost are determined by employers’ choice of high- or low-skill routes 
(Finegold 1991b: 97). Finegold argues that these choices are made in 
interaction with individuals and policy makers, and that these three 
parties’ actions are mutually reinforcing. Thus, if employers choose to 
follow the ‘low-skill route,’ with modest skill requirements, individuals 
and policy-makers will adapt so that employers’ are even more likely to 
continue on this path later. Hence, economies will tend to end up in 
either ‘low skill’ or ‘high skill equilibria’ (Finegold 1991a; 1991b; Finegold 
and Crouch 1994; Finegold and Soskice 1988). Given such mutually 
reinforcing factors, the problem with the theory is that it cannot explain 
how a wide range of ‘middle skill’ economies exist, and how even within a 
‘low skill equilibrium’ there are often important high-skill industries.
While the contributions above concentrate on explaining what 
forms skill needs, others have focused on how and why these needs are or 
are not met. In the latter, it is assumed that skill needs develop into 
employers’ skill demand, which also depends on the wage rate, so even if 
demand equals supply, all skill ‘needs’ or ‘requirements’ are not met. The 
research has concentrated on why skill supply may be lower or higher 
than demand, with the bulk of the theoretical argument focussing on why 
too little training may be provided. The screening, signalling or 
credentialism arguments are exceptions, suggesting that individuals take 
education and training to signalise their abilities or ambitions, and not
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merely to improve their own productivity (Becker 1993; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992; Spence 1973). Moreover, based primarily on the evidence of 
a growing number of graduates, there has been some concern about ‘over­
education’ (Freeman 1976; Larsen 1999). Nevertheless, a more prominent 
question has been, ‘Does the free market produce enough skills?’ (Booth 
and Snower 1996).
There are several reasons to assume that the market for training is 
not a ‘perfect’ market, and thus there is a ‘market failure’ (Acemoglu 1996; 
Booth and Snower 1996; Finegold 1996; Layard 1994; Ritzen 1992; 
Snower 1996; Stevens 1996). Some of these problems will be discussed in 
more detail in chapters 2 and 3. One problem is that the capital market is 
not perfect, so the individual may find it difficult to finance education and 
training. This effect is strengthened by the assumption that many people 
are risk averse, and are therefore reluctant to make investments when the 
returns are uncertain. Yet another argument is that there is an interaction 
between supply and demand, which means that if there are few skilled 
workers, few firms will design jobs that use these qualifications, and that- 
is a disincentive for individuals to take the training. One can also argue 
that the tax system and unemployment benefits will tend to reduce the 
benefits of training. All these reasons for a market failure in training have 
been widely discussed, and with a few exceptions (e.g., Shackleton 1992), 
the validity of the claims are accepted, even if the propositions are rarely 
rigidly tested.
In this thesis the focus is on market failures caused by externalities 
between employers associated with investment in transferable training. In 
contrast to a substantial share of previous research, the study includes 
both predictions of the severity of the ‘failures’ in different industries and 
empirical analyses of attempts to address the failures.
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1.6 Delimitation and definitions
This study leaves out several interesting aspects, either because it is outside 
the research question as presented in these first three chapters or because 
there are limits to what range of evidence can be included within a single 
study. The study primarily covers economic theories on education and 
training, and the focus is on the industry and company level rather than 
the national level or on that of individuals. Moreover, since it is a study of 
four industries in one country, the results cannot directly be generalised 
outside these four cases. The study excludes special measures for the 
unemployed. Training is primarily seen as an investment that increases 
productivity, and not as a good in itself. It is assumed that training leads to 
improved skills and acquired and practised abilities to competently carry 
out a task or job (International Labour Office 1986: 64), and this leads to 
increased productivity. These links are not studied directly, and neither is 
the quality of training programs in terms of the effectiveness of training 
methods and the relevance of training for daily work.
The definitions of training and further training require some more 
explanation. The main point is that, primarily, formal further training is 
included. Training is defined as ‘the process of acquiring the range of 
knowledge and skills that are related to current and future work 
requirements by formal or structured or guided means (i.e. excluding pure 
experience), (Training Agency 1990c: 5). The definition excludes (the 
significant amount of) learning that is achieved thought doing one’s job, if 
this is not done under special guidance, even if such learning also has a 
cost. Moreover, the definition excludes training that is not expected to 
relate to work requirements or work tasks.
Further training, which the study covers, is defined in contrast to 
initial training, which is ‘the first complete course of training for an 
occupation’ (Cedefop 1996: 61). Thus, further training is ‘used for any 
training subsequent to initial training (Cedefop 1996: 72; International 
Labour Office 1986: 29). It is however not simple to distinguish between
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initial and further training, because it differs between contexts to what 
extent training is done initially or later. Moreover, the categorisation of 
training is not dependent on any characterises of the training, but of the 
participants. While mid-wife training for experienced nurses is clearly 
further training, introductory training at a new employer is hard to 
categorise. Training given to youngsters directly after finishing school 
may be categorised as initial, whereas the case of experienced workers is 
more ambiguous. Since the empirical study in chapters 4 to 7 is of 
workers with several years of initial training, the problem will probably 
be less than it would have been with unskilled workers.
This chapter has briefly presented the most important aspects of 
the study, and presented previous research both on the three aspects of 
training that are studied and on the link between employers’ collective 
action and training. The next chapter analyses how human capital theory 
treats these three aspects, while chapter 3 presents an alternative 
theoretical perspective.
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2. Transferable training as a 
human capital investment
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to derive three hypotheses from human 
capital theory concerning the provision of transferable training. The 
hypotheses are that individual employers will not act spontaneously to 
make training transferable, that employers will pay for transferable 
training only under certain conditions, and finally that the optimal 
amount of transferable training will be provided only in a perfect labour 
market. In the next chapter, these hypotheses will be contrasted with 
hypotheses based on transferable training being a collective action 
problem, and subsequently the two alternative views will be put on to 
empirical test in the next part of the thesis.
2.2 The basic ideas and assumptions
This thesis will focus on human capital theory in relation to further 
education and training, which is only one part, or one particular 
application, of human capital theory. Human capital theory applies to a 
much wider range of issues. Becker’s (1993) Human Capital analyses as 
diverse themes as childbirth, measures against economic inequality, as well 
as education and training.
Human capital theory is not a single theory, but rather a research 
programme. According to Blaug (1992b: 207) it ‘cannot be reduced to one 
single theory, being simply an application of standard capital theory to
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certain economic phenomena.’ Blaug’s argument is that there is a ‘hard 
core’ to this research programme, which is that people spend on 
themselves for the sake of future pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. 
This cannot be empirically refuted (Blaug 1992b: 34). The ‘hard core’ has 
however generated a ‘protective belt’ of different theories that may be 
empirically tested. One of these is Becker’s theory of job training. In this 
thesis ‘human capital theory’ connotes only theories involving the analysis 
of investment education and training investments. 1 The theory presented 
in chapter 3 also sees training as an investment in human capital, but 
diverges from the latter three of these postulates.
Figure 2.1 The relationship between training, skills, productivity and pay in 
human capital investment decisions_____________ _________________________
Training  Skills  Productivity ---- ^  Individuals: Pay
Employers: Profits
Costs M---------------------------------------------------------------- ► Benefits
Figure 2.1 illustrates the basic logic of training investments according to 
human capital theory. The idea is that training improves employees’ skills, 
which determine their productivity. Finally, their pay will depend on 
their productivity. For employees, the benefit of training is the wage rise 
they get as a result of it. Employers, on the other hand, will benefit to the 
extent that the pay increase does not fully offset the productivity increase. 
For each of the parties, the decision to train or not is determined by the
1 Some important postulates of neo-classical economics is methodological individualism, 
the logical priority of perfect markets, the assumption that labour markets consist of a 
large number of similar jobs in different firms and the assumption that technology is a 
key determinant of the factor combinations firms use (Marsden 1995: 20).
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size of the benefits compared with the costs of training and their 
distribution.
As in neo-classical economics in general, the point of departure for 
human capital analysis is ‘perfect markets.’ N ot only the labour market, 
but also the product market and the capital markets must be perfect. 
These assumptions mean that there are a very large numbers of 
employers, there are a very large number of workers, there are a very 
large numbers of capital suppliers; there is perfect information, there are 
no barriers to entry to or exit from any of the markets and there are no 
transaction costs (e.g. in connection with switching jobs). In addition, one 
must assume that the employer and the employee are free to choose the 
level of investment in training and that both the employer and the 
employee know the effect of training on productivity.
In the earlier works, such as those by Becker (1962; 1993) and 
Mincer (1962) these assumptions are maintained. Broadly speaking, 
subsequent theoretical research has studied the effects on education and 
training if any of these assumptions are not met.2 Later this chapter will 
show what it means if, for example, there are only few employers, or 
there is not perfect information.
2.3 Critique of human capital theory
« «
As a scientific theory human capital theory has several attractive features 
(Blaug 1992b:24). It is applicable to a wide range of topics, it is simple, it is 
built on a set of well-defined principles, and it is fruitful measured by the 
number of hypotheses that one can derive from the theory. At least four 
types of criticism have however been raised against human capital theory.
2 Already a year after Becker’s work was published in the Journal o f Political Economy, he 
was criticised because his conclusions were based on assumptions that were unlikely to 
be exist in practice (Eckaus 1963).
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One criticism is that is takes a too narrow view of training, and 
fails to grasp important aspects of how training is part of work processes 
and management strategies. One could argue that ‘human capital theory 
treats the education and training process as a ‘black box,’ in which the 
skills are produced’ (Ashton and Green 1996: 18). Moreover, the effect of 
training on skills, and of skills on productivity is rarely questioned.3 
Gintis (1992: 266) is one of those who criticise human capital research 
because ‘almost no attempt has been made... to determine the mechanism 
by which education affects earnings or productivity.’ However, this 
criticism is mainly an effect of the level of abstraction of human capital 
theory. Therefore, it should not lead to a rejection of human capital 
theory, but rather the development of complementary theories, which, on 
a lower level of abstraction, treat the processes on the basis of which 
human capital theory abstracts from.
Another type of criticism is that the assumptions underlying 
human capital theory are often violated. For example, individuals may not 
act in accordance with the assumptions of human capital theory. Green 
(1994: 243) claims that ‘there can be little pretence...that training decisions 
are taken solely, as human capital theory suggests, on the basis of a 
rational individualistic calculus.’ Within sociology the analysis of what 
influences educational choice has provided alternative theories to human 
capital theory. To some extent this critique has been met by new versions 
of human capital theory, which relax some of the strict assumptions in the 
earliest versions of the theory.4
A third type of criticism is ideological, and argues that human
3 The idea that education can be as signal of productivity rather than a generator of 
productivity, is one example from the general impression that human capital research 
rarely questions the effect of training on productivity (Spence 1973).
4 Freeman (1971) stresses the fact that human capital theory can include other ways to 
explain educational choice. Rational choice and pecuniary awards need only be 
important at the margins for human capital theory to have predictive power. Moreover,
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capital theory treats labour and skills as ‘commodities’ (Thurow 1970: 7), 
or more precisely that outcomes are analysed as if workers and firms were 
treating investment in training as a commodity. Given that the core of 
human capital theory is that training can be analysed as an investment 
decision, this is true almost by definition. Yet, one of the crucial points in 
human capital theory is that each individual is free to choose how much 
to invest in human capital and where to work. Thus, the individual 
freedom is emphasised more in human capital theory than in other 
theories on training in firms, which tend to view employees’ skills as 
employers’ property. Moreover, shifting from a viewing of education and 
training as investments rather than consumer goods, as they were seen 
earlier (Blaug 1992a: 5), was hardly a shift towards a viewing of skills 
more rather as ‘commodities.’
One final type of criticism, and potentially the most damaging, is 
that the empirical findings are not in line with what one would expect 
from human capital theory. Faced by negative evidence one can either 
modify or reject the theory, and both these responses have been made in 
the case of human capital theory. As this chapter shows, several 
researchers have modified the human capital theory to explain common 
findings that apparently contradicted the original version of the theory. 
This has made it more difficult to find observations that would contradict 
human capital theory in all its modified versions.
Instead of devoting much space to theoretical and ideological 
criticism of human capital theory, this chapter will aim at deriving 
empirically refutable hypotheses. These hypotheses will then be tested in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7, and the theory will then be evaluated on the basis of 
its ability to predict empirical findings. According to Blaug (1992a: 8), ‘it 
can hardly be said that the human capital approach to labor training has 
yet been put to a decisive empirical test.’ This thesis cannot offer a decisive 
test, but it will attempt to give a strategic test of neo-classical human
Becker (1993) emphasises that human capital theory can also include non-pecuniary
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capital theory versus a theory based on transferable training as a collective 
action problem.
2.4 General training and cost sharing
Becker’s (1993) model of how training costs are shared between employers 
and employees is the point of departure for the deriving of the three 
hypotheses. He introduces the distinction between general and specific 
training, and comes to the crucial conclusion that employers will not 
finance any of the costs of training that is ‘general.’ Both these two points 
are fundamental building blocks for the argument in this chapter.
A simple two-period model shows the logic behind the cost- 
sharing conclusion. Employers must in some way finance both direct 
outlays and the opportunity cost of training. The opportunity cost is the 
difference between what could have been produced in the training period 
and what is actually produced. In the model employees can make an 
investment in training through accepting a lower wage than he or she 
would have received, because marginal productivity is reduced during 
training, in return for a higher marginal product, and therefore a higher 
wage in period 2.5 Employers can finance training by paying employees 
more than their net marginal product (marginal productivity minus direct 
training costs) during 1. In making decisions on whether or not to finance 
training, employees consider the wage increases after training versus the 
reduction of wages during training. Employers consider how much to 
invest in training according to the net profit from training, which is the 
difference between increased productivity and wage increases.
How much employers and employees choose to invest in training 
depends on whether training is ‘general’ or ‘specific.’ For training to be 
‘perfectly general’ it must ‘be equally useful in many firms and marginal
benefits.
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products would rise by the same amount in all of them’ (Becker 1993:34). 
Perfectly specific training, on the other hand, is ‘training that has no effect 
on the productivity of trainees that would be useful in other firms’ 
(Becker 1993:40).
One of Becker’s most important conclusions concerning 
employers’ provision of training is that the trainee pays the full cost of 
perfectly general training, because she is awarded the full increase in 
marginal productivity through a wage increase in the subsequent period. 
The reason is that general training increases the marginal product by the 
same amount in all firms, and since there is perfect competition, the wage 
must equal marginal productivity after training is completed. Thus, any 
rise in marginal productivity must then be accompanied by an equally 
large increase in the wage rate, and the firm cannot retain any of the 
increased productivity from the training. Therefore, the trainee must pay 
the whole cost of general training.
Perfectly general training is the extreme case where the employee 
gains the whole advantage from the training. In all other instances a 
smaller or larger part of training is specific, either because the skills are 
useful at only to the training employer or because the employer is a 
monopsonist. In these cases the employees will pay part of their specific 
training by receiving a lower wage in the training period, while employers 
will finance their share by paying employees more than their marginal 
product in the training period. The employee will pay the same ratio of 
the costs as she receives from the gains.
It is not obvious that employees will receive any of the gains, and 
thus that they will be willing to finance any of the costs of specific 
training. The current employer could choose to pay employees no more 
than the wage they would receive elsewhere, and therefore give no wage 
increase after specific training, since such training is of no value for other
5 The assumption is that a worker trying to complete a new task will produce less than 
she would with doing tasks she already performs well. It is assumed that all training is 
done in period 1, while the productivity increase does not occur before period 2.
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employers. Becker introduces turnover as an explanation for why the 
gains will be shared between the two parties. He argues that after an 
employee has received specific training, there is a cost of turnover for 
both her and the employer. The firm profits from specific training since it 
can pay less than the workers’ marginal product. If the worker quits, the 
firm loses its gains from the specific training. Becker argues that it is 
therefore rational for the firm to pay the employee a ‘premium’ after she 
has received specific training. The reason is that it is less likely that the 
employee will quit if she is paid more than she could receive elsewhere, 
since with such a premium turnover will incur a loss on the employee, 
too. The analysis provides little detail on how large this premium will be, 
and consequently how costs of specific training will be shared between 
employers and employees. Becker (1993:44) briefly mentions that ‘the 
shares of each depend on the relations between quit rates and wages, layoff 
rates and profits, and on other factors not discussed here, such as the cost 
of funds, attitudes toward risk, and desires for liquidity.’ Investments in 
specific human capital may furthermore give rise to a hold-up problem, 
which means that each side is vulnerable to the opposite side’s potential 
post-contractual opportunism aimed at obtaining better terms than were 
initially agreed (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 599).6
2.5 Definition of transferable training
In order to modify Becker’s analysis to cover situations with neither 
perfectly general nor perfectly specific training, some researchers have 
broadened the definition of general training to ‘all the training which can 
be used in more than one firm’ (Ritzen 1992:185), that is training that 
leads to ‘skills and knowledge that are broad enough to be applicable in 
other firms’ (Feuer, Glick, and Desai 1992: 42) or ‘those which are useful
6 Hashimoto (1981) provides a more rigid analysis of what determines the sharing of 
costs and benefits from specific training.
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with other employers’ (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999: FI 13). If it is not 
made explicit that this diverges from Becker’s definition, it leads to the 
conclusion that employers will not finance any training that is useful 
outside the firm. As this chapter will show, this is erroneous.
Instead of Becker’s general training concept, the theoretical 
argument in this thesis is therefore based on the adjacent notion of 
‘transferable training.’ There is one crucial difference between Becker’s 
concept of general training and this concept of transferable training. What 
separates them is that the labour market does not have to be perfect for 
training to be transferable. The important point is that Becker’s definition 
of specific and general training comprises two dimensions. Both usefulness 
and market conditions determine the categorisation of training. Becker 
(1993:41) explains that ‘the effect of investment in employees on their 
productivity elsewhere depends on market conditions as well as on the 
nature of the employment.’ This means that ‘very strong monopsonists 
might be completely insulated from competition by other firms, and 
practically all investments in their labor force would be specific.’ The fact 
that these concepts depend on two conditions has one important 
consequence for the general training term. It means that perfect labour 
market competition is a necessary condition for training to be perfectly 
general. Hence, even though, for example, mathematical training could be 
seen as perfectly general training in terms of usefulness, it is not general if 
there are not a large number of companies in the labour market.
There is an element of circularity in Becker’s concept of general 
training since labour markets cannot be perfect if training is not perfectly 
general, and training cannot be perfectly general if the labour market is 
not perfect. To avoid the problems of circularity and to distinguish 
between the two reasons why training may not be general, the definition 
of transferable training in this thesis does not include any condition 
regarding the competition in the labour market. In other words, this 
means that the number of firms shall not per se have any bearing on the
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transferability of certain types of training/
Thus the following definition of transferable training will be used 
in the thesis: training is transferable insofar as the resulting skills are 
equally valuable in more than one firm, and the employers have all the 
necessary information about the training to evaluate the value of the skills 
in their own firms.8
A simple model of the relationship between jobs, requirements and 
skills explains this definition in more detail. This model enables us to 
show how completely general and specific skills, and even skills 
combining only purely general and specific competencies are likely to be 
exceptional cases. Generally, one must assume that skills usually include 
several competencies, that all vary in the number of firms they are 
transferable to. This model can also be used to present the hypotheses that 
will be derived from human capital theory.
The model will show that what determines transferability is the fit 
between sets of job requirements and sets of competencies. Thus, 
transferability is not determined only by the tasks employees do, but how 
these are combined into jobs. Moreover, transferability is a matter not 
only of which competencies employees possess, but how these 
competencies are combined into skills, and how this fits with how jobs 
are designed by different employers.9
7 A similar analysis has been offered by Oatey (1970: 15), who distinguishes between the 
generality of a particular skill and the generality of the investment, which is affected by 
potential mobility.
8 A well-grounded critique is that information could be seen as a necessary part of the 
usefulness condition. That is the core of Katz and Ziderman’s (1990) argument. 
Nevertheless, the information condition is included to underline the fact that it is a 
crucial condition, and to avoid misunderstandings based on a narrower perception of 
usefulness.
9 Marsden (1995: 70) argues that ‘skill transferability is partly a matter of the technical 
characteristics of the skills involved, but even more important are the diversity with 
which the same tasks are combined and applied in different firms, and lack of 
recognition.’
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Since transferability is not just a matter of competencies and tasks 
per se, but how these are organised and combined, the model justifies the 
assumption that there is scope for employer action to affect 
transferability, discussed in more detail in chapter 3 and 5. There are three 
ways in which employers can increase transferability. First, they can 
design jobs so that the requirements are the same among employers. 
Moreover, they can design training so that the combination of 
competencies is equally valuable among employers.10
These two first options both directly influence the necessary match 
between skills and requirements. The final option is to ensure that other 
employers have information about the skills that employees get, a factor 
which is not included in the simple model presented here, but is discussed 
in chapter 5.
The model takes as its point of departure that certain competencies 
are required for a specific job, and that a certain skill consists of different 
competencies. Thus, the job requirements can be represented as: R — 
q... r;... .rn and the skills as S = q ... c;... .cn
These job requirements are not requirements in the strict sense of 
the word. Rather, this model assumes that each employer values a skill 
according to how many of the job requirements it meets, and the value of 
the skill is the same as the number of requirements it fills. For example, if 
the skill meets two requirements, the value is 2.
An obvious critique of the simple model is that skill requirements 
for a job are seldom a matter of a set of strict, dichotomous requirements. 
At the same time, a person’s skills are unlikely to be represented by a set 
of competencies that he or she has or has not got. In the real world, a skill 
will consist of degrees of certain competencies, and jobs will vary by the 
extent to which these competencies will be utilised. This point 
corresponds closely to Blaug’s (1972: chapter 5) critique of the manpower- 
requirements approach to educational planning. The simple requirements-
10 In chapter 5 it is shown that this may either be resolved through organising training
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skills model presented here must assume that there is a minimum 
qualification that is needed, ‘below which the task in question cannot be 
carried out at all but above which additional qualifications have no value’ 
(Blaug 1972: 141).11 Still, the important point remains the same even in a 
model that does not assume that it is a question only of having or not 
having a particular competence. Since different jobs utilise the different 
competencies a skill consists of, the value of a skill is likely to vary 
according to the job it is used in, and the transferability of a skill will be 
defined by the extent to which the skill is valued by different employers.
Table 2.1 Jobs as bundles of job requirements and skills as bundles of different 
competencies_________________________________________________________
Employers Skills
A B C  S S S Sj j  1 2  3 4
r r r c c
i l l  i i
2 r r  oo c  c3 2 2 .3 2 2
|  r 3 r 3 § c 3
3 1)cr r c 1 c
a  4 § 4o
-8 Uo r1—> 5
r
6
Table 2.1 illustrates a situation where employer A’s job requirements are 
r l5 r2, r3 and r4, employer B’s job requirements are r1} r2 and r5, and 
employer C ’s job requirements are r1? r3 and r6. These are the only 
employers in the labour market, and they offer only this one type of job 
each. For each requirement (r,) there is a competency (c,) that fills this
for employees in different firms or harmonising internal training.
11 Blaug argues that the manpower requirements approach to education planning can also 
give provide valid predictions if ‘the output of workers in particular occupations 
increases with their educational qualifications, very gradually at first, then at a sharply 
increasing rate beyond a certain threshold level, after which it levels off again’ (Blaug 
1972: 141). The important theoretical point is however only the distinction between a 
dichotomous and a continuous relationship between skills and output.
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requirement. This means for example that c2 is a requirement for 
employer A and B, but not for C. There are several different training 
options available, which can lead to one of the four different skills shown 
in table 2.1.
In this case, S! and S2 are perfectly transferable skills according to 
the definition, since they are both equally useful in more than one firm. 
The value of Sj is 1 for all three employers, and the value of S2 is 1 for 
both employer A and employer B. Even Sx is however not a general skill, 
as Becker defined it, since the number of employers is so low that the 
employers are likely to enjoy some degree of monopsony power. It should 
be added that with this definition of transferability, S! is not more 
transferable than S2, even if it (SJ is transferable to more employers. In 
other words, theoretically transferability is independent of the number of 
firms the skill is equally useful in. That is a consequence of distinguishing 
between usefulness and competition.12
In most cases a skill consists of combinations of competencies, each 
of which are transferable to a given number of firms. As will be shown 
later, an important possibility is that a skill can consist of one part that is 
transferable to all employers and one part that is firm specific. In table 2.1, 
S3 is such a skill. This skill is worth 2 to one employer and 1 to the two 
other employers. This chapter will show how human capital theorists 
have used the existences of such skills to explain that employers may 
finance transferable training.
The last skill, S4, can be used to explain how training in itself tends 
to limit labour market competition. The skill consists of two 
competencies that are both perfectly transferable, but the combination of
12 This distinction is more complex than it might seen, since usefulness in other firms is a 
necessary condition for competition. If we exclude other factors such as geography for a 
moment, the degree of labour market competition is a direct consequence of how the 
different employers value certain skills.
59
these two is not. The value of the skill is 2 to employer A, but only 1 to 
employers B and C.13
The purpose of the next section is to derive the hypotheses, which 
say that according to human capital theory employers:
• will finance only skills consisting of competencies such as cl5 that are 
transferable to all employers, if there are few employers in the labour 
market or the skill also includes a component of specific human capital 
(such as S3);
• will have incentives to prefer skills S3 with a specific component to S3, 
which is more transferable;
• will not provide the optimal amount of transferable training unless 
there is perfect labour market competition.14
2.6 Modifications of Becker’s theory
Too little transferable training is provided, and employers seem to pay 
even for general training. These two observations have caught many 
researchers’ attention because they apparently contradict Becker’s 
predictions.
To explain this, researchers within the human capital tradition 
have modified Becker’s original theory, and introduced ‘imperfections’ in 
the labour markets, and also in the capital market. This part of the 
chapter focuses on modifications of Becker’s theory that can contribute to
13 In this model, a skill can however be more transferable by adding another 
competency, since it can make the value of the skill more similar among employers. S5, 
consisting of c2, c3 and c5, would for example be perfectly transferable between employer 
A and B. Skill S4, that only consists of c2 and c3, is less transferable.
14 Chapter 7 will discuss in detail what is meant by the ‘optimal amount* of training, and 
how it may be measured.
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deriving the three hypotheses that will be presented.15 There are three 
types of modifications. Theories involving limited labour market 
competition are one type of modification. The second type of 
modifications are those which imply that training is not perfectly 
transferable, but includes elements of firm-specific human capital. The 
third type of modification is based on the assumption that investments in 
specific training may be more profitable if general training is provided at 
the same time.
In Becker’s theory, there are two reasons why training may be 
neither perfectly specific nor perfectly general. One possibility is that the 
training raises marginal productivity in other firms, but the rise is smaller 
than in the training firm. It is also an intermediate case if there is 
imperfect competition in the labour market. Becker analyses the first case 
by assuming that the training consists of a general and a specific part 
(Becker 1993:44). Then it follows that the trainee pays for the general part 
and the two parties share the costs of the specific training. Regarding the 
latter, Becker (1993:50) says that all training provided by a monopsonist is 
perfectly specific, whereas ‘the effect on training in less extreme 
monopsony positions is more difficult to assess.’ Moreover, ‘monopsony 
power as a whole, including the more extreme manifestations, would 
appear to increase the importance of specific training and the incentives 
for firms to invest in general capital.’ He does not discuss imperfect labour 
markets any further. According to Eckaus (1963: 504) and Ziderman 
(1978: 23), Becker was well aware of what it would mean for his 
conclusions to allow for imperfect labour markets, but he saw them as 
only minor qualifications.
15 This means that this chapter will not discuss all the reasons why there might be an 
under-investment in training, for example taxation, risk and unemployment benefits 
(Layard 1994).
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2.6.1 Limited labour market competition
In practice, labour markets for particular skills may consist of few 
employers. Specialisation in education and training, high moving costs 
and barriers to entry make monopsony power likely. This section 
presents some explanations of why employers according to the theory 
might co-finance perfectly transferable training if there are few employers 
in the labour market. These theories can also explain why too little 
transferable training may be provided. This section will also show how 
several other modifications of Becker’s original theory implicitly assume 
that there is limited labour market competition.
One explanation for why employers might be willing to finance 
perfectly transferable training has been put forward by Stevens (1993; 
1994c; 1996). She analyses situations with imperfect labour market 
competition, in which employers can pay employees less than their 
marginal productivity even for transferable training since they have 
monopsony power in the labour market (Stevens 1996: 27).16 Usually this 
difference is smaller the more employers there are (Stevens 1994c: 550). 
However, even labour markets with few employers can be effectively 
competitive, and in some cases employers may still be able to pay 
employees less than their marginal product even if there are many 
employers.17 The important point for Stevens, however, is not so much 
the origin of imperfect competition as the consequences imperfect 
competition has for provision of training.
The fact that employees are paid less than their marginal product 
means that employers will be able to profit directly from transferable 
training, because the gains from employees’ increased productivity will 
not be totally offset by higher wages. This has two important
16 Becker (1962: 24) points out that the observation that employers pay their employees 
less than their marginal productivity cannot be a valid indicator of monopoly power 
when employees have specific skills.
17 That is the case if the supply of labour is ‘sticky/ so not all workers will quit even if 
they are paid somewhat less than they could have done elsewhere (Stevens 1996: 31-32).
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consequences, according to Stevens. As long as the number of firms is not 
very high employers might be willing contribute to financing transferable 
training, because they will reap some of the benefits from transferable 
training. Moreover, because of positive externalities between employers 
too little transferable training will be provided.18 The externality exists 
because employers will benefit from training they do not finance 
themselves.
The externality effect here is the product of the probability of 
separation and the difference between wages and marginal productivity, 
which is the employer’s gains from transferable training (Stevens 1996:29). 
The probability of separation is an increasing function of the number of 
firms. The employer’s gains, on the other hand, are a decreasing function 
of labour market competition. Stevens (1994c:541) claims that ‘any source 
of imperfect competition leading to wages below marginal product, 
combined with any source of uncertainty about labour turnover, gives rise 
to this externality.’ What is clear, is that there are no externalities present 
in the cases of general or specific training, the two extreme cases. Neither 
is there any externality effect when training consists of one general and 
one specific part.
This theory can explain not only why employers pay for 
transferable training but also why too little transferable training may be 
provided. Another implication is the hypothesis that employers will act to 
make training non-transferable or at least not act to make training 
transferable. This is however a conclusion that cannot be drawn if one 
keeps to the assumptions of Stevens’ theory. One limitation of Stevens’ 
theory is, namely, that the number of firms to which training is 
transferable, is exogenous (Stevens 1994c: 544). This means that firms can 
choose only between training that is either firm specific or that is 
transferable to the given number of firms in the relevant labour market.
18 Positive externalities are defined as ‘situations where consumption benefits are shared 
and cannot be limited to particular consumers’ (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 42).
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Stevens (1994c: 550) finds that if the number of firms between which 
training is transferable decreases the following occur:
(1) the total return to the training programme falls;
(2) the return to any individual firm increases;
(3) the probability of the worker moving to another firm falls;
(4) and the return to the worker falls.
Hence, one implication is that, according to (2), any individual employer 
has an incentive to make training less transferable.19 Since Stevens’ analysis 
does not include the possibility that employers can affect the 
transferability of training, she concludes that employers will have 
incentives to provide more than the optimal amount of specific training, 
because specific training reduces the probability of turnover. Therefore, if 
workers get a lot of specific training, employers are more likely to recoup 
their investment in the transferable training. One more direct way for 
employers to ensure that they benefit from the training would, however, 
be to restrict the number of firms who would value the training. The way 
Stevens treats the size of the external market for skills as ‘exogenous’ 
reflects the way neo-classical economists tend to treat the characteristics of 
labour markets as given by the technical nature of the skills involved. She 
mentions that ‘training may be regarded as a process which itself reduces 
competition,’ but she applies this argument only to how specific training 
might reduce turnover (Stevens 1996: 26). The theoretical perspective 
presented in the next chapter focuses more on the institutional setting of 
labour markets than human capital theory does, and argues that 
transferability may be endogenous.
N ot only Stevens has argued that the number of firms in the 
labour market might affect the willingness of employers to pay for
19 While Stevens argues that transferability increases with the number of firms to which 
training is transferable, the definition of transferability in this thesis is independent of 
labour market competition. Still, in practice, attempts to increase transferability by 
Stevens’ definition will increase transferability as it is defined in this thesis.
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transferable training. The point that firms may finance transferable 
training in labour markets characterised by some degree of immobility 
was put forward soon after the publication of Becker’s work (Eckaus 
1963: 503; Thurow 1970: 99; Ziderman 1978: 22). Ritzen (1992:189) argues 
that ‘the specificity of one and the same type of training increases with the 
size of the firm’ because it has a larger internal labour market. A more 
general point is made by Ryan (1984: 209) about the situation where not 
all skilled workers leave even if they are paid less than elsewhere. Then 
firms ‘will find it not only feasible but also profitable to meet its labor 
requirements by paying lower wages to its experienced workers and 
spending some of the saving on training new labor.’ The conclusion is the 
same as Stevens’: if the labour market is not perfectly competitive, 
employers might be able to pay their workers less than their marginal 
productivity, and then employers have an incentive to finance transferable 
training.
Even the association between tenure and training is more or less 
implicitly based on the assumption that there is limited labour market 
competition. Tenure may have an impact on the level of training, but that 
the argument has to be based on a variant of Stevens’ theory above. 
Average tenure in most countries and in most situations seems to be so 
long that employers are likely to reap much of the benefits general 
training generates, goes the argument. OECD (1993) has also shown that 
in countries and sectors with long tenure, training levels tend to be high. 
The link between tenure and training is mentioned by Becker (1962:23). 
He says that ‘with an effective long-term contract...firms would be more 
willing to pay for all kinds of training...since a contract, in effect converts 
all training into completely specific training.’ Subsequent research has 
studied average tenure rather than formal long-term contracts. In other 
words, if the labour contract is de facto long term, one would expect the 
firm to pay for some general training. Some writers have also argued that 
employers are likely to provide general training to employees they expect 
to stay with the firm (Bosworth, Wilson, and Assefa 1994; Feuer, Glick,
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and Desai 1987; Ryan 1984). Yet, as long as the employee is free to leave 
after the training period, long average tenure does not provide a sufficient 
answer to why employers finance transferable training. This conclusion is 
based on an important implicit assumption in Becker’s model. In a perfect 
labour market, it is always possible to hire employees with the general 
skills on the external labour market at the going market wage instead of 
training them oneself.20 Bosworth, Wilson and Assefa (1994:86) claim that 
‘the individual may stay in the firm for a sufficient period for the 
employer to reap some of the benefits from general training.’ However, 
there is nothing in Becker’s work that suggests that employees with 
general training are not going to stay with the employer. Bosworth, 
Wilson and Assefa therefore have to assume that all employees will not 
leave the firm even if they are paid below their marginal productivity. 
They argue that ‘if duration is, in part, socially or institutionally 
determined, the crucial role of market forces which underpins the role of 
specific versus general training as the allocative mechanism to some degree 
breaks down’ (Bosworth, Wilson, and Assefa 1994:86). But their findings 
should be seen as just one example of how employers might be willing to 
finance transferable training if there is limited labour market competition, 
as Stevens argues.
Yet another argument that proves to be another version of the 
limited competition argument is presented by Bishop (1992: 91), who 
claims that seemingly general training does not have the expected effect on 
earnings and cost sharing since different firms need different mixes of 
skills. He argues that ‘the package of general skills that workers develop 
are always more valuable at the training firm than at other firms even 
when each individual skill is correctly perceived to be useful elsewhere.’ 
Thus, acquisition of non-specific skills in itself tends to limit labour 
market competition. In those situations Bishop describes, training is no 
longer general according to Becker’s definition, because there is limited
20 N ot only is it assumed that new workers can hired, the current employees can also be
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competition in the labour market.21 It may however be transferable, so his 
argument should be interpreted as one variant of the argument that 
employers may pay for transferable training if there are few employers in 
the labour market.
2.6.2 Transferable training with elements of specific human 
capital
This section examines the explanation that employers might pay if 
training is not perfectly transferable, for example, because they have more 
information about the training than other employers do. These 
modifications of the original theory all present factors which mean that 
the training is not equally valuable in all firms. This is where they depart 
from both Becker’s concept of general training and this thesis’ definition 
of transferable training. The reason is that employers can benefit from 
training if it is not perfectly transferable, because they can give a wage 
increase that is smaller than the productivity increase brought about by 
the training. An important implication is that if employers have the 
choice between providing perfectly transferable training and less 
transferable training, they would prefer the less transferable training. The 
type of explanation presented here implies that training which is 
apparently general includes an element of specific human capital. Becker 
(1993:41) argues that hiring costs represent a form of specific human 
capital. He also says that ‘expenditure on acquiring knowledge of 
employee talents would be a specific knowledge if the knowledge could be 
kept from other firms, for then the productivity would be raised more in 
the firms making the expenditures than elsewhere.’ The conclusion about
fired at no cost to the employer.
21 Bishop’s point is illustrated by the skill S4 in the skill-requirements model shown 
earlier in the chapter. This skill is less transferable than each of the competencies it 
consists of is.
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skills consisting of only perfectly specific and perfectly human capital is a 
simple one. Other employers in the labour market will offer an 
alternative wage that equals the value of the general component, and 
employers may therefore be willing to share the costs of only the specific 
component (Stevens 1996: 24).
Asymmetric information is one reason why otherwise general 
training can include an element of specific human capital. Katz and 
Ziderman (1990) argue that employers may share the cost of general 
training, and even finance it fully, if they have more information about 
the training than other employers have. Bishop (1992) gives Katz and 
Ziderman empirical support, since ‘even though employers claim that the 
skills they are teaching are general, the labor market is not treating these 
skills as if they were general’ because of informational asymmetry.
The paper by Katz and Ziderman takes as its point of departure 
that the training employer possesses more information about the nature of 
the training than other employers do. The larger this informational 
asymmetry is, the more the employer is willing to pay and the less the 
employee is willing to contribute. In the extreme case where other 
employers are not willing to pay for the training because of informational 
asymmetry, the current employer will pay the whole cost for the 
otherwise general training, leaving it free for the employee. The premise 
of the argument is that information costs make an employee with 
otherwise perfectly transferable skills less valuable to other employers. 
Katz and Ziderman’s main point is that there will be some costs incurred 
by the firm if they place a worker in a job he is not trained for. And since 
they cannot know for sure what skills he has, it will be a risk to place him 
in such a position. Moreover, it is costly to monitor the employee to find 
out what skill he possesses.
The conclusions from this theory are strikingly different from 
Becker’s. Katz and Ziderman (1990:1154) find that in some cases ‘the 
training firm will be prepared to finance [general training] fully.* Becker,
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on the contrary, found that firms would not pay for any general training, 
and would only partly finance specific training.22
Even if Katz and Ziderman claim to provide an explanation for 
why employers would pay for general training, strictly speaking they do 
not. According to Becker (1993:34) ‘perfectly general training’ would be 
equally useful in many firms and marginal products would rise by the 
same exactly the same amount in all of them.’ In Katz and Ziderman’s 
(1990:1148) theory, by contrast, ‘a recruiting firm will place a lower value 
on a recruited worker with general training than will the firm that trained 
him.’ More important for the purpose of this thesis is the fact that training 
is not perfectly transferable if not all employers have the same 
information about the value of the training. Therefore, by definition, 
asymmetrical information cannot provide an explanation for why 
employers would pay for perfectly transferable training. It is however a 
relevant example of how the transferability of training is a matter of not 
only the technical content of the training, but also the information about 
the training, and more broadly institutional matters. Among other things, 
the theory presents a potential problem with certification of on-the-job 
training, which means that information is more equally divided between 
the training employer and other employers.
An argument similar to Katz and Ziderman’s is used by Bishop 
(1992: 94), who says that ‘because other employers are unaware of [the 
training’s] exact character and unable to assess its quality prior to making 
hiring decisions, training that is technically general often becomes 
effectively specific.’ The point that seemingly transferable training can 
include a specific element is also used by Stevens (1994a) to explain the 
patterns in the numbers of apprenticeships in the British engineering
22 The reason for the different conclusions is not just that Katz and Ziderman introduce 
asymmetric information. Another difference is that Becker includes turnover costs in his 
model, which means employers will pay a ‘premium’ to employees with specific skills. 
Since Katz and Ziderman do not include this factor, they can conclude that the employer 
may pay the full cost of general training.
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industry. She argues that it is cheaper for the employer to recruit a worker 
who has undertaken the apprenticeship within the firm than it is to 
recruit a worker who has been trained elsewhere. In times when there are 
skill shortages recruitment costs for skilled workers are high, and that 
makes supplying apprenticeships a good alternative, since the cost of 
recruiting an apprentice does not vary that much, according to Stevens.23 
Another version of the asymmetric information argument is that 
employers who provide training might have more information about the 
abilities of young workers than other potential employers have. Thus, if 
an employee cannot signal her ability to other employers, employers can 
pay the employee less than the full value of her skills (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1998; 1999: F122).
2.6.3 Complementarities between specific and general 
training
The third modification of Becker’s theory is the introduction of 
interaction effects between investments in specific and general training. In 
other words: one can argue that learning general skills increases the 
positive effect of specific training, or reduces the costs of specific training. 
If that is the case, employers may have an incentive to finance for 
transferable training. This argument is potentially of great theoretical 
value, since it is one of very few arguments that can challenge Becker’s 
conclusion about cost sharing without relaxing his assumptions
23 There are alternative explanations of the association Stevens finds between skill 
shortages and apprentices. A simpler explanation of Stevens’ findings is that it reflects 
firms’ simple decision between ‘buy skills’ and ‘make skills.’ When it is difficult to ‘buy’ 
them (recruit externally), firms will rather ‘make them’ (train apprentices) (Senker 1996). 
If she had not maintained the assumption that all workers are necessarily paid their 
marginal productivity, she could have found that skill shortages make apprentices actual 
work effort more valuable tow the firm, and that they therefore would take on more 
apprentices. Thurow (1970: 100-101) discusses the impact unemployment, output 
expectations and the interest rate is expected to have on firm’s training decisions.
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concerning perfect competition. The problem is, however, that in practice 
it is difficult to see that the argument both theoretically and empirically 
adds much to the argument that employers might finance seemingly 
general training if it includes an investment in specific human capital
One of the most common findings in research on education and 
training is that those with a long education get more further training than 
those with a short education (Ashton and Green 1996: 50; Nordhaug and 
Gooderham 1996: 83). One explanation is that either the costs of training 
are smaller or the benefits of training are larger for the group that already 
has education (Green 1994: 261-262). This means that education and 
training are complementary, i.e., that the benefits from both education 
and training will be larger than the sum of the net benefits from education 
and training separately (Thurow 1970: 54). It is also reasonable to assume 
that there are complementarities between general and specific training.
According to Thurow (1970: 93) employers may be willing to pay 
for general training if there are such complementarities between general 
and specific training. These complementarities in themselves are however 
not a sufficient explanation for why firms might finance general training. 
The reason is that employers would rather choose to recruit employees 
with general training and give them specific training than finance general 
training themselves. The analogy with the relationship between education 
and training is illuminating. Even if they are complementary, this is no 
reason for employers to finance education. Instead of financing education, 
they recruit graduates.
Employers may however be willing to finance general training if 
there are complementarities between general and specific training in the 
training process. If specific training becomes more valuable, or specific 
training becomes less costly, when provided together with general 
training, employers may want to contribute to financing general training. 
N ot only must general and specific training be complementary; the 
complementarities must exist only if the two types of training are 
provided at the same time.
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The complementarity argument has been presented in different 
ways. Most of them are more complex than the version presented above. 
One example is the ‘insurance hypothesis,’ presented by Feuer, Glick and 
Desai. According to this hypothesis, ‘firm-sponsored training in general 
skills is not necessarily vulnerable to poaching’ (Feuer, Glick, and Desai 
1987: 122). They argue that as long as an employee acquires both general 
and specific skills at the same time, firms might want to finance some of 
the general training. The reason is that the worker will not leave the firm 
as long as his return to his specific and general skills is higher than he 
would receive elsewhere for his general skills. It is true that the worker 
might not leave, but this is still not an explanation for why employers 
would finance general training. There is no reason why employers should 
not just provide the specific training. The fact that they provide specific 
training at the same time gives no reason for them to finance general 
training, if there is no interaction effect between the two. Feuer, Glick 
and Desai’s (1987: 123) argument about ‘hazards associated with firm- 
specific human capital investments’ is one such interaction. They argue 
that employees are reluctant to invest in specific training because they are 
the weaker part in the bargaining with the employer once the training is 
finished. Therefore firms will provide both general training and specific 
training, since then the worker knows that she will at least get a wage 
increase that equals the increase she can get from the general skills in 
another firm.24 Feuer, Glick and Desai argue that firms will pay for 
general training to encourage specific training. By contrast, Stevens argues 
that investments in specific training are used to reduce turnover so that 
employers are more likely to reap the benefits of transferable training. 
Feuer, Glick and Desai (1992: 53) expect that employees will prefer 
general training to wage ‘premiums.’ The reason is that general training is 
valuable outside the firm, and the benefits are therefore less vulnerable to
24 This argument is similar to Stevens’ (1994c), since they both imply that investments in 
general and specific training are correlated. The difference is the rationale employers 
have to finance general training.
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the present employer’s possible exploitation or layoff. But still, the 
insurance hypothesis fails to explain why the firm cannot just pay a larger 
share of the investment in specific training if there are such hazards 
associated with it.25 The argument advocated above, about 
complementarities in the training process, is simpler than the insurance 
hypothesis presented by Feuer, Glick and Desai’s, without having to rely 
on a hypothesis concerning the vulnerability of employees.
W ithout making assumptions about employees’ vulnerability, 
Franz and Soskice (1995) use a version of the complementarity argument 
to explain why German employers finance apprenticeships, which 
apparently constitute perfectly general training. They argue that if specific 
training is cheaper during general training than after, and specific skills are 
necessary for using general skills, employers may be willing to finance 
general training.26 Franz and Soskice (1995: 224) argue that in German 
organisations, general skills themselves are not of much value until 
extensive specific skills are acquired. In the case of German 
apprenticeships, this may be a reasonable assumption to make. Even if the 
condition that much specific training is needed, it is not a necessary 
condition for the complementarity argument more generally to be true, 
but it makes it more likely that this logic will affect training decisions.
The problem with the complementarity argument is that it could 
be seen as little more than a sophisticated version of the argument that the 
apparently transferable training also includes aspects of specific human 
capital investments, even if they could be seen as two theoretically distinct 
explanations. The extreme example that specific training has no costs
25 Feuer, Glick and Desai (1992) claim to test the insurance hypothesis, but the research 
design does not permit a proper test of the hypothesis. They show that turnover is lower 
for employees who undertake employer-paid education compared with those who pay 
for the further education themselves. This is hardly surprising if we< believe that 
employees often pay for further education to get a new job. A test of the insurance 
hypothesis would have to compare those with firm-sponsored education with a 
comparable group of employees who do not undertake any further education at all.
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during general training elucidates this point. There is a negligible 
difference in practice between saying employers pay for apparently 
transferable training if it includes specific human capital aspects and saying 
they pay because provision of general training makes specific training free. 
The case of apprenticeships may be an illuminating example. Franz and 
Soskice’s argument can hardly be distinguished from explanations 
presented in the previous section; that seemingly general training includes 
aspects of specific human capital.
Later in this thesis the distinction will therefore not always be 
made between the ‘complementarities argument’ and the argument 
presented earlier, that employers might pay for apparently fully 
transferable training if it includes elements of specific human capital.
An additional rationale for not emphasising possible 
complementarities effects in this particular empirical study, is that the 
effects are likely to be small for further training, which is usually short 
compared with for example apprenticeships. The importance of the 
‘complementarities argument’ is likely to be limited by the fact that the 
effect depends on the difference between giving already generally trained 
employees specific training and providing the two at the same time.
2.7 Human capital hypotheses
This section will present three hypotheses that apply to central problems 
in research on education and training. Each of these three hypotheses will 
then be tested in chapter 5,6 and 7, respectively, and compared with 
alternative hypotheses, which treat transferable training as a collective 
action problem. These are all H 0-hypotheses, which will be contrasted 
with alternative hypotheses in chapter 3.
26 Franz and Soskice use ‘marketable skills’ as a synonym for ‘general skills.’
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The first hypothesis, H01, states: since each individual employer has 
no incentive to ensure that training is transferable, each employer will act to 
reduce transferability.
Becker’s cost sharing conclusion is the best starting point to 
explain why this might be true according to human capital theory. He 
argues that the employer will not pay any of the costs of general training 
because the employer will not benefit from it afterwards. The employer 
will however benefit from specific training, and will therefore contribute 
to financing it. As shown earlier, Stevens makes the more general point 
that the fewer firms the training is transferable to, the more will the 
individual employer who finances training benefit from it. The result is 
that human capital theory on this point predicts that each individual 
employer will prefer the less transferable training if he can choose 
between two otherwise equal types of training, even if this, according to 
Stevens, means that the total return to the training programme falls. One 
example is Katz and Ziderman’s model, where each employer would 
prefer to have more information about the training than other firms do, 
even if they then have to pay some of the training costs. So each employer 
will have an incentive to reject certification or other measures to share 
information about training to other employers.
However, the implicit assumption in human capital research is that 
the design of different training options is given, and that employers are 
not in a position to affect the transferability of these options. In other 
words, transferability has been treated as exogenous, while the theory 
presented in chapter 3 assumes that it is endogenous. Exogenous 
transferability is an assumption not only in human capital theory. For 
example, Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) account of internal labour markets 
is also based on the assumption that skill specificity is determined by the 
technology employees use. While the issue of how transferability is 
determined has remained largely untouched in human capital theory, the 
next hypothesis addresses a core theme of human capital research since the 
theory was presented in the early 1960s.
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The second hypothesis, H02, states: employers will not pay for any o f 
the costs o f perfectly transferable training in a perfect labour market, but they 
will pay some o f the costs to the extent that transferable skills includes firm- 
specific human capital, or employees can he paid less than their marginal 
productivity due to limited labour market competition.
The original hypothesis, presented by Becker, is that employers will 
not pay any of the costs of general training.27 Since transferable training 
and general training are equivalents if there are many employers in the 
labour market, his hypothesis can also be said to cover the case of 
transferable training. His hypothesis can then be reformulated thus: given 
fierce competition in the labour market, employers will not contribute to 
pay for transferable training.
As long as Becker does not discuss the case of imperfect competition in 
the labour market (except for the extreme case of monopsony), other 
contributions must be used to make predictions about the case with few 
employers. Stevens is the one who most clearly presents the argument for 
that employers will share part of the costs for fully transferable training if 
there are few employers in the labour market, and an oligopoly solution 
develops where employees can be paid less than their marginal product. 
Thus, there is theoretical support for the hypothesis that employers will 
not individually pay for transferable training, except if there are few 
employers in the labour market, or the training includes specific human 
capital components.
It is worth emphasising that according to human capital theory 
employers will not finance general training just because employees cannot 
afford to pay for it (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999: FI 19). The fact that 
employees are unable or unwilling to pay for general training has 
however, according to Becker’s theory, no impact on employers’ 
willingness to pay for general training, since employees would still reap all 
the benefits from such training. What is the case, however, is that the level
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of training will be too low if employees are liquidity constrained. In 
practice, what some researchers seem to suggest, is that in those cases 
where employees cannot pay for general skills, employers offer less 
transferable training. Then the employer may finance some of the 
training. That will tend to reduce the under-investment in skills (Bishop 
1992; Ryan 1984).
The last hypothesis (H03) states: the optimal amount o f transferable 
training will, and can only, be provided in a perfect labour market with a 
perfect capital market.
Given Becker’s assumptions, standard economic theory will show 
that the training decisions taken in a perfect labour market are the optimal 
ones for the society (Varian 1993). The core idea in human capital theory 
is that ‘the standard tools of economic analysis can be applied to the 
analyses of the determinants and consequences of investments in human 
capital’ (Mincer 1992: 186). Applying these ‘standard economic tools’ 
shows that Becker’s theory predicts that the market itself will provide the 
socially optimal amount of training if the capital market is perfect, as long 
as a perfect labour market is part of the definition of general training. 
Once again this must be reformulated to cover transferable training. Then 
Becker’s conclusion is that the optimal amount of transferable training 
will be provided if there are many employers in the labour market and no 
barriers to mobility. If, on the other hand, there is limited competition in 
the labour market, Stevens’ conclusion is that the optimal amount of 
transferable training may not be provided, since in that case transferable 
training has ‘poaching externalities.’ More generally, ‘even when workers 
have access to perfect loan markets and there are no contractual problems, 
the amount of training in imperfect labour markets will be suboptimally 
low’ (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999: F127).
So the optimal situation, according to human capital theory, can arise 
only in a situation with perfect competition in the labour market when
27 A perfect labour market is not a condition here; for it is part of the definition of
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employees bear all training costs. If employers pay for transferable 
training, there must be ‘imperfections’ in the labour market. And when 
there are ‘imperfections’ in the labour market, the amount of training 
cannot be optimal. So from the point of view of human capital theory, the 
fact that employers pay for training that is not specific, does not 
contradict the observation that too little training is provided. On the 
contrary, in the optimal situation employers should not pay for 
transferable training. In other words, the observation that employers do 
in fact pay for transferable training should, according to this theory, be a 
matter of concern, rather than an indication of higher-than-expected 
provision of training. This shows how the optimal situation depends 
heavily on the capital market being perfect, and the employees therefore 
able and willing to finance general training fully.
The question is then how likely it is that the optimal situation will 
arise. For example, Booth and Snower (1996: 7) argue that
Once we accept that wages are usually set under imperfectly 
competitive conditions (with firms exerting some market power) 
and that most skills are imperfectly transferable (so that poaching 
is usually a possibility), it becomes obvious that the free market 
generally does not provide sufficient incentives for training.
To the extent that individual employers can affect the 
transferability of training, they will prefer training not to be transferable. 
Even if they cannot, situations with few employers or not perfectly 
transferable training can arise. In these situations employers will pay some 
of the training costs, but the amount will be sub-optimal. But human 
capital theory says nothing about the likelihood of the ‘imperfections’ 
arising since the existence of labour markets for particular skills and the 
value of these skills in other firms are treated as exogenous.
The theory presented in the next chapter, to a greater extent than 
human capital theory, tries to explain the existence and constitution of 
labour markets. Based on this theory a set of alternative hypotheses about
general training.
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transferability, cost sharing and training provision are developed. After 
chapter 4, which provides the link between the theoretical predictions and 
the empirical test, these two sets of predictions are tested in chapter 5, 6 
and 7.
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3. The collective action problem of transferable 
training
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 presented human capital theory and its predictions about the 
provision of transferable training. The defining characteristic of human 
capital theory is that it sees education and training as investments. The 
theory that will be presented in this chapter still considers education and 
training as investments, but it deviates from the theory in chapter 2 in one 
important respect. The difference is that this alternative theory regards 
provision of transferable training as a collective action problem for 
employers. This small addition proves to be significant. It leads not only 
to other predictions; it also requires a changed empirical focus.
An example from the German apprenticeship system illuminates 
the difference between the two approaches. It has been a puzzle why 
German employers finance training of so many apprentices when the 
resulting skills are highly valued by other employers, since this appears to 
contradict Becker’s conclusion on cost sharing (Acemoglu and Pischke 
1998). Franz and Soskice (1995) present an explanation in line with human 
capital theory by arguing that the main reason is complementarities 
between specific and general training. Crouch (1993) holds an alternative 
view which emphasises the importance of collective action. He claims that 
German employers finance apprenticeship to such a large extent because 
the chambers of commerce, Kammern, provide the means for collective
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action. It is an alternative view similar to Crouch’s that will be the topic 
of this chapter.1
The purpose of the chapter is to present the basis and the 
implications of the alternative view. It first shows how transferable 
training theoretically is a collective action problem for employers. Then it 
presents the predicted impact employers’ collective action has on the 
provision of transferable training, cost sharing and transferability, and 
compares this to the hypotheses developed in chapter 2. The collective 
action theory does however predict not only what consequences such 
action may have, but also the probability of employers’ collective action 
in different types of industries, and this is the topic of the last part of the 
chapter.
3.2 Transferable training as a collective good
To make clear what transferable training being a collective good means, it 
can be compared to the more widely used notion of ‘public goods.’ A 
standard definition of a public good is that it is ‘non-rival’ and ‘non­
excludable’ (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). If a good is non-rival it means 
that ‘A ’s partaking of the consumption benefits does not reduce the 
benefits derived by all others’ (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 43). 
Exclusion means that ‘A’s‘consumption is made contingent on A’s paying 
the price, while B, who does not pay, is excluded’ (Musgrave and 
Musgrave 1989: 42). If such exclusion is not feasible, a good is non­
excludable. Pure public goods are both non-rival and non-excludable, in 
contrast to pure private goods, which are rival and excludable. Goods that 
are either rival and non-excludable or non-rival and excludable are called 
impure public goods.2 Collective goods are not necessarily non-rival, but
1 As this thesis will show, Tessaring (1998 : 15) is inaccurate when claiming that while 
the neo-classical economists favour market steering of education and training, 
proponents of the collective action perspective favour steering by the state.
2 Musgrave and Musgrave (1989: 44) apply the term ‘social goods’ to all goods that are 
not purely private goods.
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they are non-excludable, according to Olson (1971: 14). In his seminal 
work on collective action he defines a collective good as ‘any such good 
that, if person X[ in a group Xp...Xp„ .Xn consumes, it cannot feasibly be
withheld from the others in the group.’
Transferable training is akin to a collective good since an employee 
is free to leave the firm at any time if no special agreement exists (Crouch 
1995; Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999: 26). This means that transferable 
skills ‘cannot feasibly be withheld from others in the groups,’ i.e. other 
employers. Hence, the skills are non-excludable, and therefore covered by 
Olson’s definition. As a reflection of the fact that labour markets differ 
from markets for goods, skills differ from consumer goods in one 
important way: those who buy labour never own the labour as they 
would own other goods. Therefore, skills can never be a collective good 
by a strict definition of such goods. For example, Becker (1962: 17) argues 
that since property rights in skills are automatically vested -  they cannot 
be used without the permission of the owner -  ‘an analogy with unowned 
innovations is misleading.’ Still, in the rest of the thesis ‘training is a 
collective good’ will be used instead of ‘training is akin to collective 
goods.’
One may argue that transferable training is not only non­
excludable, but also non-rival. Marsden (1986) claims that it all depends 
upon the elasticity in labour supply, or to what extent higher wages will 
increase the supply of labour. If supply is perfectly elastic, all employers 
can have their skill needs covered at the going wage rate. Then 
transferable training is not rival. The less elastic labour supply is, the less 
is transferable training a public good, is Marsden’s argument. Transferable 
training is more like a pure public good in the long than in the short run, 
since in the long run the supply of skills is more elastic. Crouch, Finegold 
and Sako (1999: 26), on the other hand, generally see transferable skills as 
rival since they are ‘not in infinite supply, and if one firm is employing no 
one else can’ and hence they are not pure public goods. Thus, at least in 
the short run, transferable skills are rival, and non-excludable, and
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therefore impure public goods. In the longer run, however, the number of 
schools and training places may be increased, so skills are more similar to 
a pure public good.
Skill transferability is however a pure public good irrespective of 
time frame. The benefits stemming from increased transferability are, for 
example, lower information costs about employees’ skills and lower 
recruitment costs. In contrast to the skill itself, these benefits are both 
non-rival and non-excludable, and hence pure public goods.
Table 3.1 Public good characteristics of training
Excludable
Yes No (i.e. collective good)
Rival Yes Specific training Transferable training
No Employers’ information Transferability of training
about own training
The categorisation is summarised in table 3.1. Specific training is 
excludable, as no other employers can benefit from the training. Since 
only the current employer can profit from these skills, they can be seen as 
pure private goods even if the employer can never be confident that the 
employee will not leave. Information about training within the firm 
might be non-rival, yet excludable, because the employer may choose not 
to provide information about the training to other employers.3
The most important point to establish here, however, is that 
according to this theory transferable training is non-excludable and 
therefore a collective good. Consequently, a collective action problem 
exists. There is such a problem ‘where rational individual action can lead 
to a strictly Pareto-inferior outcome, that is, an outcome which is strictly 
less preferred by every individual than at least one other outcome’ (Taylor 
1987: 19). Table 3.1 shows that the provision of transferable training 
generates two collective action problems for employers:
3 The information the employee can give about the training is ignored here. As shown in 
chapter 2, employers have incentives not to pass on information to other employers.
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• actions to make training transferable, or to organise the supply of 
transferable training, involves a collective action problem for 
employers;
• financing of transferable training is a collective action problem for 
employers
From Taylor’s definition of a collective action problem two important 
consequences evolve, which will be in focus in the remaining part of this 
thesis. Firstly, since transferable training is a collective good, we expect 
that the outcome of investment decisions by individual employers will be 
too little training.. Secondly, this problem can be overcome by co­
ordinated action. O f these two consequences, previous research has given 
most attention to the former. Therefore, this chapter includes a 
framework for the analysis of solutions to the collective action problem. 
However, first it analyses the impact of employers’ collective action.
3.3 Impact of collective action
This part of the chapter (3.3) discusses the impact of employers’ collective 
action on transferability, cost sharing and amount of training, and 
generates the set of alternative hypotheses presented in table 3.2. The next 
part (3.4) answers the separate question of what determines the 
probability of such action. These two parts are both required in order to 
derive the predictions about each industry, which are discussed in detail in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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Table 3.2 H0- and Ha[t-hypotheses
Human capital theory Collective action theory Ch.
H01: Since each individual Haltl: Individual employers will 5
employer has no incentive to usually have no incentive to make
ensure that training is transferable, training transferable, but through
each employer will act to reduce collective action they may do so
transferability because it is best for the employers 
as a group.
. H02: Employers will not pay for Halt2: If the increased productivity 6
any of the costs of perfectly from transferable training is not
transferable training in a perfect fully offset by higher wages,
labour market, but they will pay employers may be willing to
some of the costs to the extent that finance a share of the costs of
transferable skills includes firm- transferable training, and they are
specific human capital, or likely to finance the highest share
employees can be paid less than if there is collective action among
their marginal productivity due to 
limited labour market competition.
employers.
H03: The optimal amount of HaIt3: Even though the optimal 7
transferable training will, and can amount of training may be
only, be provided in a perfect provided in perfect labour markets
labour market with a perfect with perfect capital markets, it is
capital market. more likely to be a result of 
employers’ collective action, which 
may be achieved if there are few 
employers, or through a powerful 
body.
3.3.1 Transferability of training and ‘endogenisation*
Collective action theory does not dispute the prediction of human capital 
theory that employers individually are unlikely to try to ensure that 
training is transferable. Collective action theory says, however, that this
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problem can be overcome either because there is voluntary co-operation 
between a few, large employers or there is a powerful body that can use 
selective incentives to make employers contribute to making training 
transferable, as this chapter will show. Still, the possibility of defection is 
always there, since individual employers have an incentive to free ride. 
Hence, co-operation is inherently unstable, and dependent on the 
continuing co-operation of the employers.
A significant difference between human capital theory and 
collective action theory is the importance of employers’ action in 
determining transferability. While human capital theory predicts that 
individual employers’ actions to reduce transferability have limited 
impact, collective action theory emphasises that employers’ actions are 
crucial in determining transferability of training.
Collective action theory states that transferability is only partly a 
result of the technology applied or the product produced. What 
eventually determines transferability is how work is organised and skills 
applied in different firms, and the information employers have about the 
training, and whether action is taken to ensure employees in different 
firms get similar training. Thus the alternative hypothesis which
will be treated in more detail in chapter 5, is: individual employers will 
usually have no incentive to make training transferable, but through collective 
action they may do so because it is best for the employers as a group.
This ‘endogenisation’ of transferability, implying that 
transferability of training is not set independently of employers’ choices, 
has had wide-ranging implications for the study of training and labour 
markets more generally. ‘Endogenisation’ would imply not only that 
employers’ individual and collective actions significantly affect 
transferability, but consequently labour market competition as well, since 
transferability of skills is a necessary condition for labour market 
competition. Therefore, collective action theory predicts that without 
collective action by employers, action by individual employers to reduce 
transferability contribute to reducing labour market competition. In other
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words, labour market competition will, according to collective action 
theory, affect not only employers’ training decisions; but these decisions 
will in turn also affect labour market competition. Human capital theory, 
on the other hand, assumes that labour market competition is given, and 
is a factor that employers must only take into consideration. The 
relationship between endogenous transferability, cost sharing and skill 
shortages are discussed in chapters 6 and 7, and the more general 
conclusions treated in chapter 8.
3.3.2 Cost sharing
Instead of maintaining that employer financing can be due only to specific 
human capital elements in the training, or limited competition in the 
labour market, collective action theory predicts that the existence or lack 
of co-operative solutions between employers is an important determinant 
of how much employers contribute to financing transferable training.
Figure 3.1 Supply and demand for training places given share of training costs 
borne by employers
Share of
training costs 
borne 100%
employers
0% Amount of training
Figure 3.1 gives a simple presentation of the argument for why collective 
action leads to a higher share of training costs borne by the employer. The 
supply of training places by employers (sl5 s j  depends on the
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transferability of training and competition in the labour market. If 
training is perfectly transferable and there is perfect competition in the 
labour market, the supply curve is horizontal at 0 per cent, since 
employers would not be willing to finance any training places. In this 
figure, however, the curve is downward sloping, illustrating that 
employers may be willing to supply training places, but the higher the 
share of training costs they have to bear, the smaller the number of places 
offered. The demand for training places from individuals reflects 
transferability of training, wage increases from training, ability to finance 
training and their willingness to bear risks.
Collective action theory predicts that collective action through 
formal and informal sanctions will lead to a shift from to s2, so that 
employers will provide more training places for any given cost sharing. 
Hence, even if the goal of employers’ collective action is not to increase 
the share of training costs borne by employers, but to increase the amount 
of training (from to x2 in figure 3.1), in the new equilibrium the share 
of training costs borne by employers will increase (from p! to p^. Hence, 
the second alternative hypothesis (Halt2), is: i f  the increased productivity 
from transferable training is not fully offset by higher wages, employers may be 
willing to finance a share o f the costs o f transferable training, and they are 
likely to finance the highest share i f  there is collective action among employers.
The rationale for employers’ collective action to shift the supply 
curve, could be not only the collective action problem among employers, 
but also that individuals’ demand for training places, for some reason, is 
lower than what is perceived to be optimal. That may happen, for 
example, if individuals find it more difficult to finance training, or they 
get more uncertain about the future pay-off, which could lead to a 
breakdown of a solution with high trainee contributions.
It may however be the case that a trainee-financed solution breaks 
down or is not possible, because the share of training costs borne by 
employers for some reason, for example trade union power or 
government regulations, is set so high that supply is lower than demand.
In that case, a shift in the supply curve leads only to a higher amount of 
training being provided, and not a higher share of training costs borne by 
employers. Thus, collective action theory predicts that collective action 
leads to a higher share of training costs borne by employers, except in the 
case where employers’ collective cannot influence this share.
3.3.3 Amount of training and skill shortages
Human capital theory states that the optimal amount of training is 
provided only if there are perfect labour and capital markets, and 
departures from this ideal situation will always mean sub-optimal 
provision of transferable training. Collective action theory does not 
conflict with the human capital theory conclusion, that if the labour 
market and the capital market are perfect, the provision of transferable 
training will be optimal. But the collective action hypothesis is 
distinctively different since it does not use the perfect labour market as the 
only ideal or point of departure. Instead, collective action theory predicts 
that the optimal amount of transferable training may be achieved in 
several different situations, and that a large number of employers in a 
labour market does not necessarily mean that the provision of transferable 
training is more likely to be optimal. This is because, as this chapter will 
show, employers’ collective action is most likely in a situation with few 
employers and a powerful superordinate body. This situation stands in 
contrast to a situation with a high number of employers without 
monopsony power, which according to human capital theory is most 
likely to generate the optimal amount of training.
Moreover, this alternative theory predicts that since transferability 
is endogenous, labour market competition is unlikely to be ‘perfect’ in 
skilled labour markets if there is no collective action, since employers’ 
collective action is likely to be a requirement for transferability of 
training. Hence the ideal situation of human capital theory is unlikely to 
develop without an institutional underpinning.
Thus, the third alternative hypothesis (Hdt 3), is: even though the 
optimal amount o f training may be provided in perfect labour markets with 
perfect capital markets, it is more likely to be a result o f employers3 collective 
action, which may be achieved i f  there are few employers, or through a 
powerful body.
The hypothesis is closely linked to the considerable difference 
between the theories regarding the theoretical position of perfect labour 
markets. In human capital theory the perfect labour market is the one 
point of reference, which other competitive situations are judged against, 
and the degree of labour market competition determines cost sharing and 
the provision of transferable training. In collective action theory a 
situation with many employers, without market power, is one of several 
possible patterns rather than a standard that the other types are compared 
with. These different patterns and the different probability of employers’ 
collective action in different labour market settings are the topic of the 
next part of the chapter.
3.4 Probability of collective action by employers
While the first step in presenting a collective action theory of training has 
been to discuss the impact of employers’ collective action, the next step 
necessary to develop predictions about training outcomes, is to derive the 
probability of collective action under different conditions.
Several other authors have argued that transferable training is a 
collective action problem. Crouch (1998: 370) acknowledges that training 
is a collective good, which implies that there is ‘no reason why company 
decisions and market forces should maximise the level of vocational 
ability for society as a whole.’ Marsden (1986: chapter 8) bases his 
‘alternative approach to labour markets’ on transferable training being a 
public good, and finally Finegold (1991b: 104) argues that the provision of 
transferable skills is a classic free-rider problem. Yet few attempts have 
been made to investigate how the conditions for solving the collective
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action problem may vary between different labour markets and different 
parts of the labour market.4 That will be done here, by linking the 
acknowledgement of training as a collective good with theories of 
employers’ collective action. Thus, an aim for this thesis is to contribute 
to the research that can explain differences in employers’ collective action 
between different categories of employers. What this section shows, 
however, is that most theories of employers’ collective action so far have 
done more to explain differences between employees’ and employers’ 
collective action than to explain differences between different groups of 
employers. First the theoretical status of employers’ collective action in 
general is presented, before it is shown how this can be applied to cases of 
transferable training. The next part of the chapter will present Olson’s 
theory of collective action, and then describe how other authors later have 
treated employers’ collective action more specifically.
3.4.1 Olson’s two solutions
Since its publication in 1971, few books in economics have achieved such 
wide-ranging, lasting and profound impact as Olson’s watershed work on 
collective action (Sandler 1992: 1). The essence of Olson’s (1971; 1982) 
thesis is that it is an exception when groups of self-interested individuals 
act to achieve their common interest. The reason is that in large groups 
each individual’s contribution is unlikely to significantly affect the total 
output of the collective good, and individuals are therefore unlikely to 
contribute. That is the case even if each individual would be better off if 
all contributed so that the collective good was provided. This is the 
collective action problem.
The problem could be solved however. Olson argues that there are 
basically two solutions to this collective action problem. In short his
4 Bowman (1989) develops predictions of employers’ collective action in the product 
market only. The factors that determine the probability of such product market 
collaboration, for example cartels, are necessarily very different from the ones that 
influence collective action in the labour market.
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argument is that ‘those groups that have access to selective incentives will 
be more likely to act collectively to obtain collective goods than those 
that do not, and that small groups will have a greater likelihood of 
engaging in collective action than larger ones’ (Olson 1982: 34).
Selective incentives are excludable goods provided only to those 
who contribute to the provision of the collective good. A necessary 
condition for this solution to be effective is that another organisation 
cannot provide the same goods without supplying the collective goods 
(Sandler 1992). The selective incentives can be either negative or positive 
(Olson 1982: 21). In other words, if an organisation can use selective 
incentives to encourage collective action, it means that it can either 
reward those who contribute to the collective good or punish those who 
do not. These incentives are not necessarily pecuniary or formal; censure 
of those who do not contribute can also be an important selective 
incentive (Olson 1982: 23). Olson does not limit his discussion of selective 
incentives to trade unions or business associations. He also argues that 
government taxes are contributions obtained with the help of negative 
selective incentives (through the legal system).
The collective action problem may also be solved because the 
group that will benefit from the collective good is small. The probability 
that the collective goods will be provided, increases the smaller, and the 
more asymmetric, the group is.5 Asymmetry means that interest in the 
collective good varies between agents. This asymmetry can reflect 
differences in size, for example between firms, but the asymmetry can also 
exist because agents have different preferences. Hence size does not 
necessarily reflect the agents’ interest in the good (Sandler 1992). Olson 
(1971) argues that differences in size between the agents make it more 
likely that the largest agents contribute to the provision of the collective 
goods. Nevertheless, preference differences can alter Olson’s (1971: 28)
5 In line with Sandler (1992),the terms ‘asymmetry’ and ‘symmetry’ are used instead of 
O lson’s (1971) ‘heterogeneous’ and ‘homogeneous’. The purpose is to avoid confusion 
with ‘social heterogeneity’, which Olson (1982) argues is an obstacle for collective action.
92
observation that there is a tendency for ‘exploitation of the great by the 
small.’ That may happen if the interest in the collective good increases less 
than proportionally with size.
What Olson means with ‘group size’ is not the number of agents 
(»)> but rather k , defined as the size of the smallest subgroup that could 
benefit more than the total cost of the whole group’s good’ (Hardin 1982: 
46-48). As Schelling (1978: 221) shows, it depends on the situation 
whether k, k /n  or n-k is most interesting. Generally k  is lower the more 
asymmetric the agents are. The implication of focusing on k  instead of n is 
that one can hardly find any general rule defining how few agents are ‘few’ 
and how many are ‘many’ without studying the situation in more detail. 
In other words, it is hard to have a priori expectations about where the 
exact borderline between small- and large number cases should be drawn. 
It depends not only on the agents themselves, but also on the collective 
good in question.6
The argument that collective action is most likely when there are 
few agents is strengthened if one includes strategic interaction. One type 
of strategic interaction is conditional co-operation, which is to co-operate, 
but only if others do. Dynamic analyses show that conditional co­
operation makes it more likely that the collective action problem is solved 
(Dixit and Nalebuff 1991; Hardin 1982: 13; Olson 1971: 43; Taylor 1987: 
12). One simple possibility deriving from game theory is to see it as a 
multi-period prisoner’s dilemma, where it may be rational for interacting 
agents to ‘co-operate,’ i.e., provide transferable training. In a series of two- 
agent games it can be rational to co-operate in the first round and then co­
operate as long as the counterpart does so (Axelrod 1984). This means that 
the conditions for solving the collective action problem in smaller groups 
are better than Olson predicts in his static model. However, as the 
number of agents becomes very large, dynamic analyses will not result in
6 Later, ‘small group’ is used instead of ‘small and/or asymmetric group’ and ‘large group’ 
instead of ‘large and symmetric group.’
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outcomes significantly different from static ones (Hardin 1982; Olson 
1971: 45). Thus, adding the possibility of repeated games strengthens the 
argument that small groups and large groups have substantially different 
prospects of providing collective goods.
Theoretically, each of these conditions (small group and selective 
incentives) can make it more likely that the collective good is provided. 
Even if Olson discusses these two solutions separately, one does not 
preclude the other. There may very well be ‘selective incentives’ in cases 
where there are few agents.
Table 3.3 Groups by conditions for collective action according to Olson
Group size 
Large Small
Organisation with 
selective incentives
N (1) (2)
Ye (3) (4)
A simple version of the argument is presented in table 3.3. In large groups 
without an organisation with selective incentives (1), a solution to the 
collective goods problem is least likely, according to Olson. In cases 
where there is either an organisation which can use selective incentives, or 
few agents, but not both (2 and 3), there could also be a solution to the 
collective goods problems. The theory does not provide a priori 
expectations about in which of these two groups collective action is most 
likely. The probability of collective action is highest where there are few 
agents and an organisation that can use selective incentives (4).
Olson’s theory fostered a great amount of research, as well as 
critique. The theory was vulnerable to criticism partly because the book 
did not present any rigid test of his theory (Traxler 1991: 34). One 
common objection was that the theory was too simplistic. Taylor (1987: 
12), for example, argues that ‘Olson’s model...is rather unrealistic.
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Accordingly, not too much weight should be attached to conclusions 
derived from it.’
Many of the critics argue that Olson underestimates the 
probability that the collective action problem will be overcome. One 
important reason to believe so is that collective action is more likely when 
we take into account that the decision to contribute or not depends on 
whether others do. These possibilities, and several others, have been 
analysed in game theory. Yet, even if they qualify Olson’s conclusions, 
they hardly provide any reason to reject Olson’s theory.7
One important such qualification is the acknowledgement that the 
provision of collective goods always involves cost sharing that is more 
complicated than Olson assumes (Udehn 1996: 212). Another is that there 
is often a choice between different levels of collective goods, and it is not 
simply a question of providing it or not (Sandler 1992: 49). Traxler (1991; 
1993) also argues that Olson confuses different aspects of collective action. 
He therefore suggests a distinction between associability (the 
organisation’s ability to attract a large proportion of the relevant target 
group), generalisability (its ability to attract members with different 
interests) and governability (its ability to influence its members actions).
A potentially more fatal criticism is that contributions towards 
collective action are in fact not based on rational calculation of pure self 
interest (Marwell and Ames 1981). More precisely, Olson’s theory is 
criticised for not including the importance of identification, socialisation, 
norms and mutual expectations for individual choice (Traxler 1991: 33).8 
These factors could themselves represent alternatives to Olson’s theory in 
explaining collective action. A pragmatic view would be that depending 
on the type of situation, the impact of identification and norms (as
7 Sandler (1992: 12) says that ‘the failure of O lson’s propositions to have universal 
validity does not significantly detract from his great achievement in elucidating some of 
the principles of collective action.’
8 This critique reflects the major debate within sociology of rational versus norm-based 
action.
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opposed to rational self-interest) on action, would vary. And even if 
Olson’s theory cannot be deterministic, since not everyone acts out of 
pure self-interest, his theory can still be valuable in predicting variation in 
the provision of collective goods.
Later in this thesis his theory is used to predict which groups of 
employers are likely to solve the collective action problem of transferable 
training. But first the next part analyses alternative theories that have been 
used to explain employers’ collective action.
3.4.2 Alternative theories of employers’ collective action
The question of why collective action varies between different groups of 
employers has remained largely unanswered. Instead, one must infer what 
can be learnt about comparisons between different groups of employers 
from employer -  employee comparisons. This section shows how these 
contributions build on and complement Olson’ theory of collective 
action.
A decisive contribution, and the point of departure for subsequent 
employer -  employee comparisons, is Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980) paper 
on ‘two logics of collective action’, which concludes that the problem of 
collective action is smaller for employers than for employees. One reason 
is that employers depend less on collective action to achieve their goals 
than employees do.9 Moreover, employers find it easier to act collectively 
because their needs are better defined and vary less between different 
employers than the case for employees. This controversial conclusion, 
based on class theory, triggered empirical research. The results to a large 
extent contradict the predictions Offe and Wiesenthal make (Waarden
9 According to Offe and Wiesenthal (1980: 84), ‘most of the ‘central life interests’ of 
capital are either resolved beneath the level of association, namely within the individual 
firm, or above the level of association, namely within the state apparatus.’
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1991: 56). Therefore, new attempts have been made to explain the 
differences between employees’ and employers’ collective action.
One of the important contributions in the debate that followed 
Offe and Wiesenthal’s work argues that the most important difference 
between employees’ and employers’ collective action is not their class 
position in itself; the crucial difference is that employers’ associations and 
business organisations are ‘organisations of organisations,’ and hence they 
differ from trade unions, which are organisations of individuals (Waarden 
1991).10 This argument does not conflict strongly with Olson’s theory, but 
is valuable particularly through the way it discusses resources and 
heterogeneity as a basis for Olson’s more abstract concept of ‘different 
preferences’ for a collective good.
According to van Waarden, ‘organisations of organisations’ 
encounter five types of problems that distinguish them from organisations 
of individuals. First, organisations tend to have more resources than 
individuals. Traxler (1993: 684-685) argues that the most essential 
difference between business and labour, aside from interests, are available 
resources. One important consequence is that employers are in a better 
position to further their interests individually than employees are (Traxler 
1991: 43; Waarden 1991: 58). According to Traxler available resources 
reduce the ‘need for organisation,’ or need for collective action. Applied to 
differences between employers, one would expect that large firms need 
collective action less than small employers do. But having considerable 
resources also means that membership fees may be a minor expense 
(Traxler 1991). Hence the effect of available resources, or ‘size’, is 
theoretically indeterminate; the need for collective action may be reduced, 
but the ability to contribute towards the collective good is enhanced. This 
is in line with the previous discussion of the effect of size and preferences 
in Olson’s theory. The fact that employers in many cases are able to
10 One may however argue that this is only partially true, since trade union 
confederations by definition are ‘organisations of organisations.’
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further their interests without collective action is also important because 
it affects the collective organisation’s possible power over the members. 
Traxler (1991) argues that employers are less ‘governable’ than employees 
are because it is ‘relatively easy for employers to bypass their associations’ 
goals through autonomous mobilisation of power resources.’ Applying 
this to comparisons between employers, one would expect that large 
employers are especially hard to govern because they can most easily do 
without the collective organisation. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980: 80) argue 
that whereas employers’ associations depend only on the companies’ 
willingness to pay, trade unions also depend on their ability to mobilise 
their members to act. But employers’ as well as employees’ organisations 
face two different problems: one of joining the organisation and one of 
making members comply (Bowman 1998: 326).
A second problem for ‘organisations of organisations’ is that 
‘organisations may differ on many more characteristics than individuals’ 
(Waarden 1991: 59). Streeck (1992) suggests that this is the most important 
reason why firms tend to establish less comprehensive organisations than 
employees do. Using Traxler’s terminology, it means that business 
organisations have less ‘generalisability.’ In other words, it is particularly 
difficult to include a wide range of different firms with a wide scope of 
different interests in one organisation. All these contributions contradict 
Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980: 75) position, namely that interest differences 
are greater among employees ‘since the worker is at the same time the 
subject and the object of the exchange of labor power.’ Streeck (1991) 
argues that heterogeneity among employers is high because they are 
represented both in the labour market and the product market, and their 
interests are more diverse in the product market. This means that it is 
easier to organise comprehensive organisations for labour market issues 
than for product market issues. Therefore, if training is regarded as a 
labour market issue, the possibility for co-operative solutions is higher
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than if it is regarded as a product market issue.11 Olson (1982) mentions 
that interest heterogeneity poses a problem for collective action, but he 
does not discuss how that could effect collective action among employers.
The last three problems van Waarden mentions are all clearly in 
line with Olson’s theory. One problem for collective action is that 
employers are more likely than individuals to act in accordance with 
Olson’s behavioural assumptions. According to van Waarden (1991: 60) ‘if 
there is one group which fits the behavioural assumptions underlying the 
theory, namely rational action and rational choice, perfect information 
and economic self-interest, it should be business.’ Hence, the free-rider 
problem is expected to be especially important for employers’ collective 
action.
The fourth and the fifth problem are ‘asymmetry in size and 
resources’ as well as ‘small group size.’ Together these two problems 
constitute one of Olson’s two solutions to the collective action problem: 
small, asymmetric groups. Therefore, one would expect that the 
conditions for collective action among employers are good compared to 
employees, according to Olson’s theory. Both Traxler (1991: 45) and van 
Waarden (1991: 69) specifically mention the possibility that contributions 
from a few large firms may suffice to set up an association. The 
implications of Olson’s theory for employer’s collective action are 
discussed in more detail later. Yet, two important points can already be 
made. First, Olson’s theory clearly influences the theories of employers’ 
collective action that were presented. Moreover, some empirical findings 
seem to confirm that collective action is more likely in small groups. 
Traxler (1991: 73) finds that the larger the share of employees in an 
industry that are employed in the four largest firms, the larger the share of 
organised employers tends to be.
11 Based on this line of reasoning, one prediction is that the emphasis within HRM on  
skills as a potential basis for competitive advantage in the labour market may discourage 
employers’ collective action.
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One final question remains about Olson’s theory and the way it is 
applied by van Waarden, namely the link between interest heterogeneity 
and group size. The paradox is illustrated by van Waarden (1991: 61), who 
on the one hand argues that ‘high interest heterogeneity will make it 
difficult for business to find a general group interest on which to organise, 
and hence be a hindrance to collective interest organisation.’ At the same 
time, this high degree of ‘fragmentation’ is an advantage because groups 
are small. That is, according to Olson, an advantage for collective action, 
and van Waarden (1991: 64) adds that small groups have less interest 
heterogeneity within the association than larger ones would have. This 
theoretical argument can explain why business associations tend to be 
smaller than trade unions (Waarden 1991: 62).
The literature on this point is confusing, mainly because the 
assumptions are not made clear, and there is no definition of what it 
means to solve the collective action problem. None of the authors disagree 
that interest heterogeneity reduces generalisability. Olson (1982: 24-25) 
mentions the effect only on governability. He argues that it will be more 
difficult for associations to unify its member’s diverging interests. The 
question is then how heterogeneity affects associability, ‘an association’s 
capacity to recruit members within its domain’ (Traxler 1993: 677).
The problem is that interest heterogeneity affects what is the 
‘domain.’ Interest heterogeneity can have two different effects on the 
domain. It may reduce the number of agents who benefit from the 
collective good. But it can also reduce the number who are willing to co­
operate without reducing the number who are actually benefiting from 
the collective good. In the first case, it will make collective action more 
likely. In the latter, however, interest heterogeneity will only hinder 
collective action. In real cases both effects will occur, depending on the
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nature of the collective good involved, and the effect of interest 
heterogeneity on collective action is therefore ambiguous.12
3.5 Collective action theory and transferable 
training
So far this chapter has shown how transferable training is a collective 
action problem for employers, and presented theories about employers’ 
collective action. Here these two are combined by applying Olson’s 
theory to predict under what conditions the collective action problem is 
likely to be solved, and when it is not.
Olson makes it clear that there are two conditions that can foster 
collective action: small group size as well as organisations that can use 
selective incentives. Both can be applied to the case of employers’ 
collective action. The first condition, the number of agents, could readily 
be interpreted as the number of employers. The hypothesis is then that 
the fewer employers that benefit from the transferable training, the more 
likely is it that the collective action problem of transferable training is 
solved (if there are no fixed start-up costs). The fewer the firms in the 
relevant industry, the more likely it is for these firms to provide the 
collective goods, if skills are valuable within one industry, and not 
outside.13 In addition, the more the firms vary with regard to how much 
they would benefit from transferable training, the more likely is it that 
they provide the transferable further education and training. It is
12 This problem is related to another problem of collective action theory; It does not 
discuss how group identification is formed.
13 In practice, the boundaries for where a skill is valuable are not necessarily the same as 
industry boundaries. Skills may be more useful in only one part of the industry than in 
other parts, or skills may be valuable outside the industry. Then, characteristics of the 
group of employers benefiting from a certain type of skill, which may not be the same as 
those of the industry, is the correct basis for considerations of the probability of 
collective action.
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reasonable that firms should benefit more, the more employees they have. 
Firms’ size, measured by the number of employees, can therefore be a 
valid indicator of firms’ interest in the collective good. Thus, size may 
have a positive effect on the probability of collective action. Yet, since 
large employers are more able to organise training themselves, and less 
dependent on the external labour market for recruitment of skilled 
employees, one would expect that their benefit from transferable training 
increases less than proportionally with the number of employees. Hence, 
in some ways size may be a hinder for collective action. Still, the 
prediction is that sectors dominated by a few, large employers are most 
likely to solve the collective action problem, ensure that transferable 
training options exist, and contribute to financing such transferable 
training. On the contrary, industries with many firms of equal size are 
least likely to solve the problem. ‘Concentration’ is used to denote the 
degree to which a few employers employ a large share of the employees in 
an industry.
The second condition that may promote collective action, 
organisations with selective incentives, is not so straightforward to apply 
to the employers’ collective action problem of transferable training. In 
this study, ‘powerful bodies’ denotes organisations that can use negative or 
positive sanctions to encourage employers to contribute to the collective 
good. The higher the opportunity cost of non-compliance for the 
employers, the more powerful is the organisation, and the more likely is it 
that the collective action problem will be solved.
This definition requires some further explanation. It is based on 
Olson’s definition of selective incentives, but is adjusted to the topic of 
transferable training. Another advantage of this definition is that it is 
neither biased towards the analysis of joining voluntary organisation nor 
specific countries or contexts. The ‘cost of non-compliance’ means how 
costly it would be not to comply with the organisation’s decisions. Cost 
here means opportunity cost. For example: the more valuable the 
membership of the organisation is to the employer, the more powerful is
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the organisation, if the organisation can exclude employers that do not 
comply, and excluding members is its main power tool. In some cases, 
employers would rather stay outside an organisation than be a member 
and contribute towards the collective good. That would mean that the 
‘cost of non-compliance’ was negative, and that the organisation did not 
have the power to ensure contributions towards the collective good.
One of few other attempts to apply Olson’s theory to the case of 
transferable training is made by Crouch (1995). He argues that 
‘associations’ can solve the collective action problem of training. The 
concept of ‘associations’ is clearly influenced by the German example it is 
derived from, and is therefore a less general application of Olson’s point 
about selective incentives than the concept of ‘powerful bodies’ above.
An association is defined as ‘a monopolistic, possibly compulsory, 
multi-purpose organization’ that ‘might use control over excludable 
benefits in order to elicit contributions to collective goods.’ Moreover, the 
association must have a ‘virtual monopoly’ over supplies of the excludable 
benefits. This ‘virtual monopoly’ is most likely to exist if the organisation 
offers a range of excludable goods, or the organisation has a monopoly 
position that is secured through laws or through a set of ties to a 
particular community (Crouch 1995: 291).
Crouch diverges from Olson’s theory in at least two ways. First, 
he does not distinguish between primary and secondary goods in the way 
Olson does. Primary goods are the collective goods, while the secondary 
goods are private goods provided to encourage the contribution to the 
provision of collective goods. Instead, Crouch argues that in practice an 
organisation can provide several different collective and private benefits 
for members, which cannot easily be categorised as ‘primary’ or 
‘secondary.’ Even if this goes beyond Olson’s theory, it is not in any way 
in conflict with his ‘logic of collective action.’
Second, whereas Crouch maintains that associations might be 
compulsory, Olson (1971: 16) says that only large organisations that ‘are 
not able to make membership compulsory’ must also provide non­
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collective goods. This difference is however superficial. While Olson 
describes joining the organisation as the collective action problem, 
Crouch describes a problem that includes making members contribute 
towards the collective good.14 Crouch’s main example of associations is 
the German chambers of commerce (Kammem ). Since they are 
monopolistic, and provide a variety of excludable goods, they can use 
resources for the provision of collective goods, such as transferable 
training. Moreover, they may use pressure to make employers provide the 
training, even if such pressure is seldom necessary (Soskice 1994a).
3.6 A typology of employers’ provision of 
transferable training
The section above showed that according to collective action theory, the 
collective action problem of transferable training is most likely to be 
solved either if the industry is concentrated or if there is a powerful body 
that can make it advantageous for employers to contribute towards the 
collective good. These two conditions can be seen as two variables which 
are both continuous. While concentration may enable small group 
interaction and informal control, a powerful body can enforce collective 
decisions. Yet, in order to grasp the impact of these two variables on the 
provision of transferable training, it may help to define a typology based 
on combinations of extreme values on the two variables. The basis for the 
typology is illustrated in table 3.4. The interpretation is similar to that of 
table 3.3.
14 This is Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980) and Bowman’s (1998) distinction between ‘joining’ 
and ‘acting.’
104
Table 3.4 Typology of industries by conditions for collective action
Employer concentration
Low High
Superordinate body Weak (i) (2)
Powerful (3) (4)
Employers are least likely to finance transferable training in industries 
where there is low concentration and weak/no organisation (1). The 
collective action problem is most likely to be solved if there is high 
concentration, and at the same time a powerful body (4). The two 
intermediate cases are high concentration with no/weak organisation (2), 
and low concentration with a powerful superordinate body (3). The 
presentation below of the predictions in each case concentrates on the 
probability of collective action, while the detailed predictions of the 
probability and impact of collective action on transferability, cost sharing 
and amount of training are presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
(1) Low concentration, no powerful body
Collective action theory predicts that the situation with many employers 
and no powerful body is least likely to experience an adequate supply of 
transferable training, since these industries are least likely to solve the 
collective action problem of transferable training. The main problem is 
that employers have few or no incentives to ensure that transferable 
training options exist, for example by working for the establishment of a 
common training organisation or standards for training in the industry.
(2) High concentration, no powerful body
If there are few employers, the collective action problem of transferable
training may be solved (Olson 1971). But the solution is fragile, since no 
powerful body can oversee it. The solution depends on the large 
employers contributing towards the collective good. On the one hand, 
large employers can benefit most from co-operation on training, simply
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because they have most employees. But since large firms on the other 
hand are those who most easily can run training internally without co­
operation, the cost of pulling out can also be low if the co-operation does 
not benefit them sufficiently, according to resource explanations of 
employers collective action (Traxler 1991; Waarden 1991).15 This means 
that collective action for transferable training must aim to a large extent at 
satisfying the large employers. If the changing needs and demands of the 
large employers are not met, collective action is likely to fail, which 
would be a disadvantage not only for large but also for small firms. Small 
employers’ contributions are less vital to the existence of the co-operative 
solution, and they are also least likely to replace external with internal 
training. The fact that the benefits from transferable training are likely to 
increase less than proportionally with size may also cause conflicts 
between firms regarding the contribution towards the collective good. 
Large firms can argue that their contributions should not be proportional 
to their number of employees (Waarden 1991).
The ‘dynamic interaction’ between the major employers is likely 
to be important for the collective action solution to be maintained. A 
likely scenario is that if one large employer chooses to defect, other large 
employers will follow. The reason is that contributing when no one else 
contributes of course is the worst possible situation for the employers. 
The employers will therefore keep an eye on the other employers’ actions 
when they decide whether to co-operate or not. As the analysis of the ‘tit- 
for-tat’ strategy would suggest, this scenario is nevertheless a force for the 
co-operative solution. The reason is that each of the large employers will 
know that it is hard to be a free rider, since if they pull out, the others 
will as well. Therefore, they are more likely to choose to contribute.16
15 It is assumed here that the largest employers in industries with high concentration are 
larger than those in low-concentration industries.
16 If there can be misunderstandings, the tit-for-tat theory does not however secure co­
operation, since some may defect because they thought others pulled out, even if they 
did not (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). In the case of training, that may be a problem if some
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In other ways, dynamic interaction can be a problem. If the few, 
large companies are each other’s main competitors in the product market, 
the position in the product market vis-a-vis the other firms may affect 
their willingness to contribute towards the collective good (Streeck 1991). 
Since contributing more than one’s ‘fair share’ then would mean not only 
a cost for the firm, but a benefit for its main competitors; oligopoly in the 
product market may be an obstacle for collective action. This is not only a 
question of how much to contribute financially. It may also mean that 
each employer has an interest in knowing what sort of training the 
competitors’ employees get, and not revealing the contents of their own 
training. In other words, the more training is seen as a product market 
issue, and not only a labour market issue, the more reluctant are 
employers to co-operate. These possible disadvantages of oligopoly in the 
product market mean that the collective action problem is most likely to 
be solved if employers are competing mainly with international 
companies, the employers do not compete in the product market, or 
training is not regarded as of strategic importance in the product market. 
Still, the major problem is that any solution is inherently fragile, and 
dependent on the continuous co-operation of the large employers.
(3) Low concentration, powerful body
The case with low concentration but a powerful body is the one most 
similar to the example of the German chambers. The powerful body can 
contribute to solving the collective action problem, but it will face a more 
difficult task than if there were only a small number of employers. The 
reason is that the employers themselves are unlikely to establish or uphold 
a solution without the intervention of the organisation. Therefore, 
positive or negative sanctions have to be used continually to keep the co­
operation intact.
employers suspect that other employers do not deliver training o f the amount or of the 
standard they claim.
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A crucial strategic choice for the organisation is finding the right 
balance between positive and negative sanctions. On the one hand, 
punishing those who do not contribute may not only be unpopular 
among employers, it will also imply a substantial task of controlling all 
employers and sanctioning those who do not act in accordance with the 
organisation’s instructions. On the other hand, the German experience 
suggests that the organisations may use negative sanctions successfully. 
Perhaps equally important, is that the use of positive sanctions, if they are 
to be consequential, may be too costly for the organisation.
To the extent that the organisation can ensure that training is 
transferable and adequate amounts are provided, it will be a great benefit 
for small employers. N ot only is it difficult for them to rely solely on 
internal training, they are also most dependent on using the external 
labour market when they recruit. Yet, individual employers will not 
consider that a sufficient reason to contribute towards the collective good, 
since their actions will not affect the other employers’ decision on 
whether or not to co-operate (Olson 1971). Therefore, the organisation 
plays a critical role, not only in establishing co-operation, but also in 
ensuring that individual employers do not undermine the solution, for 
example, by delivering training of a lower standard than agreed. Thus, 
even if the problem of provision of transferable training can be solved in 
the case of many employers and a powerful body, it depends very much 
on the organisation’s ability to encourage and monitor employers.
(4) High concentration, powerful body
The collective action problem is most likely to be solved, and any 
solution likely to be most stable, if it is based on both peer pressure and 
institutional support. The powerful body is likely to be important for the 
provision of the collective good even if it seldom needs to use its power to 
keep employers in line. The reason is that the employers’ knowledge of 
the positive and negative incentives is a sufficient reason for them to 
contribute towards the collective good.
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However, there are probably limits to the extent to which the 
organisation can or should use positive and negative sanctions actively to 
make employers provide sufficient transferable training. The reason is that 
the sanctions that are necessary reflect the private opportunity cost for 
employers of co-operating. If this cost is very high, it is likely to reflect 
not only externalities, but also other problems, such as outdated training. 
Still, the powerful body might choose to rely purely on negative sanctions 
to ensure that employers co-operate. One could also expect the powerful 
body to use its power to ensure that the transferable training meets the 
small employers’ needs more than it otherwise would do. But that will 
inevitably make it more difficult to maintain large employers’ support.
So far, the powerful body has been described as independent of the 
employers, but that is unlikely to be the case in practice. In many 
situations the employers will have some power to influence the 
organisation’s decisions. Then the relationship between the organisation 
and the employers is more complex, because the organisation’s actions 
will more or less reflect the will of the employers who will benefit from 
the transferable training. The main point to emphasise here is that this 
will make it even more unlikely that the organisation will rely heavily on 
the use of negative sanctions to ensure that employers co-operate.
3.7 Towards a test of H0 and
Chapters 2 and 3 have presented two alternative set of predictions of what 
affects transferability of training, provision of training and how costs of 
transferable training are shared. These will be put to empirical test in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7. First, however, chapter 4 provides the link between 
the two theoretical chapters and the empirical study.
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4. Research design and case study background
4.1 Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 presented two different theoretical views of the 
provision of transferable training, and their similarities and differences. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will test which of these two theories does better 
judged by how their predictions are confirmed or rejected in the empirical 
study. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the link between the 
theoretical prepositions and the empirical study undertaken to test these 
prepositions. The first part of the chapter explains how the empirical 
research was designed and how four industries were selected on the basis 
of theoretical considerations. The careful selection of these four cases, 
based on the predicted probability of employers’ collective action in 
different labour market settings, provides the necessary basis for a strong 
test of the collective action theory against human capital theory. The next 
part of the chapter briefly presents some important characteristics of the 
Norwegian economy, in which these cases are set, and then the existing 
further education and training offers in each of the industries.
4.2 Research design and data collection
The first part of this chapter describes how the research was designed and 
data were collected to ensure that the empirical study could answer the 
theoretical research questions set up in chapters 2 and 3.
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4.2.1 Data collection and multiple case study design
There are three reasons why an answer to the research questions required 
both qualitative and quantitative data. The first is that neither qualitative 
nor quantitative data separately would be sufficient to give reliable and 
valid measures of the variables under study. For example, employers’ 
individual and collective action to affect transferability, described in 
chapter 5, could not be adequately represented by only quantitative data. 
The second was that in some cases, qualitative measures were necessary to 
estimate the values of quantitative variables. For example, to make 
quantitative estimates of how training costs are shared between employers 
and employees, qualitative data on each individual case are in practice 
necessary to ensure that the estimate reflects actual cost sharing (OECD 
1997a). The final rationale for choosing both qualitative and quantitative 
data was that it would facilitate data triangulation (Yin 1994: 91). Thus, 
conclusions based on qualitative data could be tested against quantitative 
data and vice versa.
Since both qualitative and quantitative must be collected, statistical 
analysis could not be used to analyse the relationship between industry 
characteristics and the provision of transferable training. Therefore, a 
large sample of industries and statistical generalisation could not provide 
answers to the research questions. Instead, a multiple case study design 
was used, which requires a different logic of case selection. In a multiple 
case study ‘every case should serve a specific purpose within the overall 
scope of inquiry’ (Yin 1994: 45).
To analyse the variation of the independent variables it was 
necessary to select cases that had contrasting values on the two 
independent variables: 1) high concentration without a powerful body, 2) 
high concentration and a powerful body, 3) low concentration and no 
powerful body and 4) low concentration and a powerful body.
In order to counteract the lack of statistical control in a case study, 
it was it was necessary to study not only the outcomes, but also to trace 
the processes that caused these outcomes, to evaluate the predicative
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power of the two different theories (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). 
Thus, in chapters 5, 6 and 7 the correspondence between predictions, 
processes and outcomes determines the conclusions.
Choosing to study further education and training instead of initial 
education and training ensured that there was possible variation on the 
dependent variables, since further education and training has been much 
less influenced by national policies, as the last part of this chapter shows.
4.2.2 Operationalisation
The next task was to find measures of both concentration and powerful 
bodies. The nature of the two variables implies that it is difficult to find 
accurate operational measures. For example, chapter 3 illustrated the 
problems associated with finding a precise definition of what constitutes a 
‘small group’. The research design will however to a large extent avoid the 
problems this may cause. By selecting cases with contrasting values on 
both variables, the conclusions are no longer so vulnerable to 
measurement errors.
The share of employees in an industry that work for the five 
largest employers is used as the indicator of concentration. The purpose of 
the measure, in line with collective action theory, is to measure the 
interest of a group that is small enough for small group collaboration 
compared with the industry as a whole. Since the limit for what is a small 
group is impossible to determine a priori, as described in chapter 3, other 
limits may have been chosen.1 However, since cases with extreme values 
are selected, this would make little difference. Since employers’ interest in 
training is likely to increase with the number of employees, employment 
is assumed to reflect interest in the collective good. Measurement of 
‘powerful body’ is not so straightforward. Excellent literature has been 
published on this topic (e.g., Lukes 1974), but there is not, and cannot be
1 Traxler’s (1991) operational definition of concentration is the four largest employers’ 
share of total employment in the industry.
112
any ‘gold standard’ for power in the social sciences. Moreover, the 
measuring of power is inherently inaccurate.
In Norway, the clearest examples of ‘powerful bodies’ exist in the 
relationship between different public sector organisations, and not in 
relations between private employers and employers’ associations. It might 
seem paradoxical that there can be collective action problems in the public 
sector. Nevertheless, it is not an inherent condition for the ‘logic of 
collective action’ that the agents belong to the private sector.
A necessary condition is though that the powerful body is not so 
strong that the organisation and the employers should be regarded as one 
agent. This means that there must be broad opportunities for independent 
decision-making for each agent in the relevant area. The problem of 
defining ‘one agent’ is however not limited to the public sector. For 
private employers, the equivalent question is if subsidiaries can be treated 
as separate agents, or if they should be treated as part of the whole 
company. The answer is that it depends on the issue one investigates, and 
the way the parent company governs the subsidiary. In this case, the room 
for independent personnel practices by subsidiaries would determine 
whether or not a subsidiary and the parent company should be seen as one 
agent. The same logic applies to the public sector cases. One should not 
analyse ‘public sector’ as one agent, and hence refuse it in a study of 
collective action when public sector in Norway consists of at least three 
levels, or three formally independent groups of agents. These are the 435 
municipalities, the 19 counties as well as the state.
There are separate elections for local government (counties and 
municipalities) and the national parliament, and all municipalities and 
counties are autonomous entities. While county councils previously 
consisted of envoys from the municipalities in the county, there are now 
separate elections of county representatives. Yet, even if municipalities 
and counties are legally autonomous with their own budgets, have their 
own elections as well as set the local tax rate, the state is still a powerful 
body that can influence local government decisions greatly. In the post­
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war period growth in the public sector has been most notable in the 
municipalities, which are responsible for many of the basic welfare 
services. Coinciding with this growth in local government, which has 
been partly due to a delegation of tasks from the state, there has been a 
corresponding growth in financial transfers from the state to local 
government. Even if municipalities in principle are free to set their tax 
rate to finance their services, there is a legal maximum limit to this rate. In 
practice, all municipalities use the same maximum rate since it anyway 
covers only a small part of their expenditure and a reduction of the rate 
would do little to attract tax-payers. The most important source of 
additional funds is financial transfers from the state. In addition to a 
yearly lump sum transfer to the municipalities, based on objective 
measures such as population and proportion of old people, the state also 
provides earmarked funds. Thus, the state has considerable power through 
the system of financial transfers. Moreover, the state can regulate local 
government by law, which is a substantial power base. The national 
parliament is the law-making body, but the growing use of framework 
laws has given the ministries more discretion regarding the 
implementation of laws. Consequently the relationship between the state 
and local government can be used as a prime example of ‘powerful body.’ 
Even if local government is autonomous, and has considerable freedom in 
deciding their course of action, the state also has substantial power over 
local government through economic and legal instruments (Christensen 
and Egeberg 1994).
Private employers’ associations, on the other hand, have much less 
power over their members than the state has over local government. Even 
if a larger proportion of employers in Norway are organised than in most 
other countries, this does not mean that the employers’ associations are 
very powerful vis-a-vis their members.2 In one of the few works on 
Norwegian employers’ associations, Bowman (1998) concludes that even if
2 This is the distinction Traxler draws between ‘associability’ and ‘governability.’
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employers’ associations enjoy a high degree of associability, their 
problems are considerably more severe when it comes to making their 
members comply with the associations’ policy.3 It also means that 
Norwegian employers’ associations are unlikely to be as powerful as the 
German Kammern that Crouch (1995) uses as examples of strong 
associations. Thus, even if employers’ associations have some power over 
their members, their position contrasts with the strong position of the 
state vis-a-vis the municipalities and counties.
4.2.3 Selection of industries
As in all real-life research, the finite number of cases inevitably imposes a 
limit on the selection of cases that fit perfectly the theoretical criteria 
applied. However, as this section shows, the four industries ensured the 
necessary variation on the two independent variables. This study focuses 
on one specific group of employees in each of the industries. In order to 
control for the effect of education, their educational level must be 
comparable. Moreover, the groups of employees should all be one of the 
principal groups in their industries, so that their competence is 
unquestionably important for the employers. A final, more practical, 
concern was they had to be so large within the industry that it was likely 
that there were available sufficient data on their training. Table 4.1 
presents the cases that were selected. Appendix 1 gives the tables that 
provided the basis for the concentration figures.
Table 4.1 Selected cases, by conditions for collective action and employer 
concentration (per cent)__________________________________________
Employer concentration 
Low High
Weak Metal industry Insurance industry
Superordinate body (8.8%) (84.1%)
Powerful Municipal schools County hospitals
(19.2%) (47.6%)
3 This is in line with Traders (1991) and van Waarden’s (1991) predictions presented earlier
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The private sector case with low concentration is the metal industry.4 
W ithin the metal industry, the study is more specifically about engineers. 
Most engineers have two or three years of college education after 
secondary school.
The selection of the metal industry as a case with low 
concentration is not straightforward as table 4.1 suggests, however, since 
the metal industry is a diverse one compared with the three other cases in 
the study.5 Thus, if the industry were broken into narrower categories, 
the concentration measure would inevitably increase. As explained in 
chapter 3, the basis for an evaluation of the relevant boundaries is the 
usefulness of employees’ skills. As shown in the skill requirement -  
transferability model in chapter 2, any such evaluation is made difficult by 
the fact that an employee’s skills consist of a bundle of different 
competencies that are useful in different subsets of firms. Therefore, any 
decision on the relevant group boundaries must necessarily be based on 
some degree of discretion. Still, the main point for the selection of cases 
here is that unless the metal industry is divided into very small groups of 
employers, it is considerably less concentrated than the insurance industry
4 More generally, Norwegian manufacturing is characterised by a large number of small 
and medium sized employers (Bosch 1997).
5 An additional problem of demarcating sectors, industries and branches is that the 
boundaries can be based on either statistical or social/socio-political categories 
(Warmerdam and Tillaart 1998: 15-19).
6 The fact that collective action theory may influence transferability, which in turn 
affects the characteristics of the group of employers that a skill is valued in, makes this 
issue even more complex. However, given the already defined industry boundaries and 
the fact that collective action is not assumed to be the only, or indeed the most 
important, determinant of transferability, this problem of feedback between the 
independent and the dependent variables does not undermine the use of industry 
boundaries as a basis for case selection.
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The insurance industry illustrates a private sector industry with a 
few, large employers that account for most of the employees. Within the 
industry the focus is on employees with insurance specific tasks, and 
hence are excluded IT personnel, secretaries, etc. Previously insurance 
companies primarily recruited employees with higher secondary 
education, gymnas, whereas now the majority of recruits have a college 
education, usually in business administration.
The municipalities and more specifically the municipalities’ 
primary and secondary schools constitute the low concentration case in 
public sector. The municipalities are responsible for the compulsory parts 
of the Norwegian education system, the comprehensive schools, which 
are both primary schools and lower secondary schools.7 However, the 
municipalities’ discretion in running the schools is restricted by national 
regulation and supervision (OECD 1997b: 109). The focus is on the 
teachers who are general teachers (<dlmennl&rere). Most of them have 
three years of college education, though previously the education lasted 
only two years, and was extended to four years in the 1990s.
Nurses in general hospitals are the public sector, high 
concentration case.8 Concentration here is not as high as for the insurance 
industry, but still considerably higher than the two low concentration 
cases. Both psychiatric and non-psychiatric (somatic) hospitals are the 
responsibilities of the 19 counties. Still, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs has considerable power, for example through the Norwegian 
Board of Health, the central supervisory authority (OECD 1998: 75). 
Private hospitals play only a very limited role (OECD 1998: 78). The 
state, however, runs two large specialist hospitals with national overage: 
the National Hospital of Norway and the National Cancer Hospital. So 
in addition to its regulatory and supervisory role, the state is also directly
7 Since very few pupils go to private comprehensive schools, private schools will be 
ignored in the analysis. The counties are responsible for upper secondary schools.
8 The term ‘general hospitals’ is used instead of ‘somatic’ (non-psychiatric) hospitals, since 
the difference between these two is insignificant for the topic of this thesis.
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an employer. The state in itself is however no dominant employer, with 
less than 9.5 per cent of the total number of nurses employed by them.
4.2.4 Reliability and validity
Construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability are 
the four problems high quality case study research must tackle. This study 
was designed to ensure that all of these were addressed appropriately 
(Maxwell 1996: 92; Yin 1994).
Construct validity means using correct operational measures for 
the concepts being studied. In this thesis, such validity is enhanced 
through the various sources of evidence, both qualitative and quantitative. 
Using several indicators and checking the correspondence between them is 
the best, and possibly the only, way to ensure construct validity. 
Moreover, in the coming chapters, an important goal has been to establish 
a ‘chain of evidence’: explicit links between research questions, data and 
conclusions. Finally, since some of the results and many of the empirical 
data were published in a separate report after the fieldwork was 
completed, key informants were able to read the report (fohansen 1999).9
The second test, internal validity, demands that causal links are 
separated from spurious ones. As Hume has shown in his classic example, 
such causal links can never be definitely proven. The challenge is rather 
therefore to gain support for one hypothesis at the expense of others by 
comparing ‘plausible rival hypotheses’ (Campbell 1994). Such comparison, 
and pattern-matching, is achieved since the empirical chapters compare 
the data with the two sets of hypotheses that were derived in chapter 2 
and 3. In the coming chapters, triangulation is a major tactic to enhance 
validity. For each topic the link between the theories and the outcomes 
are probed by assessing the processes that have led to these outcomes.
9 Moreover, a separate working paper on further training for engineers in the metal 
industry was sent to all informants in this case (Johansen 1998).
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External validity addresses the problem of knowing if the case 
study can be generalised to other cases. The difference between case 
studies and surveys based on sampling is that ‘case studies, like 
experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes’ (Yin 1994: 10). Thus, the criteria for evaluating 
external validity cannot be the same. The important factor is that the cases 
have been carefully selected on the basis of clear, explicit considerations. 
Anyway, the four cases cannot be used to draw direct conclusions about, 
for example, other Norwegian industries. If, however, one agrees that this 
study of four cases represents a plausible test of the two theories, the 
results can be used to corroborate or refute the theories that are examined.
The final test, reliability, is concerned first and foremost with 
precision during data collection. One way to define reliability, is that 
another researcher should be able to repeat the study and come to the 
same results. In order to achieve this, copies of all available data were 
kept, and all interviews (with one exception) were taped, and are hence 
available for repeated analysis by other researchers.
4.3 The background of the case study
While the purpose of the first part of this chapter has been to explain how 
the empirical study provides a good test of the two theories, the purpose 
of this second part is to present the background information that is 
needed to understand the case study in the following three chapters. First 
it briefly presents the national setting, with a description of Norway’s 
economic position, industrial relations and training system, while the 
second part of this section describes the existing types of further training 
in each of the industries.
f
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4.3.1 Economic development, industrial relations and 
training in Norway
This section gives a short presentation of significant parts of this national 
setting, with the emphasis on issues that are likely to affect the topic of 
the case study: further education and training. First, the economic status 
of Norway is described in brief, and it shows that Norway at the time of 
the study was in a more favourable economic position than was the vast 
majority of other countries. Next, the section on industrial relations 
among other things covers the important roles of the Confederation of 
Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) and the Norwegian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). Then the system of basic education 
and training is presented, before a larger section treats the further 
education and training system, and it is shown that further training is a 
particularly good case for the purpose of this thesis, since national 
government policies have played a minor role.
Economic development
In 1998, OECD summed up Norway’s financial situation as follows: ‘The 
Norwegian economy has performed extraordinarily well in recent years, 
based on soaring petroleum exports, a stable exchange regime, a prudent 
fiscal policy stance, and a consensus based incomes policy.’10
There is little doubt that Norway in the late 1990s is in a 
favourable economic position compared with most other countries in the 
world. This small kingdom with no more than 4.4 million people (in 
1997) enjoys a higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita than all 
but a very few countries in the world, unemployment is relatively low,
10 The situation changed somewhat in 1998, when the price of oil fell, the Norwegian 
krona depreciated, wages rose more than previous years and interest rates rose 
considerably.
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and the recession in the early 1990s affected Norway less damagingly than 
many other western European countries. The exceptional financial 
position of Norway is reflected in various indicators. In 1995 the 
government had a budget surplus of 3.1 per cent of GDP, while the 
average European OECD country had a deficit of 3.6 per cent (Freeman 
1997: 23). Moreover, the general government in Norway had net financial 
assets relative to GDP of 26 per cent. The comparable measure for OECD 
countries in Europe as a whole, was a net financial liability of 46 per cent. 
Finally, the unemployment rate in Norway has persistently been lower 
than the OECD average (OECD 1997b: 59).
One explanation for Norway’s exceptional financial position is the 
natural resources from the North Sea. About one-eighth of GDP comes 
from petroleum and natural gas production (Freeman 1997: 23). 
Generating more than 30 per cent of total export income (in 1991) 
(Freeman 1997), oil and gas are undoubtedly major wealth generators. 
This income facilitates the combination of an extensive welfare state and 
good state finances.11
In many other respects Norway is, however, broadly similar to 
many other western European countries. During the last decades, the 
welfare state has expanded, and the public sector now spends roughly half 
the GDP (Freeman 1997), and one third of the labour force work in the 
public sector (Dolvik et al. 1997: 54). The expanding welfare state has 
accommodated women’s entry in the labour market, and almost three out 
of four women are now in the labour force (Dolvik and Steen 1997: 366). 
In 1997 employment reached almost 80 per cent of the working age- 
population, which was the highest ratio in the OECD area (OECD 1998:
i).
As is typical for small, industrialised countries, Norway also
11 However, in a recent study Freeman (1997) rejects the oil income as a sufficient 
explanation for such favourable economic outcomes. Instead, he argues that Norway has 
faced less dramatic problems than Sweden, for example, because it developed a less 
comprehensive welfare state.
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depends heavily on foreign trade. Roughly 40 per cent of goods and 
services produced in Norway are exported (Freeman 1997: 30). Even if 
Norway is not a member of the EU, its membership in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) secures Norway a place within the Single 
European Market. Joining EE A required Norway to harmonise its laws 
with the EU, and accordingly ‘foreign competitive pressures have 
increased significantly in product and financial markets’ (OECD 1998: 
55).
Norway is also close to the OECD average on a measure of tax 
wedges, the sum of employees’ and employers’ social security 
contributions and personal income tax as a percentage of gross labour 
costs (OECD 1997b). Still, in only Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands does government spend a larger proportion of GDP (OECD 
1997b: 77).
Finally, among European OECD members, employment 
protection legislation in Norway was ranked as the eighth strictest of the 
16 countries (OECD 1997b: 75). Thus, the Norwegian labour market is 
not particularly strictly regulated (Dolvik et al. 1997: 64). Moreover, 
compared with other countries, the labour market seems to be more 
flexible than one would expect with the existing regulation. Numbers on 
job reallocation, internal migration between regions and monthly flows in 
and out of employment are higher than in countries with protected 
internal labour markets (e.g. France and Japan). One explanation is the 
dominance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which cannot 
establish strong internal labour markets. Another is that the universal 
pension system imposes fewer barriers than more occupational or firm- 
internal systems (Bosch 1997; Dolvik et al. 1997).
Industrial relations
The advantageous economic situation in Norway inevitably affects the 
labour market. But co-operative partnership has also been used to explain 
the situation (Dolvik and Stokke 1998; Freeman 1997; OECD 1998).
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Faced with unprecedented high levels of unemployment in the early 
1990s, the Labour government appointed an Employment Commission 
with representatives from all political parties as well as the largest 
employer and trade union confederations, in addition to professional 
economists and ministerial experts. The five-year social pact implemented 
in 1992 on the basis of this Commission aimed at reducing the 
unemployment to 3 per cent. By the end of the five years, the 
unemployment target was met, and unemployment had been reduced in 
parallel with real wage increases and enhanced competitiveness (Dolvik 
and Stokke 1998). According to OECD (1998), it is ‘noteworthy’ how the 
policy secured recovery, employment growth and low inflation.
The two dominant partners in the social pact, and more generally 
in Norwegian industrial relations, are LO and N H O . Generally private 
sector collective bargaining in the post-war period has been at the peak 
inter-sector level or at the industry level. In addition local bargaining is 
widespread, especially in manufacturing, and for most private sector 
white-collar workers pay is set individually (Dolvik and Stokke 1998: 
127). The state plays a more dominant role in Norway than in e.g. 
Sweden, especially in conflict resolution (Dolvik et al. 1997: 81).
Since 1980 trade union density has been stable at around 56 per 
cent.12 This is considerably less than in neighbouring Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland (Dolvik and Stokke 1998: 124). Nevertheless, survey studies 
have suggested that the coverage rates for collective agreements are similar 
in Denmark and Norway (Dolvik et al. 1997: 85). The majority of 
unionised employees were members of LO-affiliated unions in 1994. The 
three other confederations are the Confederation of Vocational Unions 
(YS), the Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations (AF) and 
Akademikeme.
12 Trade union density has been fairly stable during the whole post-war period 
fluctuating between 50 and 57 per cent (Dolvik and Stokke 1998: 125).
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On the employer side, N H O  is the only employers’ confederation 
in the private sector. After a merger in 1989 between the Norwegian 
Employers Confederation (NAF) and two industry and crafts associations, 
N H O  became not only the dominant employers’ associations in the 
private sector, covering more than 400,000 employees (Dolvik et al. 1997: 
81), but also the most important industrial interest organisation (Dolvik 
and Stokke 1998: 122). It re-negotiates the Basic Agreement with LO 
every fourth year, and the outcome of the negotiations is the benchmark 
for the other bargaining rounds. The second largest employers’ association 
is the Norwegian Association of Local Authorities (KS). KS’s pay 
negotiations covers approx. 400,000 employees in the counties and 
municipalities (Statistisk sentralbyra 1998e: table 209). In the state sector, 
the Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination negotiates on behalf of the 
government. Current employer organisation ‘is marked by a high degree 
of centralized power and fairly high density’ (Dolvik and Stokke 1998: 
123).
Basic education and training
Three main characteristics of the system of basic education and training 
are the insignificance of private education, the high participation rates and 
the reform of vocational training in 1994.
Private schools play a minor role in the provision of primary and 
secondary education. The vast majority of primary and secondary schools 
are publicly funded. Municipalities and counties run the schools, but they 
are comprehensively regulated by the national government. National 
legislation ensures that all children have the right and duty to complete 
primary and lower secondary education, totalling 10 years of education. 
In 1994, the government also established a statutory right to three years of 
upper secondary education, either general or vocational.
Compared to most countries, except its Nordic neighbours, 
Norway’s expenditure on education and training is high, and so are 
participation rates. In 1992, 6.6 per cent of Norway’s GDP was spent on
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education, compared to 8.0 per cent for the other Nordic countries and 
5.7 for the OECD as a whole (OECD 1997b: 115). More than 80 per cent 
of Norwegians between 25 and 64 years of age have at least upper 
secondary school, and around 30 per cent have a higher education. This is 
among the highest rates in the OECD (OECD 1997b: 11).
A reform of upper secondary education in 1994, and the 
accompanying right to such education, further increased the number of 
pupils, and in 1997 no less than 96 per cent of the age group participated 
in upper secondary education. One of the reform’s main ambitions was to 
ensure that more of those who started on a vocational education 
completed it. Until then the system for vocational education and training 
was held to be inadequate, characterised by inefficiency in the number of 
students completing, and a severe lack of apprenticeship places.
Further education and training
To understand how employers in the four industries’ act within the 
further education and training area, it is necessary to know their national 
setting. Therefore, this section gives a brief introduction to the role of the 
government as well as the social partners at the national level in further 
education and training. One important aim is to show that national 
regulation of further education in Norway has been limited. Hence it 
stands in stark contrast to the system of initial training, where national 
regulation and provision are crucial. In the case of Norway, further 
education and training are therefore particularly suitable for the study of 
employer’s collective action, since training decisions are very much left to 
individual employers and collectivities of employers. This might be true 
even for other countries; Crouch, Finegold and Sako (1999: 21) argue that, 
in the case of further training compared to initial training, ‘public policy 
becomes increasingly dependent on the decisions of firms, and whole areas 
of [vocational education and training] begin to ‘disappear’ into the 
corporation, while remaining no less an object of public concern.’
In describing the role of the national government in further
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education and training in Norway, it is useful to distinguish its role in 
regulating, supplying and financing education and training, respectively. 
Employers’ and employees’ training decisions are in most cases not likely 
to be much influenced by national government financing or regulation, 
but the national colleges and universities represent significant suppliers of 
further education and training.
The most important point about national regulation of further 
education and training is that it has been weak both compared to basic 
education and training, and compared to further education and training in 
other countries (Torp 1995: 47). Larsen et al. (1997: 15) argue that 
‘whereas countries such as Sweden and Denmark have laws which shall 
ensure that firms invest in competence development, this area has been 
almost unregulated in Norway.’ Employees have few legal rights to 
further education and training, and there is no obligatory financial 
contribution towards training by companies (EIRO Online 1998a). The 
W ork Environment Act says that the employers shall give employees 
introduction and supervision in job tasks, but it is not clear to what extent 
this duty includes education and training (NOU 1997:25 : 147). Moreover, 
section 3 of the Adult Education Act states that adults should be allowed 
to document their knowledge and skills at all levels and in all areas, 
independently of how they acquired this knowledge in the first place 
(National Institute of Technology 1996). Yet, in practice, people have had 
few opportunities to document their non-formal learning. The notable 
exception is section 20 in the Act relating to Apprenticeship Training in 
Working Life, which states that experienced workers can get a skilled 
worker’s certificate without going through an apprenticeship. The 
requirements are that the worker documents relevant, all-round 
experience that is 25 per cent longer than the apprenticeship period, passes 
a theoretical test and finally passes a practical test (Reichborn, Pape, and 
Kleven 1998: 97). This opportunity has been widely used, and has, 
remained popular among both employers and employees (Bosch 1997; 
Reichborn, Pape, and Kleven 1998).
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There has been widespread concern that the Norwegian 
government lacked a coherent strategy on further education and training. 
According to Dolvik et al. (1997: 72), ‘Norwegian public authorities have 
had no articulated policy on employer-sponsored skill formation,’ and the 
Employment Commission in 1992 said that ‘Norway has no unified 
policy of adult education’ (NOU 1992:26 : 67).
The lack of an adequate national policy on further education and 
training triggered the Government to appoint a committee to present 
suggestions for new policy measures in this area. Based on the committee’s 
report, a 1998 Government white paper, among other things, proposed a 
legal right to educational leave (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1999).13 In January 1999, the Parliament decided 
not only that employees shall have the right to unpaid educational leave, 
but also that all adults shall have the right to comprehensive education.14 
Still, since the fieldwork was completed by the time Parliament made 
these decisions, the conclusion is that national laws had little impact, 
neither on the employees’ right to further education and training nor on 
employers’ duty to provide it.
The government has played a more influential role as a supplier of 
further education and training than it has as a regulator, but it has been 
criticised for not responding adequately to business needs. In 1997, more 
than 80 000 participated in further education and training at public 
colleges and universities (Statistisk sentralbyra 1998b: table 1.1).
Still, the government’s ability to offer adequate high-quality 
further education and training has been criticised. The public schools, 
colleges and universities have generally failed to make further education 
and training an integrated part of their programs, was the conclusion of
13 A  previous government appointed committee already in 1988 recommended (but 
Parliament did not follow its advice) that Norway ratify the ILO convention no. 140 
(N O U  1988:28 : 78).
14 However, the Parliament did not allow adults the same right to upper secondary 
education that had been given to all youth a few years earlier (NTB 1999).
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the government appointed committee that evaluated further education 
and training policy (NOU 1997:25 : 15). Seven of the 20 members of the 
committee, including the leader and the N H O  and LO representatives, 
therefore suggested establishing an Open University in co-operation with 
business and the labour market parties (NOU 1997:25 : 33). Moreover, 
even if the proposal was voted down in the committee, N H O  continued 
to argue that an Open University is necessary (Brsekken 1997). However, 
the government’s policy remained that of reforming the existing 
institutions than to create a new one (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1999).
The state mainly contributes to financing further education in two 
ways. First, it finances the colleges and universities. Moreover, students 
who take further education and training can apply for grants and loans for 
from the State Educational Loan fund. The rules for providing these 
grants and loans have however suited young full-time students rather than 
adult further education students. Therefore a public committee in 1998 
suggested that students should be allowed to earn more without any 
deduction of allowance from the Loan Fund, something which would 
especially favour part-time students and employees on paid educational 
leave (EIRO Online 1998c). With a few exceptions, such as initiatives by 
the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) and the 
Research Council of Norway (NFR) (National Institute of Technology 
1996: 14-15), the state does little to subsidise employers’ provision of 
further education and training. On the contrary, employers and 
employees may be taxed if employers finance education for their 
employees. Until 1999, and thus until the fieldwork was completed, 
financial support from the employer for a higher formal level of education 
or a new degree was taxed as income for the employee (NOU 1997:25 ). 
Due to the problems of implementing these tax rules, and the potential 
disincentives for employers who wanted to invest in employer training, 
the government announced that it wanted new tax rules that were ‘clear,
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predictable and easy to apply’ (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1999).
4.3.2 Existing types of further training programs for the 
four groups
In order to understand the case studies in subsequent chapters, it is 
important to know not only the national setting of the cases, but also the 
most important types of extensive formal further training that the four 
groups of employees can provide.15 It shows that even if the four groups 
are comparable with respect to educational background, there are 
significant differences in what sort of further training they can take, and 
who organises it. For all four groups, the colleges, public or private, offer 
formal further training. Nurses are the only group who can choose to take 
extensive formal internal training. The employers in the insurance 
industry are running formal further training through the industry’s 
training organisation. In neither the teachers’ nor the engineers’ case are 
the employers providers of extensive formal further training. The next 
chapter studies how employers’ actions have contributed to these different 
outcomes.
Nurses at general hospitals can take formal further education and 
training, either internally at the hospital or at nursing training colleges. As 
table 4.2 shows, nurses have a wide variety of opportunities to take 
further education and training.16
15 For all groups the focus is on education and training that is more than one week long.
16 In addition some types of further education and training at colleges are open for more 
groups of health personnel. For example, colleges offer different types further education 
in management and administration in the health sector and from 1998 all types of health 
personnel could undertake specialist training in psychiatric care. However, the thesis will 
concentrate on the further training that is exclusively for nurses. Moreover, it will focus 
on training that is especially relevant for general hospitals.
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Table 4.2 Further education and training offers for nurses
Duration
No. of 
colleges/hospitals 
that offered training 
in 1997/98
College-based further training
Specialist training to be psychiatric 
nurse (until 1998)
1 academic year 16
Specialist training in nursing for 
elderly and chronically ill
1 academic year 9
Health visitor training 1 academic year 5
Mid-wife training 1 academic year 3
Specialist training in nursing for 
dementia patients
Vi academic year 3
Cand san 
Internal specialist training
2 academic years
Specialist training to be anaesthesia 
nurse
18 months 22
Specialist training to be operation 
nurse
18 months 22
Specialist training to be intensive care 
nurse
18 months 22
Specialist training in paediatric 
nursing (nursing of children)
18 months 7
Specialist training in onkological 
nursing (nursing of cancer patients)
10 months 3
Note: The duration of specialist internal training to be anaesthesia, operation or 
intensive nurse varies between 16 and 24 months, but is 18 months in most 
hospitals. Source: Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet (1998) and 
Norsk sykepleierforbund (1996).
Even if internal and college-based further training are similar in many 
ways, there are also important differences in the way they are organised. 
Nurses who take further training at colleges are legally defined as 
students, and are covered by the Act on Universities and Colleges. Nurses 
who do internal further education and training are however not legally 
students, but employees. This has several implications for the way
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training is organised, and the rights nurses have during further training 
(Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1998). The Ministry of 
Education and Research is responsible for the college-based education, and 
the Act on Universities and Colleges regulates how plans are made for the 
training, how exams are organised, as well as teacher requirements. 
Moreover, when nurses follow college-based further training, they have 
the right to loans and grants from the State Educational Loan Fund, 
which is the principal source of funding for Norwegian students (Kirke- 
utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1998: 28-29). By contrast, no law 
regulates internal further education and training, and since nurses are 
regarded as employees and not students, they cannot get support from the 
Loan Fund. This means that each hospital can organise their internal 
further education as they want to meet their own needs, within the laws 
that generally regulate the relationship between employers and employees.
The distinction between up-dating training (etterutdanning) and 
up-grading training (videreutdanning) is crucial in order to understand 
further education and training for teachers. Up-dating training is defined 
in section 4 of the Act concerning Teacher Training (of 8 June 1973) as 
‘various forms of training intended to refresh and expand academic and 
educational knowledge to keep teachers informed of and abreast of the 
development in school and society, but without having effect on their 
formal qualifications’ (Statens laererkurs 1993: 1). Up-grading training, on 
the other hand, is training that can lead to formal competence (NOU 
1996:22 : 31).
Table 4.3 Educational requirements for teachers’ formal competence levels
Level Education Translation
Grade 1 Three-year teacher training Lcerer
Grade 2 (1) + one year of further education Adjunkt
Grade 3 (2) + one year of further education Adjunkt med opprykk
Grade 4 (2) + Master’s degree (2 years of further edu.) Lektor
Note: Based on teachers with a three-year general teacher (allmennlcerer) 
education. Teachers with a four-year basic education are grade 2 teachers.
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Table 4.3 shows how teachers can increase their formal competence 
through further education. A general teacher, with three years of basic 
education, who takes one year of further education can become a grade 2 
teachers, after an additional year, a grade 3 teacher. A grade 2 teacher can 
also choose to become a grade 4 teacher by taking a Master’s degree 
(bovedfag).17
In practice teachers can use most of the education that gives credits 
at universities and colleges to get higher formal competence, as long as 
they combine equal one year of full-time education (20 credits) (Kirke- 
utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1992).18 Still, the most important 
suppliers of up-grading training are the teacher training colleges, which are 
obliged by the Act concerning the Training of Teachers to offer such 
training (NOU 1988:32 : 20). A government-appointed committee in 1988 
recommended that colleges should offer further training in modules that 
were shorter than the quarter-year units they offered earlier (NOU 
1988:32 ). Teachers can now use courses as small as 30 hours of teaching (1 
unit) as parts of up-grading training (Statens laererkurs 1997b: 7).
Since up-dating training is negatively defined, as training that does 
not lead to higher formal competence, the variation of training suppliers 
and types of training is larger. Generally up-dating courses are short, from 
one to five days.19 They are usually organised by the schools themselves, 
by teacher colleges, by the ministerial Section for Continuing Training of 
Teachers or by the school directors. The single most important type of 
suppliers are the regional colleges who, with the financial support of the
17 The teacher training was extended from two to three years in 1973 
(Laererutdanningsradet 1985: 25). A more detailed presentation of the competence levels 
for teachers is given in Act on teacher training, sections 6, 7 and 8, and by Koch (1983).
18 There are however some restrictions to avoid overlap with a teacher’s basic education.
19 The average course updating organised by the colleges in co-operation with Section for 
Continuing Training of Teachers was approximately four days in 1996 (Statens laererkurs 
1997a: 11).
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Section for Continuing Training of Teachers, in 1996 organised 282 
updating courses (Statens laererkurs 1997a: 11).
The main difference between insurance and the other groups is 
that the employers are members of a trust that offers training to all its 
members. Virtually all insurance companies in Norway are members of 
The Norwegian Academy of Insurance (NAI). Table 4.4 shows the 
education offered by NAI.
Table 4.4 Further education and training offers at the Norwegian Academy of 
Insurance
Course Duration
(full-time
equivalents
Contents
Preparatory course: Basic 
insurance
(Short, no credits) Introduction to insurance
Step I: Insurance 
examination
V2 year 50 % insurance subjects, 50 % 
points statistics, maths, business 
administration and law
Step II: Higher Insurance 
Examination
V2 year 40 % insurance subjects, 60 % 
business administration
Step HI: Insurance 
Graduate
Vz year 40 % insurance subjects, 40 % 
business administration, 20 % 
project paper
Total 2 years (5 five 
years of part 
time education)
Note: Duration is in full-time study equivalents according to NAI. Completed 
insurance graduate exam counts as 1Vi years of full-time education in the 
national college system, i.e. V2 year less than the 2 years NAI estimates.
Source: Forsikringsakademiet (1995).
As table 4.4 shows, the education is a combination of insurance subjects 
and business administration subjects. NAI does not itself organise the 
business administration courses, so students have to take these courses at 
other colleges. To be allowed to take courses at the NAI, students are 
required to have completed upper secondary education. Each step consists 
of several courses at NAI. All the courses are distance education courses,
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with one or more voluntary seminars. These courses can be taken 
separately, and most participants choose to take courses, but not to 
combine them into a full education. In 1996 about the 58 courses offered 
by NAI had about 2,400 participants, but only 38 candidates completed 
the Insurance Examination, and even fewer finished the higher steps 
(Forsikringsakademiet 1997: 2).
Table 4.5 Courses for insurance adviser authorisation
Duration (full-time study equivalents)
Obligatory courses XA year
And either non-life insurance; or XA year
Life insurance XA year
Total XA year
Source: Forsikringsakademiet (1995; 1996b).
Authorisation for insurance advisers and claims officers, respectively, is 
the other main type of education NAI offers. The Association of 
Norwegian Insurance Companies grants the authorisation, but the courses 
are run by NAI. Employees who complete the courses and have three 
years of relevant experience, and ‘systematic on-the job training’ can be 
authorised (Forsikringsakademiet 1995; 1996b). Table 4.5 shows the 
courses one must take to become an authorised insurance adviser in life or 
non-life insurance. There is a similar structure for authorisation as claims 
officer.
In addition to further training offered by NAI, insurance 
employees can also take further training in business and administration at 
public or private colleges. This training ranges from short seminars to the 
one-year bedrifts0konom, including many credit-awarding evening courses.
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Table 4.6 Further education and training offers for engineers
Technical Administrative
Long Graduate engineer 2 - 3  years of Long courses (equivalent of 1
full time study. For engineers 
with two years college 
education: 1 year of training to 
be ‘college engineers’
(beyskoleingen i0 r)
year full time) : bedriftsekonom
Medium Specialist education Courses at private and public
EEU colleges
Short Offers from a wide variety of 
providers
Most further training in technical skills consists of short courses organised 
by a variety of different providers. Among others, the professional 
associations for engineers and graduate engineers, suppliers, industry 
organisations, universities, consulting firms, as well as profit-seeking 
course providers, offer such short training. This type of training is usually 
aimed at introducing engineers to a new area, or up-dating their 
knowledge within a specific field.
Some engineers also choose to take the somewhat longer EEU 
(eksamensrettet etterutdanning) courses at the Norwegian Institute of 
Technology (NTNU), which is the major educator of graduate engineers. 
Most of these courses last two working weeks, and participants can choose 
to take an exam at the end of the course.20 Since 1991 these courses could 
be combined into one of 11 different types specialist education, which are 
equivalent of a little more than a half year of full time education (12 
credits) (NTNU 1997).
A more extensive type of further training is the up-grading 
training for engineers with a two-year basic engineering training. In the 
1980s the basic engineering training was extended from two to three years,
20 According to Brandt (1991: 76) between 45 and 60 per cent of the participants chose 
annually to take the exams in the 1980s.
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and a three year education is now required to be a ‘college engineer’ 
(h0gskoleingeni0r) or a ‘Euro-engineer’ (eur. ing.) (Brandt 1991: 86; Eldring 
and Falkum 1995).21 One example of such up-grading training is the 
College of Stord/Haugesund, which offers up-grading training over 1.5 
years part-time to become a Euro-engineer (Hogskolen Stord/Haugesund 
1997).22
Engineers may also choose to build on the engineer training to 
become a graduate engineer. But this option is used primarily as an 
alternative track for young people onto the graduate engineer degree 
rather than as further training for engineers with more than a minimum 
of work experience (Johansen 1999: 51). At NTNU , engineers must do 
2 Vi years of further education to become graduate engineers.23 At other 
colleges, it takes from 2 to 3 years of full time education 
(Ingeniorutdanningsradet 1997: 28).
These are the most important types of technical further education 
and training. But engineers often choose to take administrative further 
education and training instead of, or in addition to, technical training. 
Such training in business administration and similar subjects are available 
at many private and public colleges. These courses do not target engineers 
in particular, but are the same as those relevant for insurance employees 
and others.
4.4 The next chapters
So far this thesis has presented two alternative views on transferable 
training, derived hypotheses from these two, and shown how these 
hypotheses will be tested. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of this
21 The eur.ing title also requires relevant experience (Ingeniorutdanningsradet 1997: 27)
22 A eur. ing. education has to satisfy the criteria set by Federation Europeenne 
d’Associations Nationales dlngenieurs (FEANI).
2323 If an engineer wants to become a graduate engineer in an area other than her basic 
engineering training, the further education takes longer.
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empirical study, before the conclusions and implications of the research 
are drawn in chapter 8. Chapter 5 will test H 01 and H altl about 
transferability of training. The hypotheses H 02 and H alt2 concerning 
financing of training will then be the topic of chapter 6, before chapter 7 
presents evidence concerning the amount of training and skill deficits, 
which tests H 03 and H alt3.
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5.Transferability of training
5.1 Introduction
This and the two subsequent chapters give the results of the empirical 
study, and show how the results both confirm or weaken the two theories 
presented in chapters 2 and 3. The problems of establishing transferable 
training, sharing costs, and providing the optimal amount are treated in 
three different chapters. Yet, even if these themes are discussed in separate 
chapters, the chapters will also show how these three aspects of 
transferable training are inherently interrelated.
After the presentation of the two hypotheses that will be tested in 
this chapter, H 02 and H alt2, it is argued that two types of measures must be 
used to carry out the test. In addition to studying the outcomes, the 
transferability of training, the processes that influence the transferability 
must also be taken into account to provide a test of the theories. The first 
part of this chapter analyses action by employers to enhance and avoid 
transferability of training, while the outcomes, the transferability of 
training, are presented in the second part. The correspondence or lack of 
it between these two shows whether or not transferability is ‘endogenous,’ 
as explained in chapter 3.
5.2 Hypotheses and predictions
Table 5.1 shows the two rival hypotheses that were derived in chapters 2 
and 3, and will be tested in this chapter.
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Table 5.1 Hq- and H ait-hypotheses: employers’ actions to increase transferability 
of training_____________________________________________________________
Human capital theory Collective action theory
H qI: Since each individual employer Ha|tl: Individual employers will
has no incentive to ensure that training usually have no incentive to make
is transferable, each employer will act training transferable, but through
to reduce transferability. collective action they may do so
because it is best for the employers as a
group.
Thus, the two topics of the chapter are if, and under what conditions, 
employers act to improve transferability, and how these actions affect 
transferability of training.
Figure 5.1 Hq and H all explanations of factors determining transferability
H 0
Individual employers’ 
incentives
---- ► N o action to
increase
transferability
X Transferability
H a,t
1. Concentration
2. Powerful body
Collective action
---- ^  by employers
to increase 
transferability
-----^  Transferability
Figure 5.1 illustrates the two alternative predictions. H 0 predicts that since 
individual employers have incentives to ensure that training is not 
transferable, there will be no employer action to increase transferability. 
However, such actions would anyway have little impact, since 
transferability is exogenous, as explained in chapter 2. Collective action 
theory, by contrast, states that employers’ collective action has a 
significant impact on transferability, since transferability is ‘endogenous’
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in this model, as chapter 3 showed. The theory also includes predictions 
of the probability of such action occurring, which implies that an analysis 
of the four different cases provides a strong test of this alternative view. 
Collective action by employers is assumed to be most likely if there is 
concentration or if there is a powerful superordinate body.
The predictions for each case are presented in table 5.2. While H 0 
says that employer action to increase transferability is unlikely in all four 
cases, H ah says it is very likely in the nurses’ case, likely in the insurance 
and teacher cases, and unlikely in only the engineers’ case. The basis for 
these predictions is described in detail in chapter 3.
Table 5.2 Summary of predictions: employers’ actions to increase transferability 
of further training_____________________________________________________
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Concentration High Low High Low
Powerful body Yes Yes No No
H alt prediction Very likely Likely Likely Unlikely
Ho prediction Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
The predictions in the table are only relative to the other cases in the 
study. Thus, they are not attempts to make predictions compared to any 
absolute level, other industries or other countries. This goes for the 
predictions in the next two chapters, too.
5.3 Processes: employers’ actions to influence 
transferability
There are three main ways in which employers can act to enhance 
transferability of skills, as shown in figure 5.2. Each of these may be, but 
are not always, sufficient to ensure that skills are transferable. After 
explaining how these three actions can increase transferability, the chapter 
will show how employers in the four cases act or do not act to ensure that 
employees’ skills are transferable.
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Figure 5.2 Actions to increase transferability
Actions to increase transferability
a. Choosing common training instead of
individual firm training Increased
b. Harmonising training, making training — > transferability
more equal among employers of skills
c. Improving information among other
employers
Since few researchers have tried to explain in detail how employers may 
influence transferability, this is one of the first attempts to find 
operational measures of actions employers can take to enhance 
transferability.1 Osterman (1984b) and Ryan (1984) give examples of how 
employers may act to reduce transferability of training, but neither tries 
to give a more comprehensive account of how employers may influence 
transferability.
5.3.1 Common training
One way employers can increase transferability is by organising ‘common 
training’, for employees in more than one company, or giving employees 
such training instead of ‘individual training’ for employees in only one 
firm. Common training tends be more transferable than training that is 
done by firms individually. If the same training is given to employees 
from different firms, it must be transferable to be of value to more than 
one employer. Yet, training being common may be a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for training to be transferable.
The choice between internal and external training has been given 
some attention in previous research (for example Osterman 1995a, Rolfe 
1994 and Nordhaug 1993).2 Since concerns about transferability are only
1 One exception is that several employers have argued that certification can increase 
transferability (Katz and Ziderman 1990; Marsden 1995; Prais 1995: 105).
2 ‘Internal training’ and ‘external training’ are not always clearly defined. In this thesis, 
internal training is defined as all training that the employer has the overall responsibility
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one of many factors that can influence the choice between common and 
individual training, it is important to trace the processes and study 
employers’ rationales to address the hypotheses in this chapter.
There are many reasons why employers may choose to organise 
training internally instead of externally. Internal training is likely to be 
preferred if equipment within the firm is needed to do the training, or 
there are no external training providers that can offer this type of training. 
It can also be easier to adapt to the employees’ job, for example by 
organising training in slack periods, and it may be easier to direct to 
company needs. Moreover, it may be easier to combine internal training 
with on-the-job training or work practice. Employers may also prefer 
internal training because they can then retain the full control of the 
contents of the training, and there is no risk of revealing information to 
competitors. Finally, internal training may be preferable for employers 
because it strengthens employees’ commitment to the company (Green 
1996; Heyes 1996) and enhances communication between employees in 
different departments (Nordhaug 1993). There are however strong reasons 
to choose external training too. One reason is, as this study will show in 
more detail, that such training is more likely to be transferable, and ceteris 
paribus that increases the total return from training (as Stevens shows in 
chapter 2). But external training may also be preferred because the 
training simply cannot be done internally, due to lack of competence or 
lack of equipment. Moreover, external training providers can have 
economies of scale that individual employers do not have. It can also be 
advantageous that external training is often quality controlled in a way 
internal training more seldom is, for example through legislation. Finally, 
external training can have positive side effects through providing 
employees with contacts and networks outside the company.
for. This will include training that is organised by hired consultants and training that is 
done off the employer’s premises. The concepts of ‘common’ and ‘individual’ training, 
on the other hand, only refer to who is participating in the training -  whether or not the 
training is for employees in only one firm.
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In many cases these factors will mean that employers have a simple 
choice in selecting one or the other, for example because there are no 
external alternatives, or because it would be virtually impossible for the 
employer to acquire the equipment or competence necessary to organise 
the training. Yet for some types of training, some middle ground, 
employers have a real choice, and these choices will be studied in this 
section of the chapter. There is evidence both from Norway and 
internationally which shows that employers who say they plan to increase 
training for their employees primarily plan to increase internal training 
and not external training (Brandt 1989; MMI 1997; Nordhaug and 
Gooderham 1996; Rolfe 1994). These findings accentuate the importance 
of analysing how employers make these choices, and what consequences 
these actions have for transferability of skills.
5.3.2 Harmonising internal training
A second way of acting to make training transferable is to harmonise 
internal training, so that the content of the training is more equal among 
employers. Harmonising training means that internal training is organised 
to meet certain standards. This is what is done for example in the German 
apprenticeship system, which combines harmonised internal training and 
common training in vocational schools (Berg 1994). Another example of 
harmonising internal training is through the requirements of health and 
safety regulations. Such harmonising will have similar effects as common 
training in enhancing transferability. Yet, as the rules and standards are 
unlikely to ensure that training is completely equal among firms, and that 
may not even be a goal, harmonised training will usually include aspects 
of specific training. Nevertheless, even if harmonised training may not 
lead to perfectly transferable skills, harmonisation still tends to make 
individual company training more transferable than it would otherwise 
be.
Harmonisation can be achieved in many different ways. The 
German apprenticeship system includes detailed national training
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standards and occupational curricula. Since each employer may have an 
incentive to undercut these standards (Marsden 1986), institutions at the 
national, regional and workplace levels monitor training within 
companies (Berg 1994; Soskice 1994a). Still, the detailed standards and 
extensive monitoring have not ensured harmonised training o£ high 
quality in all firms and all sectors (Berg 1994: 301-302; Marsden and Ryan 
1990: 358).
Even if similar types of standard setting and monitoring are the 
norm in the apprenticeship systems, harmonisation can also be achieved 
in other ways. For example, in Norway the section 20 of the Act on 
Vocational Training, as mentioned earlier, will tend to harmonise training 
within companies since the resulting skills are tested, even if the contents 
of the training are not monitored directly.3
A third way of achieving harmonisation is by national regulation 
of training requirements, for example in relation to health and safety 
standards.
Finally, rules and regulation that make the contents of jobs more 
similar within an industry will also indirectly tend to harmonise the 
training employees get. This is ‘indirect harmonisation.’ While the 
existence of any of the first three types of harmonisation are clear 
examples of actions to increase transferability of training, it is debatable 
how indirect harmonisation can be used to support the collective action 
hypothesis, and not the human capital hypothesis. As explained in 
chapters 2 and 3, it is more in line with human capital theory to assume 
that training options are direct consequences of the tasks employees must 
do, and that employers have little or no choice in the design of these 
training options to influence transferability.
3 National skill testing is also an important part of the Japanese training system (Dore 
and Sako 1989).
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5.3.3 Improving information among other employers
Information is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for transferability. 
Skills are transferable only if employers have sufficient information to 
evaluate the value of the skills in their own firms. Therefore, if employers 
act to increase the information other employers get about the training 
they offer, it will tend to improve the transferability of skills from this 
training. In the extreme case skills may be of no value to other employers 
if they have not and cannot get information about the skills. If the skill is 
potentially useful in the firm, information about the skill will always 
increase the value of the skill to the employer, as Katz and Ziderman 
(1990) show.
To some extent improving information other employers get about 
the training may be independent of other actions to increase 
transferability. For example, an employer may choose to establish an 
internal training programme with diplomas and formal courses, which 
makes it easier for other employers to assess the contents of the training. 
However, improved information will often be a by-product of other 
action to increase transferability. If employers choose to give employees 
common or harmonised training, training will not only be more similar 
among employers, but employers will also have more adequate 
information about the training employees in other firms receive. 
Therefore, action to specifically improve information about training is 
necessary, and most likely, in cases where training is neither common nor 
harmonised.
To increase the value of employees * skills through improved 
information was an important rationale behind the introduction of the 
British National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) system (Marsden 1995). 
The most common way of improving information about skills is some 
form of documentation. One type of documentation is that of formal 
training. This means that if employees go through formal internal or 
external training, they get some written proof, which describes the 
contents of the training. However, the debate about documentation has
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been more concerned with how other types of training, informal on-the- 
job training and learning through job experience, can be documented. 
Several reports have found that a substantial share of employees’ learning 
takes place outside formal training situations (e.g., Larsen et al. 1997 and 
Training Agency 1990a), and it is therefore important that other 
employers can get reliable information about the nature of such training 
and learning. Hence, the second type of skill documentation is of 
experience and on-the-job training.4 The final type of documentation is 
directly that relating to skills, typically through an exam. Documentation 
of skills has an advantage in that it measures the outcomes of training, 
rather than the processes. Skill testing in Japan or in the national ‘section 
20 system’ thus tends not only to harmonise training, as argued above, but 
is also important as a measure of documenting skills. In practice, many 
documentation measures include more than one of these three types. For 
example, a CV, a simple form of documentation, includes information 
about formal training, experience and also skill testing (exams).
5.3.4 Results
The results will show that in the insurance, teachers’ and the nurses’ cases 
there are examples of how collective action has made training common 
instead of individual and harmonised internal training. The engineers’ case 
is the only one where there has been no significant attempts to make 
training transferable in any of the three possible ways.
4 This type of documentation was at the heart of the policy discussions in Norway while 
the fieldwork was undertaken. The government-appointed committee on further 
training recommended efforts to improve documentation of non-formal learning (N O U  
1997:25), which had also been the recommendation of similar committee a decade earlier 
(N O U  1985:26 ). This was seen as important for both employers and employees, and 
N H O  initiated research into how documentation schemes could be organised 
(Reichborn, Pape, and Kleven 1998). N ew  measures for documentation of competence 
were later proposed by the government and finally approved by the Parliament (Kirke- 
utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1999; NTB 1999).
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Common training
An important conclusion in this section is that the choice between 
internal training and external training is not one that individual 
employers take independently of other employers or institutions. By 
contrast, at least in the nurses’ and the insurance employees’ case, the 
choice between training for employees from only one firm, ‘individual 
training’, and training that is undertaken by employees from many 
companies, ‘common training’, has been a matter of great importance for 
employers and employees and a target of collective action.
For nurses, the choice between internal and college-based specialist 
training has accentuated the issue, while in the insurance industry the 
large employers have had a clear choice between organising training 
internally or contributing to a common training organisation. In the 
engineers’ case common extensive training is much less important, and 
attempts by the public colleges to play an important further training 
provider role have failed. Finally, for teachers the most important point 
in this section is the way the state, through collective bargaining, has 
influenced the type of further training that teachers take.
The process that led to the Parliament decision in 1996 to transfer 
internal specialist training of nurses to the public regional colleges 
highlights the importance of how training is organised. The Nurses 
Association (NSF) had long argued that the training should not remain 
internal, but become college-based. Both SHD and KUF were, however, 
against such a move. The hospitals have also, overall, been sceptical about 
leaving the responsibility for all specialist training to the colleges. By 
analysing the parties’ respective arguments one can better understand the 
employers’ action to influence the types of further training that are 
offered.
For NSF the dual purposes of establishing nursing as a profession 
and of ensuring high quality training have led its struggle to make further 
training college-based (Melby 1990: 308). The most important argument
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from NSF has been that further training should be college-based because 
that would lead to higher and more equal standards of training.
By contrast, the two ministries involved emphasised potential 
disadvantages of making all specialist training college-based. Even if they 
have not opposed the goal of equal training standards, what was then the 
Ministry of Culture and Science in 1985 rejected national plans for 
internal specialist training. The reason was that it saw such training as the 
employers’, the hospitals’, responsibility (Radet for hogskoleutdanning i 
helse- og sosialfag 1992: 3). The two ministries have opposed a transfer 
because it could give hospitals more severe recruitment problems and that 
the training could be too ‘academic,’ and less directed towards solving the 
practical tasks of a specialist nurse (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1998: 59; St prp nr 1 (1997-98): 174).5 The 
argument is that the purpose of the internal specialist training is to meet 
the needs of hospitals for technical skills in highly specialised jobs, and 
that the employers’ needs would have less priority in college-based 
studies.6
While the two relevant Ministries have been opposed and the 
nurses have been clearly in favour of making all specialist training college- 
based, the employers themselves have been more ambivalent. A 
committee of the directors of the five regional hospitals in 1996 made no 
clear recommendation, but said that ‘the college system is good in 
itself...but one may loose some of the link to practice by a transfer [of 
internal specialist training] to the colleges’ (Holter et al. 1996: 21).
Many hospitals did in fact reorganise their training, and out­
sourced part of the training to colleges before the 1996 Parliament 
decision on transfer. So it is somewhat misleading to call specialist 
training either internal or college-based. In practice the distinction was not 
so clear, and the case is a good example of how the distinction between
5 Interviews with NSF representative, KUF representative, Representative of the 
Norwegian Board of Health and RHHS representative.
6 Interview with KUF representative.
148
internal and external training is often blurred. Even if the Ministries were 
opposed to transferring further training to the colleges, almost half of the 
hospitals had still, on their own initiative, decided to let colleges run the 
whole or parts of the training. Of the 22 hospitals, nine had already given 
colleges some or full responsibility for so-called internal training, and 
bought training services from the local college. In 1998, only one hospital, 
the National Hospital, organised its internal specialist training without 
any co-operation with other institutions. The most common form of 
organising internal specialist training was that in a region one hospital had 
the main responsibility for the training and organised theoretical training, 
while nurses did their practice at their respective employers. (Kirke- 
utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1998). The committee that was 
appointed to evaluate how internal specialist training recommended a 
training-on-demand system, similar to how four counties had already 
done it, by hospitals buying places for the number of students they 
wanted from the local college. The reason was that, according to the 
committee, this model would solve the problems of varying standards in 
internal training, and at the same time give employers the possibility of 
regulating the number of students (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1998).
The insurance case is the other example where the choice between 
internal and common training has been of great importance. The existence 
of NAI confirms that employers have co-operated to establish and 
maintain an institution for transferable training. It is a also a clear and 
outspoken opinion among NAI, employers, employees and their 
organisations, that there is a collective action problem involved in 
upholding NAI. More specifically, the challenge for those who want NAI 
to continue to exist is to ensure that the largest employers still use the 
common training organisation. As a NAI representative said, ‘We are 
quite vulnerable. The use of NAI is not obligatory, and the companies can 
at any time say: ‘We don’t want this any more.”7 In 1996, more than half
7 Interview with N A I representative.
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of the participants came from one of the three largest companies 
(Forsikringsakademiet 1997), so a pulling out of one or more of these 
could be critical for the organisation.8 At the same time, in line with the 
resource explanation for employers’ collective action presented in chapter 
3, the large employers are those who can most easily replace common 
training with internal training. As one informant said: ‘Storebrand [the 
largest insurance company] could have made their own academy.59 So, 
according to a trade union representative, ‘NAI is most important for the 
small companies. The large companies can do fine on their own.’10 This 
impression was confirmed by a personnel manager in one of the small 
firms who said: ‘At present we have no alternative [to NAI].’11
Even if, or maybe because, of the manifest awareness of the 
collective action problem, there has been no known attempt by any of the 
large companies to pull out of NAI. Nevertheless, the informants 
indicated that there had been discussions within the large companies about 
their role in NAI. All informants described the opposition to common 
training rather vaguely. A personnel manager in one of the large 
companies said there had been ‘forces which wanted to do more 
internally,’12 and a representative for the employers’ association said that 
‘there have been hints (ymting) [about leaving the organisation], but it 
seems safe at the moment.’13
NAI has used several different strategies to ensure that co­
operation has continued for 40 years without any of the large employers 
pulling out. One important strategy the NAI has used is the broad
8 Several informants used the history of the Norwegian Banking Academy and the 
Swedish Insurance Academy (EFU) as examples of the sort of crisis a withdrawal of large 
employers could lead to. Olberg (1995) argues the crisis o f the Norwegian Banking 
Academy in the 1980s illuminates the collective action problem of industry training.
9 Interview with N A F  representative.
10 Interview with Group of FL representatives.
11 Interview with Personnel manager of small insurance company (B).
12 Interview with Organisational development manager, large insurance company (B).
13 Interview with FA representative.
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participation by the member firms in the running of the organisation. 
This has contributed not only to making the training offers relevant for 
the firms, but also that the organisation has had supporters within the 
companies.14 According to one member of the board, the policy has been 
successful: ‘We on the NAI board have all been clear on this point [the 
continuing existence of NAI], and we think we have had positions in our 
companies that meant we could influence this. So we have not been close 
to any breakdown.’15 First, one representative for each of the two largest 
companies is always on the board. These representatives have usually not 
been training managers, but more senior managers. The reason is that 
representation on the board has had the purpose of not only giving NAI 
input on how to run the organisation but has also been a way of ensuring 
that the organisation had a voice when important company decisions were 
made, and these were often made above the level of training managers.16 
All training managers have been included, though, through an annual 
meeting where the main object has been to get feedback from the 
companies (Forsikringsakademiet 1998a). Many more members of the 
firm have been included through teaching. Employees from the member 
firms teach all courses at NAI, and they constitute the committees that 
define the contents of teaching and employ teachers.
Another important factor behind the NAI’s continuing existence 
may be the way NAI has developed its training programmes and limited 
its scope. NAI’s strategy has for many years been to offer training in 
insurance skills only. As shown in chapter 4, students have to take the 
business administration parts of the insurance education at other colleges. 
In the school’s first years, management training was an important part of 
N A I’s program.17 But already in the early 1970s the management training
14 Interview with NAI representative.
15 Interview with Organisational development manager, large insurance company (B).
16 Interview with N A I representative.
17 NAI was then called the Norwegian School of Insurance (.Forsikringsskolen). It changed 
names to NAI in 1986 (Lefdal 1993: 24)
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was criticised for being outside what should be the main task of the 
school, namely to educate insurance employees in insurance skills (Lefdal 
1993: 19). This critique reflects the view that is prevalent today, namely 
that NAI should stick to strictly insurance-related training (Johansen 
1999: 36).
The way NAI has developed its programs as alternatives to 
internal training is frequently called a ‘balance’ or ‘task sharing’ by the 
informants.18 In the 1989 annual report, the school states that:
The interdependence between the companies and NAI requires 
that the courses can be made up-to-date in line with the 
development in the industry. With good collaboration with the 
training departments a suitable sharing of tasks has been developed 
between internal training and N A I’s courses (Forsikringsakademiet 
1990: 8).19
This ‘task sharing’ is greatly influenced by two factors, except for 
the quality and relevance of training, namely comparative costs and 
competition sensitivity. A substantial challenge or threat to the 
organisation is that large employers may choose to do training internally 
if the costs are lower than at NAI. Small and large employers have reacted 
differently in order to save costs. While large employers have chosen to do 
some training internally, some small employers have tried to co-operate to 
achieve the same economies of scale that the large employers can. This 
contributes to explain why, as 4 shows, a smaller proportion of employees 
at large employers do NAI courses than employees at small employers.20
18 Interviews with FA representative, FL representative, N A F representative, and N A I  
representative.
19 This view was not only the official view, but also a view generally supported by the 
employers.
20 A  personnel manager in one of the largest companies said that ‘You may...say that it is 
easier for the large companies to benefit from economies of scale, and thus do things 
[internal training] more cheaply than the small companies. And that is an explanation 
[why large companies do more internal training], not competition sensitivity.’ Interview 
with Organisational development manager, large insurance company (B).
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However, small employers have also tried to establish their own training 
to save cost. To attempt to achieve economies of scale in training, a group 
of training managers from five small insurance companies in the so-called 
IN FO  group in 1997 discussed the possibility of co-operation on training, 
but the plans never materialised.21
The other challenge to a task sharing where NAI does a substantial 
amount of training of insurance employees is ‘competition sensitivity.’ All 
parties (employers, employees and the training organisation) recognise 
that companies want some training to be organised internally because the 
skills are especially important for their competitive strength in the 
product market.22 The result is that sales training and training about new 
insurance products are usually done internally because they are 
‘competition sensitive.’ The personnel manager of one of the large 
companies explained how the company chooses between NAI and 
internal training based on comparative costs and competition sensitivity:
We have, let’s call it a borderline (grensesnitt) to NAI which [means 
that if training] is not competition sensitive...and if they at the 
same time are competitive on price, they can do it. But if we can 
do it cheaper internally, there may be basis for doing that, but we 
especially organise competition sensitive training internally. It 
turns out that not so much is. It is more about price.23
21 The aims of co-operation were not well defined at the meeting. One participant said 
that the group planned to provide training as an alternative to NAI, with ‘greater 
freedom and lower costs.’ Another training manager, who attended the same meeting, 
said, on the other hand, that the co-operation was mainly meant to cover areas that N A I 
did not cover, for example IT training. Nevertheless, they both shared the view that 
saving training costs would be the main purpose of such co-operation. Interviews with 
Personnel manager of small insurance company (A) and Personnel manager of small 
insurance company (B).
22 A  similar observation was made in the case of further training in German banks. Here, 
large banks preferred internal training, the Association for Further training offered small 
banks further training that did not ‘affect their relative competitive positions’ (Streeck 
1987: 80).
23 Interview with Organisational development manager, large insurance company (B).
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The inconsistency in the excerpt reflects that there is not an absolutely 
clear policy that determines the choice between internal training and 
training at NAI. No companies said that they wanted to carry out 
competition-sensitive training at NAI, but except for sales training and 
information about their own products that were not yet released, 
employers were not clear on which training was competition-sensitive. 
Thus, this challenge to employer co-operation through NAI is not so 
much one of organising competition-sensitive training, but rather to 
ensure that employers do not define too much training as ‘competition- 
sensitive.’
The problem of competition sensitivity has been more significant 
in the 1990s than earlier. When NAI was established in 1958, and in the 
subsequent two decades, product market competition in the insurance 
industry was limited, even if the members of the industry, already in the 
early 1960s, were experiencing considerably increased competition.24 Still, 
competition in the product market remained ‘competition within a 
system characterised by extensive co-operation and regulation’ until the 
1980s (Lange 1996: 7).25 But in the 1980s and 1990s competition increased 
markedly, after the most important price cartel broke down in 1982, a 
new Insurance Act (.Forsikringsloven) was introduced in 1988, and Norway 
became part of EU’s internal market through the European Economic 
Area (EEA) (Espeli 1995; Kjaer 1992; Lange 1996: 7).
What is characteristic for engineers compared with the three other 
cases, is how little common extensive further training there is, at least in 
technical skills. There have not been very noticeable efforts to change this 
situation by the employees, the employers or the state, even if some
24 The background was a liberalisation of the national regulations and that consequently 
a previously very specialised company broadened their scope, for example from only fire 
insurance to all sorts of non-life insurance.
25 According to Espeli (1995: 80) ‘the price cartels within non life insurance, especially 
fire [insurance], were some of the most lasting and powerful cartels in the history of 
modern Norwegian business.’
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attempts have been made to strengthen the position of engineer colleges as 
providers of further training.
The state’s role is most important in this case as a provider of 
training through the universities (NTNU in particular) and the public 
colleges. The engineer colleges have a marginal position as providers of 
further training for engineers.26 As one engineer informant said: *We have 
never heard anything from the engineer colleges, to be honest.’27
Table 5.3 reveals the minimal importance of engineer colleges in 
further training among the 33 per cent of N ITO  members who planned 
or had started further education. O f these, only 9 per cent said they did or 
would do their training at the engineer colleges. Thus, not more than 
three per cent of NITO members overall had started or planned to do 
further training at the engineer colleges.
Table 5.3 Engineers who have commenced on or are planning further education, 
by further education provider____________________________________________
Education provider % N
Economic college 23 121
University 14 76
Regional college 10 53
Graduate engineer training 10 52
Engineer college 9 48
Maritime college 1 3
Other type of further education 48 254
Sum 100 530
Source: Norges ingeniororganisasjon (1997b).
The National Council for Engineering Education did a four-year 
project in the early 1990s to strengthen the role of the engineer colleges in
26 Brandt (1991: 86) argues that the engineer colleges could not play an important role as 
providers in the 1980s because they had to use their resources for extending the basic 
training from two to three years. Nevertheless, the engineer colleges do not seem to have 
been significantly more important during the 1990s.
27 Interview with NITO  representative, offshore contractor.
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provision of further training for engineers (Havn and Huitfeldt 1994; 
Ingeniorutdanningsradet 1995; Ingeniorutdanningsradet 1996). The most 
important conclusion from their project was that there was a lack of 
communication between the colleges and employers:
What we saw, was that if you are to succeed within that area 
[further education and training]...users/buyers and
providers/sellers...have to initiate a dialogue, they have to 
understand each others’ distinctive features, demands, mind set and 
approach.28
According to Havn and Huitfeldt (1994: xx) another major obstacle is that 
‘it seems as if engineer colleges and the industry have conflicting priorities: 
individual, academic careers versus experience-based competence (practical 
use of theoretical knowledge).’
The employers’ association, TBL, has spent considerable resources 
on encouraging further education and training and strategic competence 
development in their member firms. In contrast to the employers’ 
association in the process industry, PIL, it has not established its own 
training, but has rather tried to influence the training offered by public 
schools and colleges in order to bring it more into line with its members’ 
demands (Econ 1997: 10; Prosessindustriens Landsforening 1997;
Teknologibedriftenes Landsforening 1996).29
The Norwegian Society of Engineers (NITO) is an important 
provider of further training. But all its courses are short, and can hence 
hardly be interpreted as any attempt to ensure that engineers get extensive 
common further training. In 1996 N ITO  held 88 courses and seminars 
with about 3000 participants in total (Norges ingeniororganisasjon 
1997a).30 This training usually lasts from one to three days, and aims at up­
dating engineers about new developments, as well as serving as a meeting
28 Interview with National Council for Engineering Education representative.
29 Interview with National Council for Engineering Education representative.
30 NIF, which runs similar courses, had about the same number of participants in 1996 
(Norske Sivilingeniorers Forening 1997)
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place for engineers interested in related issues. Even if NITO organises the 
courses, they are not restricted to its members, but are open to all that are 
interested. In 1990 not more than 30 per cent of the participants at N ITO  
courses were NITO members (Eldring and Falkum 1995). Members do 
get a small discount, about 10 per cent, but as long as the employer always 
pays the course fees, that is hardly an important member benefit.31 At the 
same time, membership fees are not used to subsidise training, so N IT O ’s 
course department has to be self-financing. Even if it is clear that N ITO  
organises training to encourage their members’ competence development, 
the organisation has a very clear view that it is only one of a large number 
of training providers in a competitive market.
In the teachers’ case the state has, by two different means, increased 
transferability of training, and also made it very difficult for individual 
employers to influence transferability in any significant way. Neither of 
these actions has been directed primarily at increasing transferability, but 
rather at ensuring equal national standards of education for all pupils in 
the compulsory comprehensive school. This section shows how collective 
bargaining has ensured that training is common, while the next section 
shows how detailed national curricula in comprehensive schools in effect 
have harmonised further training.
The state can use collective bargaining as a means because even if 
the municipalities employ teachers, NL and Teachers Association still 
negotiate their collective agreement with the state. In effect this has 
implications for the transferability of further training teachers take. The 
main point here is that as long as the collective agreement is negotiated 
between the state and the teachers’ organisations, it remains an important 
vehicle for state power and limits the employers’ possibility for 
influencing transferability of training.
The collective agreements negotiated by the state leave little or no 
scope for individual schools to remunerate teachers by performance, 
amount of school-specific skills or which courses they teach. Formal
31 The details of cost sharing are presented in chapter 6 and appendix 3.
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competence level (described in chapter 4) and seniority (not necessarily at 
the current employer) have determined teachers* wages. Chapters 6 and 7 
will show in detail how this agreement determines cost sharing of further 
education and training, as well as how the training meets the employers’ 
needs. What is most important here is that since teachers get automatic 
wage increases if they reach a higher competence level, the agreement 
gives strong incentives for teachers to take further education and training 
at colleges and universities, which can lead to higher formal competence. 
By contrast, the collective agreement gives no incentives to train in 
school-specific skills or other skills that do not lead to wage increases. 
Consequently through this wage agreement the state encourages teachers 
to take training that is likely to be transferable. The individual employers, 
on the other hand, are left with few possibilities to influence the 
transferability of teachers’ further education. Thus, one might argue that 
because of the national collective agreement the teachers’ case is similar to 
the case of a single monopoly employer.
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the findings on this indicator 
compared to the initial predictions. The conclusions will be discussed after 
the results on all three types of action to increase transferability of 
training.
Table 5.4 Summary of predictions and processes: employers’ choice of common 
training instead of individual firm training________________________________
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
H alt prediction Very likely Likely Likely Unlikely
H0 prediction Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
Results Yes, after Yes, Yes, No
pressure through through significant
from collective common attempts
employees’ agreement training
organisation organisation
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Harmonising internal training
Training does not have to be organised with employees from many firms 
or arranged outside the firm to be transferable. Internal training may be 
transferable, but it will be transferable to varying degrees, and employers 
can influence the transferability. This section presents results showing 
how employers have tried to increase transferability of internal 
(individual) training by making the content of the training more similar 
among employers, or resisted such harmonisation. Direct harmonisation 
of internal training has been most prevalent in the nurses’ and the 
insurance cases. In the teachers’ case, the state has more indirectly 
harmonised training, as a side effect of the national curricula. In the 
engineers’ case, there have hardly been any attempts to harmonise 
training, and neither have skills been harmonised as a consequence of 
other decisions.
NSF worked long for more harmonised specialist training among 
hospitals before its struggle for transferring the training to the colleges 
succeeded in 1996. In 1989, the organisation published curricula for 
specialist training of anaesthesia, intensive and operation nurses. Even if 
there was no legal obligation to organise further training according to the 
plan, a study in 1992 showed that all but one of the hospitals used NSF’s 
plan, either as it was, or in a modified version (Radet for 
hogskoleutdanning i helse- og sosialfag 1992: 11). A representative of NSF 
argued that ‘it is NSF which has ensured that there is a reasonably equal 
level and equal quality of [internal] further training.’32 But even if most 
hospitals used the curricula, NSF was still not satisfied with the degree of 
harmonisation of training. The organisation therefore argued that 
curricula made by the KUF would ‘contribute to quality control of the 
training and ensure unitary training nationally.’ (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1998: 86). Thus, individual employers, based on
32 Interview with NSF representative.
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an employee organisation initiative, have acted to increase transferability 
of training through harmonisation.
There is also more evidence that hospitals have acted to harmonise 
internal training. The directors of the regional hospitals, five of the largest 
hospitals, in 1995 appointed a committee to compare specialist training for 
nurses in the hospitals. Among other things the committee discovered 
clear differences in the contents and organisation of training at the five 
hospitals, and therefore suggested further collaboration between the 
hospitals to achieve more similar standards of training (Holter et al. 1996:
3).
In the insurance industry, two factors have tended to harmonise 
internal training. First, national rules and regulations of the industry 
indirectly harmonise training. Moreover, NAI has tended to harmonise 
internal training because companies now integrate the NAI offers in their 
internal training.
In Norway, public regulation and control of the insurance 
industry have been weaker than in comparable industries such as banking, 
and have mainly been concerned with life insurance (Espeli 1995). Still, 
relevant laws and regulation have been important parts of insurance 
training, and have therefore tended to harmonise training. Moreover, 
cartels in the insurance industry regulated not only prices, but also 
conditions. Hence, the conditions tended to be similar, or the same, 
between companies (Espeli 1995).
Internal training has been directly harmonised through the 
existence of NAI. In many cases, the NAI courses have replaced internal 
training, or are integrated into the internal training of employees. So, as in 
the nurses’ case, the distinction between internal and external training is 
not a clear one. For example, a large company has designed internal 
computer-assisted training with NAI courses as a basis, but adjusted the 
training to its own products and routines. Hence, by following this
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internal training, employees can also qualify for the exams at the NAI.33 
In the future NAI wants it to be ‘easier to find flexible solutions so that 
N A I’s training offers can be fitted into the individual companies’ own 
training’ (Forsikringsakademiet 1997: 13). But even before the
introduction of computer-assisted training, NAI offers have been included 
in companies’ internal training catalogues, with little or no mention of 
these being organised by an external organisation.34
In schools, the curriculum has an important bearing on the 
transferability of skills through indirect harmonisation. The more 
freedom individual schools or municipalities have to set their own 
curricula and use that freedom, and thus the more the contents or 
structure of education varies between schools, the less transferable one 
would expect skills to be. Therefore, the way in which the state laid down 
tight rules, concerning the contents of education in comprehensive 
schools, has tended to increase transferability of skills, even if that was not 
the main purpose of the national curricula.
Guided by ideas of universalism and equal rights to education, the 
Norwegian state in the two decades after the second world war 
implemented detailed national curricula and elaborate national rules and 
regulation. In the late 1960s the ideological climate changed, and 
decentralised and local governance become more important, but there 
were few changes to the strong national regulation of education (Lauvdal, 
Rymoen, and Grooss 1998: xii). The national regulation of curricula is 
still strong, and recent educational reforms do not seem to have decreased 
the influence of the state.35 Lauvdal, Rymoen and Groos (1998: 187) claim 
that ‘after the latest reform in Norway the control of the content [of 
teaching] at the national level through curricula is still strong, and there is
33 Interviews with Personnel manager, large insurance company (A) and N A I  
representative.
34 Interview with N A I representative.
35 By contrast, in Sweden and Finland there has been a far-reaching decentralisation of 
curriculum definition in the 1980s and 1990s (Green, Leney, and W olf 1999: 22).
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little room for municipal curricula.’ Management through relatively 
detailed national rules has characterised comprehensive education (St meld 
nr 37 (1990-91): 18), and the rules have been formed to achieve national 
equality.36 Another intention has been that schools should still adjust their 
teaching to local conditions, but in practice ‘the opportunities for an 
individual school to organise its work, based on local conditions, to reach 
national goals are very limited’ (St meld nr 37 (1990-91): 19). Compared to 
other countries, the local level in the Norwegian education system is 
relatively weak (OECD 1999). The fact that 97 per cent of municipalities 
reported that their teachers had received up-dating training related to the 
1997 reform of comprehensive education shows the significance of the 
national curriculum for teachers’ further training. (Jordfald and Nergaard 
1999; Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1997; 
Lsererforbundet 1995). So even if ‘the municipalities have the main 
responsibility for further education and training of employees in primary 
schools’ (Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1996: 11), 
national regulation has tended to ensure transferability of skills since 
teaching tasks are, to a large extent, the same in all comprehensive schools.
For engineers in the metal industry there have been no direct 
attempts to harmonise internal training. Moreover, there has been little 
indirect harmonisation of tasks through harmonisation of job design 
among companies.
Table 5.5 summarises the results and compares the processes to the 
predications of H q and H ait.
36 The Ministry of Education and Research mentions one problem of management by 
detailed rules: ‘To keep track of the different sector-related laws and the administrative 
apparatus connected to each of the laws can be problematic enough for those who work  
within the educational system and virtually impossible for those outside’ (St meld nr 37 
(1990-91): 21).
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Table 5.5 Summary of predictions and processes: employers’ actions to
harmonise internal training
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
H alt prediction Very likely Likely Likely Unlikely
H0 prediction Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
Results Yes, but Indirectly Some No
not result through
of state national
action curricula
Improving information among other employers
A third type of action that employers can take to increase transferability 
of training is to improve the quality of the information other employers 
get, or can easily obtain, about the training. As shown above, in all but 
the engineers’ case there has been action (common training and 
harmonisation) that tends to increase transferability, which also improves 
information about the training. Therefore, this section will focus on the 
engineers, in order to see whether or not the employers, in this case, have 
acted to increase transferability through improved information, since they 
have used, to only a slight extent, the two other options to ensure that 
training is transferable.
In the engineers’ case, there is a substantial lack of information 
even about common training. In the market for short training NITO 
competes with NEF, consultants, professional training organisers, 
suppliers, NTNU, other colleges as well as industry interest organisations, 
in addition to internal training (Mofossbakke and Herrebroden 1995).37 
For the buyers of training, this situation means that there is a wide 
selection of short courses and seminars to choose from. An engineer 
commented, ‘there is no lack of opportunities to choose from [the training 
offers] that we get by post.’38 On the other hand, it is hardly possible for
37 Interview with N ITO  representative.
38 Interview with N ITO  representative, offshore contractor.
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the engineers and their employers to assess the contents and quality of the 
training programs with which they are presented. Havn and Huitfeldt 
(1994: 126) therefore argue that even if the engineers can choose from an 
‘enormous’ amount of up-dating training, the ‘opportunities for choice are 
very limited,’ since they have no overview of what is offered. This lack of 
information among employers as well as employees is therefore likely to 
limit transferability of training so long as employers cannot assess the 
value of the skills.
There have been however some other attempts to improve 
information about further training. Some individual employers have made 
attempts, due to demand from buyers or employees, in ways that even if 
they are of limited importance for the overall transferability of skills, are 
interesting because they highlight alternative processes that may lead to 
increased transferability.39 Some employers were planning to take action 
to increase transferability of training when they were interviewed. Not 
least in the area of further education and training there may be 
discrepancies between what employers say and plan and what they will 
implement, so these cases are mainly of interest because of the employers’ 
rationale when considering policy change. One employer was in co­
operation with N TN U  and about to start further training that would give 
the participants credits in the college system.40 Another employer said 
they would change their project management training in order to make it 
more attractive outside the company.41 In both cases, the employers 
wanted to implement changes, partly because they wanted higher quality 
training, but stressed that the demands of current employees and potential
39 In addition, in 1999, NITO  and N H O  (Samarbeidsutvalget NITO-NHO) financed 
research that assessed the possibilities for improved documentation of engineers’ non- 
formal learning (Eldring and Skule 1999). More generally, in connection with the 
planning and implementation of new national further training policies in the late 1990s, 
N H O  emphasised the importance of informal learning and documentation as 
alternatives to formal education and training.
40 Interview with Leader of administrative section, telecom equipment manufacturer.
41 Interview with Personnel manager, turbine producer (B).
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employees were important when deciding to offer more transferable 
training. There had partly been pressure from NITO within the firm to 
get training that would be more valuable outside the firm.42 But 
employers also said they wanted to make training transferable because 
that would make it more likely that good engineers would want to join 
the firm and remain there. One personnel manager said that to attract and 
retain competent engineers they ‘had to offer’ training that would be 
valuable outside the firm.43 This is a rationale that Larsen et al. (1997) also 
found was prevalent in their study of further training in Norwegian 
manufacturing.
Another rationale behind action to improve information about 
training, is demand from the buyers of their products or services (Larsen 
et al. 1997; Meyer and Rowan 1991). A survey done for TBL showed that 
of those employers who said that they had made a written training plan 
for their employees, 18 per cent said the most important reason was 
demand from buyers of their products (MMI 1997). Two examples from 
the informants were a car part manufacturer who said a major buyer 
wanted to see a training plan for employees, and the same was the case 
when a shipyard was in contract negotiations.44 But in most cases the 
information given does not exceed what employees would write in their 
CVs if they wanted to change employers, so there may be little net effect 
of this sort of documentation on the transferability of skills in the labour 
market.
In 1991, Brandt (1991: 91) concluded that ‘certification [of further 
training] becomes more important,’ but that seems hardly to have been 
the case. Documentation of engineers’ skills has mostly proved difficult.
An attempt by the Norwegian Society of Chartered Engineers 
(NIF) illustrates the problems of establishing routines for documentation
42 Interview with Leader of administrative section, telecom equipment manufacturer.
43 Interview with Personnel manager, turbine producer (B).
44 Interviews with Factory manager, car part manufacturer and Personnel manager, ship 
yard.
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and certification of non-formal learning for engineers in general. In 1989, 
NIF established the Professional Development Certificates (PDC) for 
graduate engineers. The aim was for this certificate to provide a 
documentation of the ‘good professional,’ and at the same time inspire 
graduate engineers to further training.45 The certificate was established 
within several different fields, for example ‘Steel Construction’ or ‘Project 
W ork.’ To get the certificate, graduate engineers needed five years work 
experience, three of which had to be within the field relevant to the 
certificate. An important specification was also that the graduate engineer 
should take five course modules, which could be taken for example at 
N TN U , at the engineer colleges or at BI. Finally, the graduate engineer 
had to complete a study project in addition to the courses. NIF estimated 
the normal duration for completion of the certification at two and a half 
years (part-time), and the maximum period was five years. For each type 
of PDC certificate there was a professional council responsible for it, 
consisting of graduate engineers working in the field, as well as a 
representative of N T N U  in each council (Brandt 1991). Even if NIF 
devoted considerable resources to the certification, very few graduate 
engineers chose to undertake the certification, however, and in 1998 NIF 
finally decided to terminate its involvement in the project.46 So at a time 
when researchers, politicians, employers’ associations and trade unions 
were working to establish systems for documentation of non-formal 
learning, NIF, an organisation that had established such certification 
many years previously, gave up their attempt. Chapter 6 will show that a 
probable explanation for the lack of interest in documentation was the 
lack of incentives for engineers to invest their spare time in training and 
certification.
In the three other cases, employers are, to a much larger extent 
than in the engineers’ case, likely to have adequate information about 
training since it is common or harmonised. Thus, a real information
45 Interview with NIF representative.
46 Interview with NIF representative.
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problem is likely to exist only in the engineers’ case, while there has been 
less need for independent efforts to improve information in the three 
other cases.
An important point in the insurance case is, however, that such 
measures would contradict an important reason why companies choose to 
undertake training individually: competition sensitivity. When companies 
choose to do internal training, because the contents of the training would 
give other companies a competitive advantage, it would hardly be logical 
for individual employers to try to improve information other employers 
get about the training. So in the insurance case, competition sensitivity has 
restricted not only the degree to which training is common, but also the 
information employers have about other companies’ training.
Table 5.6 summarises the findings on the last of the three 
indicators.
Table 5.6 Summary of predictions and processes: employers’ actions to improve 
information about training_____________________________________________
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Halt prediction Very likely Likely Likely Unlikely
H0 prediction Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
Results N o N o No Some attempts 
by individual 
employers
5.3.5 Conclusion processes
Table 5.7 presents a summary of the results in this chapter. It clearly 
shows that overall the results strongly support H a„ and not H 0, since 
employers, to a much larger extent than predicted by human capital 
theory, act to make training transferable, and the pattern of such actions 
are in line with collective action theory.
167
Table 5.7 Summary of predictions and processes: employers’ actions to increase 
transferability of further training________________________________________
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Concentration High Low High Low
Powerful body Yes Yes No No
H alt prediction Very likely Likely Likely Unlikely
H q prediction Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
a. Choosing Yes, after Yes, Yes, No
common training pressure through through significant
instead of individual from collective common attempts
firm training employees’
organisation
agreement training
organisation
b. Harmonising 
training, making 
training more equal 
among employers
Yes, but not 
result of 
state action
Indirectly
through
national
curricula
Some No
c. Improving 
information among 
other employers
N o No No A few 
attempts by 
individual 
employers
Results support Support H*, 
but role of 
employees’ 
organisations 
not
integrated in 
theory
Support 
Ha|t, but 
role of 
collective 
agreements 
not
integrated in 
theory
Support Hait Support 
both Hq and 
Hak
However, one must locate not only where employers have done most or 
least to ensure transferability, but also consider to what extent the results 
are brought about by small group interaction among employers or action 
by a powerful superordinate body. This reveals that the support for H alt is 
somewhat more mixed than table 5.7 indicates, mainly because factors 
other than those predicted seem to have contributed to the collective 
action. The nurses’ case illustrates the potential importance of employees’ 
organisations, ignored in H alt, while examples from the engineers’ case
168
show that employees indirectly affect transferability if employers’ offer 
transferable training to attract able workers. The insurance case shows the 
importance of tracing the origin of the collaboration.
In the nurses’ case, collaboration as a result of the small number of 
employers is not very important, even if there is one example of how the 
regional hospitals co-operated to ensure similar standards of training. The 
assumption in collective action theory that a powerful body can ensure 
transferability gets more support. The Parliament decision in 1996 to 
transfer training shows the impact a ‘powerful body’ can have on the 
transferability of training. On the other hand, the fact that the two 
relevant Ministries were more opposed to college-based training than the 
employers themselves were, shows that a powerful body does not 
guarantee action to increase transferability of skills. What has ensured 
transferability in the case of internal specialist training for nurses is not so 
much co-operation among employers nor actions made by the state 
(except the 1996 Parliament decision), but influence from NSF. In the two 
most important actions to enhance transferability, harmonisation of 
internal specialist training and the transfer of specialist training to the 
colleges, NSF played a pivotal role.47
In the teachers’ case, the importance of the state in increasing 
transferability of skills is much clearer than the in the nurses’ case. 
Through the national curricula and the national collective agreement the 
state has effectively given individual employers scope for influencing the 
transferability of the further training teachers take. Even if the teachers’ 
organisations have supported national curricula and state bargaining, they 
have not played the same leading role as NSF has in ensuring 
transferability of skills.
47 According to the informants, NSF played a crucial role in convincing the MPs that the 
internal specialist training should be transferred to the colleges. (Interviews with NSF 
representative, KUF representative and Representative of the Norwegian Board of 
Health).
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In the insurance industry, collective action theory predicted that 
employers might act to increase transferability if there were co-operation 
between the small number of large employers. This seemed to be the case. 
The NAI was maintained through the continuing support of the large 
employers, and the organisation had developed strategies to ensure that 
these employers remained members of the trust. Nevertheless, the case is 
less straightforward if one distinguishes between the two problems, on the 
one hand of establishing the organisation and on the other the upholding 
of the organisation (Marsden 1986: chapter 8; Olson 1971: 22). In the case 
of the insurance industry, this problem of establishing the institution was 
solved in the 1950s when the insurance industry was much less 
concentrated (Kjaer 1992; Lange 1996; Lefdal 1993).48 The Norwegian 
School of Insurance, which established as a separate trust in 1958, was a 
continuation of the training that had previously been organised as part of 
the Association of Norwegian Insurance Companies (Lefdal 1993: 18).49 So 
the establishment of what is now NAI can hardly be explained as a result 
of co-operation between a few, large employers, but is rather the result of 
efforts by the industry’s business association. As long as the training 
organisation was already in place, the situation in the insurance industry 
has been in ‘institutional equilibrium’ where ‘the relative costs and 
benefits of altering the game among the contracting parties does not make 
it worthwhile to do so’ (North 1990: 86). Hence, even if the insurance case 
shows that co-operation between large employers can ensure that that 
they act to enhance transferability, it does not show that the co-operation 
can come into place without the support of a superordinate institution.
In the engineers’ case, both theories predict that employers would 
not make a significant effort to ensure that skills from further education 
and training are transferable. These expectations are confirmed. Neither
48 While the five largest companies had 50 per cent of the non-life insurance market in 
1958, the same ratio in 1991 was 94 per cent (Kjaer 1992: 79).
49 Interview with N A I representative.
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the state, nor the employers’ association nor NITO, has taken significant 
action to ensure that skills from further training are transferable.
Table 5.8 Summary of predictions: transferability of further training
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
H0 prediction Medium Medium Medium Medium
Hah prediction Very high High High Medium
The next part of the chapter shows how the processes analysed so far have 
influenced the transferability of further training for the four groups. Since 
the results in this first part of the chapter were in line with H a]t 
predictions, and H0 does not predict a link between employers’ action and 
transferability, the predictions do not have to be revised in order to test 
the second part of the explanation: the link between employers’ action 
and transferability. The predictions are summarised in table 5.8.
5.4 Outcomes: transferability
This part of the chapter analyses how transferable skills are from further 
training, how this can be explained as resulting from employers’ action, 
and finally how the results strengthen or weaken the two rival views as to 
what extent employers act to avoid or enhance transferability. Thus, this 
second part is a test of whether or not transferability of training is 
endogenous. If it is, transferability of training will be highest in cases 
where there has been collective action to improve transferability.
5.4.1 Measuring outcomes: transferability of skills
A spectrum of different indicators of transferability must be evaluated to 
draw a valid conclusion as to what extent skills are transferable. This 
section will use these five indicators to measure differences between the 
four cases: wages, perceptions of transferability, introductory training, 
importance in recruitment, and bonds. Due to the complex nature of the
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indicators, and the even more complex combination of indicators, the 
overall measure of transferability cannot be an interval level measure. Any 
attempt to measure transferability so precisely fails to acknowledge the 
inherent measurement problems. Still, the indicators can be used to 
compare degrees of transferability between different types of training for 
one group and also between different groups.
This measurement strategy differs from that carried out so far in 
human capital research (e.g. Lynch 1993 and Schone 1996) where the 
generality of skills has been induced from wage developments. The logic is 
that while perfectly general skills raise wages by the same amount in all 
firms, completely specific skills increase wages only in the current firm. 
So it is argued that the larger the difference in wage increases, between 
staying in a company and starting in another, the more specific the skills 
are.
The problem with this approach is that it is based on the 
assumption of a perfectly competitive labour market. If the labour market 
is not perfect, and, moreover, the level of ‘imperfections’ varies between 
sectors and occupational groups, such studies may not give valid results. 
As explained in chapter 2, Becker’s (1993) definition of specific and 
general skills relies on competition in the labour market as well as 
usefulness in other firms. So differences in wage developments can in 
principle be due to differences in the usefulness in other firms, but they 
may also simply reflect that competition in the labour market varies 
between different parts of the labour market, and that wages do not 
always equal marginal productivity. The problem of deducing from wage 
developments to transferability of skills is evident in studies which find 
that training followed at a previous employer leads to larger wage 
increases than such training does at the current employer (Lowenstein and 
Spletzer 1998; Schone 1996).50 Such results are logically impossible in the
50 Lowenstein and Spletzer (1998: 167) say that ‘for outside seminars and business school 
training -  training that is almost certainly general -  the estimated return to training at a 
previous employer far exceeds the estimated return to previous training at the current
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standard version of human capital theory, and thus suggest that other 
indicators of transferability must supplement those of wage increases.
The concept of transferable training, defined in chapter 2, differs 
from Becker’s concepts in that labour market competition is not a part of 
the definition of the concept. Moreover it is not, by definition, assumed 
that wages equal marginal productivity. Therefore wage increases alone 
are not even in theory expected to give valid measures of the extent to 
which skills are transferable. The concept of ‘transferable training’ is 
instead based on organisational features of the firms in a labour market. 
These features are impossible to catch with a single measure, such as 
wages. They can, however, describe the mechanisms that cause the 
statistical associations one finds between training, mobility and wages. For 
example, one consequence of measuring transferability by measures other 
than wages is that the wage effect of transferability may by tested 
empirically.
Wages
The question here is not to what extent employees get wage increases 
from further training, or how large they are -  that will be treated in 
chapter 6 -  but whether or not the employees can get equally large wage 
increases at employers other than where they were trained. If wage 
increases as a result of training are equally large at other employers, it 
indicates that skills are transferable.
One important point is, however, that the nature of wage 
determination for the particular groups must be taken into consideration. 
If there are significant differences between groups in the way pay reflect 
productivity, wage increases may be more suitable as an indicator of 
transferability in comparisons between different types of training within 
one group than for cross-group comparisons. When wages are set by 
collective bargaining, for example, wage increases may be an inadequate
employer. It is difficult for the conventional human capital model to explain this 
differential.’
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indicator of transferability. Still, there may be wage competition even 
with collective bargaining and national pay scales, for example, if 
employers can put employees on different levels of pay scale. Therefore, 
the impact of collective bargaining must be assessed in each individual 
case.
The four cases in this study can be used as examples of the problem 
of using wage increases as an indicator of transferability of skills, if one 
does take not industry-specific factors into account. For nurses and 
teachers, and to some extent for insurance employees, collective 
agreements determine the extent to which employers give wage increases 
after further training in order to remunerate increased productivity. 
Moreover, the impact of collective agreements varies from to case to case.
The clearest example of the inadequacy of wages as an indicator of 
transferability is the teachers’ case, since a national collective agreement 
ensures that all employers must give equally large wage increases for up­
grading training. When teachers get wage increases from further education 
if it leads to higher formal competence, even if they do not teach the 
subject they took the further education in, the assumption of wages 
reflecting marginal productivity is clearly violated. Moreover, if the 
assumption of wages reflecting productivity were true, it would mean that 
up-dating training did not affect productivity at all.
In the nurses’ case there is more room for wage competition since 
the collective agreements set the lower and upper limits for the specific 
type of job, in this case the specialist nurse positions, and the hospital then 
decides where, within these limits, to set the individual nurse’s wage.51 
Yet, a statistical analysis would have been likely to show that the wage 
increases were higher at other employers than at the one who trained. The 
reason is that different hospitals are covered by different agreements. Most 
hospitals are covered by an agreement between KS and NSF, but Oslo is 
outside this agreement, and the state hospitals have yet another agreement.
51 Interview with NSF representative.
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(In practice, this has meant that the hospitals outside the KS area have been 
able to offer higher wages than hospitals within the KS area.
Thus, nurses trained at a hospital in the KS area will receive lower 
wage increases after internal specialist training at their current employer 
than they would at another employer not covered by the KS agreement. 
Hence wage increases are unsatisfactory as the only indicator of 
transferability.
In the insurance case, the collective agreement is of minor 
importance in examining whether or not training gives similar wage 
increases in all companies, even if employees in some instances have the 
right to wage increases after NAI training.52 In the engineers’ case, wages 
are set individually, so collective agreements have little impact on wage 
increases. Unfortunately, neither the annual Statistics Norway analysis of 
wages and wage differences in the insurance industry (Statistisk 
sentralbyra 1998d) nor available wage statistics on engineers contain 
information on training and tenure at a current employer. So one must 
use other indicators to assess to what extent training is transferable.
Perceptions of transferability
Several attempts have been made to measure skill specificity by asking 
employees or employers whether skills are easy or difficult to transfer to 
other firms (Bishop 1992; Kalleberg and Reve 1993: 1118; Osterman 
1984b: 175; 1995b: 137; Torp and Mastekaasa 1990: 36).
There are generally two problems with this approach. One 
problem is whether or not they measure perceptions of transferability as 
it is defined in this thesis. The problem with Bishop’s definition, for 
example, is that such questions cannot measure different degrees of 
usefulness outside the current firm. An even more important problem, 
however, is that perceptions of transferability may be a dubious measure 
of actual transferability. A major problem is that employers and 
employees in most instances can give only hypothetical answers to
52 The details of this are laid out in chapter 6.
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whether or not training in their firm is transferable. Employees are 
unlikely to know how transferable their skills are before they have 
actually changed employers, and their perception of transferability of 
skills can therefore not be a reliable measure of transferability. Thus, a 
better test would be to ask those who have changed jobs recently. An 
additional problem is the way researchers have tried to quantify these 
perceptions of transferability (Bishop 1992; Kalleberg and Reve 1993; 
Osterman 1984b; 1995a).53 As long as perceptions of transferability are 
likely to be imprecise and hypothetical, by quantifying these perceptions 
one constructs a pseudo-accurate measure. Still, if these problems are 
taken into consideration, perception of transferability may still be used as 
one of several indicators of transferability.
The results show that except for the engineers in the metal 
industry, employees and employers perceive training to be highly 
transferable. What makes transferability particularly important in the 
insurance industry is that it contributes to determining how much 
training is done internally and how much training is done at NAI. While 
FL and NAI emphasise how much of the skills are the same among firms, 
the employers more often add that there are important firm-specific skills, 
too, even if the employers maintain too that most of the insurance skills 
are equally valuable in all firms. When a small company’s personnel 
manager was asked how similar or different jobs were in different 
companies, she said that ‘the difference is the system [the IT system and 
the routines]. The tasks are the same and the customers are the same.’54 
Training at NAI is generally seen as transferable, and transferability is a 
condition for training to be organised by NAI. One reason is that
53 For example, Bishop’s (1991: appendix) asked employers, ‘What share of the skills 
learned by new employees in this job are useful outside of your firm?’ The response 
categories were ‘A ll’ (90-100 per cent), ‘M ost,’ 61-89 per cent, ‘Half’ (40-60 per cent), 
‘Some’ (11-39 per cent) and ‘Minimal’ (0-10 per cent). They were then asked, ‘H ow  many 
other firms in the local labor market have similar jobs to this one?’ with the response 
categories ‘Less than 10,’ 10-24,’ ‘25-100’ and ‘Over 100.’
54 Interview with Personnel manager of small insurance company (B).
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information about the training is more widely available. There is some 
statistical evidence to support the opinions of the informants. Torp and 
Mastekaasa (1990: 37) show that employees within banking and finance 
(including insurance) were most likely to. say that the training they had 
received would be useful at other employers.
Specialist internal training for nurses is perceived as being, to a 
large extent, the same between hospitals, but not equal in all respects. On 
the one hand, nurses’ ‘function is the same wherever they are,’ as a NSF 
representative said.55 A personnel manager agreed that the different 
hospitals ‘wanted exactly the same’ from their specialist nurses.56 Hospitals 
are organised in much the same way, and within that organisation, 
specialist nurses have particular tasks, which the specialist training must 
qualify them for. But at the same time, the informants raised three reasons 
why the internal training was not exactly the same at all hospitals. First, 
there has been no state regulation of quality and contents.57 Moreover, 
during their practice the nurses have different experiences. Nurses at large 
hospitals are, for example, likely to experience a wider variety of 
particularly challenging patients and tasks than nurses at small hospitals 
are.58 A final reason for differences in training is that some hospitals have 
a special, national responsibility for certain types of patients, and that will 
affect the specialist training.59 Nevertheless, the overall perception among 
the informants was that training was highly transferable
In a national survey Torp and Mastekaasa (1990: 37) find that 60 
per cent of employees in the education sector (including upper secondary 
schools and universities) think the training they have received is useful in 
other firms. This is 6 per cent more than the national average. The clear
55 Interview with NSF representative.
56 Interview with Personnel manager of hospital outside Oslo.
57 Interviews with RHHS representative, Representative of the Norwegian Board of 
Health and NSF representative.
58 Interviews with RHHS representative and Representative of the Norwegian Board of 
Health.
59 Interview with RHHS representative.
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view of the informants was that skills are transferable. The reason is that 
the contents of teaching, and partly how teaching is organised, is so 
strictly regulated by the state, as the first part of this chapter showed.
Employees in manufacturing in general seem to perceive their 
training as much less transferable than the three other groups. Less than 
50 per cent of employees in manufacturing said that the training they had 
received would be useful at other employers (Torp and Mastekaasa 1990: 
37). This is confirmed by the informants, who said that a large part of the 
skills they have developed after basic training are valuable only inside the 
firm, or in a small number of other firms.60 But even if the engineers 
regard their skills as clearly less transferable than the three other groups 
do, the lack of transferability should nevertheless not be exaggerated. 
Some skills, such as computer assisted design (CAD) skills, are valuable at 
virtually every potential employer. Moreover, the industrial structure 
with specialised products may make engineers’ skills transferable to a 
smaller set of employers, but they may still be transferable to the other 
employers within their niche of the industry.61
Introductory training
The rationale for using introductory training as an indicator of 
transferability is as follows: if skills are transferable, it means that 
employees need little time and little introductory training to do a job in 
another firm. If, on the other hand, skills are not transferable, workers 
need extensive introductory training, or a long time with learning by 
doing, before they can do a job in another firm.
Using the amount of introductory training as an indicator is 
advantageous because it depends less on subjective evaluation than do 
perceptions of transferability. However, instead of providing formal
60 A similar point has been made about engineers in Sweden, even if Swedish 
manufacturing is much larger than the Norwegian (Ingenjorsvetenskapsakademien 1994: 
61).
61 Interview with Organisational development manager, offshore contractor. The 
problem of defining industry boundaries is discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
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introductory training employers may let new employees learn by doing 
their job, and not expecting the output of an experienced worker for the 
first period in employment. Therefore, the length of time it takes for an 
average newcomer to become as productive as an average experienced 
worker may be an indicator of transferability. The problem with the 
latter indicator is however that it depends on employers’ evaluation of 
productivity, which in many, maybe most, cases is difficult and 
imprecise.62 Moreover, what should be measured is not only the time it 
takes, but also the gap between what a newcomer produces and what an 
experienced worker produces.63 Nevertheless, even introductory training 
and the time it takes to master a job are not incontestable measures of 
transferability of skills, they should be included in the range of indicators 
used to evaluate transferability.
Table 5.9 shows that in a national survey, employees on average 
reported that new recruits needed to work for 12 months in their position 
before they fully tackled the tasks. Employees in health and social care 
report the shortest training periods, while employees in manufacturing 
say that they need the longest introductory training, controlled for 
number of employees, centrality and the educational level of the 
employees. For example the table shows that, controlled for size, centre- 
periphery and education, employees in health and social care need almost 
ten months less of introductory training than employees in manufacturing 
without international competition.
62 Bishop (1992) attempts to measure productivity, and the cost of training due to new 
employees’ producing less than experienced employees, but his results rely heavily on 
employers’ ability to evaluate the productivity of individual employees.
63 The most correct indicator would be the total gap between an experienced employee’s 
output and a newcomer’s output in the period it takes for the newcomer to be as 
productive as an experienced employee.
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Table 5.9 Number of months of introduction training necessary, by industry, 
size, centrality and education______________________________________
No. of months 
of training required 
in new job
National average 12.1*
Industry
Health care and social care 6.5*
Teaching 11.6
Banking and finance 14.4*
Manufacturing with international competition 14.4*
Manufacturing without international competition 16.4*
Retail trade 10.6*
Public administration 13.6
Other services 9.4*
Size
Less than 20 employees 12.6
20 -  49 employees 11.2
50 -  199 employees 12.8
200 or more employees 12.4
Cen tre/peripbery
Central area 10.0*
Peripheral area 13.2*
Education
The controlled effect of an additional year of 1.13*
education after completed comprehensive
education
N: 4,326 employees in 825 firms
Note: * denotes coefficients significance on. 05 level. The results are based on an 
ANOVA analysis with length of required training as the dependent variable. No 
interaction factors are included. The average figures in the table are not actual 
averages, but theoretical average figures, controlled for the other variables in the 
model. Source: Torp and Mastekaasa (1990: 32).
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Table 5.10 Percentage of vacancies with more than 2 months necessary 
introductory training period, by sector and type of higher education preferred in 
the position. January/February 1993__________________________________
Private
sector
Public
sector
Total
Culture and education (incl. teachers) - 45 47
Health care (incl. nurses) - 30 29
Administrative 64 63 63
Technical or science (incl. engineers) 63 68 65
Average 67 47 50
Note: The source does not give information on the number of vacancies where 
higher education was preferred, except that only cells with at least 40 
observations are shown. -  denotes cells with less than 10 observations. The 
average also includes ‘no subject specified’ and ‘subject of no importance.’
Source: Larsen (1996: 36).
Table 5.10 more specifically treats three of the four groups in this study. 
The results are from the annual Recruitment Survey 
(.Rekrutteringsundersekelsen), which asks employers who advertise a vacant 
position how much training is needed to handle the job fully if the new 
recruit already has the required education. The table shows that in 50 per 
cent of the jobs that required higher education more than 2 months of 
introductory training was needed.
The evidence in tables 5.10 and 5.11 suggests that the skills of 
engineers in the metal industry are significantly less transferable than 
those of the other three groups, which is in line with the previous 
indicators. Employees in manufacturing are not only least likely to say 
that their skills are transferable, on average they also report the longest 
introductory training period as being necessary, as table 5.9 shows. 
Moreover, table 5.10 shows that 63 per cent of private sector employers 
who recruited employees with higher education in science and technical 
subjects, where engineers are a major group, said they would need more 
than two months of introductory training. That is a larger proportion 
than for the nurses or the teachers. Finally, using industry groups Larsen 
(1996: 34) finds that 75 per cent of employers in the metal industry said
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their vacant positions required more than two months of introductory 
training. The average proportion was 53 per cent in the private sector and 
42 in the public sector. In no other industry did so large a proportion of 
employers report that a period of more than two months was needed. So 
even if none of the surveys separately had a large enough sample to look 
at the introductory training needed for engineers in the metal industry 
specifically, the results clearly indicate that this group needs longer 
introductory training than most other groups, and considerably more 
than the three other groups.
The evidence suggests equally clearly that nurses’ skills are highly 
transferable. Table 5.9 shows that, within the health sector, employees on 
average needed much shorter introductory training than other groups. 
The result is similar in table 5.10. It shows that only 29 per cent of public 
sector employers who want employees with higher health care education, 
a category where nurses is the largest group, report that new employees 
need more than two months of introductory training. Even if there are no 
survey data on the specific case of internally trained specialist training, the 
informants’ unequivocal view was that the specialist nurses needed little 
introductory training if they started at a new employer.
Further training for teachers does not seem to be equally 
transferable by this indicator. According to table 5.10, 45 per cent of 
public sector employers who recruited people with higher education 
within ‘culture and education,’ most of them teachers, said that new 
employees needed more than two months of introductory training. This 
was about the national average and a somewhat bigger proportion than 
for nurses. Table 5.9 shows that the period of introductory training in the 
education sector was close to the national average. The informants, 
however, argued that introductory training for teachers does not have to 
be long. A Teachers Association representative said that ‘in principle there 
is no problem in stepping in’ without any introductory training at the 
new employer.64
64 Interview with Teachers Association representative.
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Table 5.9 shows that employees in the banking and finance 
industry report longer than average introductory training periods. 
Unfortunately there are no better statistical data on the amount of 
training needed in the insurance industry. It was clear that employers who 
recruited people from other insurance companies expected them to be 
quickly able to do the new job, but the introductory period is 
considerably longer than for nurses.
Importance in recruitment
If an employee experiences that if a skill, valued by his current employer, 
is given no weight when she applies for a job at another employer, the 
skill is specific. If, by contrast, other employers deem the skill as 
important for recruitment, the skill is transferable. This is the logic that 
implies recruitment and selection can give valuable evidence on the 
transferability of skills. What matters is not how much weight other 
employers put on these skills in recruitment, but rather how this 
compares to how the current employer values them. If both the current 
and other employers think one particular skill is of equally little value, it 
does not mean that the skill is not transferable, it is just that the skill has 
little effect on productivity in all firms. The extreme case of importance in 
recruitment decisions is occupational licensing, which means that a 
particular skill is obligatory for carrying out one type of job (Shapiro 
1986).
Also by this fourth indicator specialist training for nurses is clearly 
transferable. Even if some specialist nurse positions are filled with nurses 
without specialist education, this is done because there are not enough 
specialist nurses available. Hence, the specialist internal training is a 
crucial qualification in all hospitals for getting a position as specialist 
nurse.
In the case of teachers, skills from further training are undoubtedly 
important in recruitment decisions, but it has also been the subject of a 
lengthy political process which criteria should guide the selection and
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recruitment of teachers, and consequently what importance further 
education should have. One issue has been that, according to the Act 
concerning Comprehensive Education (Grunnskoleloven), employers have 
been allowed to consider only applicants’ education and experience, and 
not other personal qualifications. Earlier the norm was that schools did 
not interview job applicants, but the municipalities have defied teacher 
organisations’ opposition and they now use interviews in the recruitment 
process (Lauvdal, Rymoen, and Grooss 1998: 45). Still, formal education, 
including further education, remains the most important criterion in 
recruitment processes.
In the insurance case, authorisation training is a major advantage 
for insurance salespersons (assuranderer) that want a job in another 
company. The collective agreement for insurance salespersons states that 
employees are obliged to undertake the authorisation training during their 
first three years of employment, but they do not have the right to undergo 
the training (Forsikringsselskapenes Arbeidsgiverforening (FA) and 
Forsikringsfunksjonserenes Landsforbund (FL) 1996). Even in a small 
company, where ‘formal competence has not been highly valued,’ the 
personnel manager held that authorisation was important in recruitment 
decisions.65 A representative of the insurance salespersons’ trade union said 
that ‘being authorised is of great importance for getting a job in other 
companies,’ but he added that the employers ‘are even more worried 
about finding the right man.566 Other types of further training for 
insurance employees seem to be taken into account when employers make 
recruitment decisions. But except for authorisation training, training at 
NAI seems seldom to be a decisive factor in these decisions. A survey of 
all who had completed the Higher Insurance Exam showed that, except in 
one company, the majority said that their company did not mention the 
exam in their job advertisements (Gunhildsbu 1994: 333).
65 Interview with Personnel manager of small insurance company (A).
66 Interview with N A F representative.
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In the engineers’ case, the limited importance of formal further 
training for recruitment reflects the little weight that is more generally- 
put on formal skills in remuneration and recruitment decisions. Even for 
two groups that differ with more than two years of basic education, 
engineers and graduate engineers, Eldring and Falkum (1995: 25) argue 
that ‘it seems as if in the engineering occupations non-formal learning 
(realkompetanse) more than formal skills have been the decisive criterion 
in recruitment.’ Even if graduate engineers are often preferred to engineers 
because of their formal skills, it is clear that formal further training, at 
least in technical skills, seldom has any great importance in recruitment 
decisions. One employer said that in recruitment decisions ‘what counts, 
is first and foremost what they worked on before.’67
Bonds
A final indication of transferable skills is that employers use bonds to 
ensure that trained employees stay with the company after they have 
completed their training. Such arrangements indicate that the employer 
and the employee share the cost of training, so that by agreeing to let the 
employer profit from the training, the employee does not have to pay all 
the costs of the transferable training. Bonds are less likely for specific 
training partly because training will tend to increase wages in the firm, 
but give no wage increase in other firms, and specific training will itself 
tend to reduce the probability of turnover (Stevens 1994a). Moreover, 
employees need to pay less of the costs of specific training. They are 
therefore less likely to need to agree to a bond because they cannot finance 
training themselves.
The widespread existence of bonds for nurses who take internal 
training indicates that training is transferable. At all hospitals nurses have 
to agree to work for the hospital that trains them for a given period after 
the training is completed. In most cases the obligatory period is the same 
as the duration of the specialist training - 18 months. Usually the nurse is
67 Interview with Leader of administrative section, telecom equipment manufacturer.
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obliged by the agreement to work in a position the hospital chooses, but 
preferably in the position the nurse is trained for. It is then usual that if 
the nurse leaves straight after completed training, he has to pay back the 
wages received during the training. If he works for some time at the 
employer, but leaves before the end of the obligatory period, the amount 
the nurse has to pay back depends on how much time is remaining (Kirke- 
utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1998: appendix 2a).
The majority of insurance employees, working in the largest 
companies, must pay back part of the training costs if they choose to leave 
the employer shortly after completed training.68 As of 1994, the bonds are 
usually two or three years if the training costs exceed limits of NOK 5,000 
or 10,000. If the employee quits before this period ends, she must pay 
back a sum that is proportional to the remaining time. For example, in 
Vesta, where the bond is two years, an employee must pay back half of 
the training costs if she quits one year after the training is completed 
(Gunhildsbu 1994: 20-21).
Employers in the metal industry very seldom use bonds when 
engineers take further technical training, except if they finance extensive 
further education, for example up-grading from engineer to graduate 
engineer. But these are all infrequent cases, and the agreements seem to be 
made on an individual basis, and not based on clear, written guidelines, as 
in the case of insurance employees or nurses. In the teachers’ case bonds 
are not needed, since employees bear the cost of extensive further training, 
as chapter 6 will show.
5.4.2 Conclusion outcomes
Table 5.11 summarises the results on the five indicators in the different 
cases.
68 N ot all small companies seem to use bonds, however. Interview with Personnel 
manager of small insurance company (B).
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Table 5.11 Summary of outcomes: transferability of further training
Indicators Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
a. Wage 
increases at 
other 
employers
Problem with
indicator:
different
collective
agreements
Problem with
indicator:
automatic
wage
increases
Collective 
agreement 
includes small 
wage 
increases. 
Lack of data
Individual 
wage setting. 
Lack of data
b. Perception 
of transfer­
ability
High, but
quality
differences
High High Lower
c. Introductory 
training
Very short Short Medium Long
d. Importance 
in recruitment
Very
important
Important. 
Different 
views on how 
much it 
should count
Authorisation 
important 
Other: not 
crucial, but 
may be a 
factor
Of little 
importance
e. Bonds In all cases Not relevant In all large 
companies
Bonds in 
special cases
Transferability Very high High/very 
high
High Medium
The table shows that the results are not consistent across the five 
indicators. The results clearly show that further training is most 
transferable in the nurses’ case, and least in the engineers.’ The somewhat 
shorter introductory training period, and the stronger overall importance 
of skills from further training in the teachers’ case than in the insurance 
case, suggest that skills are more transferable in the former.
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Table 5.12. Summary of predictions and outcomes: transferability of further
training
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Ho prediction Medium Medium Medium Medium
HaIt prediction Very high High High Medium
Outcome Very high High/very 
high
High Medium
Collective action to 
increase transferability
Yes Yes Yes No
Table 5.12 shows that the results are in line with H alt and not H 0 since 
further training for nurses is the most transferable and further training for 
engineers is the least transferable.
These outcomes lend strong support to the H alt prediction that 
transferability of training is endogenous i.e. shaped by employers’ action. 
The pattern for transferability of skills is almost the same as the one for 
employers’ action in the first part of this chapter. The last row in table 
5.12 also shows that there is strong coherence between the collective 
action processes and outcomes described in this chapter. In the cases 
where there has been collective action, skills are more transferable than in 
the one case where there has not been. Moreover, in the case with the best 
conditions for collective action further training is most transferable. 
Hence, the results in this chapter clearly indicate support for the collective 
action hypothesis at the expense of human capital theory.
This strong link between employers’ action and transferability 
proves to be significant in the remaining part of the thesis. Chapter 6 will 
show that employers’ action to affect transferability may have significant 
cost sharing implications, and chapter 7 shows the impact on skill 
shortages and skill deficiencies. Finally, chapter 8 discusses some wider 
possible implications of endogenisation.
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown support for the collective action hypothesis, and 
not just in the fact that the outcomes, the transferability of skills, are 
broadly in line with the collective action theory and not human capital 
theory. The different outcomes also broadly reflect the differences with 
respect to employers’ action to enhance transferability of skills. Hence, 
the results, with the possible exception of teachers, support the 
assumption that employers’ action is an important determinant of the 
transferability of skills. In other words, the chapter supports the collective 
action prediction that transferability is ‘endogenous.’
However, it has also revealed reasons other than employers’ 
collective action that have lead to initiatives to increase transferability of 
training in the four cases. These have been the different explanations for 
why employers have acted to make further training transferable:
• Direct employer co-operation (upholding insurance training 
organisation, partly nurses)
• Powerful body (teachers, nurses, establishing insurance organisation)
• Pressure from employees’ organisations (nurses, partly teachers, partly 
engineers, partly insurance)
• To attract and retain good employees, willing to learn (engineers, 
nurses)
• Demand from buyers (engineers)
The conclusion is that employers act to make training transferable more 
than one would expect from the human capital hypothesis. But the 
support for the collective action hypothesis is not definitive either. The 
results give most support to the assumption that a powerful body can 
make employers act to enhance transferability. In the cases with few 
employers, there is also evidence that employers co-operate without the 
intervention of a powerful body. But in the nurses’ case such co-operation 
is clearly secondary. In the insurance industry, such co-operation is crucial
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in upholding the common training organisation, but cannot explain the 
establishment of the organisation.
What both theories lack is a treatment of how employees’ 
organisations can influence transferability of training. Employees have a 
clear interest in training being transferable, and in all four cases, most 
notably in the nurses’ case, the employees’ organisations have worked to 
make training transferable. By not including the impact of these 
organisations, both theories fail to explain thoroughly the processes 
described in the four cases. Finally, the chapter has also shown that 
employers may choose to make further training transferable to attract and 
retain good employees, or to satisfy demand from consumers, but these 
have had only limited impact in this study.
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6. Sharing training costs between 
employer and employee
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 showed that the provision of transferable training generates 
two problems: one of making training transferable and one of financing 
such training. The previous chapter studied the problem of organising 
transferable training. The topic of this chapter is how employers and 
employees share the costs of training. Cost sharing for transferable 
training is of interest not only because it has been a persistent issue in the 
conflict between labour and capital on how to share costs and profits. The 
way employers and employees share training costs is also of particular 
importance because in two ways it is linked inherently with the amount 
of training provided. As this chapter will show, cost sharing can reflect 
the incentive employees and employers have to invest in training. 
Moreover, reducing the share of training costs they bear may be one of 
two ways employers can reduce their investment in training. The second 
option, a reduction in the amount of training provided, will be the topic 
of chapter 7.
The first part of the chapter develops the predictions of the two 
theories of cost sharing in each of the four cases, and shows how both 
theories consist of predictions concerning both processes and outcomes. 
These two are in turn the subjects of the second and the third parts of the 
chapter. In the final part of the chapter an alternative to the two 
hypotheses is developed, based on a synthesis of the two coupled with the 
assumption that employers’ collective action is an important determinant 
of individuals’ incentives to invest in training.
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6.2 Hypotheses and predictions
The two hypotheses that will be tested this chapter are shown in table 6.1. 
Both theories predict that employers pay the costs of transferable training 
to the extent that the training includes firm specific aspects, or there is 
limited competition in the labour market, so that employers can pay 
employees below their marginal product. The difference is that H alt 
predicts that employers’ collective action can induce employers to pay a 
larger share.1
Table 6.1 H0- and H^-hypotheses: cost sharing for transferable training______
o^ro.Vol rUtm-'T Collective action theoryHuman capital theory
H02: Employers will not pay for any 
of the costs of perfectly transferable 
training in a perfect labour market, 
but they will pay some of the costs to 
the extent that transferable skills 
includes firm-specific human capital, 
or employees can be paid less than 
their marginal productivity due to 
limited labour market competition.
HaIt2: If the increased productivity 
from transferable training is not fully 
offset by higher wages, employers 
may be willing to finance a share of 
the costs of transferable training, and 
they are likely to finance the highest 
share if there is collective action 
among employers.
Chapter 3 showed how the two hypotheses were derived. In order to test 
these two empirically, they must however be coupled with what the 
theories predict about the processes that determine incentives and the 
probability of collective action.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the logic of the two arguments, and this logic 
is also reflected in this chapter’s outline. The testing of the theories will be 
performed not only by comparing the outcomes with the predictions, but 
also by assessing the processes that lead to these outcomes, similar to the 
procedure in chapter 5. H 0, based on human capital theory, states that cost 
sharing reflects the incentives individuals have to spend resources on 
improving their skills. The second explanation, leading to H alt, states that
1 This was illustrated as a positive shift in the supply of training places in figure 3.1.
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employers’ collective action can account for different patterns of cost 
sharing between industries.
Figure 6.1 Hp and Halt explanations of factors determining cost sharing
H 0
Labour market competition __. Individuals’ __^  Cost
Transferability incentives sharing
H alt
1. Concentration Employers’
2. Powerful body ^ collective action — ► Cost
t sharing
Transferability
Chapter 2 presented human capital theory and its predictions about how 
employers and employees share training costs. The theory predicts that 
employers will share the costs of transferable training only to the extent 
that the training included specific human capital, or limited competition 
in the labour market meant employers could pay their employees less 
than their marginal product. So as shown in figure 6.1; if transferability is 
low or labour market competition is weak, individuals’ incentives to 
invest in training are weak, and the share of training costs borne by 
employers high.
The core of the argument is that incentives shape the way costs are 
shared. Employers have an incentive to invest in transferable training only 
if subsequently they can pay their trained employees less than their 
marginal product. So the more general point about limited competition 
and specific aspects, discussed in chapter 2, is that they give employers 
incentives to invest in transferable training.
The difference between previous contributions and the explanation 
developed here is that the latter takes the individual employees’ 
perspective, albeit it seeks primarily to explain employer financing. Even
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if the employers’ perspective has been the dominant one in the human 
capital literature on job training, the explanation depends equally on 
individuals’ incentives to invest in training.2
The argument is that wage increases after completed training are 
incentives for individuals to invest in transferable training, and the larger 
the increases are, the more resources individuals will devote to training. 
Previously, the incentives individuals face, and the investments they 
make, have been discussed and addressed for the most part by government 
policies in the area of initial education and training, and not further 
training.3 So the issue of individuals’ investments in training is not a new 
one. But the argument in this chapter is one of the first to combine 
employees’ and employers’ incentives in an explanation of an empirical 
pattern of cost sharing of further training.
The shift of focus from employer to employee investments in 
training alters the logic of the explanation of cost sharing. Previous 
human capital explanations of employers’ investments in transferable 
training have taken as their point of departure that employers will not
2 This shift of focus from employer to employee contributions could for example imply 
that an examination of the German apprenticeship system would not only reveal why 
employers contributed to financing transferable training (Crouch 1995; Soskice 1994a), 
but also why young German make large investments in this type of training.
3 According to economic theory, there are several reasons why individuals may invest 
less in training than the economic optimal amount, and governments have implemented 
different policies to tackle these problems. For example, governments have established 
loan and grant schemes to support education. One reason has been that individuals may 
under-invest in training because it can be difficult to finance such investments. 
Moreover, individuals may invest less in training than the social optimum if there are 
positive externalities associated with investment in education and training. For example, 
if training reduces the probability of unemployment, and the state finances 
unemployment benefits, the government may find it profitable to partly finance 
individuals’ training. Risk aversion may be another reason individuals do not themselves 
finance the optimal amount of education and training. This problem has been addressed 
by government loan schemes, which make payback dependent on individuals’ income 
after training.
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finance transferable training. Instead, the explanation here will start out 
with the assumption that individuals will invest in transferable training 
only if they have sufficient incentives to do so. If they do not, employers 
must fully finance transferable training if there is to be any training. 
Employers might finance some training, but the amount is likely to be 
sub-optimal.
The argument shows clearly that a high share of employer 
financing does not secure an optimal amount of training. On the contrary, 
according to human capital theory, the optimal amount of transferable 
training will be provided in a perfect labour market, where it is assumed 
that individuals finance the full cost of transferable training, because the 
increase in marginal productivity will be fully reflected in higher wages.4 
So this incentive explanation, based on human capital theory, predicts that 
if employees have strong incentives to invest in transferable training, there 
will much employee investment, much training, and a small share of 
training costs will be borne by employers, and much transferable training 
provided. If, on the other hand, there are weak incentives for individuals 
to spend resources on transferable further training, there will be little 
employee investment, employers will bear most of the training costs, and 
little transferable training will be provided. The issue of cost sharing will 
be treated in this chapter, while the amount of training provided is the 
topic of chapter 7.
The core of the explanation is that employers’ collective action 
in order to increase the amount of training provided will increase the 
share of training costs borne by employers, as shown in chapter 3. 
According to the collective action theory, there are two possible solutions 
to the collective action problem: either there is a powerful body that can 
induce employers to finance training, or there is co-operation in a small 
group of employers. In both cases, both formal and informal pressure can
4 In this case, where employees bear the full cost of training, the optimal amount of 
transferable training will be provided, as explained in chapter 2.
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be used to restrict employers from financing a too small share of training 
costs.
However, just as in human capital theory, collective action theory 
also predicts that transferability of training has a significant impact on 
how training costs are shared by employers and employees. The more 
transferable skills are, the less likely are employers to bear a large share of 
training costs. Thus, since there is no difference between the two theories 
in the predicted impact of transferability, this chapter will focus on the 
other factors in figure 6.1, namely labour market competition, individuals’ 
incentives, the probability of collective action and the impact of collective 
action. Still, as the dotted line in figure 6.1 indicates, one difference 
between the two explanations is that H aIt, as shown in chapter 5, states 
that employers’ collective action is an important determinant of 
transferability. The possible indirect effect of such actions on cost sharing 
is not integrated into the H alt prediction, but is discussed in the last part of 
this chapter.
Table 6.2 Summary of predictions: cost sharing for transferable training
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
H0
Transferability (ch. 5) Very high Very high High Medium
Concentration (ch. 4) High Low High Low
Hq prediction of 
individuals’ incentives
Strong Very strong Medium Medium
Hq prediction of
employer
contribution
Low Very low Medium Medium
Hait
Transferability (ch. 5) Very high Very high High Medium
Probability of 
collective action (ch.3)
High Medium Medium Low
Hait prediction of
employer
contribution
Medium Medium Medium Medium
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Table 6.2 shows the predictions of the two theories concerning each of the 
cases. Within the limits of the table format all nuances cannot be taken 
into account, but the table shows the broad differences between the two 
theories. As in chapter 5, all predictions must be interpreted as rankings.
To derive the H 0 prediction information on transferability of 
training and labour market competition was needed. The data on 
transferability from chapter 5 are used, while the measures of 
concentration from chapter 4 are used to measure labour market 
competition. The fact that the selection of the cases was guided by the 
need to get industries with extreme values on the concentration variable, 
warrants its use as an indicator of labour market competition. In order to 
make ad hoc assumptions about the relative importance of transferability 
versus labour market competition, these two are assumed to have the 
same impact in table 6.2.
Based on the combination of transferability and the probability of 
collective action the H aIt prediction is that employers will bear the same 
share of training costs in all four cases. The reason is that in the cases with 
the highest probability of collective action, transferability is also highest, 
while, for example, in the engineers’ case the probability of collective 
action is low, but this is outweighed by the fact that transferability is 
lower than in the other cases. Hence, the prediction is simply that the 
effect collective action was shown to have had on transferability in 
chapter 5, and therefore indirectly on cost sharing, is outweighed by the 
predicted direct effect of collective action.
6.3 Processes
The first task in testing the two theories is that of testing the predictions 
of individuals’ incentives and employers’ collective action, respectively. 
Later in the chapter the cost sharing outcomes are assessed. Eventually, 
any conclusion will be based on both the extent to which individuals* 
incentives to invest in training or employers’ collective action, are more
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important determinants of cost sharing, but also the two theories’ ability 
to predict the variation within these two. This section will show first 
what incentives employees in each of the cases have to invest in further 
education and training. Then a shorter section analyses whether or not 
employers’ collective action has increased the share of training cost borne 
by employers.
6.3.1 Employees’ incentives
In order to study employees’ incentives to invest in training, it is 
necessary to study the effects of further training and assume that these are 
the reasons for employees to undertake training.5 In addition, one may ask 
employees who have undertaken further training what were their motives 
for doing so, and this data is also used.6
The use of both effects of training and individuals’ motives for 
doing further training, in order to assess incentives, aims to solve the 
problems of each of the measures separately. Showing that further 
training has a positive effect on wages does not necessarily confirm that 
this is why employees choose to finance such training. On the other hand, 
higher wages and better promotion possibilities may be significant 
incentives, and may explain variation between groups of employees, even 
if neither is the most important motive for investing in further training. If 
individuals’ incentives are to be used as an explanation of cost sharing of 
further training, it should be shown that the incentives mentioned, wages 
and promotion, are in fact significant factors when employees choose 
whether or not to finance further training. Still, the importance or lack of 
importance of wage increases as an incentive to take further training
5 These potential benefits can of course only be incentives if potential trainees have 
information about the effects of training. It is assumed that employees have a reasonably 
good idea of the effect further training will have on their career.
6 One may also ask employees who have not undertaken training why they have not, 
but such data were not available for this study.
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cannot simply be evaluated only by what employees report as motives for 
undertaking the training. The reason is that wage increases after training 
may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for some to finance 
further training. If employees do not get wage increases after further 
training they may find it too costly to finance, but a wage increase that 
can cover their training costs may not be sufficient reason for them to 
undertake the training. This explanation, in line with human capital 
theory, may explain situations where employees finance the highest share 
of training costs if they get wage increases as a result of the training, even 
if they do not report that wage increases were the most important motive 
for taking it. However, this is the case for all groups, so variations 
between the motives employees report can still be used as indicators of 
how incentives vary between groups.
Effects of further training
There are three different ways to measure effects of further training. One 
way is perform a regression analysis, which can show the effect of training 
on wages or promotion, statistically controlled for the other independent 
variables in the analysis. One theoretical problem with this approach is 
that it is vulnerable to unobserved heterogeneity bias, or differences 
created because those who choose to commence on further training differ 
from those who do not, for example because they are more able or more 
ambitious (McNabb and Whitfield 1994: 14-16). Moreover, the
comparison of different groups might fail to take into account the 
institutional differences between groups that contribute to the effects of 
further education and training. This is not an argument against regression 
analysis per se, but it suggests that other indicators must be used as well.
A second way of measuring effects of further training is self- 
reporting from employees. The potential advantage of such self-reporting 
is that employees may know whether or not the further training actually 
was the reason why they received wage increases or promotion, or if
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other factors could account for the effect. The problem, however, is that it 
be difficult for individual employees to assess the employers’ rationales for 
giving or not giving them new jobs, new tasks or higher wages. This 
problem is especially severe if further training alone does not have a clear 
independent effect, but is one of several attributes employers consider 
when they make salary or promotion decisions.
The final way of measuring the effect is to use collective 
agreements or details of occupational licensing if such exist. These are less 
vulnerable to the selection problem and the self-reporting problems, and 
can therefore be valuable supplements to the two other measures.
The human capital prediction is that the effect on wages and job 
opportunities of taking further training is largest for nurses and teachers, 
and the results here will confirm this prediction. However, contrary to 
the H 0 prediction the results will show that the effect of further training is 
considerably stronger in the insurance case than in the engineers’ case. 
Still, an even more important shortcoming, which will be discussed later 
in the chapter, is that a more detailed analysis shows that factors other 
than the ones included in the H 0 explanation are important in explaining 
individuals’ incentives.
There is a distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ wage effects of 
training. Direct wage effects are wage increases employees get even if they 
remain in the same position, while indirect wage effects exist when 
employees get higher wages only because they change position as a results 
of training, and thus get higher wages.7 This means that the results will 
cover further training’s effect both directly on wages and on the 
probability of getting a job with higher wages.8 The data in this section
7 Another way of stating the same point is to say that if the wage effect is only indirect, 
there is no wage effect of training controlled for position. If the wage effect is purely 
direct, further training has an effect on wages controlled for position, but there is no 
effect of further training on the probability of being promoted.
8 In addition, promotion may be an independent incentive for employees, and thus an 
incentive for individuals to finance further training.
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are mostly from similar questions asked in separate surveys within each of 
the four industries. These single industry survey data are supplemented 
with qualitative data and data from collective agreements, as well as a 
survey that covers more than one of the four cases.
Nurses have strong incentives to take both internal specialist 
training and college-based further training. Further training increases the 
probability of getting higher positions or specialist positions, and as a 
consequence of job changes nurses get higher wages. Thus, nurses are a 
strong example of ‘indirect wage increases.’
Table 6.3 Self-reported effects of further education and training equivalent of 6
months or more of full-time study for nurses. Per cent
Changes as results of further education and training %
New tasks or responsibilities 75
New position 77
Wage increase 91
N: 851
Source: Havn (1996: chapter 9).
Table 6.3 shows that 75 per cent of nurses with completed extensive 
further education and training said they had new tasks or responsibilities 
as a result of the training. While 91 per cent reported wage increases, 77 
per cent said they had a new job as a result of the training. The survey 
substantiates the claim that these changes are effects of the training, by 
showing that most of these effects occur within six months after the 
training is completed (Havn 1996: chapter 9).
According to Havn (1996: 119-121) the changes in wages and tasks 
are to a large extent associated with the new positions nurses get after they 
have completed the training. In other words, the effect of further training 
on obtaining new jobs is an important factor in understanding the effect 
of training on wages and tasks. This survey shows that 62 per cent of 
nurses who had completed training started in a new job, as a result of the 
training, within one year after completed training. A further 15 per cent
201
started in a new job as a result of the training more than one year after 
completion, while the remaining 23 per cent did not get new jobs that 
resulted from the further training they had completed (Havn 1996: 118). 
The evidence on which groups of nurses have completed further training 
supports the conclusion that further training is important for promotion.9 
While only 17 per cent of ordinary nurses {offentlig godkjente sykepleierej 
have completed a further training of more than six months, as many as 55 
per cent of charge nurses have done so. Of nurses in higher management 
positions (unit nursing officers, senior nursing officers, etc), 79 per cent 
have completed such extensive further training (Havn 1996: 50-51).10 If 
there is occupational licensing, further training may be not only 
important, but also absolutely necessary for employees to get a certain 
type of position. For nurses, this is the case only for mid-wife training 
(Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1998). But even if there is 
not, strictly speaking, occupational licensing for the other types of further 
training for nurses, they are also, in practice, very important in specialist 
positions, even if they are not legal requirements.
Improved chances of getting a new position may be an 
independent rationale for employees to take further training, but it can 
also be a vehicle for earning higher wages. In the case of further training
9 A  previous survey, based on a cohort of nurses who completed training in 1979, shows 
a weaker link between further training and leading positions. Among women, the 
majority of nurses, 24 per cent of those with further training were in leading positions, 
compared to 18 per cent of those without further training. The corresponding figures for 
men were 59 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively (Hoel 1991: 41).
10 The survey also shows that not only do more nurses in the higher positions have 
further training, but they have on average also completed longer further training than 
‘ordinary nurses’ {offentlig godkjente sykepleierej who have done such training (Havn 1996: 
64). There are alternative explanations for this pattern, for example that with age, more 
nurses take further training, and more nurses get leading positions, but these two  
processes are not related. Nevertheless, combined with the self-reported data, this gives a 
weighty evidence for the conclusion that further education and training for nurses to a 
very large degree improves employees’ chances of getting new positions.
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for nurses, it is clear that the vast majority of those who take training get 
higher wages. A large survey shows that 51 per cent of nurses who have 
completed extensive further training report that their wages increased 
shortly afterwards. Only 9 per cent said they had not experienced any 
wage effect, while 23 percent reported that the wage effect came at least 
one year after they had finished their further training (Havn 1996: 121). 
Thus, it is clear that in the vast majority of cases, nurses get wage increases 
if they complete further training.11
Table 6.4 shows that the wage premium for doing specialist 
training is between 5 and 10 per cent.12 This is based on minimum wages 
for nurses with and without specialist training according to three different 
collective agreements described in chapter 5.13 Since employers may put 
nurses higher on the wage scale, the actual wage premium might differ 
from those in the table. Nevertheless, since that goes for nurses both with 
and without specialist training, table 6.4 gives a good estimate of the wage 
increases nurses can expect if they undertake specialist training.14 
Therefore, the clear conclusion is that for nurses, the effect of further 
training on wages and job opportunities is strong.
11 Among the different groups of nurses, nurses at general hospitals who do specialist 
training are most likely to report that they had wage increases directly after they 
completed training. In this group 68 per cent say their wages increased directly after they 
finished their further training.
12 A  1989 survey found that the controlled wage effect of further training for a cohort of 
nurses graduated in 1979 was 1.2 per cent per semester, or 3.6 per cent for 18 month 
training (Hoel, Mastekaasa, and Arnesen 1990: 33).
13 Wages for midwives and health visitors are the same as for specialist nurses.
14 Given the severe shortages of nurses with specialist skills to be described in chapter 7, 
the employers are more likely to pay nurses with further training more than the 
minimum rate. Thus, the estimates in table 6.4 may underestimate the wage increases.
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Table 6.4 Minimum wages for nurses (offentlig godkjente sykepleiere) and specialist 
nurses, by collective agreement. NOK. 1999__________________________,
KS Oslo State
Experience (years) 5 10 5 10 5 10
Nurse 201,300 220,100 208,700 220,100 216,500 234,500
Specialist nurse 212,600 241,700 227,300 234,500 230,900 249,000
Wage increase 11,300 21,600 18,600 14,400 14,400 14,500
Per cent increase 5.6 9.8 8.9 6.5 6.7 6.2
Note: The stabilisation supplement in Oslo, mentioned in chapter 5, is not 
included in this table.
Source: Norsk sykepleierforbund (1999).
The strong effect of further training for teachers is in line with H 0 
predictions. However, the analysis will later show that the support for the 
H 0 prediction is only superficial. While the nurses’ case is a good example 
of the indirect wage effects of further training, the teachers* case is an 
equally clear example of ‘direct’ wage increases. Teachers have a strong 
incentive to take up-grading training because, of the automatic wage 
increases they get according to the collective agreement. In a system with 
‘indirect’ wage effects, as in the nurses’ case, the increased possibility of 
getting a new position if one takes further training is an important 
incentive for taking further training. But in the teachers’ case, where fewer 
are promoted to leading positions; and there is no similar differentiation 
between specialists and non-specialists, indirect wage-effects can hardly 
form sufficient incentives for teachers to take further training.15 
Therefore, it is necessary for employers to differentiate between teachers 
with and without further training, even if they are doing the same job, if 
there is to be an incentive for teachers to invest in further training. A 
representative of Norwegian Union of Teachers put it this way: ‘The flat
15 Hoel (1991: 19) shows that ten years after graduation from college, less than 10 per 
cent of teachers were in leading positions, compared with approx. 30 per cent of nurses 
and 50 per cent of engineers.
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structure of our labour market...means we have to have some incentives 
like that [wage increases from formal further training].’16
Table 6.5 Teachers’ wages and wage increase from up-grading training, by formal 
competence and experience. NOK. 1998________________________________
5 years’ experience 10 years’ experience
Wages Increase Wages Increase
1. Grade 1 205,000 - 223,700 -
2. Grade 2 220,100 15,100 (2 -  1) 234,500 10,800 (2 -  1)
3. Grade 3 227,300 7,200 (3 -  2) 241,700 7,200 (3 -  2)
4. Grade 4 234,500 14,400 (4 -  2) 249,000 14,500 (4 -  2)
Note: Both grade 3 and grade 4 build on grade 2, as explained in chapter 4 
Source: Norsk lasrerlag (1998).
Table 6.5 shows that the collective agreement ensures that teachers who 
take up-grading training get considerable wage increases. A grade 1 teacher 
who takes one year of further training to become a grade 2, gets a wage 
increase of between NOK 10,000 and NOK 15,000, depending on how 
experienced she is. The increase from taking one more year of training to 
become grade 3 is smaller, N OK 7,200 or roughly 3 per cent in both 
examples, but still considerable. If the grade 2 teacher took instead two 
years of further training to become a grade 4, the wage increase would be 
twice as big; NOK 14,400 or NOK 14,500. The effect of one year of up­
grading training for teachers with five years’ experience is roughly the 
same as the effect of five more years of experience. Grade 2 teachers with 
five years’ experience need to take two years of up-grading training to 
become grade 4 to get the wage increase equivalent of the increase from 
five more years of experience.
Ho predicts that the effect of further training is smaller for 
insurance employees than for the two other groups, and the data confirm 
that this is the case. In the insurance industry the most important 
incentive employees have to take further education is neither that some
16 Interview with NL representative.
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positions necessarily require a special type of further training, as in the 
nurses’ case, or that employees get automatic wage increases from training, 
as in the teachers’ case. The most important incentive is that further 
training may make it more likely that they get a better job, but the link 
between training and certain jobs is not as clear and inflexible as it is for 
nurses. There are also some direct wage increases from training. More 
important, however, are the increased opportunities for promotion, 
which are substantial in the large insurance companies’ well developed 
internal labour markets with rich promotion opportunities.17
Table 6.6 Insurance em ployees’ responses to  the statem ent ‘If I to o k  further 
education and training at N A I, it w ou ld  have a large im pact on  m y  career,’ and 
age. Per cent___________________________________________________________________
A ttitude U nder 30 30-39
A ge 
4 0 -  49 50 + T otal
T ota lly /p artly  disagree 33 38 40 67 42
T ota lly /p artly  agree 47 46 37 17 388
D o n ’t k n o w 19 17 22 17 19
Sum 100 101 99 101 99
N 86 105 87 53 331
Note: M issing excluded from  original table. 
Source: M M I (1989).
A survey of insurance employees found that 83 per cent of those under 50 
years of age disagreed with the statement ‘I would gain little from further 
education and training’ (MMI 1989).18 But table 6.6 shows that employees 
are less convinced that taking further training at NAI would have a large 
impact on their career. While 38 per cent think it will, 42 per cent do not.
17 In 1988, a survey in Gjensidige showed that 67 per cent of employees said the 
company gave them ‘good development possibilities in line with...personal goals and 
ambitions’ (Gran and Tofte 1989: 129).
18 O f those over 50 years of age, only 36 per cent disagreed.
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Young employees are more likely than older employees to think they 
would benefit from further training.19
The self-reported effect of further training at NAI is clearly lower 
than in the nurses’ case, and not very high compared to the working 
population as a whole either. Table 6.7 shows that 42 per cent of those 
who have taken the Higher Insurance Exam report that it has given them 
a higher position, or new job tasks in their current job, while 46 say that 
it has not had any significant impact on their position or the tasks they 
do.20 By comparison, 75 per cent of nurses said they were in new positions 
as a result of training, and 77 per cent said they had new tasks (table 6.3). 
A representative survey of the Norwegian working population shows 
that, of those who had taken further training equivalent to 12 weeks full 
time study or more in the last five years, 45 per cent said it had 
contributed to a job change, and 33 per cent said it had contributed to 
their having new job tasks (Johansen 1999: 74).21 So in the insurance case 
the effect of further training, at least at NAI, is not particularly large.22
19 There may have been changes since the survey was conducted in 1989. However, in 
the interviews there were no suggestions that further education and training had become 
less important between 1989 and 1999, rather the contrary. Moreover, the increased 
importance of higher education in recruitment in this period may also indicate that at 
least there has not been any significant decrease in the significance of formal training in 
recruitment and promotion decisions.
20 The report does not distinguish between different groups according to the length of 
time since they completed the training.
21 The data in table 6.7 are not directly comparable to the results from the survey of the 
working population as a whole, since table 6.7 does not adequately cover the effect the 
training may have in combination with other factors. In the national survey, the 
question was whether or not the training had contributed.
22 Unfortunately, there are no data that shows the impact of other types of further 
training for insurance employees, but wage statistics show that formal education is a very 
strong determinant of insurance employees’ wages (Statistisk sentralbyra 1998d). Still, a 
strong effect of basic education on wages does not necessarily imply that further training 
is a strong determinant of wages.
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Table 6.7 Employees with completed Higher Insurance Exam, by self-reported 
career impact of training
Perceived impact %
Yes, I have a job with more responsibilities 24
Yes, I have more interesting job tasks [but not a higher position] 18
No, I am working with almost the same as I did before I took the exam 46
Other impact 13
Sum 101
N 443
Source: Gunhildsbu (1994: 184).
For insurance employees enhanced possibilities of promotion to other 
positions are the most important career benefits. Since salary class is the 
most important determinant of wages in the insurance industry (Statistisk 
sentralbyra 1998d: 17), the impact of further training on promotion is 
indirectly but strongly associated with the impact of training on wages. 
Still, there are some direct wage benefits from training. In the collective 
agreement between FL and FA, insurance employees in the lower salary 
classes {stillingsklasser) are entitled to an increase of about N O K  6,500, or 
about 3 per cent of annual salary, when they complete the Insurance 
Examination or the Higher Insurance Examination 
(Forsikringsselskapenes Arbeidsgiverforening (FA) and 
Forsikringsfunksjonaerenes Landsforbund (FL) 1996). Neither employers 
nor employees consider this as an important incentive, however, mostly 
because those who complete these exams are often in higher positions 
already, where this clause does not apply.23 A representative of NAI said 
that ‘in practice these rights mean nothing.’24 Both the employers and 
NAI have been opposed to including other wage increases for formal 
training in the collective agreement,25 and such clauses are not an
23 Interviews with NAI representative, Organisational development manager, large 
insurance company (B), FA representative and Group of FL representatives
24 Interview with NAI representative.
25 Interviews with FA representative and NAI representative.
208
important issue for Norwegian Insurance Employees Union (FL) either 
(Forsikringsfunksjonserenes Landsforbund 1997). So insurance employees 
enjoy weaker effects from further training than nurses and teachers do, 
but increased promotion possibilities still seem to be a notable effect.
The weak effect of further technical training for engineers is 
contrary to H 0 predictions. For the short further training that engineers 
usually take, the unequivocal opinion among all informants in the 
industry is that such training has virtually no impact on wages or 
promotion possibilities. The training is not given much weight in 
individual wage setting, is not important for internal promotion, and it is 
not important in recruitment of engineers from other companies.26
However, even for more extensive technical training, there seems 
to be few clear incentives for engineers to invest in training. An NIF 
representative said that employers ‘are very reluctant to pay for further 
training [through higher wages]. They do not even pay more for a 
doctorate.’27 This has been used as an explanation for why the PDC 
programme, the system for documentation of skills described in chapter 5, 
failed. Since Norwegian engineers’ and graduate engineers’ labour markets 
to some extent overlap, and moreover share many of the same 
characteristics in terms of wage-setting, as well as in terms of the 
importance of formal skills in recruitment and selection (Eldring and 
Falkum 1995; Havn and Huitfeldt 1994; Holter 1961; Sorensen 1988), the 
example of graduate engineers can illuminate the case of engineers as well. 
A NIF representative said that ‘in hindsight it is not hard to see that [in 
PDC] there had been a little too much idealism,’ since ‘there is nothing to
26 Interviews with N ITO  representative, NIF representative, Leader of administrative 
section, telecom equipment manufacturer, NITO  representative, telecom equipment 
manufacturer, N ITO  representative, turbine producer (A), Personnel manager, turbine 
producer (A), NITO  representative, car part manufacturer, N ITO  representative, 
turbine producer (B), Managing director, traffic system supplier, N ITO  representative, 
offshore contractor and Personnel manager, ship yard.
27 Interview with NIF representative.
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collect [through higher wages] from that sort of thing.’28 A representative 
of N ITO  had a very similar explanation for the failure of PDC:
My belief is that as long as you do not have a good ‘receiver’ at the 
other end, that is an employer who signals that it is of importance 
for [the engineer’s] position in the organisation, wage development 
and so on, the program is quite laborious to go through. And there 
is no doubt that is costs a few kroner and takes a lot of time.29
Wages for engineers in the private sector are set individually, and unlike 
the three other cases there are no collective agreements that ensure wage 
increases. Moreover, formal competence is not an important consideration 
for employers when establishing a basis for wage setting. Employers have 
generally been reluctant to award formal skills in their wage setting 
(Eldring and Falkum 1995).30 Instead, there is a clear and explicit emphasis 
on non-formal learning (realkompetansej. This way of rewarding 
performance rather than formal skills may give sufficient incentives for 
employees to finance further training if the employers perceive that the 
training enhances productivity. Thus, in the case of engineers in the metal 
industry, the lack of incentives for individuals to finance further training 
may have different explanations. It may mean that further training does 
not improve job performance significantly, and employers therefore will 
not give higher wages or increased possibilities of promotion for those 
who take the training. But it may also mean that employers do not fully 
recognise the positive impact of further training on productivity or fail to 
utilise the new skills.31
28 Interview with NIF representative.
29 Interview with NITO representative.
30 Interviews with NIF representative and N IT O  representative.
31 The policy implications of the three explanations differ. If the problem is that training 
only yields a small productivity increase, the solution is to find ways to improve the 
training. If the problem rather is that employers do not recognise the impact of training, 
changes should be made to the way wages are set. Finally, if the problem is one of 
utilisation of skills, the organisation of work should be assessed.
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One exception to this pattern is that administrative training 
according to the informants may be rewarded through higher wages or 
increased probability of promotion to senior positions. As one expects 
from the incentive explanation, if engineers spend their spare time on 
further training, it is usually on administrative training.32
Several metal industry companies said that they were planning, or 
considering, introducing professional job ladders (tekniske stiger) for 
engineers.33 These may contribute to improving engineers’ incentives to 
invest in technical further education and training as well. A professional 
ladder ‘involves the design of explicit career ladders for professionals or 
technical employees in which advancement along the technical track 
parallels advancement along a managerial track’ (Kanter 1984: 123). Such 
parallel ladders have been introduced by a number of large American 
companies in order to provide incentives for competence development 
and to provide an alternative for employees who are more valuable to the 
firm in technical than in management positions (Kanter 1990; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992: 366). If such technical ladders mean that engineers can 
improve their status and get higher wages without going into 
administrative positions, they can give engineers stronger incentives to 
invest in training.
Motives for investing in further training
So far the results have shown that nurses have very strong incentives to 
finance specialist training, and so have teachers for up-grading training. 
Insurance employees have significant incentives to invest their spare time
32 Interviews with NITO  representative, telecom equipment manufacturer, NITO  
representative, turbine producer (A), Factory manager, car part manufacturer, Personnel 
manager, turbine producer (B) and Managing director, traffic system supplier.
33 Interviews with Organisational development manager, offshore contractor, NITO  
representative, turbine producer (B), Personnel manager, turbine producer (A) and 
Factory manager, car part manufacturer.
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in further training, while engineers have weak incentives to invest in 
technical further training.
The results in this section confirm the results above by showing 
that the differences between the groups in motivation broadly reflect the 
differences in effects shown above. This correspondence between the two 
indicators of individuals’ incentives is important, not only as a 
methodological confirmation of indicator validity, but it also confirms an 
important link between the effects of training and individuals’ subjective 
rationales when deciding whether or not to invest in training.
The results above show that nurses have strong incentives to take 
further training since such training gives them new positions and higher 
wages. Nevertheless, for a majority of nurses these incentives do not seem 
to be the most important reason why they undertake further training.
Table 6.8 Nurses with completed further training, by most important motive for 
training_________________________________________________________
Motive %
Wanted more knowledge about existing or new tasks within current 37
position
Wanted to learn more 32
Wanted knowledge for new position at current or other employer 26
Wanted higher wages 3
Request by employer 3
Other 6
Sum 107
N: 888
Note: Assumedly, the sum is higher than 100 because some respondents have 
chosen more than one alternative as ‘most important’.
Source: Havn (1996: 70).
Table 6.8 shows that two out of three nurses said they had taken further 
training primarily because they wanted to learn more (l&relyst), or because 
they wanted more knowledge in their current position. Only 3 per cent
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said their primary motive was a wage increase, while 26 per cent said they 
first and foremost took further training to qualify for a new position at 
their current employer or a new one.34 Table 6.8 shows similar results, 
with 25 per cent of nurses saying their most import motive for taking 
further training was ‘better opportunities to choose between jobs’ or the 
possibility of promotion. In this survey, only 2 per cent reported that 
higher wages was the primary motive (NAVFs utredningsinstitutt 1989: 
102).35 So to the extent that nurses take further training as a result of the 
incentives described above, it is mainly because they can gain access to 
new positions. However, since nurses’ wages are closely linked to the 
positions they are in, there is a possible under-reporting of the importance 
of wages if one considers only their most important motives. 
Considerably more, 20 per cent of the respondents, say that wage increase 
was one of the three most important motives for taking further training 
(Havn 1996: 73). So the strong effects of further training are reflected in 
nurses’ motives.
In line with what one would expect from the incentive 
explanation, the wage increases from further training are an important 
reason why teachers have taken on such training. As one would expect, 
teachers who get ‘direct’ wage increases more often report this as a 
primary motive than nurses, who get ‘indirect’ wage increases, and more 
often report that they take further training to get a new job. The Ministry 
of Education and Research argues that ‘the main force [behind the 
extensive further training teachers take] is a wage system that has given
34 A  1988 report found that 17 per cent of specialist nurses had taken the specialist 
training to improve their opportunities to choose between jobs, to get higher wages or 
increase their chances of getting a place in a kindergarten for their children (Skaar 1988: 
53).
35 Based on the same material, Hoel (1991: 41) reports that more men than women say 
access to new positions or higher wages are most important, this gender difference is 
marginal in Havn’s (1996: 74) survey.
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automatic advantage to formal further training of a given magnitude’ 
(Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1992: 6).
Table 6.9 Teachers and nurses w ith  further training ten  years after graduation, 
b y  m ost im portant m otive for training. Per cent______________________________
M otive Teachers N urses
Interest in  the subject 61 65
H igh er wages 17 2
Better opportunities to  choose betw een jobs 17 19
Tired o f  current job situation 3 8
Better p rom otion  possibilities 2 6
Sum 100 100
N : 298 316
N ote: N  for this particular table is n ot reported in the source. N  is therefore  
estim ated on  the basis o f inform ation about the sam ple size o f  each group and 
th e proportion  in  each group w h o  had taken further training (N A V F s  
utredningsinstitutt 1989:18: 96).
Source: N A V F s utredningsinstitutt (1989: 102).
Table 6.9 shows that 17 per cent of teachers say that their most important 
motive for taking further training is that they can get higher wages. By 
comparison, only 2 per cent of nurses say the same.36 Thus, wage increases 
from further training are a significant incentive in the teachers’ case, not 
least because a much larger group would probably say wage increases were 
the second or third most important motive, as showed above in the 
nurses’ case.
The incentive explanation is further supported by Jordfald and 
Nergaard (1999: 66), who find that a much larger proportion of grade 1 
teachers than of grade 4 teachers take extensive formal further training.
36 This study is based on a cohort of college graduates (from 1979) at a particular moment 
in time (1989), and the results cannot therefore be generalised directly to all members of 
the three groups. Still, on this particular question the differences are so large that they
214
While 11 per cent of grade 1 teachers said they took up-grading training in 
1998, 10 per cent of grade 2 and 3 teachers,37 but only 6 per cent of grade 4 
teachers did. Thus, the groups that get pecuniary rewards from up-grading 
training, take such training much more often. The results form strong 
support for the incentive explanation because the groups with least 
education take most further education and training. That is contrary to 
the ‘iron law of training’, which says that those with most education also 
get most further training (Nordhaug and Gooderham 1996: 83).
Table 6.7 showed that only a minority of insurance employees 
who had taken the Higher Insurance Exam reported that they had a new 
position, or new tasks in their old position, as a result of the training. 
Still, improved promotion possibilities were an important rationale for 
those who have undertaken the training.38 This supports the incentive 
explanation, since increased probability of promotion may be an 
important incentive even if the majority who take the training do not get 
promoted as a direct result of it.
are assumed to reflect a difference even for other cohorts, and at other stages of their 
career.
37 There is made no distinction between grade 2 and grade 3 teachers in the report.
38 Since the majority of participants had more than seven years’ experience in the 
insurance industry before they commenced the Higher Insurance Exam study, it is 
assumed that those who chose to take the training had reasonably correct impressions of 
the impact the training could have on their career, even if the first thorough evaluation 
of the effects of the training was completed only in 1994 (Gunhildsbu 1994).
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Table 6.10 E m ployees w ith  com pleted higher insurance exam, by m ost and 
second  m ost im portant m otive for training. Per cent_______________________
M otive
M ost
im portant
m otive
Second
m ost
im portant
m otive
M ost or 
second  
m ost 
im portant 
m otive
W anted to  learn m ore 75 17 92
W anted a m iddle manager position  in  
th e insurance industry
12 21 33
W age increases 1 16 17
N o t  to  be ‘overtaken’ by new ly  
recruited w ith  better education than I 
have
1 9 10
G et m ore out o f m y spare tim e 0 6 6
E m p loyer’s order 2 3 4
W anted a m iddle manager position  
outside the insurance industry
0 2 3
Keep the job 0 2 2
O ther 7 15 22
Sum  
N : 455
98 91 189
------------------------------------- ---—
Note: T he sum  o f second m ost im portant reason is less than 100 per cent since 
n o t all respondents have given m ore than m ore reason. Source: G unhildsbu  
(1994: 67).
The most important motive is ‘to learn more.’ Apart from this, three 
career-related motives are the most important. One third, 33 per cent, say 
they have taken the Higher Insurance Exam because they wanted a middle 
manager position in the insurance industry, and 17 per cent say they 
wanted higher wages. The motive to not be ‘overtaken’ by new employees 
with better education can also be interpreted as a career motive.39 Thus, 
the data are important supplements to the data on the effect of training, 
and therefore contribute to the support of the H q explanation.
39 The question was asked because young employees in the insurance industry on average 
have higher education than more experienced employees.
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Earlier the results showed that further training for engineers has 
little impact on wages and promotion, with the possible exception of 
business administration training, but in the engineers* case, there is no 
representative survey that shows the motives of those who take further 
training. Overall the data on employees’ motives for taking further 
training are clearly in line with the effects described earlier, and are 
therefore broadly in line with the H 0 prediction.
The H0 prediction of incentives
As indicated in the teachers’ case, the fit between H 0 predictions and 
outcomes is superficial. Even if the incentives above are shown to be 
roughly in line with H0 prediction, the simple human capital prediction is 
inadequate for two important reasons. The first is that it does not include 
collective agreements, which in the teachers’ case is the most important 
reason why employees have strong incentives to invest in further training. 
While the outcome is in line with H q predictions, the reason is not high 
transferability and strong labour market competition, as assumed by H 0. 
On the contrary, the key to the strong incentives teachers have to invest 
in training is a collective agreement that in practice virtually abolishes 
labour market competition. More generally collective agreements can, to a 
greater or lesser extent contribute to weakening the link between marginal 
productivity and wages, that is the link at the heart of the human capital 
account of the link between labour market competition, incentives and 
cost sharing.
The second objection to the H 0 prediction of individuals’ 
incentives is based on the considerable difference between incentives in 
the engineers’ and the insurance cases. This suggests that transferability is 
considerably more important than labour market competition as 
measured by concentration in the labour market (even if this cannot be 
verified by using one simple comparison). Still, the strong link between 
transferability and individuals’ incentives in all cases suggests that actions 
to affect transferability are crucial determinants of cost sharing, and that
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these actions should be integrated into the cost sharing analysis. One such 
integrated analysis is tested in the last part of this chapter, and is 
developed further in chapter 8.
6.3.2 Employers’ collective action
According to the theory presented in chapter 3, collective action by 
employers may be achieved either if there is a powerful body or if there is 
interaction between a small group of employers.40 While the results 
support the prediction that these two factors increase the probability of 
collective action, there is no evidence that such action has increased the 
share of training costs borne by the employers. In fact, the results rather 
suggest that collective action may reduce the share of training costs borne 
by employers. An explanation of why this may be the case, based on the 
link between collective action and incentives, is presented in the last part 
of this chapter.
The insurance case not only weakens the collective action 
hypothesis, but also shows that employers’ collective action can also be 
used to reduce, and not increase, the share of training costs borne by 
employers. When NAI replaced classroom education and seminars at 
hotels with distance education in 1989 (Brandt 1989: 97), it meant that the 
employees, instead of the employers, had to bear the time costs.41 As the 
results in the next part of this chapter will show, these costs are the most 
substantial part of total training costs. Thus, through collective action 
employers were able to substantially reduce the share of training costs 
they bore. This means that today employers finance a smaller share of
40 However, as chapter 4 showed, employees’ organisations may also play a significant 
role in establishing collective solutions among employers.
41 NAI argues that in addition to saving costs for employers, the change also meant the 
training was more easily available to employees outside Oslo, the exam results improved, 
and it allowed a ‘more optimal use of personnel resources’ (Forsikringsakademiet 1995: 
6).
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training costs for NAI training than for internal training, which indicates 
the problem for the collective action prediction that collective action is 
likely to directly increase the share of training costs borne by employers. 
The insurance case at least shows that just the opposite is also possible.
Similarly, in the nurses’ case, the collective action that lead to a 
transfer of internal specialist training to the colleges, consequently also 
reduced the share of training costs borne by employers, as the results later 
in the chapter show.
The key to the incentive explanation of why collective action may 
reduce employers’ share, the explanation suggested later in the chapter, 
shows most clearly in the teachers’ case. Here, the collective agreement, 
by definition a result of collective action, gives employees’ strong 
incentives to fully finance up-grading training.
Finally, as predicted by H aIt, in the engineers’ case, collective action 
to restrict employers from financing a too small share of training costs has 
been insignificant. TBL has encouraged further training through giving 
financial support to companies that implement competence mapping, 
which has also been encouraged by NITO and N H O . However, this 
action has not aimed at making employers finance a larger share of costs 
of further training for engineers, and is unlikely to have affected these 
investments much.
6.3.3 Conclusion processes
The results of this first part of the chapter are summed up in table 6.11. It 
shows that both theories faired poorly. Human capital theory did so 
because it could not account for the variation in individuals’ incentives 
between the four cases. Collective action theory was correct in predicting 
the occurrence of employers’ collective action, but the consequences of 
this type of action were quite the opposite of the prediction.
Table 6.11 Summary of predictions and processes: cost sharing for transferable
training_____________________________________________________________
N urses Teachers Insurance Engineers
H 0
Ho prediction o f
individuals’
incentives
Strong V ery strong M edium M edium
Results:
W age increases
Wage
increases
Guaranteed
wage
increases
Contributes Lim ited
Increased  
chances o f  
better positions
N ew
positions
O f  little  
im portance
Contributes M ore for  
admin, than  
for technical 
training
C on clu sion V ery strong 
incentives
Up-grading  
training: very  
strong. U p ­
dating
training: very  
w eak
Strong Technical
training:
weak.
Business
admin.
training:
stronger
Fit Even if  rough correspondence betw een predictions and 
outcom es, H q w eakened because processes that shaped the  
incentives are n ot in line w ith  H q explanation.
H alt
H alt prediction  
o f  probability  o f  
collective action
H igh M edium M edium L ow
A ction s to  
increase share o f  
training costs 
borne b y  
em ployers
C ollective  
action, but 
rather to  
reduce than  
to  increase
C ollective  
action, but 
rather to  
reduce than  
to  increase
C ollective  
action, but 
rather to  
reduce than  
to  increase
Insignificant
Fit Prediction o f collective action right, but consequence o f  
collective action the opposite o f prediction
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6.4 Outcomes
The purpose of this second part of the chapter is to study the cost sharing 
outcomes and compare these with the initial predictions and the processes 
above in order to facilitate a full test of the two alternative theories. First, 
however, some of the problems associated with defining and measuring 
training costs are discussed. This is the background to the selection of 
direct costs and the use of spare time as the two crucial determinants of 
formal further training costs in the four cases. The advantage of being able 
to use spare time training as the indicator of time costs is that it solves the 
otherwise intricate problem of measuring the gap between what is 
produced during training and what could otherwise have been produced.
6.4.1 Definition and measurement of training costs
Two initial problems with studying cost sharing are to define what 
training costs are and how they can be measured (Ryan 1991). This thesis 
uses what Ryan calls an economic definition of training costs: ‘the 
[opportunity] cost to the employer of the resources used in the
enhancement of employee knowledge and skills’ (Ryan 1991: 59). By 
contrast, according to Ryan, an ‘accounting definition’ of training costs 
instead of opportunity costs only includes recorded pecuniary costs. The 
difference is clearest in the case of on-the-job training. While such training 
is without costs, by an accounting definition, users of the economic 
definition will assess the difference between actual output in the training 
period and what could have been produced if there had been no training. 
Ryan is right in distinguishing between the definitional and operational 
problems involved in cost sharing, but his distinction between an
‘economic definition* and an ‘accounting definition’ transcends his
distinction between definition and operationalisation. When economists 
and others have used accounting data to measure training costs, it has not 
necessarily been because they prefer the accounting definition
theoretically to the economic definition. It has rather been because
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accounting data have been used as operational measures of the economic 
definition.
There are at least three problems with measuring employers’ 
training costs. The first, and primarily practical problem, is that few 
employers have detailed data on training costs available. A more 
important problem is that even if employers have accounting data on 
training costs, these are unlikely to be valid measures of the economic 
costs of training, since the accounting data do not measure the 
opportunity costs of training. This relates to the third, and potentially 
most serious problem, namely that of measuring informal on-the-job 
training. Such training constitutes a major part of the training employees 
receive, but does not usually show as a cost in the employer accounts 
Mincer (1962: 52). OECD (1997a: 221) says that ‘the complex empirical 
issues posed by the measurement of the costs of on-the-job training... are 
not capable of resolution in a survey context.’
Two different approaches have been applied to measuring the costs 
of on-the-job training. One approach has been to estimate the costs of on- 
the-job training indirectly through analysing age-earnings profiles. The 
premise of this approach is that since wages reflect marginal productivity, 
wage growth reflects human capital investments, and after basic education 
is completed such investment is effected through on-the-job training. 
Using this approach, Mincer (1962) in his influential paper argues that 
investment in on-the-job training for the US male labour force was as 
large as investment in formal education. One important problem with this 
approach is, however, that age-earnings profiles may not directly reflect 
the range and quantity of skills obtained through on-the-job training. 
Mincer uses investment in on-the-job training as a residual variable to 
explain those wage developments that cannot be explained by differences 
in formal education. This indirect approach is most likely to give valid 
results for analyses of individuals’ investment in and returns from initial 
training, in for example apprenticeships, since returns then can be 
estimated similarly to those for individuals’ investments in formal
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education. The approach is less likely to measure adequately the 
investments employers make in on-the-job training later, since such 
investments cannot be measured as easily as the difference between what 
an employee earns and what she could have earned in another job.
Acknowledging the problems of the indirect measure of training 
costs, an alternative approach has been to measure the costs of on-the-job 
training more directly by trying to measure the opportunity cost of 
training. These contributions are designed to measure the gap between 
productivity of trainees and of experienced workers, and the costs of 
informal supervision. The problem with this approach is the inherent 
complexity involved in measuring these variables, as Ryan (1980) shows in 
a case study of welding training in a large US shipyard. In an attempt to 
use the direct approach to cost measurement in a larger sample, Bishop 
(1992) uses a questionnaire to find out about training period, wage 
developments and productivity increases for new hires. In the UK, the 
measurement of employers’ training investments in the ‘Training in 
Britain’ study has highlighted the problems of directly measuring the costs 
of on-the-job training. The study quantifies the importance of on-the-job 
training, estimating that the costs of on-the-job training were higher than 
the costs of off-the-job training (Training Agency 1990a: 29). But the 
subsequent critique of the methods used also makes clear the severe 
methodological problems involved in measuring costs of informal training 
in a high number of firms. For example, the study excluded learning by 
experience and induction training (Finegold 1991a; Ryan 1991).
This study will make no attempt to estimate the precise costs of 
on-the-job training in the four cases. The purpose is rather to elicit results 
on the cost sharing of transferable further training that are accurate 
enough to facilitate a comparison of the four industries. Moreover, the 
focus is on extensive, transferable further training, which to a large extent 
is off-the-job training, and hence less difficult to measure.
For the purpose of this thesis, a simple distinction is made between 
time costs and pay during training, which is similar to cost categories used
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for cases with mainly on-the-job training (Becker 1993; Ryan 1980; 1991; 
Training Agency 1990a). The most important difference is that the key to 
understanding cost sharing in the four cases is employees’ use of spare 
time for further training. By comparison, the key to understanding cost 
sharing in the case of on-the-job training has been the difference between 
trainee productivity and trainee wages (Becker 1962; Bishop 1992; Bosch 
1997; Jones 1986; Mincer 1962; Training Agency 1990a). The difference is 
that during off-the-job training the trainee usually has no output, so that 
the entire trainee’s wages are net costs. In other words, the principle for 
cost measurement is the same as for off-the-job training, but employers’ 
contributions towards training costs differ. In the case of on-the-job 
training employers may contribute by paying trainees more than their 
marginal productivity, while in the case of off-the-job training employers 
contribute if employees get paid at all.
If one applies a strict definition of opportunity costs, time costs are 
the costs of spending time on training instead of on production if it is 
done within working hours, or the costs of training instead of having time 
off if it is done in the employee’s spare time.42 But in this study, 
employers’ time costs are operationalised as the wages they pay employees 
during off-the-job further training. Direct costs include course fees, 
material expenses, transport and hotels, and will in this case also include 
the cost of time spent by instructors and co-workers.43
6.4.2 Results
This section presents how training costs are shared in the four cases. The 
results are then compared both with the initial predictions of both 
theories and then with predictions revised after taking into account the 
results described earlier in this chapter, which were not in line with
42 It is assumed that individuals will adjust their supply of labour so that the wage rate 
equals the individual’s marginal cost of working instead of having time off.
43 In effect, ‘direct costs’ in this case cover all but the trainee’s time costs.
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predictions. Appendix 3 presents the assumptions made in the estimates 
and the details of how cost sharing is calculated.
Table 6.12 gives a summary of the results presented here, 
distinguishing between direct costs and time costs. Since both must be 
combined in each case to estimate the share of the cost employers and 
employees bear, respectively, cost sharing will be presented case by case. 
While nurses’ internal specialist training and engineers’ technical further 
training are those cases where employers bear the largest share of training 
costs, they finance the smallest share of costs of teachers’ up-grading 
training and nurses’ college-based training.
Table 6.12 Summary o f outcom es: cost sharing
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
a. D irect costs Internal:
Em ployers
pay all.
College-
based: small
em ployer
contribution
N o
em ployer
contribution
E m ployer
pays
Em ployer
pays
b. T im e cost (pay Internal: Upgrading: M ostly  in M ostly  in
during training) em ployers’
tim e.
College-
based:
em ployees’
A ll in spare 
tim e
spare tim e w orking
tim e
Share o f Internal: U p grad in g: N A I : T ech n ica l:
em p loyee and 75 -  85 %. 0 - 1 0  % 25 -  35 % 90 -  100 %
em p loyer costs 
borne b y  
em ployer
College- 
based: 
0 - 1 0  %.
College- 
based ‘on  
dem and’: 
10 -  20 % 
(predicted)
Updating: 
90 -  100 %
Business
admin.:
30 -  40 %
Business
admin.:
30 -  40 %
Internal specialist training for nurses is the clearest example in this study 
of employers financing the larger part of highly transferable, extensive
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further training. The estimates in Appendix 3 show that employers bear 
75-85 per cent of the total costs of this training, while employees finance 
the remaining share. The college-based further training stands in stark 
contrast to the internal specialist training. For college-based training 
employers in most cases do not pay anything, since the costs are shared 
between the individual nurses and the state through the national 
educational system. A 1995 survey shows that no students undertaking 
college-based mid-wife or health visitor training received pay from their 
employers, but a few of those who trained to be psychiatric nurses 
received full or reduced wages (Norsk sykepleierforbund 1996).44
Cost sharing for the two types of further training is likely to be 
much more similar after the proposed transfer of internal specialist 
training to colleges, and the introduction of a ‘training on demand’ 
(oppdragsutdanning) system. In this new model, hospitals must finance the 
colleges’ costs of specialist training, but can therefore also decide how 
many training places they will finance and ‘to a large extent’ decide who 
will be admitted for the training. But most importantly, they do not have 
to finance nurses’ wages. An estimate is therefore that employers will then 
finance only 10-20 per cent of the total training costs, compared to 75-85 
per cent for internal training (Appendix 3). Instead, the employees will 
bear the bulk of the costs. This will be the case if employers do not, for 
some reason, choose to use their opportunity to give some or all of the 
students financial support during the training (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1998: 71). However, until the internal specialist 
training was transferred to the colleges, the most noticeable result in the 
nurses’ case was the striking difference between cost sharing for the two
44 The survey does not give details of how large a proportion of the nurses received pay 
during training (Norsk sykepleierforbund 1996). Additional evidence shows that nurses 
at psychiatric institutions are more likely to agree that their employers were willing to 
give paid educational leave than nurses at other types of institutions are (Havn 1996: 
101).
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types of specialist training, when there were so many other characteristics 
in common.
Cost sharing in the nurses’ case is characterised by very different 
cost sharing for two similar types of further training. By contrast, 
different cost sharing for the two types of teachers’ further training 
reflects a profound difference in the types of training, and even more the 
different wage effects of such training.
The key to understanding further training for teachers is once 
again the distinction between up-grading training and up-dating training. 
In most cases the cost sharing follows a simple pattern: employers pay the 
full cost of up-dating training, but no up-grading training costs. In the case 
of up-grading training, employers usually bear neither the direct costs nor 
the time costs. The training is done in the teachers’ spare time, teachers 
must themselves pay for fees and books, and they normally do not receive 
any wages if they take educational leave to do the training.45
Nevertheless, as in the nurses’ case, recent changes have altered the 
hitherto clear difference between the two types of further training. The 
introduction of modularised up-grading training, described in chapter 4, 
has to some extent altered this clear distinction between up-grading and 
up-dating training and the cost sharing implications of this distinction. 
Modularised up-grading training in science is one example. Instead of a 
few large half-year or one-year courses, teachers can choose between 27 
modules, each of which gives one, two or three credits. For these to count 
as up-grading training, they must be combined into 10 or 20 credit units 
(Statens lsererkurs 1997b). The reason why employers may pay for such 
modularised up-grading training is that teachers can take one or more of 
the modules as up-dating training. Thus, module courses blur the 
otherwise clear-cut distinction between up-dating and up-grading training. 
This means that the employers have had to find new solutions to the 
problem of sharing training costs. In one case the Ministry of Education
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and Research has recommended that employers should finance all 
modules except the final one; the one that gives the teacher the possibility 
to combine the modules into a unit that gives the teacher higher wages 
according to the collective agreement. This solution has been used in some 
cases, but it is still not clear whether or not this will be the solution most 
employers opt for if or when more up-grading training is organised in 
modules. A recent survey shows that 28 per cent of teachers say up­
grading training was done within working hours, and 24 per cent say 
employers paid all direct costs of up-grading training, which may be 
because they took modularised up-grading training (Jordfald and Nergaard 
1999: 68-70). The conclusion is that if modularised courses are introduced 
in more subjects and partly replace up-grading training in larger units, 
employers are likely to pay a larger share of the costs of transferable 
further training.
As for teachers’ up-grading training, insurance employees invest 
considerable amounts in further training through using their own spare 
time. However, the employer pays a considerably larger share of total 
training costs in the insurance case through financing the direct costs of 
training. Since fees are much higher in this case than for teachers’ and 
nurses’ training in public colleges, they constitute a significant share of 
total training costs. Still, trainees bear the bulk of the costs.
Training at NAI is, as described in chapter 4, organised as distance 
education with one or more voluntary seminars. When insurance 
employees take business administration training at other colleges, the 
study is usually organised similarly to that at NAI, and training costs are 
shared in the same way if the training is relevant for the employee’s work 
tasks (see Appendix 3).46 According to this estimate, employers finance
45 The fees at public universities and colleges, where virtually all up-grading training is 
carried out are low: less than NO K  1,000 per year.
46 One exception to this pattern, where employers finance direct costs and employees 
most time costs is the so-called ‘The Gjensidige School,’ established by the second largest 
insurance company in 1997. This special program included 25 carefully selected
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around one third of the costs of NAI training.47 Even if most NAI 
training is done in employees’ spare time, employers do pay employees for 
some of the time they spend in training. In some cases NAI training is 
integrated into internal training, which is done within working hours. 
Between 10 -  15 per cent of the students at NAI carry out their training as 
internal training (Forsikringsakademiet 1995: 7). More often, employers 
allow employees to take the exams within working hours, and some 
employers also allow employees some time to prepare for the exam. In 
addition to giving some time off, the employers pay all course fees 
(Gunhildsbu 1994: 20).
Together with internal specialist training for nurses, the engineers’ 
case is the one where employers bear the largest share of training costs. In 
most cases when engineers do further education and training, training is 
short, within working hours and fully paid for by the employer. 
Compared to teachers and insurance employees, engineers do, to a lesser 
extent, use their spare time for up-grading training. Nevertheless, for some 
types of training, most importantly extensive, external management and 
business administration training, engineers must use their spare time for 
the training. Both public and private colleges offer this sort of training. If 
engineers use their spare time, the employer tends to pay all, or the bulk 
of, the course fees. For example, an employer in the car industry, known 
for providing good further training, said that ‘We have told all [engineers] 
that they can take management training at [the private college] BI if they 
want to, but that will require something from them...It requires time... A 
management course will not lead us to reducing their workload
employees, who during a 10-month period could take a 10-credit training at BI within 
working hours. Even if the intention was to continue the program, it was cancelled after 
one year because the company found it too costly. Interview with Personnel manager, 
large insurance company (A).
47 Because of social costs and taxes, the share born by employers is higher from the 
employee’s perspective, as shown in appendix 3.
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significantly.548 In those cases where half or more of the training is done in 
the spare time, 80 per cent of managing directors and representatives of 
salaried employees’ organisations say that the employer pays all the 
(direct) costs of training (MMI 1997).49 Thus, the situation is clearly 
similar to the insurance case. The difference is that while employees in the 
insurance industry use spare time for training in both technical and 
administrative skills, engineers usually do so only for administrative skills. 
In Appendix 3 it is estimated that through financing the direct costs of 
spare time business administration and management training employers 
finance 30 -  40 per cent of the total costs of such training.
6.4.3 Conclusion outcomes
Given that both theories have a two-step explanation of cost sharing, 
including both outcomes and processes, and their predictions for the first 
steps in the first part of this chapter were not confirmed, a conclusion can 
be drawn in two different ways. Table 6.13 shows the correspondence 
between the initial predictions and the outcomes. However, a better way 
to assess the second step of both theories is to compare the conclusions 
with revised predictions based on the results of the ‘first step’ described in 
the first part of this chapter, and the analysis is therefore based on this 
comparison.
48 Interview with Factory manager, car part manufacturer.
49 On this question, there were small differences between the views of employers and 
employees. In fact, slightly more employees than employers said employers paid all 
costs.
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Table 6.13 Summary of predictions and outcomes: cost sharing for transferable
training
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Hq prediction of
employer
contribution
Low Very low Medium Medium
Halt prediction of
employer
contribution
Medium Medium Medium Medium
Results Internal: 
very high 
College- 
based: low
Upgrading: 
No, or very 
low
Medium Technical:
high
Table 6.13 shows that there is little correspondence between the initial 
predictions and the cost sharing outcomes. Contrary to H aIt predictions 
there is significant variation between the cases. Moreover, the H 0 is of 
limited help in explaining this variation. Yet, this does not warrant a 
complete rejection of either of the two theories. A sounder way to assess 
the theories is to take the incentives and the unpredicted nature of 
collective action from the first part of this chapter as given, and revise the 
predictions accordingly in order to test the second step of both theories. 
However, the results in the first section mean that it makes little sense to 
revise H alt as has been done for H q. The reason is that the problem with 
H alt in the first section of the chapter was not its ability to predict the 
occurrence of employers’ collective action, but rather the nature and 
purpose of these actions. Instead, the next section will present a 
theoretically founded explanation of the effect of employers’ collective 
action that rivals H dt2.
Table 6.14 shows how the results fit with the revised predictions of 
H 0, based on the logic that if employees have strong incentives to invest in 
training, primarily through using their spare time, a small share of the 
costs are borne by employers.
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Table 6.14 Summary of revised predictions given processes: cost sharing for
transferable training_______________________________________________
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Employer
contribution
Internal
specialist
training:
very high.
College-
based
training:
low
Up-grading 
training: 
no, or very 
low
Medium Technical
training:
High
Incentives Very strong 
incentives
Up-grading 
training: 
very strong. 
Up-dating 
training: 
very weak
Strong Technical
training:
weak.
Business
admin.
training:
stronger
Hq prediction of
employer
contribution
Internal: 
very high. 
College- 
based: low
Upgrading: 
no, or very 
low
Medium High
Fit Good fit, except for internal specialist training of nurses
The conclusion is that the explanation provides a plausible prediction of 
the pattern for insurance employees, teachers and engineers. However, the 
incentive explanation cannot account for the difference between cost 
sharing for internal and college-based training for nurses. Nurses have 
similar incentives to take both types of training, but they have to pay 
most of the costs of college-based training themselves, while employers 
pay the bulk of the costs of internal specialist training.
The explanation of the deviant case, why hospitals finance the bulk 
of costs for internal specialist training, requires more detailed analysis. 
The inability of nurses in practice to finance the training could be one 
reason why employers have financed such a large share of costs of highly 
transferable, further training. Since nurses who undertake internal
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training do not have the right to loans and grants from the State 
Educational Loan fund (Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 
1998), it has been difficult for employers to let nurses pay a larger share of 
training costs. Combined with the employers’ wanting to control the 
number of trainees in skills of vital importance to the hospitals, this may 
explain why hospitals have continued to finance the very costly, highly 
specialist training for nurses.50 The consequence, however, is that this has 
generated a significant collective action problem of ensuring that enough 
specialist nurses are trained, as chapter 7 will show.
The introduction of employees’ inability to finance training as a 
reason why employers might finance a large share of training costs is, at 
best, an element introduced deux ex machina. As chapter 2 showed, human 
capital theory states that employees’ inability to finance general training is 
not a reason for employers to do so. In collective action theory, the 
possibility of a set share of employer financing was discussed in chapter 3 
as a reason why the amount of training provided is likely to be sub- 
optimal. But the theory itself does not include an explanation of how and 
why employers’ share of costs may be set, or at least very difficult to 
reduce. Therefore, neither Hq nor H aIt can adequately explain cost sharing 
in the case of internal specialist training compared with college-based 
training.
The overall conclusion is still that H0 is confirmed in this second 
part of the prediction since the link between individuals’ incentives and 
cost sharing is so strong. Nevertheless, the inadequacy of H 0 in explaining 
how these incentives were shaped, shown in the first part of this chapter, 
means that altogether the support of H q is mixed. An alternative 
explanation of how incentives are formed is presented next, based on the 
assumption that the main way in which employers’ collective action 
affects cost sharing is through affecting individuals’ incentives to invest in 
further training.
50 This is an example of what in the discussion of figure 3.1 is described as the problem of
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6.5 A collective action explanation of incentives
The explanation presented here accounts for the problems with both H 0 
and H alt earlier in the chapter. It explains both why H 0 failed to predict 
the variation between individuals’ incentives in the four groups and why 
the effect of employers’ collective action was not a higher share of training 
costs borne by employers.
The core of the explanation is that employers’ collective action is 
important as a determinant of individuals’ incentives, which subsequently 
determine cost sharing. The explanation includes the H alt prediction of the 
probability of collective action as well as the H 0 prediction of the link 
between individuals’ incentives and cost sharing. What is added is the 
assumption that the most important effect of employers’ collective action 
is not to increase the share of training costs borne by employers, but 
rather to enable employers to bear a smaller share of costs by improving 
individuals’ incentives to invest in training.
The difference between this new version of collective action 
theory and the one reflected in H a)t can be illustrated in figure 3.1, which 
showed the supply and demand of training places given the share of 
training costs borne by employers. Here, the amount of training can 
increase either through shifts in the supply or the demand curve. The 
original H a!t hypothesis was based on the assumption that in order to 
ensure that sufficient transferable training is provided, employers’ 
collective action will induce employers to offer more training for any 
given cost sharing arrangement, represented as a shift in the supply of 
training places. The explanation presented here, however, is that the main 
impact of employers’ collective action is that it increases individuals’ 
demand, so that employees are willing to do more training for any given 
share of employer contributions. If employers’ collective action can
employers’ share being set too high.
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induce such a shift, the outcome will be both more training and that 
trainees will bear a greater share of the costs.
There are several ways in which employers’ collective action can 
improve individuals’ incentives to finance further training, and 
consequently tend to reduce the share of training costs employers bear. 
Chapter 5 showed that collective action was important in improving 
transferability of training. These actions will indirectly improve 
individuals’ incentives to take further training, and reduce the share of 
costs borne by employers. Collective action by employers may also 
directly improve training, and increase the productivity increase from 
training, especially if close employer involvement is necessary to establish 
high quality training. But collective action can also improve individuals’ 
incentives more indirectly. Collective agreements can contain important 
incentives for individuals to take training, which do not always directly 
reflect productivity increases. Moreover, employers’ collective action can 
affect the way training increases the probability of promotion or the way 
skills are utilised if collective action influences the way employers organise 
work or promotion criteria, for example by the introduction of common 
job ladders at different employers. Finally, employer collaboration may 
give employees the necessary trust in employers’ claims that skills from 
training are transferable and will strengthen their position in the external 
labour market. Thus, there is a wide range of options for employers’ 
collective action that give theoretical support to the claim that employers’ 
collective action can increase the share of training costs borne by 
employees and increase the total amount of transferable training provided 
by improving individuals’ incentives.
There are however two reasons why employers’ collective action 
does not necessarily lead to a higher amount of training and a lower share 
of training costs borne by employers. First, employers’ collective action 
may reduce individuals’ incentives to invest in training. If, for example, a 
collective agreement restricts wage increases after training, this form of 
employers’ collective action increases the share of cost borne by
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employers. Another possibility is that employer collaboration on training 
reduces the quality or relevance of training, for example by adapting too 
slowly to new technology.
A second possible problem is that increased transferability, or 
other improvements of individuals’ incentives, may worsen the problem 
through reducing employers’ willingness to finance the training if there is, 
for some reason, no accompanying increase in employee contributions. As 
Stevens (1994c) showed in chapter 2, increased employee demand for 
training will more than outweigh employers’ reduced willingness to 
finance training transferability if employees are willing to bear a larger a 
share of training costs. However, if employees’ problems of financing 
training were the reason why employers paid a considerable share in the 
first place, a reduction of amount of training may be a likely outcome. In 
this case, employers’ collective action to reduce individuals’ incentives to 
invest in training could lead to increased employers’ willingness to finance 
training. For example, if a collective agreement held down wage increases 
after training, employers would be more willing to finance training.
6.5.1 Results
A test of the explanation based on collective action forming individuals’ 
incentives requires a test of three steps, compared with two steps for H 0 
and H ^. First, the explanation predicts that if there is high concentration 
or a powerful superordinate body, collective action is most likely. Second, 
the explanation predicts that employers’ collective action improves 
individuals’ incentives to invest in furthers training. Finally, it predicts 
that these incentives determine the cost sharing.
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Table 6.15 Summary of collective action predictions of incentives and outcomes
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Probability of 
collective action
High Medium Medium Low
Actions to shape 
individuals’ 
incentives to 
invest in training
Significant Significant Significant Insignificant
Individuals ‘ 
incentives to 
invest in training
Very strong 
incentives
Upgrading: 
very strong. 
Updating: 
very weak
Strong Technical:
weak.
Business
admin.:
stronger
Fit Good Good Good Good
Table 6.15 shows the good fit between predictions and outcomes on both 
collective action and incentives, while the link between incentives and 
cost sharing was clearly confirmed in table 6.14.
In all but the engineers’ case, employers’ collective action has had a 
significant impact on employees’ incentives to finance further training. 
Since such action was not expected in the engineers’ case, this is in line 
with the collective action explanation.
In the nurses’ case, collective action to increase individuals’ 
incentives to take further training has primarily been the same action as 
those which improved transferability, described in chapter 5, which have 
directly improved individuals’ incentives to take the training.51 One may 
also argue that collective agreements have held down the wage increases 
nurses get as a result of specialist training but, as shown in chapter 5, 
individuals still have considerable incentives to finance this training. 
Moreover, there is no significant difference between college-based and 
internal training on this point.
51 As explained in chapter 5, the employees’ organisations played a more significant role 
in the nurses’ case than predicted by collective action theory.
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The introduction of ‘professional ladders’ in hospitals is an 
example of how collective action has shaped incentives in the nurses’ case, 
through a process similar to the way most hospitals applied NSF’s 
curricula for specialist training. NSF has introduced a plan for a ‘clinical 
ladder’ (klinisk stige), which share several important features with Ranter’s 
professional ladder, even if Ranter sees such ladders as implemented by 
individual companies and not initiated by employees’ organisations. The 
plan defines what experience and theoretical training is needed to advance 
on the ladder for nurses who work in clinical departments (kliniske 
avdelinger) (Diakonhjemmets sykehus 1996). Nurses who have the 
required practice, including practice with supervision, and have done 
some additional theoretical training, can be recognised as ‘clinical nurses’ 
by NSF. As was the case with the specialist training curricula, hospitals 
are not obliged to recognise these ladders and titles awarded by NSF. But 
the hospitals still use NSF’s plan as a basis for their own professional 
ladder for nurses.52 One important reason why the hospitals seem to use 
the employees’ organisation’s plan, modified or unmodified, is that it can 
help recruit and retain nurses. A senior nursing officer at a large hospital 
said that they initially wanted a professional ladder that differed from 
NSF’s plan, but feared that introducing a completely different plan could 
effectively ‘place the hospital on the sidelines’ in the struggle to recruit 
qualified nurses.53 The NSF ladder is not directly linked to wage increases, 
but according to a NSF official, they ‘are working on it.’54
In the case of teachers, the incentives individuals have to invest in 
further training gives a plausible explanation of how costs are shared in 
this case. However, these are incentives not generated by individual 
employers, but through a collective agreement, a result of collective 
action. This collective agreement has ensured that teachers have strong
52 Diakonhjemmets sykehus (1996) and interviews with Personnel manager of hospital 
outside Oslo and Senior nursing officer at an Oslo hospital.
53 Interview with Senior nursing officer at an Oslo hospital.
54 Interview with NSF representative.
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incentives to take up-grading training and that the schools do not have to 
pay any of the costs, so there is no need for collective action to restrict 
employers’ under-investment in up-grading training. The teachers have 
not negotiated with their employers, the municipalities, on wages and 
employment conditions since 1949. From 1949 to 1960, the Parliament set 
their wages, and then from 1960 the teachers’ organisations have 
negotiated with the state, in the same way as national government 
employees do. The question of whether teachers should continue 
collective bargaining with the state rather than the municipalities has been 
raised since the mid 1980s (Lauvdal, Rymoen, and Grooss 1998: 23). The 
teachers’ organisations have always been against transferring the 
responsibility for collective bargaining back to the municipalities 
(Lauvdal, Rymoen, and Grooss 1998: 25). Within the Teachers 
Association, there has been some discontent with the official position, 
because it may have restricted wage increases. The other main employees’ 
organisation, Norwegian Union of Teachers (NL), on the other hand, has 
been unequivocal in its support for state negotiations (Hustadnes 1997). 
The municipalities’ employer organisation, KS, has attempted to get the 
responsibility for the wage negotiations. In 1995 KS tried to establish 
whether legally the state had the right to oblige municipalities through 
collective bargaining (Lauvdal, Rymoen, and Grooss 1998: 27). Even 
though KS lost the legal case, the organisation has continued to maintain 
that they should negotiate collective agreement on behalf of the 
municipalities. For example, it has tried to convince the teachers that their 
working conditions may be improved if they choose to negotiate with KS 
instead of the state (Hustadnes 1997).55
55 For the municipalities a transfer of negotiations from the state to KS would mean not 
only more power to influence wages and working conditions for their own employees, 
but it would also reduce the municipalities’ current problems of administrating two sets 
of basic agreements, one for teachers and one for the rest of their employees (Lauvdal, 
Rymoen, and Grooss 1998).
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The most important way insurance companies have improved 
individuals’ incentives to invest in further training has been to make sure 
that NAI training has been valuable, and valued, in the companies. In the 
process, NAI itself has played an important role, partly independently of 
its members. All action described in chapter 5, which have secured N AI’s 
position in the industry, has also contributed to ensuring that employees 
have incentives to spend their spare time on the organisation’s training. 
But FL has expressed worries that employers may value NAI training less 
than other types of further training, for example at BI.56 If this is the case, 
it may mean that employees have weaker incentives to take NAI training, 
and consequently employers must expect to pay a larger part of the 
training costs if the level of training is to remain the same. Based on 
interviews in 1988, Brandt (1989: 99) says that insurance employees 
wanted training that could be rewarded outside the industry. This view is 
confirmed by the trade union representative who said that ‘NAI is no 
longer so attractive, since it does not confer the universal competence that 
can be used in the market,’ and explained that ‘the market’ in this case 
meant a market beyond the insurance industry.57 The employers have not 
opposed an insurance education that could give credits in the public 
college system. On the contrary, the employers’ first choice has been for 
the public colleges to provide insurance education, mostly since that 
would be cheaper for the employers.58 In 1998 a public college, in co­
operation with NAI, presented the first one-year study in insurance 
(Forsikringsakademiet 1998b). So both the employers and the employees 
prefer education that gives credits and can be used as part of a degree in 
other colleges, but the rationales differ. While employees emphasise the 
recognition such education can give outside the industry, employers are 
primarily interested in reducing costs.
56 Interview with Group of FL representatives.
57 Interview with Group of FL representatives.
58 Interview with NAI representative.
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Collective action by employers has had little impact on the 
incentives engineers have to take transferable further training or the 
investments employers make in such training. Still, there have been some 
attempts to do both. Both TBL and the National Council for Engineering 
Education have worked to make training at engineer colleges and other 
public education institutions more valuable to employers (Econ 1997; 
Ingeniorutdanningsradet 1995; 1996; Teknologibedriftenes Landsforening 
1996).59 Nevertheless, as chapter 3 showed, these types of further training 
play a very limited role in the further training of engineers.
A comparison of professional job ladders for nurses and engineers 
reveals some important differences. In contrast to the case of nurses, but 
more in line with what Kanter (1984; 1990) found, the characteristics of 
the engineers’ ladders were to be determined by the individual employer 
and the local trade union representatives, based on local competence 
needs. So while the nurses’ ‘clinical ladder’ is a clear example of how 
collective action has improved individuals’ incentives to invest in training, 
the engineers’ case is one of individual employers* initiatives.60
6.6 Conclusion
The chapter has shown that in the four cases, variation in individuals’ 
incentives to invest in training could explain the pattern of cost sharing 
for these four groups. This is in line with the human capital prediction 
developed in chapter 2. The problem, however, was that this prediction 
could not adequately account for how and why the variation of incentives 
developed. The collective action hypothesis developed in the same chapter 
gained little support, primarily because employers’ collective action rather
59 Interview with National Council for Engineering Education representative.
60 Moreover, the engineers’ ladders will have a weaker harmonising effect on internal 
training, because the ladders are not linked to any system of recognition outside the 
firm.
241
tended to reduce than to increase the share of training costs borne by- 
employers.
An alternative collective action based on the assumption that 
employers’ collective action could improve individuals’ incentives to 
invest in training, and therefore reduce the share of training costs borne 
by employers, gained more support than any of the two initial theories.
The implication of this alternative view, a synthesis H q and H alt, is 
that on the one hand, cost sharing could be seen as a result of a market 
solution, where individuals’ incentives to invest in training determine the 
share of training costs they are willing to bear. Employers’ collective 
action, on the other hand, does not primarily intervene directly in how 
this market solution of cost sharing is set. Instead, the results in the 
chapter suggest that employers’ collective action is crucial in determining 
the incentives individuals need to be willing to invest in training. Thus, 
the conclusion in this chapter supplements the conclusion of chapter 5 
through emphasising the importance of employers’ collective action as a 
requirement for market solutions. The importance of endogenisation and 
employers’ collective action to shape individual incentives is discussed 
further in chapter 8. First, however, chapter 7 analyses how the supply of 
transferable training does or does not meet employers’ demand.
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7. Sufficient training or skill shortages?
7.1 Introduction
The ultimate indicator of adequate further education and training in an 
industry is neither transferability nor cost sharing, but whether or not the 
right amount of the right training is provided. However, as this chapter 
will show, this topic is inherently tightly linked with the themes of 
chapters 5 and 6.
If there is a collective action problem associated with the provision 
of transferable training, individual employers will tend to provide too 
little transferable training. The main purpose of this chapter is to test this 
prediction. Like the two previous chapters, the predictions consist of 
processes and outcomes, which will be considered in terms of whether or 
not the results are in line with predictions. The last part of the chapter 
explains how collective solutions may be amenable to solving some skill 
provision problems, but not others.
7.2 Hypotheses and predictions
The two hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter are presented in 
table 7.1.
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Table 7.1 H0- and Halt-hypotheses: skill shortage and deficiencies_______
Human capital theory Collective action theory
H q3: The optimal amount of 
transferable training will, and can 
only, be provided in a perfect labour 
market with a perfect capital market.
As this chapter will describe later, the notion of ‘optimal amount’ is in 
practice difficult both to define and to measure. Therefore, this chapter 
will rather study different indicators of sub-optimal amount of training 
than attempt to measure some ‘optimal level’ of training provision. As for 
the hypotheses tested in chapters 5 and 6, a comprehensive test cannot be 
performed without studying the processes that can explain the outcomes.
Figure 7.1 Hq and KL,lt explanations of factors leading to sub-optimal amount of 
transferable training___________________________________________________
H 0
Limited labour Wages <  marginal Sub-optimal
market product amount of
competition transferable
training
H aIt
1. Concentration — ^  Collective action —► Optimal
2. Powerful super­ by employers amount of
ordinate body transferable
training
Figure 7.1 shows the logic of the two explanations.
The core of the H0 argument is that if imperfect competition 
means wage increases are smaller than the increase in marginal
Halt3: Even though the optimal 
amount of training may be provided in 
perfect labour markets with perfect 
capital markets, it is more likely to be 
a result of employers’ collective action, 
which may be achieved if there are few 
employers, or through a powerful 
body.
productivity after training, employees will finance less than the optimal 
amount of transferable training.1 In this initial version of the H 0 
explanation it is assumed, as it was in chapter 6, that concentration in the 
labour market (defined in chapter 4) is a valid indicator of imperfect 
competition. Therefore, the initial prediction is that wages are less likely 
to reflect marginal productivity in the insurance and nurses’ cases than in 
the two others, and therefore skill shortages are most likely in the two 
former than in the two latter cases. It is beyond the limits of this study to 
assess precisely whether or not wages equal marginal productivity, but it 
is still possible to contemplate factors that affect the probability that 
productivity increases from training will be reflected in higher wages, and 
this will be done in the next section. The results will show that the clear 
examples of wages not reflecting marginal productivity are results of 
collective agreements, not oligopolistic competition between a few, large 
employers in the labour market.
According to H ^, employers’ collective action is what reduces the 
likelihood of skill shortages. Such action may in two different ways ensure 
that enough training is provided. First, as chapter 6 showed, employers’ 
collective action may increase individuals’ demand for training, and 
consequently increase the amount of training provided. However, if the 
share of training costs borne by employers is set too high, as discussed in 
chapters 3 and 6, collective action is necessary to ensure a positive shift in 
the number of training places employers supply for the given cost sharing 
arrangement. This latter explanation of how collective action can solve a 
potential skill shortage problem is most in line with the versions of 
collective action theory that argue that the collective action problem exists 
because employers must bear a large share of the costs of transferable 
training, for example because the solution of trainee financing has broken
1 The essence of this explanation is summarised by Booth and Snower (1996: 4): ‘The 
trick for finding market failures in the acquisition of skills is to identify the 
circumstances under which workers and firms do not get fully rewarded for the training 
costs they bear.’
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down (Marsden 1986). In order to test the collective action theory by 
deriving predictions about each case, the predicted effects of collective 
action must be coupled with predictions of the probability of collective 
actions. Given the theoretical predictions of this probability in chapter 3, 
H alt predicts that skill shortages are least likely in the nurses’ case, more 
likely in the insurance and teacher cases, but most likely in the engineers’ 
case.2
Table 7.2 Summary of predictions: skill shortage and deficiencies
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Concentration High Low High Low
H0 prediction of skill 
shortages
Many Few Many Few
Probability of collective 
action
High Medium Medium Low
Halt prediction of skill 
shortages
No Few Few Many
Table 7.2 shows the predictions of the two theories for each of the four 
cases.
7.3 Processes
In a case study, correlation between skill shortages and concentration or 
probability of collective action would not suffice to confirm any of the 
hypotheses. Therefore, this section examines whether or not 
concentration leads to the predicted gap between wages and marginal 
productivity, and if employers’ collective action occurs where predicted.
As indicated above, the clearest examples of marginal productivity 
increases from further training not being reflected in wage increases are 
not consequences of concentration in the labour market, but of collective
2 It is assumed that collective action theory predicts not only the probability of 
employers’ collective action, but also differences in the effect of such actions, and 
consequently can predict different degrees of skill provision problems.
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agreements. The two public sector cases are the ones where collective 
agreements, more than in the other cases, have restricted employers’ 
ability to reward productivity increases with higher wages. Thus, national 
pay scales have compressed wage differentials and so discouraged 
employee investments. In the nurses’ case, the collective agreement 
between KS and the counties (except Oslo) has restricted the majority of 
hospitals’ opportunities to increase wages for specialist nurses, even if 
there is some scope for wage competition, since employers can decide 
where on the wage scale to put their specialist nurses.
More than in the nurses’ case there is, in the teachers’ case, a weak 
link between increased productivity and increased wages. The most 
notable reason is that teachers get wage increases from further training 
even if they do not teach the subject they specialise in, but on the other 
hand do not get wage increases for types of training other than formal up­
grading training. Given that the collective agreements do little to link 
teachers’ up-grading training with employers’ demand, Hq predicts that, at 
least in some subjects, too few teachers undertake up-grading training, 
even if it is virtually impossible to a priori determine in which cases 
productivity increases are higher or lower than wage increases. However, 
unless the wage increases are higher than the productivity increases for all 
subjects, H 0 predicts shortages.
In the insurance and engineers’ cases, there is considerably more 
scope for employers to set wages that they deem to reflect productivity. 
There may be a monopsony effect in the insurance case, but this is very 
unlikely to restrict wage growth as clearly as the collective agreements in 
the teachers’ and nurses’ cases. Insurance employees are covered by a 
collective agreement but, compared with the two public sector cases, 
employers have more opportunities to reward productivity increases from 
further training, especially through promotion, which in chapter 6 was 
shown to be the most important motive for insurance employees to 
undertake further training. In the engineers’ case there is individual wage- 
setting, so collective agreements have little impact on employers’ ability to
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remunerate employees according to their marginal productivity, or at least 
employers’ evaluation of productivity. Thus, the results show that, rather 
than concentration, collective agreements are the most important reasons 
why productivity increases from further training are not reflected in wage 
increases, which weakens the H 0 prediction. However, this hardly 
constitutes a critical weakening of human capital theory, since collective 
agreements may be adequately included in this line of reasoning without 
altering the more basic aspect of the explanation (see e.g. Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1999), namely the link between skill shortages and these 
productivity -  wage gaps. This link will be the topic of the next section.
The H alt prediction is that collective action to increase the amount 
of training is likely in the nurses’, insurance employees’ and teachers’ 
cases, and that this will lead to increased employee demand for training 
and increased employer willingness to provide it. Since collective action 
by employers to improve individual employees’ incentives has been 
treated in chapters 5 and 6, this chapter will focus on collective action to 
increase employers’ willingness to finance training. The results show that 
the predictions are supported in all but the nurses’ case. Moreover, the 
solution to the collective action problem in the teachers’ case differs from 
the type of solution suggested by
As predicted from H alt, collective action to increase the amount of 
transferable further training provided has been very limited in the 
engineers’ case compared with the others. Despite some attempts by 
N H O , N ITO  and TBL to encourage further training, there has been no 
marked collective action to ensure high levels of transferable training.
In the insurance case there is clear support for H aIt. While chapters 
5 and 6 have shown how collective action by employers has improved 
individuals’ incentives to undertake further training, the employers, 
through NAI, have also clearly acted to ensure that each employer 
contributes to the collective good by giving their employees transferable 
training. So in line with the predictions of H aU there has been collective 
action to solve a perceived collective action problem. For example, each
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annual report of the NAI gives details of the number of participants from 
each of the large and medium-sized companies.3 Moreover, direct pressure 
has been applied to a company that trained less than others did. When the 
insurance company Vesta used insurance salespersons that were less 
trained than salespersons in other companies, ‘officially the whole 
industry condemned it.H Such direct pressure is a clear example of how 
collective action can discourage what is seen as under-investment in 
training.5 However, in the insurance case, action aimed directly at keeping 
training levels high has been interwoven with collective action to uphold 
the common training organisation. These two are clearly interrelated 
since upholding the organisation is very difficult without sufficient 
participation, and the existence of the organisation probably increases the 
amount of training provided.
As chapter 6 showed, the national collective agreement for teachers 
ensures that employees have clear and strong wage incentives to invest in 
further training. The collective agreement also forms one sort of solution 
of the collective action problem of employers’ contributions. The 
collective agreement binds all employers to give the same wage increases 
from transferable training, and at the same time it prevents poaching, 
since it makes it virtually impossible for employers to use wages to attract 
already trained teachers. However, this type of solution to the collective 
action problem differs from H ^ as it has been presented, since instead of 
ensuring that schools provide enough employer-financed further training, 
the collective agreement rather forces employers to give wage increases 
after fully trainee financed training. Thus, the teachers’ case suggests that 
collective agreements may effectively constitute solutions to the collective
3 A  similar practice is used in the German vocational training system (Marsden 1999:225).
4 Interview with NAF representative.
5 One may argue that the specific characteristics of the insurance industry makes employers 
especially concerned that their competitors under-investing in training, since they sell complex 
products, the consumer’s trust is especially important, and the reputation of one company may 
affect the reputation of the whole industry.
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action problem in a way that breaks down the distinction between 
improving individuals’ incentives and increasing employer supply. The 
fact that up-grading training is trainee-financed, has meant that national 
government initiatives and action by teachers’ organisations have aimed at 
encouraging up-dating training, which is mainly financed by employers 
(Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1997; Laererforbundet 
1995).
The H alt explanation is in line with H 0 regarding the inherent 
problems of the collective action solution in the teachers’ case. The 
problem is that the agreement does not include any mechanism to adjust 
the supply of training to employers’ needs. An employer, interviewed in a 
1994 survey, said that ‘when it comes to up-grading training, each 
individual school can do little but encourage teachers to take further 
training in those subjects where the school has a demand’ (Statens 
laererkurs 1994: 5). In 1991, the Ministry of Education and Research 
promised it would ‘establish a system of further education and training 
which is based on each individual school’s need for competence 
development, in which one creates a system that directs teachers’ choice of 
subject and specialisation, based on the needs in a teacher collegium* (St 
meld nr 40 (1990-91): 132). But this type of collective action has not been 
introduced, so the potential problem of linking demand and supply has 
persisted. Even if some schools have used seniority increments to induce 
teachers to take up-grading training, as explained in appendix 3, its limited 
diffusion has restricted its impact as a vehicle for directing up-grading 
training towards employers’ needs. Neither has the opportunity 
employers have to give educational leave only if the training is needed by 
the school (St meld nr 40 (1990-91): 124) had much impact. This is partly 
because this is primarily an option in those few cases where the teachers 
get financial support from the school, and also because most up-grading 
training is carried out without teachers taking educational leave.
Previous chapters have shown how employers, to some extent 
prompted by the Nurses Association, have acted to improve individuals’
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incentives to invest in formal further training, for example by ensuring 
transferability. However, contrary to H alt predictions, there been have no 
powerful attempts, either through hospital co-operation or state 
intervention, to ensure that employers provided enough of the very 
costly, highly transferable internal specialist training. Even if there has 
been some co-operation between the regional hospitals regarding internal 
specialist training, this co-operation has mainly focused on standards of 
training, and not directly on the number of specialist nurses each of the 
hospitals trained (Holter et al. 1996). Chapter 5 showed that the Nurses 
Association (NSF) has been important in fostering collective solutions, 
but the organisation has been less influential in reducing under-investment 
in training. However, from 1992 onwards, NSF has published yearly 
statistics on the numbers being trained by each hospital within each field, 
which, to some extent, may discourage hospitals from training too few 
(Norsk sykepleierforbund 1996). A government-appointed committee in 
1997 recommended national subsidies to encourage specialist training 
(NOU 1997:2 : chapter 9), but such subsidises were not introduced before 
the transfer of specialist training to the colleges.
Consequently, it has been up to employers, the hospitals, to 
choose independently how many specialist nurses they wanted to train. In 
fact, according to KUF, one of the advantages of internal specialist 
training was that employers individually could regulate the number of 
nurses on internal training according to their needs. Therefore, KUF 
argued, supply was likely to meet demand (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1998).
However, cost sharing for this type of training, described in 
chapter 6, suggests that collective action was needed to avoid under­
investment. The reason is that employers bear a very large share, 75-85 per 
cent, of the costs of the highly transferable and costly training. Hence, this 
situation is an example of the theoretical case where the employers’ share 
of training costs is set so high that collective action is needed to ensure a 
sufficient amount of transferable training. In the nurses’ case, there is
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hardly an absolute barrier to individual investment, the situation is rather 
that, in practice, nurses have had few opportunities to finance the internal 
specialist training.6 So the nurses’ case is one example of a situation with a 
significant collective action problem, because employers must bear a very 
large share of training costs for a highly transferable skill; however, 
contrary to H alt predictions there was no significant collective action to 
address the problem.
Table 7.3 Summary of predictions and outcomes: skill shortages and deficiencies
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Ho
Concentration (ch. 3) High Low High Low
Ho prediction gap between Larger Smaller Larger Smaller
productivity increase and 
wage increase
Gap between productivity Larger Larger Smaller Smaller
increase and wage increase 
Fit Weak fit, because of strict interpretation of Hq
Hdl
Probability of collective High Medium Medium Low
action (ch. 3)
Halt prediction skill No Few Few Many
shortages
Collective action to Yes Yes Yes No
increase employee demand 
for training (ch. 5, 6)
Collective action to No Yes, but Yes No
increase employer supply of 
training
Fit
only
through
collective
agreement
Contrary to prediction lack of collective action
to increase supply in nurses’ case
6 A solution in line with cost sharing in the other cases, as described in chapter 6, would 
be to make specialist training a part time training, which was done both in spare time 
and within working hours
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Table 7.3 summarises the processes. The H 0 fit is weak since collective 
agreements were not included, but this is mostly due to the strict 
interpretation of H 0 in the deriving of the predictions. There is a good fit 
between H alt predictions and outcomes in three cases, but in the case 
where employers’ collective action seems most needed to increase 
employer supply, there has been no significant such action, contrary to 
H alt predictions.
In order to facilitate a test in the second part of the chapter, table 
7.4 shows the revised predictions based on the results in this first part.
Table 7.4 Summary of revised predictions given processes: skill shortages and 
deficiencies
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Ho
Gap between productivity 
increase and wage increase
Larger Larger Smaller Smaller
Hq prediction of skill 
shortages
Many Many Few Few
Halt
Collective action to increase 
employee demand for 
training (ch. 5, 6)
Yes Yes Yes No
Collective action to increase 
employer supply of training
No Yes Yes No
Hah prediction of skill 
shortages
Many Many, 
because of 
nature of 
collective 
agreement
Few Many
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7.4 Definition and measurement of sub-optimal 
training levels
7.4.1 Introduction
The two tasks of assessing what constitutes an optimal level of training 
and whether or not enough training is supplied, are inherently complex. 
Bosworth and Pearson (1992: 92) say that ‘the concept of skill shortage (or 
surplus) is difficult to define and even harder to measure with any degree 
of rigour.’
This section will present different theoretical dimensions of the 
concept of optimal training levels. It will also present some of the 
problems with the different theoretical definitions, and the related 
problems of operationalising and measuring whether or not sufficient 
education and training are provided. Finally, it will show how these 
problems are tackled in this chapter, and how different indicators are used 
to enhance the validity of the findings.
7.4.2 Defining optimality and sub-optimality
There is a clear distinction in the literature between the neo-classical and 
other, more or less explicit, definitions of an optimal training level. A 
crucial consequence of the neo-classical assumptions is the idea of single, 
optimal long-term equilibrium of skill supply and demand, which would 
occur in a perfectly competitive market. However, in practice there may 
be, and are, multiple departures from perfect competition. In neo-classical 
theory, these departures typically imply that there are short- and medium- 
term fluctuations in the supply and demand. Consequently, there may be 
skill shortages, usually measured as recruitment problems, until wage 
adjustments ensure that supply meets demand.
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However, several authors have argued that neo-classical theory 
takes a too narrow view of the skill supply problems that may occur. A 
core point of these alternative theoretical definitions of optimality and 
sub-optimality is that employers do more than increase wages when faced 
with a skill supply problem; businesses choose their business strategies 
based on assessments of available skills in the labour market. Therefore, 
skill supply problems may be directly transformed into a product market 
problem if businesses have to choose inferior product market strategies. 
Moreover, since training is a long-term investment, which could be a 
requirement for growth and development of industries that may be 
important in the future, assessments of skill supply optimality and sub­
optimality might only be done in the long term, and with hindsight.
Several authors have advocated the view that the neo-classical 
emphasis on recruitment problems and wage adjustments is too narrow 
(Finegold and Soskice 1988; Green and Ashton 1992; Lester, Solow, and 
Dertouzos 1989). However, while they find the idea of a different 
definition of optimal or sub-optimal provision plausible, they have still 
not come up with satisfactory theoretical definitions of optimal or sub- 
optimal amounts of education and training. Moreover, these contributions 
encounter some substantial problems when attempting to find operational 
measures of sub-optimality.
Thus, when attempting to measure whether or not there is 
sufficient education and training in different industries, there seems to be 
a clear trade-off between narrow definitions of sub-optimality, that may 
be relatively easy to measure, and the wider definitions, which cover 
additional important characteristics of optimal or sub-optimal provision, 
but are inherently very difficult to measure validly and reliably.
With the possible exception of neo-classical theory, the literature 
lacks satisfactory, explicit theoretical definitions of the optimal level of 
training. The debate has been concerned not so much with what 
characterises the optimal level as with what sorts of departures there are 
from the theoretical model of perfect competition, and what impact these
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have on the type of sub-optimal solutions that may occur. However, this 
section will show that the different more or less implicit definitions of 
optimal training provision vary along at least four dimensions. The 
empirical part of this chapter will be based mainly on a fairly narrow and 
static definition of optimality, with a focus on the current skill needs of 
employers. But this theoretical discussion shows that this is only one of 
several different approaches to the difficult question of establishing criteria 
for evaluating optimality or sub-optimality, and the empirical part of the 
chapter will give also some evidence of other possible indicators of sub- 
optimal training provision.
First, definitions of optimality vary regarding whether current 
production and capacity or future skill needs constitutes the basis for 
evaluation. The neo-classical definition is based on the current demand of 
employers, even if at the core of human capital theory is the 
presumption that education and training are long-term investments. 
Given the long-term nature of these investments, one could argue that the 
basis for a definition of optimal training provision should be the future 
demand for skills. The obvious problem for a future-based definition of 
optimality is that it could be assessed only ex post. Still, this is not per se a 
sufficient reason for rejecting the theoretical definition, even if it raises 
some fundamental problems of operationalisation and measurement.
The present-future dimension of optimality is closely related to the 
question of whether optimality should be defined only in terms of the 
perceived requirements of existing organisations, or whether it should, in 
theory at least, include the idea that education and training can facilitate 
or hinder future growth and innovation. The latter definition would 
theoretically comprise the demand of employers that do not yet exist. For 
example, in an industry expected to grow substantially in the future, say 
bio-tech firms, one could choose to base an assessment of current training 
levels on to what extent the pool of competent engineers and researchers 
can facilitate the innovation and growth of existing and new firms. 
Theoretically it is a well-founded point that if there is insufficient
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education and training, this may deter the establishment of new, 
profitable firms. The question arises, however, of whether these 
consequences of sub-optimal training provision are at all possible to test 
empirically. As the discussion later shows, one possible measurement 
strategy is to do ex post assessment of growth and innovation, and attempt 
to investigate whether or not these were linked with education and 
training.
A third dimension, along which different theoretical definitions of 
optimality differ, is whether or not some public interest wider than the 
individual firms and employers is included. While the neo-classical 
definition of optimality is concerned with the recruitment problems of 
individual employers, one may also regard skill supply as a necessary 
requirement for economic growth that can finance public services. 
However, strictly speaking this is more a matter of emphasis than of 
different definitions.
The fourth question a theoretical definition of optimality and sub­
optimality must address, is whether or not wage adjustment is the most 
important mechanism for adjusting skill supply and demand. The core 
point is that employers’ adjustments to skill shortages may undermine the 
observed difference between supply and demand as a valid indicator of 
sub-optimal skill supply. This is the most important of the four 
dimensions, and requires some further discussion.
In neo-classical theory, there is one optimal level (theoretically), 
around which the actual level fluctuates. Because of market imperfections, 
for example limited labour mobility and lengthy training, there may be 
deviations from the optimal level. However, employers use wage 
adjustments as part of a general adjustment to ensure that supply meets 
demand.
The alternative view, which provides the basis for the concept of 
skill deficiencies, says that employers use many other options than 
increasing wages in reaction to a situation with insufficient education and 
training, and the use of these tactics varies between different groups of
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employers. These ‘skill deficiencies’ restrict the employers’ choice of 
product market strategies and lead to under-performance in the product 
market. In practice this is usually measured by using the most successful 
comparable country or industry as a benchmark, and then studying if and 
how the choice of a less successful strategy has been a consequence of 
inadequate training levels.7
Moreover, Finegold and Soskice (1988) argue that the actions of 
employers, trainees and the government interact so that there may be 
several different equilibria, for example a ‘high skill equilibrium’ and a 
‘low skill equilibrium’. A core characteristic of the low skill equilibrium is 
that action by one of the parties only, for example the offering of wage 
increases by employers, will not suffice to bring the situation closer to a 
high skill outcome. The inclusion of interaction effects between supply 
and demand, apart from the wage mechanism, leads to significantly 
different accounts of the antecedents and nature of skill sub-optimality, as 
well as potential solutions to the skill supply problem.
7.4.3 Skill shortages and skill deficiencies
The two different views of what constitutes an optimal level of training 
are inherently tightly linked to possible operational measures of 
optimality and sub-optimality. This section first discusses ‘skill shortages’, 
which cover sub-optimality in the neo-classical framework. It then treats 
some of the theoretical problems with this theoretical and operational 
measure of sub-optimality, which leads to the alternative definition of sub- 
optimal training provision: ‘skill deficiencies’.
The most straightforward approach to the issue of skill shortages is 
to ask employers if they have had difficulties recruiting any types of 
personnel. Skill shortages ‘exist when employers do not have enough 
people available with the skills needed to do the jobs they require’ (Smith
7 The problems of measuring this are discussed later in the section.
258
1990: 1). Since such shortages are highly cyclical, what is more specifically 
an indicator of inadequate skill supply are persistent skill shortages, or 
shortages even at the bottom of the business cycle. The advantage of this 
approach is clearly its simplicity and transparency. Nevertheless, there are 
several problems, which have all been the basis for alternative measures of 
skill shortages.
First, employers’ answers are based on their subjective evaluation 
of the difficulty of filling vacancies, and are therefore formed by 
employers’ view of what is ‘difficult* (Smith 1990: 3). If their basis for 
evaluation is past recruitment, the measure might be a valid indicator of 
changing skill shortages over time for one particular group, but does not 
necessarily give valid measures of differences between different 
occupational groups or different industries. Average duration of a skilled 
vacancy, used by Haskel and Martin (1993) in an analysis of the effect of 
skill shortages on productivity, is an indicator that solves this problem of 
subjectivity.
But a second problem is that both reported recruitment problems 
and average duration of vacancies could be the result of choices by 
employers, and their preferences for filling the vacancy quickly versus 
increasing wages to attract employees. Thus, they may choose between 
either offering a low wage and waiting a long time to fill a vacancy, or 
offering a high wage to fill the position immediately (Card and Krueger 
1995).
Another problem with the simple skill shortage indicator is that it 
may reflect only that individual employers, or types of jobs are 
unattractive to employees, for example because of reputation and working 
conditions, and not necessarily that there is a too small number of people 
with the particular skill in the labour market. An alternative approach is 
therefore ‘the market perspective,’ which says that ‘a shortage exists only 
if recruitment difficulties reflect genuine lack of appropriate people in the 
market, to fill existing posts at going wages’ (Meager 1986: 240). Still, 
reported recruitment problems may be an indicator of ‘genuine lack of
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appropriate people’ if one assumes that the difference between the 
reported and the ‘genuine’ skill shortages does not vary too much between 
industries or change too much over time.
Yet another problem for the above-mentioned measures, which is 
particularly important in the case of further training, is that existing staff 
not having the required skills may constitute a skill gap. A related 
problem is that employer surveys of recruitment difficulties assume that 
employers cover their skill needs primarily through recruitment (Liff 
1992: 84). Since the propensity to use the external labour market for skill 
supply varies between industries and between countries, neglecting skill 
gaps may give invalid results (Green and Ashton 1992: 290). In other 
words, if employers primarily fill positions by internal promotion, and 
not recruitment from the external labour market, a skill supply problem 
is not necessarily a recruitment problem. According to Smith (1990: 1) 
skill gaps are ‘impossible to measure objectively using survey research 
techniques.’ There have however been several attempts to measure skill 
gaps. Larsen et al. (1997: 70) study skill gaps at the macro level of the 
Norwegian economy, based on questions to employers about what level 
of education and what amount of job experience would be most 
productive in a specific position. They estimate that in the private sector 
in 1992, 38 per cent of those in positions where employers said higher 
education was most productive did not have higher education. Research 
on competence needs, de-skilling and up-skilling (Gallie 1991; Penn, Rose, 
and Rubery 1994) provides other ways of assessing skill needs in different 
jobs, which may be a basis for skill gaps analyses. Moreover, employers 
themselves often perform skill gap analyses of their own employees. 
Finally, the empirical analysis, later in this chapter, will show how skill 
gaps in some cases may be measured using other types of data, for example 
teachers’ educational background. Still, no generally acknowledged 
method exists for estimating the magnitude of skill gaps for particular 
groups, industries or occupations.
260
Another problem with using recruitment problems as an indicator 
of insufficient training is based on the neo-classical assumption that if 
employees and employers are free to set the wage rate in a free market, it 
will be set so that supply equals demand. However, short-term shortages 
may exist if there are market rigidities, for example because workers are 
immobile and training takes time (Blaug and Ahamad 1973: 6; Bosworth, 
Dutton, and Lewis 1992: 2).8 Thus, in the short to medium run there may 
be shortages, since the supply of labour is not perfectly elastic. In the case 
of education in particular, there may be a substantial lead-time before a 
wage increase leads to a higher number of graduates. Employers will then 
address the problem by offering higher wages, which will increase the 
supply of and reduce the demand for skills, so that in the longer run 
supply will again equal demand.9 Thus, skill shortages are for a given wage 
level only.
Instead of, or in addition to, increasing wages employers can use 
several different means to overcome skill shortages. The wage structures 
of internal labour markets may deter employers from raising wages for 
one group because it might require a readjustment for the whole firm or a 
significant fraction of it (Folk 1970: 156; Osterman 1984: 3). If they are 
experiencing difficulties in recruiting skilled employees, employers can
8 Since no training analysed in this thesis lasts more than 18 months, it ignores the 
problems that may occur for long education and training because students base their 
choice on current wage levels instead of wage levels after completing training (Bosworth 
and Warren 1992; Freeman 1971).
9 This type of adjustment is the basis for another indicator of skill shortages, since before 
skill supply meets demand, skill shortages will show as a higher wage growth for skills in 
short supply than for other comparable skills. Cain, Freeman and Hansen (1973: 62) 
therefore argue that ‘the most complete indicator of an optimal number in an occupation 
is the rate of return on investments needed to enter the occupation...A long term 
shortage would show up as a persistent and significantly higher rate of return for this 
occupation than for other comparable investments.’ Yet according to Meager (1986: 237) 
this approach ‘yielded no practical methods for determining the existence and severity of 
shortages.’
261
choose to let current employees work more over-time, retrain existing 
staff, sub-contract work, reduced entry requirements, intensify 
recruitment efforts, reduce production, give up plans to increase 
production or redesign jobs (Folk 1970; Hart 1992; Smith 1990). These 
actions are typically seen in recruitment surveys as possible employer 
responses to skill shortages, but they can, at the same time, reduce the 
probability of experiencing recruitment difficulties in the longer run.
The use of both these two types of adjustment varies between 
different groups, different industries and different countries, depending on 
to what extent employers have wanted, or been able, to adapt to a 
situation with a low supply of a particular skill. For example, legal 
requirements and occupational licensing may make it difficult for 
employers to alter the organisation of work to reduce the problems caused 
by skill shortages. Moreover, employers’ ability to use wages to solve 
problems of skill shortages varies considerably between industries. If the 
wage structure is flexible, wage adjustments are likely to ensure that skill 
shortages do not persist. If, on the other hand, wage adjustments are 
restricted, for example by collective agreements, a shortage may become 
persistent. Hence, differences in the persistence of skill shortages may 
reflect differences in wage setting or employers’ ability to make types of 
adjustments other than the supply of training.
Given all these problems with the skill shortage as an indicator, it 
is clear that even if skill shortages give an indication of at least one type of 
under-provision of training, it should be complemented with alternative 
indicators of sub-optimal provision.
Acknowledging the problems of using skill shortages as the sole 
indicator of inadequate training, it can be complemented with either 
simpler or more complex measures. However, these have other 
shortcomings. While the amount of training provided is simpler and more 
likely to be reliably measured than skill shortage, it does not address the 
problem of how training is related to skill demand. On the contrary, the 
concept of ‘skill deficiencies’ accounts for many of the problems with the
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skill shortage indicator, but is inherently extremely difficult to measure 
precisely.
The amount of training provided is included because it can 
contribute to the understanding of the nature of possible skill problems in 
the different cases, and that the success of different institutional solutions 
in ensuring adequate training provision depends on the success measures 
applied. However, the amount of training in itself is an unsuitable 
indicator of whether or not enough training is provided since it does not 
measure whether or nor skill supply meets demand. It simply does not 
account for the fact that skill-intensive industries require more highly 
skilled employees than non-intensive industries do. Thus, a high skill 
branch may have high levels of training and shortages while a low skill 
branch has little training and no shortages. Even given that employers 
demand the same level of skill, the amount of training does not say 
anything about how the mix of skills relates to the mix of skills employers 
demand.
Instead of neglecting demand for skills, as does the amount of 
training indicator, or including only employers’ actual demand for skills, 
as does the skill shortage indicator, the skill deficiency approach is based 
on the assumption that actual demand for skills does not reflect an 
‘optimal level.’ A ‘skill deficiency’ is defined ‘in the abstract as the 
difference between current and some suitably-defined optimum level of 
skills’ (Green and Ashton 1992). In the following, skill deficiency is used 
to denote recruitment problems and skill gaps as well as skill supply 
problems not reflected in any of these measures.
The rationale for constructing this alternative definition of what 
constitutes sub-optimal training provision is that ‘the level of skill 
employed in productive activities is a function of the interaction of the 
general level of skill available in the labour market...with the ways in
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which employers decide to make use of their technology’ (Green and 
Ashton 1992: 293). 10
The adjustments employers make when faced with recruitment 
difficulties is one reason why the sum of filled positions and actual 
vacancies might not reflect what would be the optimal level of skills. 
Green and Ashton (1992: 288) claim that ‘there are a host of reasons why 
companies’ actual demand for skilled labour may be socially non-optimal.’ 
For example, they argue that ‘it would be a mistake to characterise 
recruitment difficulties as reflecting the structural skills problem of the 
UK economy.’ One reason is that employers adjust to the problems of 
recruiting skilled labour, and might choose business strategies that do not 
require such skilled workers (Finegold 1991; 1988). For example, 
employers may shift recruitment and training strategies from dependence 
on an external labour market to a strategy of on-the-job training for 
unskilled workers.11 This adjustment alone is a sufficient reason for 
questioning recruitment difficulties as a reliable indicator of insufficient
10 Thus, the interaction between skill supply and skill demand makes it necessary to 
establish a new definition. This is not only a critique of the recruitment difficulty 
approach discussed later. It is also implicit that wages do not have to be particularly high 
for skills in short supply if employers have organised work so that these skills are not 
needed, or cannot be utilised effectively (Blaug, Peston, and Ziderman 1967; Gannicot 
and Blaug 1973; Steedman 1993).
11 Snower (1996) gives one example of this interplay between the supply of skills and 
demand for skills. He argues that when employers choose between offering high- or low- 
skilled jobs, they consider not only the wage difference, but also the number of skilled 
people. The fewer skilled people, the more difficult it will be to fill the position. This 
gives rise to a ‘training supply externality* because employers will benefit directly if more 
people do the training. At the same time individuals deciding whether or not to invest in 
training are interested not only in the wages they can expect, but also the number of jobs 
where the skills are utilised. Thus, there is a ‘vacancy supply externality*. These two 
externalities reinforce each other, which means that there is a tendency for sectors to end 
up either in a ‘low-skill, bad-job trap’ or a ‘high-skill, good-job equilibrium*.
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training, except in the short run. Moreover, it questions the validity of 
wage developments as indicators of the optimality of skill supply.12
Using the skill deficiency approach, it may be that both the 
employers and the employees could have been better off in a situation 
with more further education and training, even if employers currently 
report no problems in recruiting employees with this type of training. 
The reason is that employers have chosen their business strategy and 
organisation of work on the basis of the supply of these skills. For 
example, it has been suggested that Britain’s most important skill 
problems were not caused by insufficient supply, but rather by lack of 
demand for skills and inadequate skill utilisation (Glynn and Gospel 1993; 
Keep andMayhew 1996; Metcalf 1995).
It is evident that employers, to varying degrees, choose their 
production strategies and organisation of work based on assessments of 
what skills are available in the labour market and at what cost. 
Nevertheless, there are two considerable problems with replacing the skill 
shortage measures with the concept of skill deficiency. The first is to 
define what the optimal amount of skills is, and the second is how to find 
operational measures of gaps between actual and optimal skill provision. 
In addition to the problem of finding a suitable benchmark with which to 
compare performance, the application of the skill deficiency concept in 
empirical studies requires us to establish a link organisational policies with 
market outcomes, by demonstrating that under-performance in the 
product market is caused by problems in the supply of skills.
An analysis of skill deficiencies requires both a theoretical and an 
operational definition of ‘some suitably-defined optimal level of skills’. 
Green and Ashton (1992: 288) do not suggest any definition of such an 
optimum, but refer to research that has taken what they call ‘a pragmatic 
approach to skills deficiency.’ In this pragmatic approach, ‘implicitly, the
12 Later in this chapter, the link between endogenous transferability and optimal training 
is discussed.
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optimal skill level is seen as that which is used in economies operating at 
the skills frontier...The explicit criterion for judging other countries’ 
solutions to be optimal is frequently taken to be that of competitiveness.’
The problem with the ‘implicit’ criterion is that it is based on the 
assumption that the higher the skills, the closer to the optimum. If this 
criterion is used, this approach is in principle the same as just using the 
‘amount of training’ as an indicator. The ‘explicit’ criterion relies on the 
questionable assumption that investments in training will necessarily 
improve competitiveness and that the skill level is a crucial factor in 
determining the competitiveness of firms. One first problem with these 
assumptions is that it is not necessarily true that investments in training 
will increase competitiveness. As with other investments, investments in 
training do not always improve companies’ competitiveness or increase 
their profits. Moreover, many other factors might be considerably more 
important for the competitiveness of firms than the training their 
employees get. Even if it might be shown that, on average, training 
improves the economic performance of firms, economic performance 
cannot be a reliable indicator of skill deficits as long as training is not a 
necessary and sufficient condition for economic success.
An optimal level is difficult to determine empirically. The cost 
minimising use of production factors will depend on the cost of each of 
the factors, and the optimal input of a given production factor will 
therefore depend on its relative price (Shackleton 1992: 19-20).13 Thus, the 
optimal level will depend on characteristics of the labour and product 
market in which the skill is applied. However, the problem of defining 
one optimal level may be avoided in a comparative study, if it is shown 
that the case with higher skills is also the most successful, as measured, for 
example, by relative profitability (or relative export growth or shares 
etc.). Then one does not have to define one optimal level, but can rely on
13 A basic proposition of micro-economic theory is the assumption that production 
factors are more or less substitutable, and that a given quantity of a product can be 
produced with different combinations of the production factors.
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the difference between two or more cases to draw conclusions. This has 
been attempted in a series of comparative studies of plants in Britain and 
countries on the continent, which concluded that the relatively low levels 
of skills in British companies was a major reason why they were less 
competitive than their German counterparts (Mason, van Ark, and 
Wagner 1996; Prais 1995; Steedman 1993).14 But if the focus is on the 
supply of training, as it is here, it must also be shown that the reason why 
employers have chosen the less efficient and cost-effective strategy is that 
they have faced problems in recruiting skilled employees (Marsden 1995: 
92). Moreover, since one cannot generalise from these studies to other 
sectors or other countries, it is still possible that both firms with low-skills 
strategies and firms with high-skills strategies prove equally profitable and 
successful so that it in principle it is impossible to specify an optimal level 
of skills (Ashton and Green 1996; Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1993; 
Shackleton 1992). For example, countries may adopt different competitive 
strategies in order to exploit their comparative advantages.15
All in all these points suggest that even if the skill deficiency 
concept comprises important aspects not included in the definition of skill 
shortages proposed earlier, studies applying the skill deficiency approach 
must solve other substantial validity and reliability problems. The 
empirical analysis will next attempt to answer the question of whether or 
not there are skill deficiencies in the four sectors by discussing to what 
extent there are problems caused by inadequate further training offers,
14 In fact, for example Mason, van Ark and Wagner (1996) do not show directly that 
German producers are more profitable than their British counterparts. They show that 
German companies produce higher-quality products (biscuits), and that this is likely to 
be explained by the differences in skill levels between the two countries. But since 
British producers to a large extent produce for their domestic market, and there is little 
international trade, the British strategy is not necessarily inferior to the German, but 
only reflects a difference in taste and preferences between the two countries.
15 Logically, ‘skill deficiency’ can also be ‘negative,’ implying that the current skill level is 
higher than the ‘suitably-defined optimum level of skills,’ but this possibility is not 
discussed by Green and Ashton (1992).
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deficient skill utilisation, or forced business strategy choices because of 
insufficient training. The analysis will indicate what some possible 
deficiencies are, depending on the institutional solutions in the different 
cases, by comparing the results on the three sets of indicators.
7.4.4 Selecting indicators of insufficient training
The points above on the theoretical dimensions of optimality have 
bearings on way sub-optimality of training provision could and should be 
measured. The over-riding problem is to make the trade-off between 
reasonably good measures of a narrow concept or more questionable 
measures of broad one. In this thesis the first option is selected, but as this 
theoretical discussion would suggest, and the empirical evidence will 
support, this might have significant implications for the conclusions to be 
drawn from the case studies.
The hypotheses presented at the beginning of the chapter refer to 
an optimal amount of skills. Instead of discussing optimal skill levels 
directly, the empirical study will use a negation of the optimality concept, 
assessing different forms of sub-optimality. Persistent skill shortages, skill 
shortages that remain even during a downturn, constitute the main test of 
sub-optimal training that will be used. However, as the discussion has 
shown, such shortages do not necessarily fully reflect possible problems of 
skill provision. Therefore, the measures of skill shortages will be 
supplemented by the broader concept of ‘skill deficiencies.’ Finally, given 
the potential problems of these first two complex measures, the simple 
measure of amount of training provided is used as an additional indicator. 
This use of multiple indicators is in line with previous studies of skill 
shortages and skill deficiencies, which strongly recommend that several 
different indicators should be used (Meager 1986: 242; Senker 1992: 10). 
Liff (1992: 84) argues that
The current state of research suggests that one has to make the best
of a variety of approaches with strengths and weaknesses. In such
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circumstances it is important to use the widest range of measures 
available in order to be in the best position to distinguish between 
contradictory evidence.
The conclusion will also show the importance of using different indicators 
by suggesting that the two theories tested will tend to perform 
systematically differently on the three different measures.
7.5 Outcomes
This part presents the results from the four cases, to see to what extent the 
predictions from the two rival theories are supported or not. To facilitate 
comparison between the four cases, the results for all sectors are compared 
for each of the three types of indicators discussed above.
7.5.1 Skill shortages and gaps
First, some data that directly compares skill shortages and gaps in the four 
cases are presented. However, these are not sufficiently detailed and will 
therefore be complemented with more specific information on skill 
shortages in each case. A problem with measuring skill shortages, in the 
case of further training, is that of distinguishing between problems caused 
by further training and not only by initial training. The skill shortages 
presented must necessarily measure combinations of initial and further 
training. Yet, as the results will show, the available data effectively 
distinguish between skills from initial and further training in a way that 
makes it possible to draw conclusions about whether or not the problems 
are primarily related to initial or further training.
There have been changes in the reporting of recruitment problems 
and vacancies in the 1980s and 1990s, so one single time series cannot be 
used to show persistent skill shortages. Nevertheless, the data, especially 
from the Norwegian Recruitment Survey, give valuable results from 
comparing the four cases in this study. The main benefit of this survey is
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that it is based on vacancies advertised in newspapers and journals, in 
addition to those reported to the job centres, which is a considerable 
advantage since many employers do not use the job centres in the 
recruitment process.
The Recruitment Survey shows that, in 1995, 11.5 per cent of 
vacant positions remained vacant after the recruitment process was 
completed. The same ratio was 13.5 per cent in 1993. The most important 
reason why they remained vacant was the lack of qualified candidates 
(Larsen 1996: 58-59). Of the total number of vacant positions, 5 per cent 
of positions in 1993 and 6 per cent of positions in 1995 were not filled 
because the employers had not found qualified candidates (Larsen 1996: 
64-65).
Table 7.5 Percentage o f vacant positions that remained vacant because o f  lack o f  
qualified candidates b y  industry________________________________________________
Industry 1990 L991 1993 1995
H ealth  and veterinary services 12 13 13 12
M etal industry 11 13 (5) 4
Financial sector (banking, insurance etc.) 7 8 4 4
Teaching and research 4 6 5 2
N ation a l average 8 8 5 6
N ote: ( )  denotes that there are less than 40 observations in the cell. N for each
cell is n o t reported, but except for metal industry in  1993 there are m ore than 40 
observations in  each cell. T he data for 1990 are the sim ple average o f  the surveys 
in  February and in August.
Source: Larsen (1991: 33; 1992: 45; 1996: 64-65).
Table 7.5 indicates that in the first part of the 1990s employers in the 
health service, including the hospitals, experienced skill shortages more 
often than the three other industries. During all the four years shown in 
this table, one in eight vacant positions in health and veterinary services 
remained unfilled due to lack of qualified candidates. For the three other 
industries, and Norwegian employers in general, the proportion of 
unfilled vacancies fell from 1990/1991 to 1993/1995. The financial sector
270
and teaching and research in all four periods reported fewer skill shortages 
than employers in the health sector did. Finally, while employers in the 
metal industry experienced skill shortages similar to the health services in 
1990/1991, the shortages were below the national average in the two latest 
periods.
The problem with table 7.5, for the purpose of this chapter, is that 
it does not say for which particular groups within the industries the skill 
shortages occur. Partly because of the limited size of the data sets, since 
such data are available only for 1987. The data then showed that among 
the cases in this study, there were most shortages of nurses. Employers in 
the health sector then had what was called ‘unmet needs’ of 13 per cent 
more nurses than they currently employed.16 The same ratio was 10 per 
cent for engineers in the metal industry and only 1 per cent for general 
teachers (Arbeidsdirektoratet 1987: tables 3 and 4).
Table 7.6 Percentage o f  vacancies remaining vacant because o f lack o f  qualified
candidates, b y  type o f higher education preferred in the position.
Preferred education 1993 1995
H ealth  care (including nurses) 14 12
T echnical or science (including engineers) 18 4
Culture and education (including teachers) 10 8
Average higher education 8 7
Note: Each cell has at least 40 observations. T he average also includes ‘n o  subject 
specified’ and ‘subject o f n o  im portance’. Source: Larsen (1996: 76).
Table 7.6 shows the pattern for three of the four occupational groups 
more recently, but this is not confined to those industries that constitute 
the four cases in this study.17 This table supports the impression from
16 The problem with the concept ‘unmet needs’ is that it may either mean unfilled 
vacancies, but it can also relate to ‘needs’ that are not reflected in vacancies, for example 
if hospitals, due to budget constraints, cannot afford to hire more nurses, even if this 
negatively affects the patients’ health.
17 Previous editions of the recruitment survey did not distinguish between lack of 
qualified candidates and other reasons why positions remained unfilled.
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table 7.5 that there have been significant skill shortages of nurses in 
general hospitals. There also seems to have been more shortages of 
teachers than of other groups of employees in the teaching and research 
sector. For engineers, the 1993 figure of 18 per cent unfilled vacancies 
suggests that there may have been more shortages of engineers than of 
other groups in the metal industry, but the figure in 1995 is much lower, 
reflecting the volatility of shortages in the engineers’ case. Data for 1996 
and 1997 confirm that skill shortages are largest for nurses and smallest for 
teachers, while more fluctuating for engineers (Arbeidsdirektoratet 1997: 
34-35).
All in all these data have shown unequivocally that there have 
been most skill shortages among nurses. There have been much smaller 
shortages of general teachers, while the shortages of engineers in the metal 
industry have been smaller than for nurses and larger than for teachers. 
The shortages among engineers have varied more over time than for these 
two other groups. These data do not, however, distinguish between those 
who have and those who do not have further training, so additional 
information about each case is necessary to provide valid indicators of 
possible shortages of skills from further training.
More detailed information about the nurses’ case confirms that 
there have been persistent skill shortages among nurses, and that they 
have been especially large for specialist nurses. Already in 1986, 7.1 per 
cent of nurse positions in non-psychiatric hospitals were vacant or filled 
with other than qualified nurses (Hofoss and Buxrud 1987: 33), and the 
lack of specialist nurses was a matter of particular concern (Skaar 1988).
According to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, available 
official statistics do not adequately measure the number of vacant nursing 
position in hospitals. But a study done by the Nurses Association 
indicates that more than one in four positions for anaesthesia nurses, 
intensive and operation nurses are either vacant or filled with nurses 
without specialist training (St meld nr 44 (1995-96): chapter 5). Thus, skill
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shortages of specialist nurses are clearly larger than for those without 
specialist training.
One report focussing specifically on intensive care nurses gives 
more information about skill shortages of this type of nurse with internal 
specialist training. A study by The Norwegian Board of Health in 
December 1998 showed that 17 per cent of intensive nurse positions were 
vacant and had been vacant for at least four months (Statens helsetilsyn 
1999).18 However, since hospitals may choose to employ nurses without 
specialist training, if they cannot get specialist nurses, the magnitude of 
the skill shortage is even larger than the vacancy figure indicates. On 
average 33 per cent of nursing positions in intensive care units were filled 
with nurses without specialist training. Hospitals do not necessarily want 
all positions in intensive care units filled with specialist nurses, given the 
higher cost of those compared to nurses without specialist training. Yet, 
there is little doubt that skill shortages have forced hospitals to hire a 
larger proportion of nurses without specialist training than they would 
otherwise have.19 So there is clear evidence of significant and persistent 
skill shortage of nurses with specialist further training.
Nevertheless, using an approach similar to the ‘market approach* 
to skill shortages, Skaar (1988) claims that the lack of specialist nurses is 
not caused by a too small stock of nurses with such further training. The 
problem is rather that too few of those with specialist training work in 
specialist nurse positions, that is, a matter of allocation rather than the 
supply of skill per se.20 She demonstrates that there are enough specialist 
nurses to fill all specialist nurse positions, but argues that there are skill 
shortages because 50 to 60 per cent of them work in other positions (Skaar
18 The results for each hospital are presented in Appendix 4.
19 Given the relatively small wage premium given to specialist nurses, there is little to 
suggest that hospitals have preferred nurses without specialist training to reduce costs.
20 Skaar describes the situation in the 1980s, but the question is relevant for the 1990s, 
too, given the persistent shortages of specialist nurses.
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1988: 10-13).21 However, this example shows why this ‘market approach’ 
to skill shortages is questionable. The same report shows that specialist 
nurses on average have longer tenure in their current positions than 
nurses and auxiliary nurses in general (Skaar 1988: 20). Moreover, it shows 
that 22 per cent of all nurses with specialist training work in leading 
positions or are teachers (Skaar 1988: 12). These are positions where they 
are likely to make good use of skills from the specialist further training. 
Thus, the problem for this market approach interpretation is to establish 
whether the problem in practice is one of skill supply rather than of 
allocation of skilled people. Claiming that the problem is one of allocation 
if there are more skilled people than the total number of positions where 
the particular skill is demanded, neglects the fact that people may not be 
mobile or that some, sooner or later, may want to change their job tasks. 
So even if one argues, as Skaar does, that skill shortages would be smaller 
if the specialist positions were made more attractive through a better 
work environment or through higher wages, it is problematic to use the 
data to claim that it is not a problem of skill supply. What is important 
over time is that the skill supply meets the demand, and the number of 
skilled people who take other jobs is one factor that affects demand.
The results above showed that skill shortages among teachers 
apparently are smaller than for nurses with specialist training. But in the 
teachers’ case vacancy data underestimate the further training problem. 
The reason is that general teachers have the right to teach all subjects in 
primary and lower secondary schools independently of which subjects 
they have specialised in. Thus, positions may be filled, but they are not 
necessarily filled by teachers who have the educational background 
schools prefer. Such skill gaps have been a matter of concern and debate in 
the teachers’ case (Grunnskoleradet 1989; Laererutdanningsradet 1985; 
Nasringslivets Hovedorganisasjon 1991; Statens laererkurs 1994). The
21 The exception is for intensive nurses, who would not fill all vacant intensive nurse 
positions even if all with such specialist training worked in these positions.
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reason is that, at least in lower secondary school, it may be difficult for 
teachers without sufficient educational background in the subject to give 
high quality teaching, even if experience to some extent can compensate 
for lack of formal specialisation.22
Table 7.7 Teachers’ educational background in subjects th ey  teach. L ow er  
secondary school. Per cent. 1994_________________________________________
Subject < 1 0
credits
1 0 - 1 9
credits
2 0+
credits Sum N
R elig ion 74.0 6.8 19.2 100 5,367
H . E. 54.4 8.7 36.9 100 2,278
M athem atics 50.3 20.9 28.8 100 6,342
Art 48.4 14.8 36.8 100 3,612
P.E. 47.1 15.3 37.6 100 4,773
Sami 46.5 25.6 27.9 100 43
N orw egian 44.4 14.0 41.6 100 7,176
M usic 40.8 15.5 43.7 100 2,168
Social studies 39.7 13.1 47.2 100 6,252
Science 33.8 19.4 46.8 100 4,502
English 26.8 15.2 58.0 100 5,840
Germ an 24.0 2.3 73.7 100 2,185
French 17.8 3.3 78.9 100 488
W eighted average 44.4 14.0 41.2 100 51,026
Note: Teachers usually teach m ore than one subject, so the sum  o f  N  is larger 
than the sum  o f respondents.
Source: Statens laererkurs (1994).
Table 7.7 shows that on average 44 per cent of teachers in lower secondary 
school have less than 10 credits, a half year’s full time study, in the 
subjects they teach. Foreign language teachers have the strongest 
educational background according to the table, while only one in four 
religion teachers have 10 credits or more in the subject. Moreover, in 
science and social studies the lack of specialisation is underestimated. The
22 More details on this debate were given in chapter 5.
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reason is that studies in biology, chemistry or physics all are sufficient to 
be counted as educational background in science. Likewise, studies in 
history, geography, political science or sociology all count as social studies 
education. Half the teachers in mathematics, one of the basic subjects, 
have less than a half-year study in the subject. Hence, table 7.7 lends 
support to the claim that there is a skill gap that does not show in vacancy 
and recruitment data.
For the topic of this chapter, it is of special interest to what extent 
the problem has been persistent and to what extent further education has 
reduced the problem over time. Table 7.8 shows the development from 
1974 to 1994. Since new teachers have been recruited during the period, 
the table shows not only the effect of further education and training. 
Moreover, it does not include teachers who have taken further training 
but do not teach the subject they have taken further training in. Thus, 
some changes may be due to changes in the allocation of teaching tasks 
rather than changes in teachers’ educational background. Still, the table 
gives a good indication of to what extent skill shortages have persisted, 
and what the combined effect of further training and new recruitment has 
been.
Table 7.8 Teachers by educational background in subjects they  teach. Average.
Per cent
Educational background
1974
Change
1 9 7 4 -
1984
Change 
1984 -  
1994
Total
change
1 9 7 4 -
1994 1994
Less than 10 credits 59.1 -1 0 .4 -4 .8 -1 5 .2 43.9
10 -  19 credits 2.1 6.2 5.0 11.2 13.3
20 credits or m ore 38.8 4.2 -0 .2 4.0 42.8
Sum 100 0 0 0 100
Note: Sami and French are excluded, as th ey  w ere n o t included in  1974. N  for  
1994 is the same as in Table 7.6. T otal N  in  1984 was 2,423, w hile N  in 1974 is 
not reported.
Source: Statens laererkurs (1994: 8).
276
Table 7.8 shows that the share of teachers with at least 10 credits in 
subjects they teach has increased by 15 per cent over the 20-year period 
from 1974 to 1994. However, the larger share of this increase has been 
among teachers with less than one year (30 credits) of education, and the 
table also shows that the increase was larger in the first period than in the 
later.
Table 7.9 Teachers’ educational background in subject they teach, by subject. 
Per cent
1974
1974-
1984
1984-
1994 1974-- 1994
Subject
% with at 
least 10 
credits
Change 
in % 
with at 
least 10 
credits
Change 
in % 
with at 
least 10 
credits
Change 
in % 
with at 
least 10 
credits
Of 
which, 
change in 
% with at 
least 20 
credits
Religion 15.1 7.6 3.3 10.9 5.3
P. E. 26.4 17.8 8.7 26.5 14.1
Norwegian 34.5 14.4 6.7 21.1 9.3
Maths 35.8 6.0 7.9 13.9 -4.1
Art 37.0 7.9 6.7 14.6 1.5
Music 37.2 17.9 4.1 22.0 10.0
Social studies 38.9 24.0 -2.6 21.4 9.3
Science 44.5 20.2 1.5 21.7 4.4
H. E. 48.2 1.2 -3.8 -2.6 -10.3
English 56.3 13.4 3.5 16.9 5.1
German 75.3 -15.7 16.4 0.7 -0.8
Average 40.8 10.4 4.8 15.2 4.0
Note: Sami and French are excluded, as they were not included in 1974. N for 
1994 is the same as in Table 7.6. Total N in 1984 was 2,423, while N  in 1974 is 
not reported.
Source: Statens laererkurs (1994: 8).
The question then is to what extent the gaps have decreased most in the 
subjects where there were most gaps. Table 7.9, where the subjects are
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ranked according to the proportion of teachers who had at least 10 credits, 
shows that there is no indication of such a trend. Thus, recruitment and 
further training combined have overall reduced skill gaps, but there is 
little evidence that they have reduced them any more or any less in 
subjects where few had at least 10 credits in 1974. Table 7.9 also shows 
that, except for Home Economics and German, the share of teachers with 
at least 10 credits in the subjects they teach has increased by more than 10 
per cent from 1974 to 1994. But only in physical education and music has 
the share of teachers with at least one year of education risen by more 
than 10 per cent.
Another question is to what extent the reductions in skill gaps in 
‘core subjects’ have differed from those in other subjects. N H O  claims 
that too few teacher students choose to specialise in ‘core subjects,’ such as 
Norwegian, English, mathematics and science, and that this ‘bias’ is not 
reduced through further education and training (Naeringslivets 
Hovedorganisasjon 1991: 7). According to table 7.9, N H O  is incorrect in 
claiming that fewer teachers have specialisation in core subjects than in 
other subjects. However, the organisation is right in claiming that the 
decrease in skill shortages over time is not larger for these skills than for 
others. Table 7.9 shows that the increase in share of teachers with at least 
10 credits is largest for physical education and music, but also that the 
increase for Norwegian, English and Science has been above average. 
Thus, the changes in skill gaps do not differ significantly between ‘core’ 
and ‘non-core’ subjects.
As in the teachers’ case, there is reason to believe that data on 
vacancies and recruitment problems may not suffice as indicators of sub- 
optimal skill provision in the insurance case. The reason is a ‘recruitment 
stop’ (ansettelsesstopp) triggered by the introduction of improved IT 
systems. Therefore, insurance companies recruited few new employees in 
the late 1980s and the first part of the 1990s, even if there was not a literal
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halt to all recruitment. Instead, the employers sought to fill skill needs 
with their existing employees.23
Table 7.10 Percentage of managers in the insurance industry very or somewhat 
dissatisfied with their employees’ skills and knowledge compared to job 
requirements, by subject. Per cent___________________________________
Subject %
Business administration 23
Organisation and management 21
Economics 21
English 20
Damage prevention 19
Reinsurance 19
Financing, mortgage law, etc. 17
Insurance law 13
Mathematics and statistics 13
Marine insurance 13
IT 12
Group insurance 11
Business insurance 11
Life insurance 10
Structure and organisation of the insurance industry 8
Fire and combined insurance 4
Other non-life insurance 4
Motor insurance 3
Average 12.7
N 126
Source: MMI (1989).
Survey data from 1989, presented in table 7.10, are the newest available on 
skill gaps in the insurance industry. It shows that on average only 12.7 per 
cent of managers in the insurance industry were somewhat or very
23 According to FL representatives, this was partly due to pressure from the employees’
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dissatisfied with their employees’ skills listed in the table.24 Managers are 
most satisfied in insurance specific skills, and most dissatisfied in areas 
such as business administration, management, economics and English. In 
other words, NAI training, formal internal training and informal training 
have given employees sufficient skills in most directly insurance-related 
areas. Additional data in the survey showed that employees were most 
interested in taking further training in those same areas where managers 
were dissatisfied with their skills, which is an advantage for employers 
who want to bridge the skill gaps (Johansen 1999: 59; MMI 1989). Thus, 
even if the data are not updated enough to give results that are necessarily 
valid in the 1990s, the results indicate that employers in the insurance 
industry have had only limited recruitment problems, but also that the 
skill gaps have been modest.
In the engineers’ case, there have been skill shortages of engineers, 
but these seem primarily to have been cyclical. Moreover, it is difficult to 
see whether there have been particularly large shortages for engineers with 
specific types of further training.
Figure 7.2 Percentage of employers in manufacturing reporting lack of labour 
restricting production. Source: Statistisk sentralbyra (1999: table 16).
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Year
organisations. Interviews with FL representative and Group of FL representatives.
24 The question did not distinguish between whether the problem was that too few had 
these skills or that the employees had a too low level of competence in these areas.
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Figure 7.2 shows how skill shortages in manufacturing more generally 
have varied over the business cycle. While between 8 and 11 per cent of 
employers reported skill shortages restricting production in the two 
periods of high activity 1986 to 1988 and 1997 to 1998, this share was 
under 3 per cent for most of the period from 1983 to 1999.
Thus, it is as expected that employers in the metal industry 
reported considerable recruitment problems for engineers at the peak of 
the business cycle in 1998, and that fewer did so in 1999. In 1998, 36 per 
cent of employers reported that it was ‘very difficult’ to recruit engineers, 
while the corresponding figure had fallen to 28 per cent in 1999 
(Teknologibedriftenes Landsforening 1998; 1999).25 Still, the evidence 
presented here combined with tables 7.5 and 7.6 clearly suggest that skill 
shortages of engineers in the metal industry first and foremost are a 
cyclical phenomenon, and not persistent. Even if recruitment problems 
for engineers overall are modest, there could be severe and persistent 
shortages of engineers with some types of skills, for example skills 
acquired from further training. Nevertheless, no figures, reports or 
interviews suggest that there have been persistent skill shortages of the 
skills engineers acquire through further training. The next part of the 
chapter will examine this paradox by assessing to what extent there may 
be skill deficiencies even if there are few skill shortages.
25 Unfortunately, earlier versions of the publications do not contain this question, so the 
figures cannot be compared directly to recruitment problems previously. A likely 
explanation of why the questions of skill shortages were not included earlier is that 
these, as expected from figure 7.2, were not perceived to be significant in previous 
periods.
281
Table 7.11 Summary of revised predictions and outcomes: skill shortages and
gaps__________________________________________________________________
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
R evised  H q prediction  
o f  skill shortages and 
gaps
M any M any Few Few
R evised prediction  
o f  skill shortages and 
gaps
M any M any, 
because o f  
nature o f  
collective  
agreement
F ew M any
O u tcom e Yes Som e N o Few ,
volatility
Table 7.11 summarises the skill shortages results, and compares them with 
the revised predictions of the two theories. It shows that in those three 
cases where the two revised predictions are most similar, the results also 
confirm both theories. In the nurses’ case, skill shortages are most severe, 
which is as predicted by both but for different reasons. While the problem 
according to H0 is that wage premiums for undertaking further training 
has not been high enough, the explanation is that the collective action 
problem of the costly specialist training has not been solved. Similarly, 
while both theories predicted few skill shortages in the insurance case, a 
prediction that was confirmed, the logic differed. While the H 0 
explanation is based on the employers’ ability to adjust wages to 
encourage employer investment in the type of training employers need, 
the H alt prediction is based on the collective action by employers to 
increase the amount of training. In the teachers* case, the problem 
according to both H 0 and H alt is that the collective agreements include no 
link between employers* needs and employees* further training. Thus, the 
only case that can differentiate between the two theories is the engineers.’ 
As the table shows, the results are clearly most in line with H0. Thus, the 
results give clear support to H 0, and less to H alt.
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Still, the differing logic that the two theories use to get the similar 
predictions in the nurses, teachers’ and insurance cases, prompts a closer 
examination. This will be done first by analysing the results on the 
amount of training and skill deficiencies, and then by studying how 
employers’ collective action and market adjustments can contribute to 
explaining the findings on the three indicators.
7.5.2 Amount of training and skill deficiencies
While the previous section has shown the variation of skill gaps and 
shortages between the four cases, this section will supplement these 
findings with an analysis of the extent these skill shortages reflect 
deficiencies and whether there are skill deficiencies not reflected in the 
data presented above. Finally, the findings on the first two indicators will 
be complemented with measures of how much further training is 
undertaken This leads to a discussion of how the findings on the three 
indicators may be interpreted. The results will show that even if the 
teachers and nurses undertake most formal training, there are clear 
problems of skill provision, mainly reflected through skill shortages. In 
the engineers’ case, there is less further training, but no persistent skill 
shortages. Still, there is some evidence that there is a skill deficiency not 
reflected in the measures of skill shortages. Finally, in the insurance case, 
there is little evidence of either skill shortages or skill deficiencies.
A problem associated with studying skill deficiencies in the 
teachers’ and nurses’ cases is this: that the notions of skill deficiencies and 
low skill equilibrium usually denote problems of skill provision in private 
sector cases, where a shift to higher skill and higher quality production 
could lead to increased profits (Finegold 1991; 1996; Finegold and Soskice
1988). There is no direct link between quality and income within the 
Norwegian system of hospital and school financing. Therefore, an analysis 
requires a case-by-case consideration of whether or not apparent skill 
deficiencies are caused only by the fact that there may be no budget to pay 
for higher skilled workers. Given the severe negative consequences of the
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lack of specialist nurses and all attempts by hospitals to attract them, and 
moreover the overall limited wage premium for specialists, there is little 
support for the interpretation that the problem is mainly one of cost 
considerations. In the teachers’ case this conclusion is even clearer, since 
the problem has not been that employers have not remunerated further 
training, but rather the way remuneration has not reflected employers’ 
needs.
Previous studies have compared skills, organisation and 
productivity in the same industries in different countries to draw 
conclusions on skill deficiencies. Such studies which require, as described 
earlier, very careful analysis to infer the link between skills and 
productivity, have been unavailable for this study. Instead, given the 
limits to available data, the analysis here is a discussion of to what extent 
the skill shortages are indicators of employers having severe skill 
problems in the running of their organisations and to what extent there 
are indicators of problems of skill provision and utilisation that are not 
represented by skill shortage indicators.
In the nurses’ case, the problem of skill provision is primarily the 
skill shortages described earlier. There is clear evidence that shortages of 
specialists have restrained production significantly over a long period of 
time. A government-appointed committee in 1997 said that the lack of 
specialist nurses and doctors was a problem not only for patients who had 
to wait for treatment, but that the shortages created quality differences 
between different regions, made management spend too much time and 
resources on recruitment, and increased strains on employees because of 
high turnover and lack of personnel (NOU 1997:2 : chapter 9). The 
severity of the problem was underlined by a 1999 study which found that 
skill shortages of specialist nurses were the most important cause of 
capacity problems in intensive care units, with 29 of 30 hospitals reporting 
lack of specialist nurses as a factor restricting production (Statens
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helsetilsyn 1999: 2).26 The regional hospitals in 1996 said that ‘one of the 
bottlenecks in hospitals is the lack of specialist nurses’ (Holter et al. 1996: 
6). However, the problem has existed even longer. Already in 1988, the 
government’s explanation for long waiting lists for operations at hospitals 
was a lack of specialist nurses already in 1988 (Skaar 1988: 1). So in the 
nurses’ case therg is little doubt that the persistent skill shortage has 
reflected a severe skill supply problem.
The hospitals have not done very much to change production 
strategies or organisation of work to cope with the shortages. The most 
important exception is the attempt to reduce the need for operation 
nurses by giving auxiliary nurses up-grading training.27 In practice, such 
up-grading training could make it possible for employers to replace one of 
two nurses assisting doctors during operations with an auxiliary nurse, 
and thus reduce the need for specialist nurses.28 The move has however 
been strongly opposed by the Nurses Association, and nurses have taken 
action to oppose employers’ attempts to replace nurses with auxiliary 
nurses.29 Still, up-grading training of auxiliary nurses has not so far 
reduced by very much the overall demand for specialist nurses.
In the other public sector case, for the teachers, the skill gaps 
described earlier in the chapter show a significant skill provision problem. 
However, it has been a matter of long-lasting debate how critical these 
skill gaps are and if skill deficiencies not covered by these measures are not 
at least equally important. Teachers have been more dissatisfied with how
26 By comparison, figure 7.2 shows that even at the peak of the business cycle in 1998, 
around 11 per cent of employers in manufacturing reported that lack of labour restricted 
production.
27 Interviews with RHHS representative, Representative of the Norwegian Board of 
Health and Personnel manager for hospitals outside Oslo
28 Interview with Personnel manager of hospital outside Oslo.
29 In 1995, the Labour court favoured KS in its case against the Nurses Association, 
saying that the Nurses Association had violated the collective agreement and acted 
unlawfully by not acting to stop actions by their members to oppose up-grading training 
for auxiliary nurses (Kommunenes sentralforbund 1996).
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their basic training fitted their work tasks than other comparable groups 
have (Jordell 1991), and consequently one must expect significant skill 
deficiencies if further training does not compensate for inadequacies in the 
basic training. Formal education in particular subjects may then be only 
one of several areas where further training is needed. For example, it may 
be that the more important problems are that teachers lack other types of 
skills, such as pedagogical skills, or skills primarily obtained through 
informal training. A sticking point is whether pedagogical skills or 
educational background in a particular subject are the more important in 
comprehensive schools. The law regarding Teacher training incorporates 
the view that pedagogical skills are more important, since it argues that 
general teachers (allmennhxrere) have the right to teach any course in 
comprehensive schools. However, teacher training might not ensure 
sufficient knowledge of the subject to ensure good teaching, at least not in 
the lower secondary school.30 There have therefore been discussions and 
reports regarding whether or not subject specialisation should be a 
criterion not only in recruitment, but also as a condition for teaching a 
subject in lower secondary school (Naeringslivets Hovedorganisasjon 
1991; St meld nr 40 (1990-91)). For example, the national Comprehensive 
Education Council [Grunnskoleradet) and the Teacher Training Council 
in 1989 recommended that general teachers should not automatically be 
allowed to teach all courses in lower secondary school (Grunnskoleradet
1989). The Ministry of Education and Research argued, however, that 
strict conditions requiring teachers to have a half or one year of education 
in a subject to be permitted to teach it in lower secondary school would 
lead to too much inflexibility. Moreover it would, in practice, be difficult 
for small schools to recruit good teachers (St meld nr 40 (1990-91): 125). 
Hence, there is currently no legal restriction on what general teachers can 
teach in comprehensive schools, but schools must provide information 
about which subjects they need teachers for when they advertise vacant
30 Interview with the Teachers Association representative.
286
positions.31 The case has not only been a matter of practicalities and 
pedagogical views, but also a conflict between the two major teachers’ 
organisations.32 NL, whose majority of members have general teacher 
(allmennlazrer) training, has argued that this pedagogical education is 
suitable for teaching at all levels in comprehensive schools. The Teachers 
Association, whose members are mainly teachers with a more specialised 
university education, has on the other hand claimed that a general teacher 
education is not sufficient to teach in subjects such as maths and science at 
the lower secondary level.33
Skill shortages for engineers were shown to be cyclical and short­
lived. However, it has been argued that there is still a skill deficiency in 
this case. Based on in-depth studies of a small number of firms, Havn and 
Huitfeldt (1994: 114) claim that there is under-utilisation of engineers’ 
skills, and that further training for engineers is, to a large extent, 
‘arbitrary, ad hoc, and directed at satisfying short-term needs.’ These 
results are however not directly generalisable. Moreover, it is difficult to 
see how Havn and Huitfeldt can make a valid judgement about the 
engineers’ case without explicitly comparing them to other groups or to 
engineers in other countries or industries. Thus, there remains a lack of 
data that may convincingly show whether or not, or to what extent, there 
is a skill deficiency in the case of engineers’ further training. Any such 
study will however face significant problems.
One problem is that employers may adapt to skill deficiencies in 
subtle ways because there are no clear and strict boundaries between the 
tasks of technicians, engineers and graduate engineers, and employers 
therefore can partially substitute engineers with those from either of the
31 Interviews with the Section for Continued Training of Teachers representative and the 
Teachers Association representative.
32 Interviews with the Section for Continued Training of Teachers representative and the 
Teachers Association representative.
33 In recent years the differences between the two unions have decreased since they have 
recruited members with similar educational backgrounds (EIRO Online 1998).
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two other groups (Benum 1975; Eldring and Falkum 1995; Halvorsen
1994; Havn and Huitfeldt 1994; Holter 1961; Sorensen 1989). Such
changes may be very difficult to trace.
Another problem is that management and engineers may have very
different opinions on the existence of such deficiencies. Interviews from
one turbine producer may illustrate the problem. These personnel and
training managers said:
What we have seen is that we have more than enough engineers 
and technical competence, but what we usually lack in day-to-day 
running is better understanding of economics and business.34
The NITO representative in the company, on the other hand, said:
In technical skills, it [further training] has been virtually non­
existent. The only such training, comes about if individual 
employees ask for training, and then it is usually in some computer 
programme...It is not basic technology, which we actually depend 
on when we develop a product, as we do.35
With such conflicting assessments of the situation, any study 
would have to make delicate decisions concerning the basis of any 
evaluation.
The final, perhaps most difficult problem in the engineers’ case, is 
the difficulty of assessing, even at the level of the individual engineer what 
it means to have sufficient skills within an area. An engineer in an 
offshore company illustrated the problem:
It is clear that what you always long for is to know if you could 
have done it [a job task] in a better way. It is not the case that you 
lack competence and don’t know how to tackle the job. I believe 
that it is rather that you could have done things differently.36
Hence, it would be very difficult to assess to what extent there is a 
skill deficiency in the engineers’ case despite the small and non-persistent
34 Interview with Personnel manager, turbine producer (B)
35 Interview with NITO  representative, turbine producer (B).
36 Interview with NITO representative, offshore contractor.
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skill shortages. The conclusion of this chapter will discuss different 
theoretical interpretations of the engineers’ case, focusing on the link 
between amount of training, skill shortages and skill deficiencies.
The insurance case is the only one where there are no data to 
suggest that there have been significant persistent skill deficiencies. The 
Norwegian insurance industry has overall tackled what internationally 
has been called a great challenge, namely that of adapting a workforce 
with an increasing average age and little formal education to considerable 
changes in the industry (Bertrand and Noyelle 1988).37 One might argue 
that the challenge has been overstated, because the older employees have 
been more adaptable than presumed, or because further training is not the 
main reason why employers have managed to cope with an ageing stock 
of employees and major changes without many dismissals or skill 
shortages. Nevertheless, even if it cannot be taken directly as an indicator 
of the success of training policies, there are least no indications of the 
opposite.
While this limited analysis of skill deficiencies confirms the pattern 
of skill shortages, with the possible exception of the engineers’ case, the 
amount of training provided, estimated in appendix 4, shows little 
correlation with these first two indicators. It shows that teachers and 
nurses clearly are the two groups who undertake most formal further 
education and training.
7.5.3 Conclusion outcomes
Table 7.12 summarises the outcomes on each of the three indicators, and 
compares these with the two revised predictions.
37 Interviews with Personnel manager, large insurance company (A), FL representative, 
Group of FL representatives, NAI representative and FA representative.
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Table 7.12 Summary of revised predictions and outcomes: skill shortages, skill
deficiencies and amount of training_____________________________________
Nurses Teachers Insurance Engineers
Revised Hq prediction 
of skill shortages
Many Many Few Few
Revised Halt 
prediction of skill 
shortages
Many Many, 
because of 
nature of 
collective 
agreement
Few Many
Skill shortages and 
gaps
Yes Some No Few,
volatility
Skill deficiencies Yes,
reflected in 
skill
shortages
Yes,
reflected in 
skill gaps
No
evidence
suggests
deficiencies
Some
indications
Amount of training High High Medium Medium
The results are broadly in line with the revised H q predictions since, with 
the possible exception of the engineers’ case, the pattern of skill 
deficiencies is the same as for skill shortages.
However, the resemblance between the two revised predictions 
makes it difficult to use the outcomes directly to support either theory, 
and therefore leaves the confirmation or weakening of the two theories to 
the interpretation of each individual case. This interpretation is a matter 
not only of theoretical support; it also has significant policy implications. 
The nurses* case is a clear example. According to H 0, skill deficiencies are 
caused by the limits to wage premiums employers can give to specialist 
nurses, which means individuals have insufficient incentives to invest in 
further training. According to H a]t, on the other hand, the problem is that 
there has been no collective action to ensure that employers provide 
enough specialist training. The ultimate test would have been to see what 
impact the significant wage increases after 1997, if they were more 
widespread, would have had on training if specialist training remained
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internal.38 If more nurses did specialist training, and there were fewer 
shortages, H 0 would be confirmed. If, by contrast, there were less training, 
H alt would be confirmed. Finally, if there were less training, but fewer 
shortages, it would confirm that wage flexibility might be more important 
for adapting to skill shortages than providing sufficient training.
The remaining part of this chapter will critically evaluate the link 
between the two theories and the three different indicators of ‘success’, 
and question the inference that the outcomes support the human capital 
explanation.
One question is how to interpret the finding that even if teachers 
and nurses do most further training, these are also the cases with most 
skill shortages and the clearest deficiencies. The simplest explanation 
would lie in the argument that theoretically there is no necessary link 
between amount of training and skill shortages, since only the latter 
measure is related to employer demand for skills. However, the next 
section will show that there is another plausible, yet less straightforward 
explanation. This is based on the assumption that employer demand for 
skills from formal further training are not independent of employers’ 
collective action, and that one must distinguish between providing the 
right amount of training and adjusting to a situation with skill shortages.
The indications of skill deficiencies in the engineers’ case trigger 
the second set of questions, namely whether or not there is a deficiency, 
and if there is, why it is not reflected in persistent skill shortages of 
engineers with further training. A first possible position is that the results 
show that there is no skill deficiency, but that employers either have little 
need of skills from engineers’ further training, or that the industry relies 
on informal training instead. The second is that there is sub-optimal 
provision of training, but that wage increases quickly eliminate such 
shortages. However, since wage increases from technical further training 
are small for engineers, this interpretation seems unlikely. The final
38 From 1996, the KS agreement included no upper limits on nurses’ wages.
291
position is that the skill deficiency in the engineers’ case is caused by the 
inability to establish transferable further training offers due to lack of 
collective action. The basis for these positions will be discussed in the next 
section.
7.6 Why employers’ collective action and flexible 
wages may solve different problems
The purpose of this section is to show that the outcomes shown earlier in 
this chapter could be explained as anticipated problems with the two 
theories and the two conditions claimed to ensure optimal training 
provision, namely employers’ collective action (H J  and flexible wage 
structures ensuring that wages equal marginal productivity (H0). This 
section will show why skill shortages may be anticipated if there is 
collective action, while the problem if there is no collective action is lack 
of transferable training offers. Moreover, distinguishing between the 
optimal provision of training and employers’ adjustment to skill 
shortages, also reveals a critical problem with the human capital 
prediction, and underlines a problem with using skill shortages as an 
indicator of sub-optimal training provision.
Collective action theory predicts that employers’ collective action 
will increase the amount of training provided. This and the previous 
chapters have shown that in the four cases this has been done through 
ensuring that training is transferable and improving individuals’ incentives 
to invest in training. This suggests that collective action means skill 
deficiencies are less likely.
However, demand in the external labour market will increase if 
skills are made transferable, partly by definition and partly as a result of 
skills being transferable. If, on the other hand, the collective action 
problem of ensuring transferability is not overcome, demand in the 
external labour market for skills from further training is lower, for
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example because employers do not organise vacancies to match these 
skills. For completely specific skills there is no external demand, so skill 
shortages measured by recruitment problems will not occur (even if there 
may be skill gaps). Thus, solving the collective action problem of 
transferability may in itself make it more likely that skill shortages occur.
An adjacent argument is the ‘social construction of competence 
categories,’ which implies that, to some extent, skill shortages depend on 
the construction of categories with which to measure shortages (Biichter 
1999: 8-9; Johansen 1999: 61). This is in line with the assumption that 
transferability is endogenous, since transferability requires common 
categories of training and skills. On the one hand there are some clear 
examples of competence categories given directly by job categories, such 
as that for specialist nurses and for many types of initial training. 
However, especially for further training, there is a problem of finding 
competence categories that reflect employers’ demand. In the teachers’ 
case, categories where constructed based on the amount of education each 
teacher has in a subject. The case most different from the nurses’ case on 
this account is the engineers’, where there are no or very few categories 
constructed to measure shortages or gaps of skills acquired after basic 
training. A similar argument is that differences in the amount and quality 
of data on skill shortages and skill deficiencies in the different cases, to 
some extent reflect that perceived shortages or deficiencies have prompted 
data collection.
The fact that transferability increases demand, means that the risk 
of skill shortages is higher if there is not an adequate response of supply to 
demand. This requires not only the right amount of training, but also the 
right mix of different types of training. Even if the supply of training is 
also expected to be higher if there is collective action, there are three 
reasons to anticipate that skill shortages are more likely with than without 
collective action. The first is that some degree of rigour is a prerequisite 
for transferability, since too frequent changes will damage employers’ 
ability to design vacancies to fit the training, and in practice reduce the
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information they have about the contents of training. Moreover, the 
institutional changes that are required, in the case of employers’ collective 
action, are likely to take considerably longer than individual employers’ 
adjustments. Finally, in those cases where collective agreements are an 
integral part of the collective solution, it may hinder adjustment of skill 
supply to demand, as in the teachers’ case. There, the wage system that 
ensures that teachers get wage increases independently of which subjects 
they specialise in, has meant that there is ‘still...a large shortage of teachers 
with education in certain subjects, for example science, even if there has 
generally been very extensive further training [of teachers]’ (Kirke- 
utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1992: 12). Thus, if there is 
collective action, a likely outcome is high transferability, high amount of 
training, but possibly skill shortages.
If there is not collective action, skills are less likely to be 
transferable, which in itself is a skill deficiency. Moreover, if skills are less 
transferable, it reduces individuals’ incentives to investing in training, 
which in turn reduces the amount of training, since the increased 
propensity of employers to invest is unlikely to outweigh the reduction in 
trainee contributions, as shown by Stevens in chapter 2. Therefore, the 
amount of training is likely to be smaller.39 Thus, if there is no collective 
action, a likely outcome is less training, fewer shortages, but a possible 
deficiency because skills are less transferable than would have been 
optimal.
Still, one cannot necessarily draw the conclusion that formal 
transferable training is superior to less transferable, informal training. For 
example, in the engineers’ case, there is clear evidence of widespread 
informal training, for example through reading the manual for new 
software and equipment, which to some extent can substitute for formal
39 However, if employers choose to ‘fall back’ on their internal labour markets and 
provision of less transferable skills because the collective solution failed to provide the 
sufficient amount of skills, training provision may increase because employers are willing 
to bear a larger share of training costs.
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training. One engineer said that: ‘from day to day, there will always be 
some training. We do not depend on sending people on courses to achieve 
that. We have plenty of competence within our department, and we help 
those who need it.’40 Another engineer’s impression was that ‘we mainly 
get our stimulus from product development, and that is how we develop 
[our knowledge].’41 However, even if many engineers said that daily work 
was an important source of learning, some were critical of employers’ 
dependence on such learning. One engineer said that:
[The company’s management] claims that the best learning is 
through doing one’s job, and that is the way it has been done here 
[in this company], too. But that is just a very good excuse when 
one does not have any clear strategy at all on further education and 
training42
Thus, in the engineers’ case informal training to some extent 
replaces more transferable training. However, the evidence is not clear on 
whether or not this reflects a skill deficiency caused by the inability to 
ensure transferable further training.
The second basis for re-evaluating the outcomes is dual role of 
wage flexibility in human capital theory. The condition that wages equal 
marginal productivity guarantees not only that the optimal amount of 
transferable training is provided. It also means that skill shortages that 
occur will not persist, because wages will adjust so that skill supply equals 
skill demand. Therefore, the reason why cases with wage flexibility are 
those with least skill shortage is not necessarily that skill supply is more 
optimal in these cases, but may be caused by their more rapid adjustment 
to sub-optimal provision. In other words, flexible wages in human capital 
theory solve two problems, training provision and market adjustments to 
skill supply, and the reason that there are not persistent skill shortages 
may be due to either of the two. Thus, results will tend to be in line with
40 Interview with NITO  representative, offshore contractor.
41 Interview with NITO  representative, telecom equipment manufacturer.
42 Interview with NITO representative, turbine producer (A).
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H 0 predictions, even if the reason might be based on allocation of labour 
and adjustment of supply and demand rather than the amount of training 
employees finance.
This might contribute to explaining the paradox that in the two 
public sector cases with most further training there are most severe skill 
shortages. A probable reason is that the individual employers have had 
fewer possibilities for adjusting wages, so that supply equals demand, than 
employers in the two private sector cases have. So to the extent that such 
adjustments, rather than the incentives for employees to train, explain the 
pattern of skill shortages, the H 0 explanation is weakened. Similarly, if 
wages are flexible, it also contributes to solving the problem of allocating 
employees with further training to jobs where their skills are most 
valuable. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Skaar (Skaar 1988) argues 
there is not a ‘real’ lack of specialist nurses, but that the shortages occur 
because many nurses with specialist training work in jobs other than 
specialist positions. One may also find that in the teachers’ case employees 
have specialisation in subjects they do not teach. A related, yet distinct, 
point is that employers in the different industries vary in their ability to 
adjust organisation of work, and consequently adjust to a skill deficiency 
in a way that reduces persistent skill shortages without solving the 
underlying problem of skill provision. Given the national regulation in 
the teachers’ and nurses’ cases, it is likely that such adjustments are also 
more likely in the two private sector cases. The main point here, 
however, is that the dual effects of wage flexibility have shown a 
potentially critical problem in human capital theory, through the way it 
may ensure that skill shortages do not persist without solving the basic 
problem of skill provision. In other words, if there are skill shortages, 
provision of training is definitely sub-optimal, but problems may be 
worse in situations without reported skill shortages.
An additional point is that while compared with individual 
negotiations, collective bargaining is more inflexible in the short run 
regarding wage increases to attract employees in short demand, it may
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have other flexibility advantages in the longer run. On the one hand, as 
argued above, collective agreements limit individual employers’ ability to 
increase wages, which could lead to the persistence of recruitment 
difficulties. In the short to medium run, this might be the case particularly 
if there are regional or other differences in the severity of the shortages. 
On the other hand, collective re-negotiation may in other ways facilitate 
change or flexibility. For example, Marsden (1999: 83) argues that 
collective negotiations ‘can help average out temporary power imbalances 
[between employers and employees] and facilitate a more steady approach 
to change’. Moreover, Teulings and Hartog (1998) claim that an essential 
virtue of collective bargaining is the possibilities for re-negotiation in 
order to accommodate aggregate shocks. For the topic of this thesis, 
however, it is likely to be more important that collective bargaining 
might offer a sort of flexibility that ensures the predictability of skill 
categories and wage rates, the importance of which was discussed in 
chapter 6.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown mixed success for the predictions of the two 
theories. Neither the H 0 prediction of wage setting nor the H alt 
predictions of collective action were strongly confirmed. In the second 
part of the chapter, it was shown that three of the cases were broadly in 
line with both the revised predictions. Therefore, the engineers’ case was 
critical, because this was the case where predictions differed most. The 
result was that, in line with H q there were no persistent skill shortages, 
but in line with H ah there were also indications of skill deficiencies. 
Therefore, overall the results could not support one hypothesis more than 
the other.
The final part of the chapter emphasised the importance of 
studying different aspects of sub-optimal training, and showed how 
employers’ collective action and flexible wage setting may solve two
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different problems of skill provision in a way that may explain the mixed 
results.
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8. Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis was the study of the conditions for, and the 
nature and consequences of employers’ collective action on further 
education and training. Instead of giving a detailed account of the 
empirical findings in each case, this chapter will suggest how they can be 
used to modify the theoretical models presented in chapters 2 and 3. Since 
the potential collective action problem of transferable training exists in all 
labour market settings, the theoretical development suggested here is 
valuable beyond the four cases in the empirical study.
One of the chapter’s aims is to present the implications of the 
thesis for the research on transferability, cost sharing, skill shortages and 
employers’ collective action. The second is to suggest how the insights 
should be developed further, either integrated into human capital theory 
or towards an independent alternative.
The implications of the results are considerable. For example, the 
integration of collective action in human capital theory means that 
paradoxically the labour markets with many small employers are not 
necessarily the ones most similar to a ‘perfect labour market.’ Moreover, 
the results suggest that the fundamental question should not be: ‘Why do 
employers finance transferable training?’ but rather ‘What ensures 
transferable training’ and ‘How can one encourage employee investment 
in such training?’
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8.2 Summary results
This study was designed as a strategic test of two rival theories and sets of 
hypotheses: H 0 and H alt. The intention of such tests is to enable 
researchers to draw an unequivocal conclusion about which of the 
theories the results support, since an empirical result supporting one 
theory’s hypotheses should automatically weaken the other’s. But the 
empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7 showed that there was not consistent support 
for either of the hypotheses.
Table 8.1 Summary support of human capital and collective action theory
Human capital theory Collective action theory
Transfer­
ability
Cost sharing
Amount of 
training and 
skill
shortages
Weak support since employer 
action to improve 
transferability, and these 
actions significantly affected 
transferability
Support because cost sharing 
broadly reflected incentives, 
but could not explain the 
variation of these incentives
Support of predicted link 
between lack of wage 
flexibility and skill shortages, 
but flexibility might only cover 
up and not solve underlying 
skill supply problem
I Strong support] Employers’ 
collective action in cases where 
predicted, and strong link 
between these actions and 
transferability
Support because collective 
action occurred where 
predicted, but weakened 
because collective action did 
not increase the share of 
training costs borne by 
employers. Support for new 
explanation based on collective 
action reducing employers’ 
share through improving 
trainees’ incentives
Weak support because 
predicted conditions for 
collective action had little 
influence on skill shortages, 
but some evidence that 
collective action solved 
problems not reflected in skill 
shortage indicator
Table 8.1 summarises the support for the two theories. Since the support 
varied so much between the chapters’ findings, and most notably since the
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cost sharing results differed so much from H alt predictions, the results call 
for a critical evaluation of collective action theory as well as human capital 
theory. While H alt was strongly supported in the findings reported in 
chapter 5, those in chapter 6 showed that in line with H 0 trainees’ 
incentives, and not directly collective action, determined the way training 
costs were shared between employer and employee. Yet, chapter 6 also 
showed that collective action was crucial as a determinant of the 
incentives that motivated trainees to invest their spare time in further 
training. Finally, chapter 7 showed that employers’ collective action and 
wage flexibility rather than being two solutions to the same problem 
might solve two different problems of skill provision. Because of the 
inherent problems of measuring skill deficiencies accurately there was no 
decisive support for either theory.
Given the mixed support for both theories, and the attempt in 
chapter 6 to integrate collective action theory with the incentive 
explanation of cost sharing, a pressing question is whether collective 
action theory is a strong alternative to human capital theory, or whether a 
synthesis of the two theories is preferable. This question is addressed in 
the final part of this chapter. First, the implications of the research for 
each of the three main topics are analysed, before the predictions of 
the conditions for and the nature of employers’ collective action are 
revisited in light of the evidence in chapters 5, 6 and 7.
8.3 Implications for the main topics
This section analyses the implications of the results in the previous 
chapters for research on transferability, cost sharing, skill shortages and 
deficiencies as well as the conditions for, and nature of collective action by 
employers’ collective
The results from this study were not intended to and cannot be 
directly generalised statistically to other sections of the Norwegian labour 
markets or to other labour markets. The purpose was, as described in
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chapter 4, that the results should be generalisable to theoretical 
propositions, i.e. ‘analytical generalisation’ (Yin 1994). The two 
preconditions for this type of generalisation are that the hypotheses be 
logically and reasonably derived from the respective theories and that the 
empirical study provides a valid test of the two sets of hypotheses.
Analytical generalisation is thus possible if one accepts that the 
hypotheses developed in chapters 2 and 3 can be used to test the two 
theories and that the operationalisation, measurement and analysis in 
chapters 4 - 7  suffice to confirm or weaken the hypotheses. To ensure that 
the study fulfilled these criteria, the hypotheses were based on a thorough 
analysis of the two theories, the cases were selected on the basis of clear 
and explicit criteria to test the hypotheses, and each empirical chapter 
contained careful operationalisation and discussion of measurement 
problems. Moreover, both processes and outcomes were presented and 
compared for each hypothesis. Finally, a wide variety of data sources were 
used. An additional criterion for the results to be relevant also to the 
analysis of other cases and other countries, is that the problem of 
supplying sufficient transferable training is a generic problem in labour 
markets, and not restricted to the four cases in this study. The discussion 
of previous research in chapter 2 and 3 suggests that this is the case. 
Hence, if one accepts that the above-mentioned conditions are met, the 
results can be used to draw conclusions that are relevant to other labour 
markets too.
8.3.1 Transferability and ‘endogenisation’
One of the most important implications of the results in the previous 
chapters is ‘endogenisation’ of transferability. The assumption that 
transferability is endogenous, i.e. significantly shaped by employers’ 
action, has important consequences for the research on transferability and 
the constitution of labour markets. Since transferability has been analysed 
as exogenous in human capital theory, it has been seen primarily as a 
determinant of cost sharing between employers and trainees. However, if
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one accepts that transferability is endogenous, it becomes an important 
link between employers’ action, institutions and labour market 
competition.
This thesis has shown how transferability is endogenous by using a 
definition of transferability that differs from Becker’s (1993) distinction 
between general and specific training. One important problem with 
previous research on ‘general training’ is that it has been defined too 
loosely as training that is ‘useful in other firms.’ Another critical problem 
is that by measuring transferability by wage increases only, empirical 
studies have not distinguished between usefulness and market conditions 
as determinants of whether or not training is general. In effect, they have 
assumed perfect labour markets in all industries. This study has shown 
that since the nature of wage setting varies considerably between 
industries, for example because of collective agreements, a more careful 
analysis of the nature, determinants and consequences of transferability is 
required. Transferability has therefore been studied using the 
organisational features of groups of employers as indicators. By excluding 
labour market competition as a determinant of transferability, this enables 
the study of how employers’ actions on transferability can affect labour 
market competition. Chapter 5 showed that such actions are 
consequential, which suggests that transferability is ‘endogenous.’
A crucial assumption for the notion of endogenous transferability 
is that transferability is not absolutely determined by the technology 
employees use. Microsoft’s certificates for users of their software is a good 
example of how this assumption is supported. Even if the same, well- 
known technology is used by a large number of employers, there has still 
been demand for ways to ensure that skills are transferable.
There are in fact strong reasons why skills tend not to be 
transferable even if the same technology is applied in different firms. Katz 
and Ziderman (1990) emphasise, as shown in chapter 2, that reliable 
information is important since the firm must bear the cost if an employee 
is put in a position without the required skills. These costs are not only
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the costs of mistakes the employee might make,-hut also xecruitment .costs_
and costs of firing employees that do not have the assumed skills. An 
additional reason, not stressed in human capital theory, is that the value of 
skills depends on utilisation of these skills in different firms. Therefore, 
differences in job design between employers can lead to low transferability 
even if the firms use the same technology and produce the same sorts of 
products.
The core of the ‘endogenisation’ thesis is that employers’ collective 
action can offset this tendency for skills to be non-transferable. While 
individual employers have many ways to resist or reduce transferability, 
they have limited ability to improve or ensure transferability, even if they 
try. Individual employers may improve information about the training 
that they provide, but they have few incentives to do so, and in practice 
some sort of co-ordinated action is required to increase transferability. 
One important reason is that transferability, by definition, is a collective 
phenomenon; it is not a characteristic of individual employers, but of 
features of a group of employers.
This thesis has suggested three ways in which such employers’ 
collective action can improve transferability: choosing common training, 
harmonising internal training or improving information about training. 
These actions, described in chapter 5, make concrete the theoretical idea 
of endogenisation, and thus provide the necessary link between the 
assumption that employers may influence transferability and different 
degrees of transferability in different groups.
‘Endogenisation’ accentuates the effect of employers’ choice of 
training and skill supply strategies on the constitution and development of n 
labour markets. As shown in chapter 1 and 5, Osterman (1984b) argues 
that employers have significant discretion when choosing between relying 
on skill supply through the external labour market or by internal S
training. While this thesis does not ignore the impact of these individual 
choices, it also shows that individual employers’ options and strategies are 
likely to be strongly influenced by institutions and employers’ collective
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action. Thus, studies focussing on individual employers’ action might only 
overlook variation caused by differences in collective action between 
industries.
One type of study that could benefit from a coupling of employer- 
level and aggregate-level analysis, is research on the determinants and 
impact of different personnel management strategies, on the type of 
training employees receive and companies’ involvement in collective 
training organisations. The reason is that human resource management^\ 
policies that increase training efforts overall, through emphasising the 
importance of employees’ skills for productivity and competitiveness, 
might have negative unintended consequences for the labour market as a \ 
whole. More specifically, there is a potential contradiction between / 
employers’ ‘strategic human resource management’ and employers’ actions \ 
to establish and uphold collective training organisations, as was illustrated 
in the insurance case in chapter 5. Employers’ actions to adapt graining to 
company strategies, and using training to gain competitive advantage, 
might pose a threat to employer co-operation on training. More generally, 
increased reliance on internal training designed to meet company needs 
might reduce transferability of skills. A major challengejor organisations 
concerned with both the competitiveness of firms and a well-functioning 
external labour market, is therefore the development of solutions that 
solve this potential conflict between individual and collective goals.
By accepting that employers’ collective action may be necessary to 
ensure transferability, the paradoxical conclusion is that employer 
collaboration may be necessary to ensure labour market competition. 
Thus, encouraging employer collaboration on training may be a way of 
increasing labour market competition. However, in practice employer 
collaboration to ensure collaboration may be combined with other types 
of actions that effectively reduce labour market competition, for example 
collective agreements that restrict opportunities for poaching. Thus, if 
transferability is endogenous, there is no simple trade-off between 
competition and co-operation in labour markets.
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8.3.2 Cost sharing
One of the most essential results shown in chapter 6 was that there was no 
support for the prediction that employers’ collective action would 
increase the share of training costs borne by employers. Instead, the 
results suggest that collective action indirectly reduces the share of 
training costs borne by employers, through increasing transferability 
leading to improved incentives for employees to finance training in other 
ways. At the same time, more training can be provided, and employers 
can enjoy the additional benefits resulting from a labour market with 
employees with transferable skills. The two roles have diametrically 
opposed implications for the impact on how training costs are shared, an 
issue to the forefront of economic theoretical discourse since Becker’s 
(1993) seminal work.
The view presented in chapter 3 suggests that collective action may 
be necessary to induce employers to share parts of the costs of transferable 
training. By contrast, employers’ collective action may, in some cases, be 
necessary to develop training options that can induce employees to 
finance part of the training. At least, collective action can induce 
employees to finance a larger part of training costs, and more training, 
than they would without such action.
This alternative view on the impact of collective action on cost 
sharing gives a different outlook on the role, the nature and impact of 
employers’ collective action on how training costs are shared.
This thesis has shown the importance of analysing employees’ 
incentives to invest in training, even when explaining the share of training 
costs borne by employers (and the amount of training provided). 
Focussing on employees’ incentives makes it easier to explain both a high 
share of employer financing and under-supply of transferable skills than if 
the focus were only on employers’ willingness to finance training. In 
practice, trainees’ incentives must also be at the focal point for employers’ 
collective action, if such action aims to increase the amount of training
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and reduce the share of training costs borne by employers. What is 
important, is how incentives are shaped and how employee financing is 
ensured. The core question is then, ‘What characterises training that 
individuals are willing and able to invest in?’ Transferability increases 
considerably employees’ willingness to invest in training, and therefore a 
significant indirect effect of employers’ collective action to increase 
transferability of training is that it improves employees’ incentives. In 
human capital theory, employees’ willingness to invest in training reflects 
the average wage they can expect after training. However, the 
opportunities to get a particular type of job may also be a partially 
independent incentive for employees. For example, nurses’ incentives to 
invest in mid-wife training reflect not only the wage increases they can get 
after training, but also the non-pecuniary benefits of being allowed to 
work as mid-wives. A second objection to the use of average wage increase 
as a measure is that employees are likely to value predictability when they 
consider whether or not to invest in training. Thus, if employers’ 
collective action can provide this predictability for employees by showing 
that all employers in thejndustry are committed to usjng and valuing one 
typ.e_of skills^ employees’ incentives to invest in training increase.
Yet, employees’ willingness to invest in training must be coupled 
with ability to do so. Chapter 6 showed the importance of s tu d y in g j^ re  
tjmLe as investment in the case of further training. By comparison, special 
trainee rates of pay, for example in collective agreements, is the key to 
employee investment in the case of on-the-job training. Moreover, honcls 
may also increase employees’ ability to invest in training, as described in 
chapter 5. Finally, for full-time education, tpan^ are the most important 
source of individuals’ investments, at least in the Norwegian case.
As this thesis has emphasised, collective agreements are important 
determinants of both employees’ willingness and ability to invest in 
tra iih ^ Jan d  they can both increase and decrease either of the two. For 
example, a collective agreement may give employees’ very strong 
incentives to invest in training by ensuring high wage increases after
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training, but at the same time restrict employees’ ability to invest in 
training because all training must be carried out within working hours 
without any special trainee rates of pay.1
This example clearly illustrates a crucial point about cost sharing, 
namely that cost sharing and incentives for employers and employees, first 
and foremost, are not of interest per se, but rather as preconditions for an 
adequate solution to the problem of training provision. A high share of 
employer financing cannot be a goal in itself, but it is likely rather to 
indicate a training provision problem in an industry. If employers finance 
a large share of training costs for transferable training, the consequence is 
likely to be low levels of training, strict selection of participants and skill 
shortages if there is not collective action to ensure that employers provide 
enough.2 Moreover, chapters 6 and 7 suggest that employers’ collective 
action is less effective in increasing employer supply of training than 
improving individuals’ incentives to invest in training. The amount of 
training and skills shortages is the topic of the next section.
8.3.3 Amount of training and skill shortages
Chapter 1 showed that previous research has presented several reasons 
why there may be a market failure in the provision of transferable 
training. What has been lacking are empirical studies with industry 
comparisons to test the impact of market failures in different settings, as 
well as analyses of institutional solutions to such failures in the case of 
further training.
The study has shown that the extent and nature of market failures 
varied considerably between the four cases, and that employers’ collective
1 A later section will show that collective agreements are important too because they 
reflect the important role of employee involvement, and agreements may constitute one 
form of solution to the collective action problem.
2 As shown in chapter 2, employers may also finance a high share if training is only 
apparently transferable, but includes specific human capital elements, for example 
because of asymmetric information.
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action provided no simple solution to all these failures. While collective 
action is likely to solve some problems, it is also liable to make other 
problems more likely.
This qualified support was based on an analysis of three different 
types of measures of sub-optimal training provision: skill shortages, skill 
deficiencies and amount of training. The thesis illustrated both the 
problems with basing conclusions on only one indicator and the value of 
studying different indicators of ‘success’ of institutional solutions to the 
problem of transferable training.
The implication of the results is that wages reflecting marginal 
productivity, the condition for optimal provision according to human 
capital theory, and employers’ collective action, solve different problems 
of training provision, and both have inherent problems. Thus, neither 
collective action by employers nor flexible wage setting is sufficient to 
ensure adequate provision of transferable training.3
The results imply that the main reason why employers’ collective 
action may contribute to adequate supply of transferable training is that 
such action can improve transferability and employees’ willingness to 
invest in training. In contrast, employers’ collective action aimed directly 
at ensuring that employers provide enough training are of less importance, 
at least in the four cases in this study. Overall, collective action seems 
more likely to succeed when aiming to increase the amount of training 
through encouraging employee investment than through forcing firms to 
finance enough employer-financed highly transferable training.
Yet, even if collective action is successful in ensuring that training 
is transferable, and employees have incentives to finance such training, 
skill shortages may be at least as likely with as without collective action. 
Part of the reason is, as argued in chapter 7, that there are no visible skill 
shortages if skills are not transferable. But shortages may also last longer 
because collective solutions are rigid, for example because training
3 The condition is that transferability is endogenous, as the argument below shows.
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institutions are slow to respond to new needs (Crouch, Finegold, and 
Sako 1999).4 Thus, skills may in principle be transferable, but outmoded, 
so that they are of little value to all employers. Moreover, collective 
agreements that are parts of the collective solution, as for example in the 
teachers’ case, may restrict the necessary wage adjustments to ensure that 
skill supply meets demand. If the collective action relies on employer 
financing and limited wage increases after training, there is a substantial 
risk of failure if there is not sufficient pressure on employers to uphold 
high training investments.
This leads to the main point of the human capital account, namely 
that flexible wages are necessary to ensure the right amount and mix of 
training. However, chapter 7 also showed that even if wage setting is 
clearly a key to understanding how training provision relates to 
employers’ demand for skills, there is also a spurious relationship between 
flexible wage setting and skill shortages. The reason is that flexible wages 
may ensure that skill shortages are short-lived without solving the 
underlying problem of sub-optimal provision.
The main problem with flexible wages as a solution to the problem 
of transferable training is that they do not ensure that training is 
transferable. Therefore, there are likely to be few visible skill shortages, 
but there may still be skill deficiencies. Hence, if transferability is 
endogenous, skill shortages are inadequate measures of the extent of the 
skill provision problem. Moreover, policies aimed at reducing skill 
shortages may overlook possibly more severe problems in industries 
where there are not skill shortages because skills are not transferable, but 
the fundamental training problem is not solved.
4 In the German dual system of initial training, employers ‘may object that they cannot 
shape training sufficiently in accordance with their short-term needs’. Nevertheless, 
according to Lane (1990: 249), ‘this may be a necessary price to pay for the extensive 
benefits of the system for the long-term development of both individuals and the whole 
economy’.
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This has important policy implications because the two problems 
of skill shortages and skill deficiencies require radically different solutions. 
The first calls for an analysis of possible unsolved collective problems 
caused by a high share of employer financing and few opportunities for 
employee investment, or possibly the wage-setting process fails to ensure a 
link between supply and demand of skills. The second, on the other hand, 
requires an analysis of why there are no training offers that are highly 
valued by employers. Thus, if the diagnosis of the problem in an industry 
is not right, the cure will not be either.
8.3.4 Conditions for and nature of employers’ collective 
action
The collective action theory presented in chapter 3 made the simple 
prediction that employers’ collective action would be most likely if there 
were few employers in the labour market, or else there was an powerful
superordinate body that could force employers to comply with its 
decisions.
By studying both processes and outcomes, the thesis provides a 
basis for the evaluation of these predictions. Moreover, the empirical 
study confirmed and reiterated the importance of distinguishing between 
the different forms of employers’ collective action in the training area. 
One important distinction is between establishing a collective  ^
organisation and recruiting employers as members, and the problem of J 
making the members comply with the organisation’s policy (Bowman 
1998). For example, even if employers have established transferable 
further training options, there is not necessarily any collective action to  ^
ensure that employers provide sufficient amounts of such training. In the ' 
nurses’ case, it was clear that collective action had ensured that further 
training was highly transferable, but there was little collective action to 
make employers finance enough of such training. Thus, the results of the 
study can be used to stress the significance of not discussing whether or
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not there is employers’ collective action on training, but also what form 
such action should take, and what the purpose of the action should be.
The results confirm that both concentration and a powerful body 
significantly increase the probability of employers’ collective action, but 
also suggest that the impact of employees’ organisations and collective 
agreements is overlooked in the version of collective action theory 
presented in the first part of the thesis.
Even if the study has shown that peer pressure and informal co- f 
operation may play a significant role in collective solutions, it does not
i
give sufficient evidence to suggest that informal co-operation can be a fully \
independent alternative to a powerful body in solving the collective action (
problem of transferable training. In the insurance case, and partly in the j
nurses’ case, it was shown that informal co-operation between a small 
number of employers played a significant part in upholding a collective 
solution and shaping the type of training employees received. However, 
in none of these cases was there any example of a small group of large 
employers establishing a separate training organisation independently of a 
powerful superordinate body. Most notably in the insurance case the 
establishment of the common training organisation was a result of 
institutional support, and not independent of co-operation between a few 
employers.
The results have shown the significant impact of a powerful body, 
the state in the teachers’ and nurses’ cases, in affecting training outcomes. 
Still, the study has also shown that the employees’ organisations have 
played an important role in pushing action by the state in a way that was 
not integrated into the theory. Actions by the nurses’ and the teachers’ 
organisations have been crucial as an impetus towards the policies the 
national government has then implemented.
More generally, the role of employees’ organisations is 
inadequately treated in the original version of the model presented in 
chapter 3. Training is important for employees for many reasons. It is a 
major determinant of income and employability. Unequal access to
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training can therefore create or reinforce other inequalities, and 
employees with a particular skill may want to restrict access to this skill 
(the insider-outsider problem). Yet, this does not explain why employers 
would choose to involve employees in training provision. The simplest 
explanation of this is given by applying the cost sharing view, developed 
in chapter 6, based on individuals’ incentives to invest in training. From 
this perspective, collective training solutions are not only a fundamental 
method of ensuring employer contributions towards training costs, but a 
way of ensuring that employees are willing to bear a large share of these 
costs. Therefore employee involvement, including involvement by 
employees’ organisations, is important to ensure the quality of training 
that employees consider to be a worthwhile investment, that trainees are 
not exploited as cheap labour, and that the training organisation is seen as 
a legitimate representative of both employers’ and employees’ interests 
(Green 1999: 389).
The second major addition to the collective action theory, as 
described in chapter 3, should be the role of collective agreements. The 
teachers’ case was the prime example of how collective agreements can be 
highly influential in determining the type of further training employees 
take, how the costs are shared and even the amount and type of training 
provided. In this case, the collective agreement itself constituted the 
solution to the collective action problem, by ensuring strong incentives 
for employees to invest in training and discourage poaching.
Collective agreements are essential for determining the incentives 
individuals have to finance further training. The agreements can more or 
less directly favour some types of training over others, for example if 
employees have the right to certain types of training, if employees are 
guaranteed wage increases from a given type of training, or if the 
agreements define what sort of training should be criteria for getting 
certain jobs or performing certain tasks. Moreover, the role of collective 
agreements once again suggests that a significant shortcoming of the initial
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version of the collective action theory was its neglect of the role 
employees’ organisations play for collective training solutions.
Thus, it is clear that new versions of the collective action theory 
should not only integrate the impact of employees’ organisations in 
creating and upholding collective training policies, but also accommodate 
collective agreements as important parts of collective solutions to the 
problems of transferable training provision.
8.4 Synthesis or alternative?
Earlier in the chapter it was argued that the empirical chapters did not 
consistently refute or corroborate either of the two theories. The results 
can however be used to suggest possible areas for further theoretical 
development. According to McNabb and Whitfield (1994: 16) ‘there is no 
doubt that the human capital approach is dominant... [but] at the very 
least, it needs to be augmented with concepts from a more sociological or 
institutional approach.’
A paper developing Becker’s model to cover imperfect labour 
markets claims to go ‘beyond Becker’ (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). One 
can however argue that this, and other attempts to accommodate the 
possibility of imperfect labour markets, does not go beyond the basic 
principles of Becker’s model, but simply develop a theme that Becker 
chose not to develop himself (Eckaus 1963: 504; Stevens 1994c:557; 
Ziderman 1978: 23).5
Collective action theory, on the other hand, provides insights that 
clearly go beyond Becker’s theory. In line with human capital theory, cost 
sharing and amount of training, to a greater or lesser extent, are 
determined by transferability of training and the incentives individuals
5 Stevens (1994c:557) says that her arguments ‘do not conflict strongly with those made 
by Becker, except to the extent that he implied that all types of training were covered by 
his analysis in terms of general and specific.’
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have to invest in training, but collective action theory is necessary to 
explain how transferability and incentives are shaped.
The most important point for human capital theory is the role 
employers’ collective action plays in affecting transferability of training 
and the incentives individuals have to invest in training. Some insight 
concerning the possible effect of collective agreements may be drawn from 
contributions that consider the effect of different forms of wage-setting on 
training (e.g., Stevens 1994b and Acemoglu and Pischke 1996; 1999); but 
the major role of collective action in shaping incentives, shown in chapter 
6, remains to be integrated into human capital theory. Here the focus is 
on the other way that collective action is ‘beyond’ human capital theory, 
namely such action’s effect on transferability of training, or examples of 
how transferability of training is ‘endogenous.’6
The question is whether the insights of this thesis should be used 
to suggest a further development of collective action theory as an 
alternative to human capital theory, or parts of the former should be 
integrated into the latter.
There are weighty arguments for both positions. A combination of 
three factors substantiates the argument that parts of collective action 
theory, mainly the point concerning endogenisation, should be integrated 
into human capital theory. The first is the significance of assuming that 
transferability is endogenous and not exogenous, as illustrated in this 
thesis. The second is the call for human capital analysis to be 
supplemented with institutional analysis, as illustrated above. Finally, 
collective action theory provides this institutional supplement, and at the 
same time shares with human capital theory most of the basic 
assumptions.7
6 Increased transferability also increases employees’ incentives to finance training.
7 An additional argument for integration is that human capital theory is the most 
important economic theory of training.
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The core of a possible synthesis should be endogenisation, 
described in chapters 3 and 5, and the collective action explanation of 
incentives described in chapter 6. These two parts of collective action 
theory both imply that collective action by employers is primarily 
important as a market facilitator. At the same time, the interaction 
between employers’ actions and the structure of the market, for example, 
because of the effect on transferability, means that one cannot leave these 
actions out by simply distinguishing between the constitution of the 
market and both parties’ incentives, on the one hand, and the effect this 
has for cost sharing and training supply on the other. One important 
effect of integrating endogenisation of skills in this way is that it 
effectively questions the superior status of ‘perfect labour markets’ with a 
large number of employers without market power. The reason is that 
since small group interaction, according to collective action theory, may 
improve the probability of transferable skills and consequently labour 
market competition, it conflicts with the human capital assumption that a 
high number of employers is necessary, or sufficient, to ensure 
competition. Thus, the integration of insights based on collective action 
theory could have wide-ranging implications for some of the basic 
principles of human capital theory.
The argument for developing collective action theory, as an 
independent alternative to human capital theory, is that the complexity 
and richness of collective action, and the institutional support for and 
intervention in labour markets, cannot fit within the strict human capital 
framework. Moreover, if attempts were made to adequately capture these 
processes with human capital theory, the theory would loose one of its 
strongest virtues: simplicity.
By contrast, the discussion of the conditions for and the nature of 
employers’ collective action above suggests that the role of employees’ 
organisations and collective agreements should be integrated into the 
theory. This is a call for a more sophisticated analysis of institutions and
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processes, rather than the simplification that integration into human 
capital is likely to require.
An institutional analysis can either aim to supplement or be a 
direct alternative to human capital theory. A supplement strategy is based 
on the assumption that there is, in practice, a distinction between the 
processes that determine transferability and individuals’ incentives to 
invest in training, and the processes that determine cost sharing and the 
amount of training provided based on these conditions. Such a distinction 
may be useful, as illustrated in this thesis by the treatment of the processes 
influencing transferability being allotted a separate chapter. However, this 
thesis has also stressed the strong relationship between transferability and 
employers’ actions regarding training provision, cost sharing and skill 
deficiencies. If the constitution of labour markets and the transactions in 
this market are treated separately, the analysis effectively plays down the 
importance of the interaction between the training employers provide and 
transferability, i.e. endogenisation.
However, the initial version of collective action theory, as 
presented in chapter 3, is not only a supplement, but also a direct 
alternative to human capital theory. The reason is that collective action 
may not only be a requirement for labour market competition, but may 
also disturb the market mechanism in a way perhaps not adequately 
explained as only a ‘market failure’. For example, in chapter 7 the two 
theories gave sharply contrasting explanations of the nature and causes of 
skill shortages and deficiencies in the four cases. A core issue, when 
deciding how to develop the collective action theory of transferable 
training, is to what extent the assumptions of the initial version of the 
theory, presented in chapter 3, should be maintained. While the initial 
version was based on assumptions very close to those of human capital 
theory, these may be too restrictive in a more sophisticated theory of the 
conditions for and the nature of employers’ collective action.
The results have shown that new versions of the collective action 
theory must integrate the role of employees’ organisations and collective
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agreements. But chapter 6, in particular, has illustrated the importance of 
integrating aspects of human capital theory, for example, in the way 
incentives shape how training costs are shared. Thus, the question is 
whether collective action theory should be used as a basis, and insights 
from human capital theory integrated, or whether insights from collective 
action theory should be integrated in human capital theory. The answer 
to this is that the only basis for deciding which strategy is superior, is the 
ability to predict empirical results.
8.5 Reconciling institutions and markets
A recurrent problem in social science is how to analyse the relationship 
and interaction between agents and structures, between individuals’ 
actions and their context. Explanations based only on individual agents’ 
actions run the risk of overlooking the significant impact of institutions, 
norms and interaction (Granovetter 1985). By contrast, explanations based 
only on the institutional level will tend to underestimate the importance 
of individual agents’ scope for choice. In studies of labour markets this 
theoretical problem is one of ‘reconciling institutions and markets’ 
(Soskice 1994a).8
Collective action theory, despite the shortcomings discussed earlier 
in the chapter, is particularly valuable because it manages to capture 
individual employers’ actions, institutions and markets, and the 
interaction between these.9 The theory has explained how individual 
employers and employees’ incentives have generated collective action and
8 While Soskice refers mainly to a practical problem for training systems, the concept is 
used here as a characteristic of a basic theoretical problem.
9 Rubery (1994: 67) stresses the need for this type of analysis: ‘An institutional approach 
to the organization of employment cannot stop at the establishment or the company 
door. It needs to extend this analysis to the iterative relations between organizations and 
the operations of the labour market, in the hope that a direct analysis of the institutional 
relationship through which markets are created and structured will at last serve to reduce 
the pervasive power of the myth of the invisible hand.’
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the structure of the labour markets. At the same time, it has explained 
how collective action, institutions and labour market characteristics have 
affected employers’ and employees’ training choices. Studies of the 
constitution of labour markets and market behaviour separately cannot 
capture this interaction between individual employers’ actions and the 
structure of labour markets. Therefore, collective action theory is an 
excellent starting point for attempts to reconcile institutions and markets 
in labour market analysis.
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Appendix 1. Case selection
Tables A l.l  to A1.4 provided the basis for concentration measurement, 
and consequently case selection, as described in chapter 4.
Table A l.l Metal industry employers, by share of total employment in industry.
1999
Size (no. of 
employees) Establishments Employees
Share of 
employment
%
Cumulative
%
Five largest 5 8,300 8.8 8.8
500+ (excl. five 
largest)
31 18,600 20 28.8
200 -  499 110 26,000 28 56.8
100 -  199 150 16,700 18 74.8
50-99 230 13,000 14 88.8
20-49 330 8,300 9 97.8
<20 360 2,700 3 100.8
Sum: 1,216 93,600 100.8
Note: Data on employment in five largest firms obtained directly from TBL. 
Employment and number of firms in other categories estimates based on total 
employment, number of firms and share of employment in each size category. 
Source: Teknologibedriftenes Landsforening (1999a) and data from TBL.
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Table A 1.2 Insurance firms, by share of total employment in industry
Firm Employees % of employees Cumulative %
Storebrand 4,232 34.1 34.1
Gjensidige 3,294 26.5 60.6
Vesta 1,230 9.9 70.5
Samvirke 958 7.7 78.2
Vital 732 5.9 84.1
Next 5 881 7.1 91.2
Next 62 1,090 8.8 100.0
Total 12,417 100.0
Note: Some of the smallest employers are not insurance companies, but other 
members of the Insurance Academy.
Source: Forsikringsakademiet (1996a: Appendix 2).
Table A 1.3 Municipalities, by share of total number of man-years in 
comprehensive education. 1997_____________________________
Municipality Man-years % of total Cumulative %
1. Oslo 4,686 8.5 8.5
2. Bergen 2,274 4.1 12.6
3. Trondheim 1,464 2.6 15.2
4. Stavanger 1,109 2.0 17.2
5. Basrum 1,086 2.0 19.2
Next 5 3,468 6.2 25.4
Next 10 4,729 8.6 34.0
Next 10 3,339 6.0 40.0
Next 10 2,760 5.0 45.0
Remaining 395 30,486 55.0 100.0
Total 55,401 100.0
N: 435
Source: Statistisk sentralbyra (1998c: appendix 2).
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Table A1.4 Counties, by share of total number of man-years in general (somatic) 
hospitals. 1997____________________________________________________
County Man-years % of total Cumulative %
Oslo 2,906 14.9 14.9
The state 1,842 9.5 24.4
Hordaland 1,804 9.3 33.7
Sor-Trondelag 1,398 7.2 40.9
Rogaland 1,311 6.7 47.6
Next 5 4,755 24.4 72.0
Next 5 3,241 16.7 88.7
Next 5 2,031 10.4 99.1
Private 152 0.8 99.9
Total 19,440 99.9
Source: Statistisk Sentralbyra (1998a).
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Appendix 2. Data collection
A2.1 The data collection procedure
A wide range of different data sources has been used. The first step was to 
go through available secondary data, and establish how far these could 
answer the research questions. There was extensive relevant written 
material available concerning the two public sector cases in particular. The 
secondary data consisted of published and unpublished reports, official 
statistics, government publications, internal documents from companies 
and organisations, annual reports and other publications. The next step 
was to do interviews, and attempt to fill the gaps. Within the four 
industries, the interview subjects were selected to represent a wide variety 
of interests and views. The interview guide and the list of interview 
subjects are presented below. The Norwegian version of the guide is 
published in Johansen (1999). In order to let the subjects talk freely where 
possible, the sequence of the questions varied between interviews. 
Moreover, not every person was asked all questions in the guide. For 
example, when speaking with individual employees and employers, the 
detailed questions of the management and financing of training 
institutions were dropped. In many cases the interplay between interviews 
and secondary data repeated itself throughout the interview period of 10 
months. The interviews often led to new data sources, for example 
unpublished reports and previously unpublished statistical material that is 
used in the thesis.
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A2.2 Interview guide
Name: _____________________________
Title: ______________________________
Organisation/firm: ______________________________
Been there since: _________
Date: _________
Time: _________
Duration: _________
Recorded? (y/n): _________
A. Introduction
The purpose of the study 
Background
The purpose of the interview
B. Description o f further education and training offers
Type of training (course guide available?)
Purpose
How long are the courses?
Typical course
Working time or spare time? Classroom or distant education? 
Tailor-make courses? (if yes, how much/often?)
Educational methods
Number of participants
Development in numbers of participants
Characteristics of participants
Does the training lead to formal competence?
Does the further training build on basic training?
Systems for documentation of non-formal learning? (describe)
Changes, trends [detailed, examples rather than opinions and 
predictions]
C. Organisation and government o f training institution 
Organisation and government of the institution (annual reports?)
Who is on the board?
How is the board elected?
How are administrative staff and teachers recruited?
Relations with other organisations or the government
Who decides course contents (institution, employer, employers’
organisations, trade unions, hearing, ministry)?
Typical processes (routines, rules and actual process)
Has anyone more influence/power than others (How can we know?) 
Veto powers?
Changes?
Examples!
[Be aware of possible conflicts]
D. Financing the institution 
How are costs shared?
Income and costs for the different types of training 
Financial support from the government 
How much does the individual employee pay?
Financing -  sources
Financing -  criteria for support/payment
Variable and non-variable costs and incomes
Get estimates (shares) if exact figures not available
Development -  changes -  crises? (Are the budgets for the last ten years
available?)
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E. Other training suppliers
Description of the other most important suppliers of further
education and training
Which of these are most important?
Briefly describe their activities 
Strengths and weaknesses
Industry training versus university or college education
E. Regulation o f further education and training
Regulated by laws or agreements?
Educational leave (if yes, paid?)
Agreements -  what do they say about further education and training? 
What individual rights does the individual employee have?
Do the agreements say anything about wage increases after further 
education and training? -  Describe [possible to get copy of the 
agreements?]
Changes? [reorganisation of tasks, functional flexibility]
F. Standardisation o f jobs
Regulation, occupational licensing? - Is it necessary to have a particular 
type of further training for any jobs?
Standardised jobs (easy to switch between firms?)
Demarcation of job tasks -  strict or not 
Changes?
G. The firm ’s further education and training decisions
Who makes decisions? (top management, HR department, middle 
manager, employee)
Internal vs. external training -  which considerations are made. 
Advantages and disadvantages of each type
Examples of large, training programmes by firms? [if yes, describe in 
detail]
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Development -  changes [describe in detail, motives and actions]
Who pays? (employee, employer)
Bonds? (If yes, for what types of training?)
H. Effects offurther education and training
Wage setting (collective negotiations -  individual, local -  central) 
Performance related pay?
Pay according to formal competence?
What are the most important recruitment criteria?
How is non-formal learning (experience) rewarded compared with 
formal competence?
Do further education and training have any effect on wages, 
promotion opportunities, opportunities in the external labour market?
I. Technological and organisational changes
Describe the most important technological, organisational and market 
changes in the last ten -  fifteen years
What have been the challenges? (technology, organisation, market) 
What are the current/future challenges? [focus on the past] 
Organisational changes? (functional flexibility, outsourcing, 
upgrading)
Effect of technological changes 
Effect of changes on skill requirements
What have been the most important factors affecting skill 
requirements in recent years?
/. Skill situation
Changes in employment/unemployment during the last 1 0 -1 5  years 
Skill surpluses/deficits? - perception 
Perception of ‘mismatch’ in the labour market
How have the employers tackled skill surpluses/deficits -  examples of 
actions
327
Competition in the labour market -  strong, weak, inducements 
[poaching?]
Wage developments -  indicate skill surplus/deficit?
K. Skill utilisation
How do you try  to get an impression of what employers need?
What sources do you use to get information on employers’ training 
needs?
Do you collect such information in a systematic, routine way, or on a 
more ad hoc basis?
How do you try to get an impression of what employers think about 
your training offers?
Which methods do you use to elicit their views?
Do you think that your further education and training meet the firms’ 
needs well or not particularly well? What is the basis for this 
impression?
How are skills from further education and training utilised? How is 
this measured?
L. Co-operation
Refer to what has been said about financing and organisation
Has there been any attempt to change the institution? [Describe in
detail]
Have any employers ever tried to break out? What happened? 
[Describe in detail]
Are there ways of influencing firms in order to make them obey? 
(positive, negative)
How has further education and training been an issue in negotiations? 
[Describe in detail]
There are examples of conflicts between employers and employees on 
further education and training. Do you remember if there have been 
examples of differing interests in your industry? [Describe in detail]
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M. Other information 
Anything to add?
How can what have said be documented? 
Other information? Own surveys/reports? 
Suggestions of whom to contact
A.2.3 Interview subjects
N ITO  representative 
NEF representative
National Council for Engineering Education representative
Personnel manager, ship yard
N ITO  representative, ship yard
Factory manager, car part manufacturer
N ITO  representative, car part manufacturer
Personnel manager, turbine producer (A)
N ITO  representative, turbine producer (A)
Leader of administrative section, telecom manufacturer 
N ITO  representative, telecom manufacturer 
Personnel manager, turbine producer (B)
N ITO  representative, turbine producer (B)
Managing director, traffic system supplier 
N ITO  representative, traffic system supplier 
Organisational development manager, offshore contractor 
N ITO representative, offshore contractor
NAI representative
Personnel manager, large insurance company (A)
FA representative 
FL representative
Organisational development manager, large insurance company (B) 
Personnel manager of small insurance company (A)
Personnel manager of small insurance company (B)
NAF representative 
Group of FL representatives
NSF representative
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KUF representative
Personnel manager of hospital outside Oslo 
Senior nursing officer at an Oslo hospital 
RHHS representative
Representative of the Norwegian Board of Health
Teachers Association representative 
NL representative
Section for Continued Training of Teachers representative 
Head of an Oslo primary and lower secondary school
Appendix 3. Estimation of cost sharing
The purpose of this appendix is to give additional information about how 
costs and cost sharing presented in chapter 6 were estimated.
In the nurses’ case, a detailed study of the costs of specialist 
training made in 1997 was the basis for the cost estimates (Kirke- 
utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 1998). The estimates from this 
report are broadly in line with previous estimates, allowing for inflation. 
In 1992 the National Council for Health and Social Work Education 
(RHHS) estimated the costs per student per year to NOK 254,000, about 
10 per cent less than the KUF estimate (Radet for hogskoleutdanning i 
helse- og sosialfag 1992: 7). The average costs of specialist training per 
nurses at the five regional hospitals were estimated at NOK 384,000 in 
1995,1 which is the same as the RHHS estimate, given that the training on 
average lasts 18 months (Holter et al. 1996).
Trainee wages are in most cases somewhat lower than nurses 
would have received in a normal nursing position. Of the nine hospitals 
presented in detail in the KUF report, three hospitals pay normal wages, 
two hospitals pay 75 per cent of normal wages, two hospitals pay nurses 
reduced wages for the first six months and then normal wages without 
service increment, while finally one hospital pay their students approx. 50 
per cent of normal wages (Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 
1998: appendix 2a). In the estimates it is assumed that nurses get 75 per 
cent of their normal wages during training. Thus, the normal wage costs 
for 18 months would be NOK 381,000 (286,000/0.75).
1 This is a weighted average based on participation data from NSF (Norsk 
sykepleierforbund 1996).
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The KUF estimates lack the value of trainee output. A 1992 survey 
showed than on average 62 per cent of the training is practice (Radet for 
hogskoleutdanning i helse- og sosialfag 1992: 6), and the 1998 report 
shows similar figures for the nine selected hospitals (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1998: appendix 2a). No studies have attempted 
to measure the value of trainee’s output, even if the informants suggested 
that towards the end of the training period the trainee nurses were 
Valuable help’.2 Assuming that a trainee on average gets 75 per cent of 
normal wages, and their output is 30 per cent of a trained nurses’ output, 
and 62 per cent of the training is practice, the value of their output during 
the training is NOK 71,000 (381,000 x 0.62 x 0.3).
Table A3.1 Cost sharing internal specialist training for nurses. 18-month
programme. NOK. 1997
Item Per item
Costs
Total %
Costs borne by Wage costs 286,000
employer
+Personnel costs 107,000
+ Other costs 29,000
-  Output -71,000 351,000 79
Costs borne by + Wage reduction 95,000 95,000 21
employee
Total net cost 446,000 446,000 100
The estimate is shown in table A3.1. The nurses’ investment is the
earnings foregone while they are doing the training. If one assumes that 
nurses on average earn 75 per cent of what they would receive, their 
investment is effectively one third of the wages they receive.3 Table A3.1 
shows that employers bear four fifths of the costs of specialist internal
2 Interviews with RHHS representative and Representative of the Norwegian Board of 
Health.
3 The tax rate is assumed to be constant.
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training, while nurses bear the remaining one fifth. The value of the 
output is however uncertain, and this should be accounted for in the 
estimate. If the output were 20 per cent instead of 30, the share of training 
costs borne by employers would be 84 per cent. If, on the other hand, the 
output were as high as 40 per cent, the employer share would be 73 per 
cent. Therefore, the estimate of employer financing in the case of internal 
specialist trianing is 75 -  85 per cent.
Table A3.2 Estimated cost sharing for college-based specialist training in ‘training 
on demand* system. 18 month programme. NOK________________________
Costs
Costs borne by Item Per item Total %
Employer +Payment to 
college 136,000
-  Output -71,000 65,000 15
State Colleges’ costs
-  Payment from 
hospital
136,000
-36,000
Loans and grants 30,000 30,000 7
Employee Alternative wages 381,000
-  Loans and grants -30,000 351,000 79
Total net cost 446,000 446,000 101
The proposed training on demand system will reduce the costs to
employers considerably, as shown in table A3.2. Assuming that hospitals 
must pay the colleges as much as their current non-wage costs (NOK 
107,000 + NOK 29,000), and continue to pay wages to the nurses in this 
new system, their average contribution per trainee will be reduced from 
N O K  351,000 to N O K  65,000. It is also assumed that the proportion of 
practice in the training does not change significantly.4 Moreover, it is
4 If we assume that the trainees’ productivity increases during the training period, a 
reduction of the training period will effectively reduce the net output of trainees’ work 
more than the product of the reduced time and the average net output.
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assumed that nurses receive support from the State Education and Loan 
fund of N OK 30,000.5 Assuming that the total costs are the same as in 
table A3.1, the share of total costs borne by the employers will be reduced 
from 79 per cent to 15 per cent. However, if the output were only 20 per 
cent of a trained nurse’s, the share would be 19 per cent. On the other 
hand, if output were 40 per cent, the share would be only 10 per cent. 
Thus, the estimate of employers’ share in the case of the ‘training on 
demand’ system is set at 10-20 per cent.
For normal college-based training, employers usually do not bear 
any of the costs, but since some hospitals provide scholarships for their 
nurses, the estimate is that employers bear 0-10 per cent of costs.
In the teachers’ case, cost sharing for different types of further 
training is clearer than in the three other groups. One reason is that up­
dating training is done within working hours, and up-grading training in 
teachers’ spare time. Moreover, in contrast to the engineers’ and the 
insurance employees’ cases, the schools do not finance the direct costs of 
extensive further training teachers undertake in their spare time. So in 
principle the schools bear 100 per cent of the costs of up-dating training, 
and none of the costs of up-grading training. But in some cases employers 
have chosen to give teachers on educational leave some financial support. 
This has usually been the so-called service increment, which denotes the 
difference between the teacher’s actual wage and the starting wage for a 
teacher at that formal competence level. In 1999, this ‘increment* was 
N OK 29,600, or 13 per cent of current annual salary for one who had 15 
years tenure as a general teacher (Norsk laererlag 1998). This financial 
support during up-grading training covers only a minority of teachers 
who take up-grading training (Kirke- utdannings- og
5 This support is partly scholarship, and partly subsidised loans. For the purpose here a 
detailed estimate of the value of the support is not made, since variation in this sum 
would not have altered the conclusion on cost sharing significantly.
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forskningsdepartementet 1992),6 but to allow for this and other possible 
contributions from employers, for example, because part of the training in 
some cases may be done within working hours, it is estimated that 
employers may, in total, pay up to 10 per cent of up-grading training 
costs.
Employees do not finance 100 per cent of the costs of up-grading 
training, since it is carried out at state financed colleges and universities, 
but since the focus in this thesis is on the sharing of costs between 
employers and employees, the state contribution towards up-grading 
training has not been studied in more detail.7 Moreover, in some cases 
employees spend some of their spare time, or have small expenses in 
relation to, up-dating training. It is therefore estimated that employers 
finance 90 to 100 of the costs of up-dating training.
Table A3.3 Estimated cost sharing for 1-credit NAI course. Costs from
employer’s and trainee’s perspective. NOK
Costs from employer’s 
perspective
Costs from trainee 
perspective
’s
Cost
borne by Item Per item Total % Per item Total %
Employer
Reading day and exam
day 3,000 1,500
Course fees 4,000 7,000 33 4,000 5,500 44
Employee
Reading 14,000 14,000 67 7,000 7,000 56
Total
Total net cost 21,000 21,000 100 12,500 12,500 100
6 Interviews with Section for Continued Training of Teachers representative, Head of an 
Oslo primary and lower secondary school and NL representative
7 State contributions towards further training for teachers has been estimated by the 
Ministry of Education and Research (Kirke- utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet 
1992).
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The example in table A3.3 is a 1 credit course at the NAI, costing NOK
5,000, which the employer pays. It is assumed that the total amount of 
required reading is 77.5 hours.8 It is also assumed that the employee does 
most of the reading in unpaid spare time, but is allowed one paid reading 
day, and also the exam day off. With a 7.5 hours working day, this means 
that 70 hours of reading are unpaid, while the employer pays the 
employee for the remaining 15 hours. The employer also pays the course 
fees of N O K  4,000. Moreover, it is assumed that the hourly wage is NOK 
167.9 Assuming that social costs are 20 per cent, the cost of one working 
hour to the employer is NOK 200. Employees, on the other hand, have to 
pay taxes, and assuming a marginal tax rate of 40 per cent, the 
opportunity cost of training is N O K  100 per hour.
The distinction between ‘employer’s perspective’ and ‘employee’s 
perspective’ reflects this distinction between the costs to employers and 
the income of employee from a working hour. The rationale for 
introducing this distinction, is that it may contribute to explain why both 
employers and employees find it sensible that employers pay course fees if 
employees use their spare time for training. Table A3.3 shows that the 
employer contribution is larger from the employee’s perspective than 
from the employer’s. The reason is that because of social costs the costs of 
labour to the employer is higher than the wage rate, while taxes make the 
employee’s income lower than the wage rate.10 This means that in this 
example the course fees for the employer is only 19 per cent of the total
8 According to the NAI, a 1 credit course requires at least 5 hours per week during the 
term, which is assumed to last for 15 weeks (Forsikringsakademiet 1996b: 7).
9 The estimate is derived from the Statistics Norway report that says average monthly 
salary in the insurance industry in 1997 was NO K  25,005 (Statistisk sentralbyra 1998d), 
assuming 150 working hours per month.
10 In this example only 20 per cent social costs are added to the wage rate, which 
probably is a low estimate. For example, the process of finding stand-ins or adapting 
production may incur significant costs. The larger this mark-up is, the larger the 
difference between costs, from an employers’ perspective compared to an employees.’
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costs, while they constitute 32 per cent of the total costs from the 
employee’s perspective.
Table A3.3 tends to underestimate the time employees use since 
voluntary weekend seminars organised as part of the training are not 
included. If this time is included, assumed to be two days of 7,5 hours 
each, the share of employer financing is reduced from 33 to 29 per cent. 
The estimate of employer financing, given these uncertainties, is set to 25 
-3 5  per cent.
Table A3.4 Cost sharing for BI course. NOK
Costs
Costs borne by Item Per item Total %
Employer Reading day + exam 
day (15 hours)
3,000
Course fees 11,400 14,400 40
Employee Reading (109 hours) 21,800 21,800 60
Total net cost 36,200 36,200 100
The direct costs of training are higher at private colleges, for example BI, 
than at NAI, and the employers therefore bear a larger share of the total 
costs. The price of the course ‘Insurance’ at BI’s Centre for Finance 
Education cost NOK 11,400 in 1999. The training is organised similarly 
to training at NAI, with two voluntary seminars. In table A3.4 it is 
assumed that the required reading is 1.5 times as much as for the NAI 
course. Table A3.4 shows that in this example, the share financed by the 
employer is increased to 40 per cent compared with 33 per cent in the 
NAI example. Moreover, the insurance companies do not always cover all 
direct costs for BI training. For example, one large employer finances 
course fees by 100 per cent if the training is ‘necessary’ in the job, 75 per 
cent if it is ‘of much use’, and 50 per cent if it is ‘of little use.’11 Given that
11 Interview with Personnel manager, large insurance company (A).
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employees may share some of the direct costs, and also participate in the 
seminars, the estimate for BI training is that employers finance between 30 
and 40 per cent of total costs.
In most cases employers fully finance engineers’ further training. A 
N ITO  course is used here as an example of such short training. In 1997, a 
typical three-day course cost NOK 5,000 for NITO members, excluding 
travel and hotel expenses. The average cost of a working day is assumed to 
be N O K  1,500 per day.12 If one adds travel expenses of N OK 500, and 
excludes possible hotel costs, the total cost of the three day course is NOK
10,000. Training costs may be lower in some cases because there are no 
course fees. For example, suppliers are important providers of further 
training for engineers, and supplier training is usually given free of charge 
(Johansen 1998; Larsen et al. 1997; MMI 1997). The costs are however 
likely to be higher than the NITO estimate in many cases, either because 
travel and hotel expenses are added, or because course fees are higher, or 
simply because training is longer. For example, a 2 weeks course at 
N TN U , where the course fees are typically NOK 12,000, would cost 
N OK 27,000 with the same assumptions as in the NITO example. All 
these costs are borne by employers.
For some types of training, typically for business administration or 
management training, engineers share a part of the costs through using 
their own spare time. Since this training is similar to the BI example in the 
insurance case, the estimate of employer financing is 30 to 40 per cent in 
the engineers’ case too.
12 The estimate is based on the average for engineers in the private sector, which was 
approx. 305,000 in 1996 (Norges ingeniororganisasjon 1997a: 6), 240 working days per 
year, and social costs of 20 per cent of wages.
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Appendix 4. Estimation of training outcomes
This appendix shows how the amount of training for each of the four 
groups is estimated. It also presents a table of skill shortages in intensive 
care units.
A4.1 Amount of training
A significant proportion of nurses take extensive formal further training 
at some stage during their careers. Table A4.1 shows that 49 per cent of 
nurses have completed formal further training equivalent to at least six 
months full time training, and a further 13 per cent are currently 
undertaking such training or are planning to do so.1 By comparison, 14 
per cent of Norwegian employees have done at least six months of further 
training during the last five years before they were interviewed (Opinion 
1998).
1 These figures cover nurses with all employers, not only general hospitals, since the 
breakdown on groups by years since completed basic training was not available for 
general hospitals only. But since the share of nurses general hospitals who had taken 
further training equals the average for all nurses, the pattern in table A4.1 is assumed to 
reflect the pattern at general hospitals. Overall, 48 per cent of nurses at general hospitals 
have completed further training, and 14 per cent are undertaking or planning such 
training (Havn 1996: 48).
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Table A4.1 Percentage of nurses with further training equivalent to at least 6 
months full time training, by years since completed basic training.________
Years since basic training
1 -  5 6 -  10 11-20 21+ Total
Completed further training 11 37 63 62 49
Is currently undertaking or is 
planning further training
31 22 9 4 13
No further training 57 41 28 34 37
Sum 99 98 100 100 99
N 322 305 559 615 1801
Source: Havn (1996: figures 5.2 and 5.3).
On average, the nurses who have taken further training have done 19 
months of such training. This means that the average for all nurses is 
more than 9 months of formal further training.2
A 1996 survey shows that of those who had taken further training, 
76 had taken professional specialisation, 36 per cent had taken 
administrative training, 9 per cent pedagogical further training, while 12 
per cent had taken further training in other subjects (Havn 1996: 52).3
Like the nurses, teachers undertake a considerable amount of 
extensive, formal further training. But previous estimates have differed 
significantly in how much time teachers spend on up-grading training. A 
study by the Ministry of Education and Research estimates that in 1992 
teachers on average spent 40 hours on up-dating training and 149 hours on 
up-grading training per year (Kirke- utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 1992).4
2 This number only includes a formal further training equivalent of six months full time 
training or more. Thus, the number underestimates the total amount of further training 
nurses have received.
3 The sum is over 100 per cent because some nurses had taken more than one type of 
further training.
4 The estimates in the Ministry’s report are 5.0 and 13.6 days, respectively.
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By comparison, Jordfald and Nergaard (1999: 16) find that teachers 
on average spend 36 hours on up-dating training and 33 hours on up­
grading training.5 So while the estimates of up-dating training are similar, 
the latter estimate of up-grading training is less than a quarter of the 
former.6
Instead of basing the analysis on any of the previous, contradictory 
results, a time series can show the amount of up-grading training teachers
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have undergone.
Figure A4.1 Share of teachers of grade 2, 3 or 4 in 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 by 
age cohorts in 1977. Source: Statistisk sentralbyra (1978: Table 42; 1983: Table 44; 
1988: Table 41; 1993: Table 23)
Figure A4.1 shows the increase in the share grade 2, 3 and 4 
teachers over the period from 1977 to 1992. The remaining teachers are all 
grade 1 teachers. Hence, the figure illustrates the up-grading training 
undertaken by five cohorts over the 15-year period. The figure shows that
5 One reason for the vast difference is that many teachers do not know how many hours 
they have spent on up-grading training. Less than half of those who had taken up-grading 
training reported how many hours they had spend on such training Qordfald and 
Nergaard 1999: 9). The Ministry of Education and Research estimate was not based on a 
survey, but on participation data from colleges and universities.
6 Another survey showed that employers financed three days of further training for 
teachers during the last 12 month before the interview (Nergaard 1994: 28).
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in 1992 more than 70 per cent of the teachers were grade 2, 3 or 4. 15 
years earlier none of the cohorts had a share larger than 55 per cent.
Table A4.2 Number of teachers, by age in 1977
Age group in 1977 1977 1982 1987 1992
25-29 6228 5933 6116 6442
30-34 7268 5781 5943 6748
35-39 4175 3204 3113 3846
40-44 2118 1820 1665 2115
Source: Statistisk sentralbyra (1978: Table 42; 1983: Table 44; 1988: Table 41; 
1993: Table 23).
The data are from the Statistics Norway’s figures on primary and lower 
secondary schools. There are two problems associated with using these 
data in a time series. One is that these are not panel data, so one cannot 
control for the effect of members leaving or joining the cohort groups 
during the period. For example, table A4.2 shows that the size of all 
groups is reduced from 1977 to 1982.
This may be related to the second problem, namely that the 
methods of data collection and reporting may have changed over time, 
with effects that cannot easily be distinguished from actual changes in the 
educational level of teachers. These problems mean that interpretation of 
these tables should be based on broad comparisons over more than one 
time period.
Table A4.3 Net change in teachers’ educational background from 1977 to 1992, 
by age cohorts in 1977. Per cent______________________________________
Net change % grade Net change % 2/3 Net change % 4
1 teachers 1977-1992 teachers 1977 -  1992 teachers 1977 -  1992
25-29 -30.5 26.0 4.5
30-34 -19.6 14.5 5.1
35-39 -19.4 7.7 11.8
40-44 21.9 3.9 17.9
Source: Statistisk sentralbyra (1978: Table 42; 1983: Table 44; 1988: Table 41; 
1993: Table 23).
343
The pattern shown in figure A4.1 and the differences between the age 
groups are shown more precisely in table A4.3. This table shows that in 
the 25-29 years of age cohort of 1977, a 30.5 per cent smaller share was 
made up of grade 1 teachers in 1992. The net increase of share of grade 2 
and 3 teachers was 26.0 per cent, while the equivalent for grade 4 teachers 
was 4.5 per cent. For the three other groups, the decrease in the share of 
grade 1 teachers was lower, about 20 per cent. But in the older groups the 
share of grade 4 teachers had grown more than in the younger groups. 
This means that while the up-grading training for the younger groups was 
primarily from grade 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3, a larger part of up-grading 
training for the older groups was from grade 2 or 3 /
Since the information about up-grading from grade 2 to grade 3 is 
unavailable, the figures here underestimate the amount of up-grading 
teachers have undergone by a considerable amount. But even if we exclude 
this type of up-grading training, which is likely to be no smaller than up­
grading from grade 1 to grade 2, the share of teachers who have done up­
grading training of at least one year in this period is considerable. In the 
youngest cohort, the share is 35 per cent, for those between 30 and 34 in 
1977 it is 25 per cent, for those between 35 and 39 in 1977 it is 30 per cent, 
while the share for the oldest group is 38 per cent. Table A4.1 showed 
that six out of ten nurses who completed training at least 10 years ago had 
undertaken formal further training. This share is higher than the share of 
teachers above. But since further training for nurses needed to be only a 
minimum of six months, while the amount required for teachers was one 
year, and the important type of up-grading training from grade 2 to 3 
could not be estimated, the amount of formal training teachers get is 
unlikely to be much, if at all, lower than for nurses.
7 There are no available data on the amount of upgrading from grade 2 to grade 3. Thus, 
one cannot know how extensive this type of up-grading training is compared to 
upgrading from grade 1 or to grade 4.
344
The insurance industry data show that employees get a 
considerable amount of formal further training, but the amount is smaller 
than for nurses and teachers.
Table A4.4 Estimated percentage of employees participating in NAI training, by 
company. 1996___________________________________________________
Insurance 
companies, 
ranked by 
size
NAI participants 
as ratio of total 
no. of employees 
in 1996
Estimated no. 
of participants Employees
Storebrand 16% 680 4,306
Gjensidige 19% 624 3,273
Vesta 20% 283 1,432
Samvirke 28% 255 924
Vital 24% 170 703
Norske Liv 51% 113 222
Andre 35% 709 2,016
Total 22% 2,834 12,876
Source: Forsikringsakademiet (1997).
In this estimate it is assumed that all NAI participants are employees in 
companies that are NAI members.
NAI training plays an important part in further training of 
insurance employees. A 1989 survey shows that 71 per cent of insurance 
employees had done some NAI training (MMI 1989). The most important 
source of training in addition to NAI is internal training. Companies to 
some extent use internal training as an alternative to NAI training. In line 
with the resource explanation of collective action, presented in chapter 3, 
larger companies are most likely to organise internal training, and a 
smaller share of employees in large companies therefore do NAI training, 
as shown in table A4.4.8 There is no representative survey of the amount
8 The pattern in Table A4.4 could also reflect that employees in the larger companies 
overall get less training than employees in the small companies, but there is no support 
for this interpretation in the interviews with informants in the industry.
345
of internal training employees receive, but detailed information from one 
of the largest companies showed that employees on average did 23 hours 
of internal training per year (Johansen 1999: 56). In addition, assuming 
that on average the NAI participants take a 1 credit course, and as 
assumed in Appendix 3 this takes 85 hours, insurance employees on 
average receive 19 hours of NAI training per year (22% x 85). Since 
employees in large companies get a fair amount of internal training, 
relatively speaking, and less than average NAI training, this suggests that a 
rough estimate for all insurance employees is that they get one week of 
further training either internally or at NAI per year. In addition, some 
take training at private or public colleges, but the number of participants 
there is likely to be much lower.9
While the estimate is uncertain, it still clearly suggests that the 
amount of further training is lower in the insurance case than in the 
nurses’ case. Given that nurses on average have undergone 9 months of 
long, formal further training, and their average time since completed basic 
training is 16.5 years (Havn 1996: 8), they have spent on average almost 
two and a half weeks per year on this type of training. All short training 
nurses receive is excluded. Thus, there is clear support for the conclusion 
that insurance employees receive less further training than nurses do.
The difference from teachers and nurses is not only that the 
amount of training is somewhat lower, but also, and more clearly, that 
fewer take extensive further training. Insurance employees can combine 
NAI training into larger units, as the Insurance Exam or the Higher 
Insurance Exam, but few do so compared to the amount of extensive 
further training teachers and nurses take. In the period from 1980 to 1992, 
a total of 576 people had commenced the fourth term of the Higher 
Insurance Exam (Gunhildsbu 1994: 6).10 This was slightly less than 5 per 
cent of the total number of employees in the insurance companies in 1992.
9 N o data on such participation exist.
10 N ot all of these completed the program.
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Even if one must add those who have take extensive further training at 
other colleges, there is nothing to suggest that adding these will make the 
share of employees who have taken extensive further training similar to 
teachers and nurses.
Table A4.5 Percentage of engineers with further training equivalent of at least 6 
months full time training, by years since completed basic training.____________
Years since completed basic training
0 - 5 6 - 1 0 11-20 21 + Total
6 months or more of 
further training
24.3 27.6 35.5 32.0 31.2
N o training, or up to 
6 months
75.7 72.4 64.5 68.0 68.8
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 280 297 583 647 1,807
Source: Norges ingeniororganisasjon (1997b).
Table A4.5 shows that 31 per cent of engineers have taken 6 months or 
more of further training since they completed initial training. This can be 
compared to Table A4.1, where 49 per cent of nurses said they had 
completed further training equivalent to six months. However, the 
difference between the two groups is larger than these figures suggest. The 
reason is that the data on nurses include only those who have taken one 
type of further training that lasted more than six months, while the data 
on engineers include those who have taken several types of further 
training which in sum has lasted more than six months. 11 Thus, even if a
11 But the data do, to some extent, also underestimate the amount of training engineers 
undertake, because if engineers take further training to be graduate engineers they will 
leave NITO , and thus disappear from the survey sample (in 1997, 2 of 2002 respondents 
in N lT O ’s member survey were graduate engineers (Norges ingeniororganisasjon 
1997b)). Still, since the vast majority of engineers who take graduate engineer training do 
it soon after completing training, this has been defined as basic training, as explained in 
chapter 4.
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substantial share of engineers have done a lot of further training, the 
amount is significantly lower than for nurses, and consequently lower 
than for teachers too. There are not sufficient data to make an accurate 
comparison of the amount of training in the engineers’ and insurance 
cases.
Table A4.5 shows that among engineers the group that finished 
basic training 1 1 - 2 0  years ago is the one where the largest share has 
taken further training of six months or more. Those who most recently 
completed basic training are least likely to have taken further training. 
Since the most experienced group has taken further training less often 
than the second most experienced one, the table suggests not only that 
engineers are more likely to have taken further training, the longer it has 
been since they completed basic training, but there are also differences 
between cohorts. However, the table cannot show how strong this 
difference between ‘generations’ of engineers is, or if the younger cohorts 
will take more further training than the more experienced cohorts have. 
A comparison of table A4.5 with the equivalent table for nurses, table 
A4.1, shows that the differences between the four cohorts are much 
smaller for engineers than for nurses. Without a time series available, it is 
impossible to analyse the reasons for this difference between the two 
groups.
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A4.2 Shortages of specialist nurses
Table A4.6 Vacancies, number of positions, percentage of specialist nurses in 
filled positions, number of specialist nurses and total number of filled positions 
in Norwegian hospitals* intensive care units. 1999._________________________
Positions 
vacant 
more 
than 4 
months
Total 
no. of 
positions 
(both 
filled and 
vacant)
% of 
positions 
vacant 
more 
than 4 
months
% of 
specialist 
nurses in 
filled 
positions
No. of 
specialist 
nurses
Filled
positions
Akershus 6 101.6 64 49.3 18.0 35.5
Hammerfest 11.6 24.5 47.5 67.0 8.6 21.6
Bserum 6.7 17.0 39.1 47.1 4.9 15.9
Telemark 24.5 76.3 32.1 56.6 29.3 57.6
Aker 16 62.0 25.8 42.0 19.3 52.1
Fredrikstad 16 65.0 24.6 63.3 31.0 54.6
Ringerike 7 29.8 23.5 85.7 19.5 27.7
Tromso 13.5 60.0 22.5 89.4 41.6 51.9
Lillehammer 6 37.7 15.9 80.0 25.4 35.5
Vestfold 6 44.8 13.4 84.5 32.8 42.1
Rogaland 10 76.9 13 77.4 51.8 69.2
Buskerud 4.7 40.2 11.7 45.5 16.1 38.3
Vest-Agder 7 69.3 10.1 58.8 36.6 64.5
Ulleval 6 60.0 10 55.6 30.0 56.4
Kongsvinger 2 20.8 9.6 37.8 7.1 20.4
Sogn og Fjordane 2.5 29.4 8.5 77.9 21.0 28.7
Haukeland 3.75 50.7 7.4 87.3 41.0 48.8
Namdal 1 20.4 4.9 51.7 10.0 20.2
Haugesund 1.25 29.1 4.3 94.6 26.3 28.7
Hedmark 1.75 53.0 3.3 81.2 41.6 52.1
Molde 0.8 25.0 3.2 62.9 15.2 24.8
Harstad 0.5 22.7 2.2 84.3 18.7 22.6
Kristiansund 0.4 25.0 1.6 96.1 23.6 24.9
Trondheim 0 44.5 0 62.5 27.8 44.5
Aust-Agder 0 44.5 0 96.8 43.1 44.5
More og Romsdal 0 44.5 0 74.1 33.0 44.5
Nordland 0 44.5 0 65.1 29.0 44.5
Gjovik 0 44.5 0 97.8 43.5 44.5
National Cancer 1.5 26.8 5.6 - - -
Hospital
Average 16.7 66.8
Sum 215.4 1,290.5 745.8 1,116.6
Note: -  denotes missing. Number of positions at hospitals with no vacant 
positions estimated as average of number at other hospitals. National Hospital 
missing. Source: Statens helsetilsyn (1999: 12).
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